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ABSTRACT 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE POLITICAL PARTY GROUP ON THE 
REPRESENTATIVE ACTIVITIES OF COUNCILLORS 
This thesis studies the influence of the political party group on the 
processes of local political representation. It sets out to discover how party 
groups are able to position themselves between councillor and the 
electorate, to demand the loyalty of councillors, and to ensure that they act 
publicly in a cohesive fashion in respect of local issues. 
The study distinguishes between different theatres of representation, the 
more or less open arenas within which councillors speak and act. This 
distinction is used to investigate the actual and likely behaviour of 
councillors in a range of situations from the closed and private to the open 
and public. The study also introduces the concept of crises of 
representation, which arise when a councillor experiences the competing 
pulls of party group loyalty and local feelings on contentious issues 
affecting his or her ward or division. To explore this tension, the study 
introduces the concept of event-driven democracy to describe those 
situations which motivate the community to protest council decisions and 
compete with the party group for councillors' loyalty. 
2 
Evidence from a survey of 629 councillors in 20 authorities in the 
Midlands and surrounding area was gathered in order to compare and 
contrast reports of past and hypothetical actions in open and closed 
theatres of representation. Interviews were used to supplement and 
illuminate these data. Three case studies examine the actual responses of 
councillors faced with crises of representation. Comparison is made with 
national data. Differences between the political parties are explored and 
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PART I 
DILEMMAS OF REPRESENTATION 
13 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
Within the liberal democratic model of representation, there exists an 
important tension: that between the local councillor as an elected 
representative, the electorate he or she represents, and the political party 
of which he or she is a member. The aim of this thesis is to explore that 
tension. 
The predominant understanding of the relationship between councillors 
and their constituents fails to take account of the impact of party on the 
processes of local representative democracy. That the presence of parties 
has introduced new elements to local authority decision-making has long 
been recognised. The role of the party group - the cohesive organisation of 
councillors from a single party - has in comparison been neglected. Yet, it 
will be shown, the party group plays an important part in the representative 
process itself, interposing itself between the electors and their 
representatives with its own distinctive claims to commitment. 
The first section of this chapter explores the tensions within liberal 
democracy as they relate to mass participation. The second section turns to 
the conflicts that result when the processes of representative democracy 
meet with the pressures of an increasingly assertive and demanding 
electorate. It introduces the notion of 'event-driven democracy', 
recognising that local issues and events may energise the community, or 
sections of it, to seek an enhanced input to local political decision-making 
only episodically. The third section shows how political parties have come 
to play an increasing role in local politics, and argues for a new focus on 
the part played by the party group in the processes of local democracy. 
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The final part of the chapter previews the ways in which the argument is 
deployed and the evidence assessed in the chapters which follow. 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE. 
It is commonplace to argue that the classical doctrine of democracy, in 
which the people are participants and decision-makers, is no longer 
relevant. Modem society's scale and complexity requires mechanisms of 
indirect, or representative democracy, to ensure the quality of political 
decisions and decision-makers. ' While loss of direct involvement may be 
a product of the necessities of decision-making rather than a desire to 
reduce citizen participation, the result is the same: representation involves 
a transfer of engagement from the citizen to the elected representative, 
facilitated through the mechanism of the political party. 
The elements of liberal democracy 
The theory of liberal democracy is based on two propositions: 'the 
electoral presumption' and 'competitive elitism'. 2 The electoral 
presumption is that a system of electorally-based representative democracy 
is the most 'practical' mechanism for choosing 'governors' from competing 
1 See, J. Madison, The Federalist Papers or the New Constitution, in M. 
Beloff (editor), New York, Doubleday, 1966, J. S. Mill Considerations on 
Representative Government, in H. B. Acton (editor), Utilitarianism, 
Liberty, and Representative Government, Dent and Sons, 1951. J. A. 
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London, Unwin, 
1974 and G. Sartori, Democratic Theory, Detroit, Wayne State University 
Press, 1962. 
2 D. Held, chapter 5, `Competitive Elitism and Technocratic Vision', 
Models of Democracy, Oxford, Polity Press, 1993, pp. 143-185. 
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elites and reflecting the general priorities of the electorate. Here the 
people are and can be no more than producers of governments, being 
required only to decide on 'the men who are to do the deciding'. Indeed, 
democracy can be defined by the existence of institutional arrangements 
for 'arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to 
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote'. 3 
Inextricably linked to the electoral presumption is 'competitive elitism', the 
elevation of political elites to positions of power through the sporadic input 
of the electorate. Indeed, in liberal democracy the political role of the 
citizen is restricted to infrequent electoral activity and the selection of 
leaders via the mechanism of political parties. Anything more than the use 
of elections to produce governments is ruled out, for as has been argued, 
the electorate lack the intellectual sophistication for wider political 
involvement. 4 
Moreover, the threat of the tyranny of the majority is stressed by many 
theorists of liberal democracy, who seek to balance it with political control 
and property ownership. Much democratic theorising has been based on 
reconciling support for a system of popular democracy with protecting 'the 
haves (a minority), from the have-nots (a majority)' and avoidance of a 
majority turning the 'instruments of state policy against a minority's 
privilege'. 5 Such fear underpinned the foundation of American 
3 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 269. 
4 Ibid, p. 262. and Sartori, Democratic Theory, pp. 75-78. Also see, 
chapter 6, `Democracy, Leadership and Elites', pp. 96-134. 
5 Held, Models of Democracy, p. 66. 
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democracy. 6 The answer was to turn from democracy to Republicanism, 
or representation, for as Madison noted: 'in a democracy, the people meet 
and exercise the government in person: in a republic, they assemble and 
administer it by their representatives and agents'. 7 Indeed, the important 
question for America's founding fathers was how strong the 'democratic 
element" should be. 8 Furthermore, republicanism was linked with ideas of 
`simplicity, civic virtue, and even small proprietorship as the typical estate 
of a true citizen' and thus protected the propertied minority from the 
'majoritarian overtones of democracy'. 9 Indeed, the `omnipotence of the 
majority' could drive minorities to protect their freedom by an `appeal to 
physical force'. 10 Such an appeal however, would not be necessary in the 
United States, where there was a `love of property' and where the majority 
displayed a rejection of `doctrines which in any way threaten the way 
property is owned'. II 
While protection of the minority from popular exploitation is not a central 
feature of British local politics, earlier periods were characterised by just 
such a debate. First, the local government franchise as it developed 
throughout the nineteenth century ensured that those exercising the vote, 
and the candidates from which they could select, fulfilled some property 
6The Federalist or The New Constitution, in M. Beloff (editor), pp. xvi- 
xvii. 
7 Ibid, J. Madison, Paper No 14, p. 62. 
8 B. Crick, In Defence of Politics, Politics, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1982, 
p. 58. 
9 Ibid, p. 68. 
10 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, in J. P. Mayer (editor), 
London, Fontana, 1994, p. 260. 
11 Ibid, pp. 638-639. 
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qualification. 12 The franchise and the office of councillor was restricted to 
certain sections of the community and even radical candidates 'tended to 
be small masters, shopkeepers or publicans'. 13 Young refers to mid- 
nineteenth century attempts to reform county government as not a search 
for 'representative democracy' but the development of a 'form of ratepayer 
democracy'. 14 
Secondly, the development of municipal government as an integral part of 
the growth of the British state led to some 'bitter hostility' 'voiced by 
interests threatened by municipal proposals - particularly gas and water 
companies'. 15 The Victorian assumption that national politics were 
irrelevant to local government was undermined by municipalisation, and 
12 For a comprehensive discussion of the property qualification for the 
franchise and council candidacy, see, B. Keith-Lucas, The English Local 
Government Franchise, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1952. 
13 E. P. Hennock, Fit and Proper Persons: Ideal and Reality in 
Nineteenth Century Urban Government, London, Edward Arnold, 1973, 
p. 10. 
14 K. Young, `Bright Hopes and Dark Fears: The Origins and 
Expectations of the County Councils', New Directions For County 
Government, in K. Young (editor), London, Association of County 
Councils, 1989, p. 6. Gyford notes that 'the bodies which emerged from 
the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act were seen first and foremost as 
owners of corporate property'. Indeed, `councillors as members of the 
corporation were trustees in a fiduciary relationship to the ratepayers 
within a system based upon the rights of property'. J. Gyford, `Diversity, 
Sectionalism and Local Democracy' in The Conduct of Local Authority 
Business, Research Vol. IV, Aspects of Local Democracy, HMSO, 1986, 
p. 128. 
15 J. Davis, The Progressive Council, 1889-1907', in A. Saint (editor), 
Politics and the People of London: The London County Council 1889- 
1965, London, Hambledon Press, 1989, pp. 27-48, p. 28. Young makes a 
similar point by identifying a tirade by the tramways interest against 'local 
authorities exercising any further powers', `Bright Hopes and Dark Fears' 
p. 17. 
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the pursuit of local redistributionary policies. 16 Indeed, as the franchise 
was extended, property ownership would require protection from 
infringement by either national or local government. 17 Liberal democracy, 
then, has traditionally portrayed liberalism, with its entrenchment of 
minority rights, both political and property, as a counterpoint to 
democracy. Similarly, it balances the dangers of participation with an 
acceptance of electoral apathy. 
Apathy and participation 
An institutional or procedural definition of democracy does not necessarily 
imply mass participation. Indeed participation may be deprecated on 
account of the low level of intellect deployed by the typical citizen when 
considering political issues. 18 The representational model created by the 
critics of participation is that democracy cannot be left with the 'citizenry' 
alone. Representation is thus a filter, allowing sporadic input to the 
democratic process, whilst separating actual decision-making from 
wholesale public involvement. It protects and facilitates the general 
democratic ideal at a cost of a participatory role for the people and can be 
seen as both inclusive (in intent) and exclusive (in practice). Morris-Jones 
furnished exclusion with its own justification and rejected a general 'duty' 
16 For a discussion of these points see, Davis, 'The Progressive Council, 
1889-1907', particularly, pp. 32-35. For a further discussion of this point, 
set between the wars, see J. Gillespie, `Municipalism, Monopoly and 
Management: The Demise of Socialism in one County, 1918-1933' pp. 
103-125, Politics and the People of London. 
17 N. Soldon, 'Laissez-faire as Dogma: The Liberty and Property Defence 
League 1882-1914', in K. Brown (editor), Essays in Anti-Labour History: 
Responses to the Rise of Labour in Britain, London, Macmillan, 1974, pp. 
208-233. 
18 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 262. 
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to participate in political activity and, specifically, to vote. He argued that 
while low electoral turnout can weaken support for local democracy, 
democracy remains healthy if those with little interest in or knowledge of 
political issues 'choose' not to participate. 19 
Parties and participation 
Morris-Jones's view is not, however, widely held in discussions of the 
quality of local democracy, where electoral turnout is awarded central 
importance. If representative democracy is perceived as a set of 
institutional relationships and procedures to facilitate the sporadic input of 
the electorate, then electoral turnout must be an important indicator of the 
health of any democracy. The defenders of representative democracy thus 
present the vote as the 'trump card'. 20 Indeed, elections can be 'virtually 
absolute trumps: the only legitimate method for ascertaining the will of... 
the people'. 21 Local electoral turnout in Britain averages around 40 per 
cent (less for by-elections) and, as Rallings and his colleagues point out, 
Britain 'lags some distance behind' the rest of Europe in local electoral 
turnout. 22 The argument about local electoral democracy would appear 
weak, were it not for the link between political parties and popular 
involvement in local elections. 
19 W. H. Morris-Jones, `In Defence of Apathy: Some Doubts on the Duty 
to Vote', Political Studies, 2 (1) 1954, pp. 25-37. 
20 A. Phillips, `Local Democracy: The Terms of the Debate'. Commission 
for Local Democracy Research Report No 2,1994, pp. 10-11. 
21 P. Green, `A Review Essay of Robert Dahl, Democracy and its 
Critics', Social Theory and Practice, 16 (2), 1990, pp. 217-243, p. 238. 
22 C. Railings, M. Temple, and M. Thrasher, `Community Identity and 
Participation in Local Democracy', Commission for Local Democracy, 
Research Report No 1,1994, Table 6, p. 17. 
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Election campaigning and competition between local political parties is a 
stimulus to public interest in political issues. It also facilitates a choice 
between alternative policies and encourages the electorate to vote. 23 
Indeed, political parties ease the elector's choice through label 
identification. 24 Without it, individual profile and local knowledge would 
be at a premium, for to vote other than for party an 'elector must know 
something of the personal characteristics of the candidates'. 25 Indeed, the 
'relatively disinterested [sic] elector' may rely on party to make local 
elections `more readily comprehensible'. 26 
On the other hand the presence of parties may lead to electoral apathy and 
to something deeper; cynicism about local democracy. The Maud 
committee in 1967, and the Widdicombe committee in 1986, highlighted 
the existence of negative attitudes towards local democracy. A significant 
percentage of Maud's respondents registered alienation from the council 
responsible for 'governing their locality'. 27 Criticisms of the democratic 
procedure and selection of representatives, were also voiced. 28 When 
23 For a discussion of the benefits of local political party competition see 
Railings, Temple and Thrasher, `Community Identity and Participation in 
Local Democracy', pp. 18-20. 
24 N. Rao, 'Representation in Local Politics: A Reconsideration and Some 
New Evidence', to appear in Political Studies, 1997. 
25 J. Stanyer, `Social and Rational Models of Man: Alternative 
Approaches to the Study of Local Elections', Advancement of Science, 26, 
1970, pp. 399-407. 
26 W. P. Grant, `Non-partisanship in British Local Politics', Policy and 
Politics, 1 (3), 1973, pp. 241-254. p. 245. 
27 Committee on the Management of Local Government, Research Vol. 
III, The Local Government Elector, An Enquiry Carried out for the 
Committee by the Government Social Survey, by M. Horton HMSO, 
1967, p. 70. 
28 Maud Report, Research Vol. III, Tables 98-100, pp. 69-72. 
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questioned as to their ability to influence their local council, 54 per cent 
responded negatively, being either ineffective or uninterested in local 
affairs. 29 Almost three in 10 of Widdicombe's respondents failed to 
complain about their council as a result of 'a sense of personal incapacity 
or pessimism'. 30 A negative shift in confidence in local democracy since 
Maud was noted, alongside a 'cheerful dismissal of hustings promises'. 31 
Young and Rao underlined this trend with 1994 data, when only 38 per 
cent responded positively to the statement 'people like me can have a real 
influence on politics if they are prepared to get involved'. 32 Support for 
local democracy was linked to the influence of elections in local affairs 
and real choice between 'alternative candidates or parties'. 33 It seems that 
political parties have had none of the beneficial impact cited by Rallings 
and his colleagues, and may in fact work to depress local involvement. 
Indeed, by acting as disciplined bodies, parties may narrow the choice 
available to the local electorate to one of accepting or rejecting a small 
number of competing policy packages. 34 
The arguments about the beneficial (or otherwise) impact of political 
parties on local elections are quite distinct from those concerning their 
impact on the conduct of council business and the ongoing representative 
29 Maud Report, Research Vol. III, Table 105, p. 75. 
30 The Conduct of Local Authority Business, Research Vol. III, The Local 
Government Elector, HMSO, 1986, p. 52. 
31 Widdicombe committee, Vol. III, tables 6.13-6.17, pp. 94-98 
32 K. Young and N. Rao, 'Faith in Local Democracy', British Social 
Attitudes: The Twelfth Report, in J. Curtice, R. Jowell, L. Brook and A. 
Park, (editors), Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1995, pp. 91-117. pp. 111-112. 
33 Young and Rao, 'Faith in Local Democracy', p. 100. 
34 J. Burnheim, Is Democracy Possible? The Alternative to Electoral 
Politics, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989, p. 102. 
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process. These latter direct attention to the actual working relationship 
between the councillor and the party group, the importance the party group 
has for the councillor in his or her representative activities, and the 
interrelationship between the councillor, the group and the electorate. 
These are matters examined in the later chapters of the thesis. 
Accountability in liberal democracy. 
A balanced view would be that representative democracy facilitates, via 
party, a choice of councillor, but excludes the community from any other 
choices. The interaction between councillor, party group and community, 
which occurs around specific issues and events, exemplifies the tensions 
inherent in local representative democracy. Such tensions raise an 
important question: can the electoral process stimulate sufficient citizen 
involvement to ensure councillors are held to account for what they do? 
It is in the answer to this question that a judgement will be reached on 
whether criticisms of liberal democracy add up to a case against it, or an 
argument for enhanced democracy within broadly liberal democratic terms. 
The judgement must depend on the particular context, for the severity of 
the shortcomings of liberal democracy become more or less important on 
different spatial scales. For example, within local democracy the councillor 
confronts the tensions generated by a system which focuses political 
power in the party group, and more liberal democracy would not in itself 
lead to a shift of power to local communities. Nevertheless, such a shift 
may be both desirable and demanded by today's more assertive local 
communities. 
23 
THE COUNCILLOR AND THE ASSERTIVE COMMUNITY 
A number of surveys have considered community assertiveness as 
evidence of both the electorate's willingness to take action, and belief in 
the effectiveness of it when faced with unpopular governmental acts. Three 
surveys, in 1984,1985 and 1991, noted similar trends; a decline in 
political passivity; a growing confidence amongst the electorate in their 
ability to affect the political process; and the increasing importance of the 
local arena as a catalyst for enhanced citizen protest. 35 They also noted 
that few people perceived the various acts of protest as effective, 
compared with those claiming they would take such action. However, 
councillors were seen as an effective focus for protest. Indeed, a number 
of studies found a greater propensity to protest local than national 
actions. 36 
Almond and Verba noted that British political culture was characterised by 
'general attitudes of social trust and confidence' and that participation had 
not challenged its deferential nature. Indeed, the British 'maintained a 
35 K. Young, `Political Attitudes', British Social Attitudes: The 1984 
Report, in R. Jowell and C. Airey (editors), Aldershot, Gower, 1984, pp. 
11-45. K. Young, `Local Government and the Environment', British 
Social Attitudes: The 1985 Report, in R. Jowell and S. Witherspoon 
(editors), Aldershot, Gower, pp. 149-175. A. Bloch and P. John, Attitudes 
to Local Government: A Survey of Electors, York, Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, 1991, pp. 36-38. 
36 G. A. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in five Nations, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963, 
p. 185. A. Marsh, Protest and Political Consciousness, London, Sage, 
1977, particularly pp. 66-69. K. Young, `From Character to Culture: 
Authority, Deference and the Political Imagination Since 1945', To appear 
in S. James (editor), Political Change in Britain Since 1945, London, 
Macmillan, 1997. 
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strong deference to the independent authority of the government'. 37 
Marsh, amongst others, has challenged the idea of British political culture 
as essentially deferential, providing an alternative view of a Britain that is 
willing to consider a range of political protest actions alongside a concern 
for political involvement. 38 Kavanagh noted that in Britain's civic culture, 
where ideology and mistrust combine, there is an 'enhanced potential for 
protest', thus further undermining Almond and Verba's assertion of the 
deferential nature of British political culture. 39 Young has gone as far as 
to comment that the Civic Culture could be seen as 'embarrassingly naive 
and... as simply wrong'. 40 Young reports that the propensity has increased 
for local government to attract greater citizen protest than central 
government, 41 and indeed, Britain has moved 'towards an assertive and 
truculent pattern of political behaviour'. 42 The 1987 British Social 
Attitudes Report noted evidence of a 'growing self confidence' amongst the 
electorate, which would bring new political concerns and a 'greater wish to 
be consulted in the political process'. 43 In 1995 Young and Rao found 
that two in every five respondents felt they could have a real influence on 
politics, if they got involved. 44 
37 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 455. 
38 A. Marsh, Protest and Political Consciousness. 
39D. Kavanagh, 'Political Culture in Great Britain: The Decline of the 
Civic Culture', in G. A. Almond and S. Verba (editors), The Civic Culture 
Revisited, London, Sage, 1989, pp. 124-176. p. 152. 
40 Young, `From Character to Culture'. 
41 Young, 'Local Government and the Environment', pp. 150-154. 
42 Young, 'From Character to Culture'. 
43 A. Heath and R. Topf, `Political Culture', In R. Jowell, S. 
Witherspoon, and L. Brook (editors), British Social Attitudes: The 1987 
Report, Aldershot, Gower, 1987, pp. 51-69. pp. 58-59. 
44 Young and Rao, `Faith in Local Democracy', p. 111. 
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What are the implications of these trends for the representative process? 
Gyford noted that 'a move away from a society with a large degree of 
consensus on interests and values, towards a more diverse and fragmented 
society', exerts pressure on representative democracy to take on a greater 
participatory form. 45 Moreover the councillor will directly experience the 
tension between his or her position as a local representative and demands 
from the electorate within their ward or division for a greater involvement 
in local affairs. Widdicombe reported that councillors' responses to the 
increased assertiveness which impinged on their activities and those of the 
party group, was to support 'more say' for the 'ordinary citizen in the 
decisions made by local government', although this 'say' need not detract 
from the 'proper responsibilities of the councillor'. 46 Consultation could be 
enhanced, but the councillor's position as elected decision-maker need not 
be diminished. 
The implications for representative democracy 
Two questions are raised by these developments in political culture. First, 
can the system of representative democracy at the local level cope 
effectively with greater consultation and an increasingly confident and 
assertive electorate? Secondly, how will councillors manage pressure for 
greater participation, within a system controlled by the party group? Much 
depends on the intensity of feeling on any issue, and whether 
'acquiescence' is a permanent or a transient state, and on how a 
45 Gyford, `Diversity, Sectionalism and Local Democracy', pp. 110-111. 
46 Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. II, table 7.15. p. 75, and table 
7.16, p. 77. 
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'sufficiently salient matter' may rouse an otherwise 'quiescent citizenry into 
involvement' and intense, though intermittent action. 47 
In evidence presented by Batley, a community's demands for involvement 
as a response to events, and councillors' attitudes towards their 
representational role, display the tension within local democracy. 
Councillors 'did not see themselves in the main as representatives of the 
community's interests'. Their task as local representatives was not 
to represent the expressed interests of the ward but to identify 
these interests and then 'to convince people that you know best'. 
This seemed to amount in practice to attempting to bring the 
public to terms with party (or council) policy which must often 
be long-term and city-wide in scale rather than short-term and 
parochial as local opinion was felt likely to be. 48 
The tension generated by citizen involvement is that it conflicts with 
councillors' right to govern and thus threatens the party group, and its 
authority-wide view of representation. Indeed, Lambert et al comment that 
councillors may seem to have little interest in 'being direct representatives 
of the area, but rather regard themselves as elected to create and defend 
city government'. 49 Those members of the community who are moved to 
seek direct representation of an area and its interests may indeed join 
47 G. Parry, G. Moyser, and N. Day, Political Participation and 
Democracy in Britain, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, 
p. 358. 
48 R. Batley, 'An Explanation of Non-Participation in Planning', Policy 
and Politics, 1 (2), 1972, pp. 95-114. p. 104-105 
49 J. Lambert, C. Paris, and B. Blackaby, Housing Policy and the State: 
Allocation, Access and Control, London, Macmillan, 1978, p. 141. 
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political parties to use the processes of councillor selection to influence the 
policies of a local authority. 50 
The mobilisation of action 
Recognition of the tension between an assertive electorate and its 
councillors as local party representatives gave rise to the concept of 
`event-driven democracy'. The term is construed for the purpose of this 
thesis as referring to that tension between the community's focus on issues 
and events of local importance, and the councillors' focus on the decision- 
making forum of the party group. It highlights the crisis of representation 
created when councillors find that issue-based demands for representation 
from the community conflict with the party-based demands for loyalty 
from the group. Event-driven democracy relates to the mobilisation of 
communities and individuals, around a particular event in which they have 
an interest. It can be seen as primarily reactive and protective in nature; 
reactive in that communities are mobilised after a decision has been made 
or consultation undertaken, and protective in that communities perceive 
some threat from the decision or from its consequences. Yet it is also 
important to see such processes in a positive light, with events as a 
motivational trigger to action. This action provides a stake in the 
community and has an educative effect on those involved. 51 Indeed, it has 
been argued that: 
50 B. Colenutt, 'Community Action over Local Planning Issues', in G. 
Craig, M. Mayo, and N. Sharman (editors), Jobs and Community Action, 
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, pp. 243-252. p. 246. Bealey, J. 
Blondel, and W. P. McCann, Constituency Politics: A Study of Newcastle- 
under-Lyme, London, Faber and Faber, 1965, pp. 320-323. 
51 N. Boaden, M. Goldsmith, W. Hampton, and P. Stringer, Public 
Participation in Local Services, Harlow, Longman, 1982, p. 15. 
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people are less willing than they were to accept authoritarian 
styles of leadership. Action groups and public protest have 
become a regular feature of policy development. The receding 
tide leaves pools of interest where new initiatives are taken. 52 
As local events are immediate to local communities they can serve to 
motivate the electorate to a greater degree than that generated by local 
election campaigns, the timing of which may not be congruent with an 
issue's life-span. Campaigns on issues of common concern, by 'involving 
the previously uninvolved for however short a time, may increase 
democratic activity'. 53 Such campaigns indicate that councillors and the 
community are motivated by different political issues, and councillors, in 
complaining of the electorate's lack of interest in local politics, reflect 
these different motivations. 54 Such varying spheres of interest and the 
events that drive members of the community to activity, provide arenas in 
which the tensions between the councillor as a representative, the 
councillor as a member of a party group, and the electorate themselves, 
can be explored. 
How do councillors, as power holders and gatekeepers, perceive and 
respond to the challenges to representative democracy emanating from 
local events? How do they respond to the demands for involvement rather 
than representation, and balance this against the demands of their parties? 
52 Ibid, preface. 
53 A. Cochrane, `Community Politics and Democracy', in D. Held and C. 
Pollit (editors), New Forms of Democracy, London, Sage, 1986, pp. 51- 
77. p. 72. 
54 W. Hampton, Democracy and Community: A Study of Politics in 
Sheffield, chapter 6, `The Local Citizen', London, O. U. P, 1970, pp. 122- 
152. pp. 149-152 are of particular note. 
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In order to address these questions it is necessary to consider the claims 
made on councillor loyalty, particularly those generated by the party 
group. This requires us first to consider the impact of the party group in 
the context of the long term process of the 'nationalisation' of local politics. 
THE NATIONALISATION OF LOCAL POLITICS. 
National parties have had a persistent presence in the structure and 
processes of local representation, but insufficient recognition has been 
given to the importance of the local manifestation of party, particularly the 
party group. Parties accordingly continue to be viewed as 'national' rather 
than 'local' entities. McKenzie took the view that the party outside its 
Parliamentary manifestation was little more than 'a highly organised 
pressure group with a special channel of communication directly to the 
Leader, the Cabinet and the Parliamentary Party'. 55 This, the dominant 
view of national political parties has overshadowed their local impact and 
significance. 56 
55 R. T. McKenzie, British Political Parties, London, Heinemann, 1955, 
p. 585. Parkinson has criticised Mackenzie's approach and argued that 
local political parties should be regarded far less as 'creatures of the 
national party machine'. Local parties have a distinctive local purpose and 
interest and more importance should be attached to the 'effect of local 
factors in motivating party members'. M. Parkinson, `Central-Local 
Relations in British Parties: A Local View', Political Studies, 19 (4), 
1971, pp. 440-446. p. 444 
56 C. Game and S. Leach, `The Role of Political Parties in Local 
Democracy', Commission for Local Democracy, Research Paper No. 11, 
1995, pp. 7-8. 
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Gyford and James note that much of the existing literature on political 
parties relegates the local party to an almost non-existent status. 57 The 
customary division into 'constituency parties, party headquarters and the 
party in parliament' reflects the assumption that outside of the national 
arena political parties have little relevance. 58 A more recent text 
perpetuates this tripartite model of parliamentary, professional and 
voluntary party. 59 Indeed political parties in local government have not 
been distinguished from constituency parties or seen as a separate 
manifestation of party 'as the scale of their activity would seem to merit'. 60 
Equally, national political parties squeeze local events out of local election 
campaigns. They use particular local councils as the worst examples of 
local government by their opponents, and the best examples by their own 
party administrations. Local elections are drawn into some national 
aggregate of party activity, which may be beneficial to future national 
election campaigns. This is not new. `As early as the 1870s Sir John 
Gorst, principal agent of the Conservative Party', used local election 
results `as Parliamentary indicators' . 
61 
57 J. Gyford and M. James, National Parties and Local Politics, London, 
Allen & Unwin, 1983, pp. 3-6. 
58 R. Rose, Politics in England. - Change and Persistence, London, 
Macmillan, 1989, p. 272. 
59 R. Garner and R. Kelly, British Political Parties Today, Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1993. 
60 Game and Leach, `The Role of Political Parties in Local Democracy', 
p. 7. Also see, Gyford and James, National Parties and Local Politics, 
pp. 3-8. 
61 K. Young, Local Politics and the Rise of Party: The London Municipal 
Society and the Conservative Intervention in Local Elections 1894-1963, 
Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1975, p. 32. 
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Accounting for the rise of party 
The politicisation of local government has long been a source of argument. 
The 'intrusion into local government elections of party politics' was 
deprecated by The Times of 3 November 1880 which saw councillors as 
'docile tools of party politics'. Yet, Jones notes, support existed for party 
politics amongst the local press of 1885, in Wolverhampton, as 'political 
organisations' contesting local elections could overcome the 'deplorable 
apathy' amongst the electorate as they had done 'in Parliamentary 
elections'. 62 
Gyford summarised the long term process of the party politicisation of 
local government identifying five distinct stages. These he termed diversity 
(1835-65), crystallisation (1865-1905), realignment (1905-1945), 
nationalisation (1945-1974), and reappraisal (1974- ). 63 Although he 
deals with broad national trends, it appears that at the local level party 
groups themselves changed in character, corresponding to a maturation 
process classified by Bulpitt as either negative or positive. The main 
distinction between these types of party systems is the degree to which 
councillors act in coherent political groupings to accept responsibility for 
control of council policy and the settling of patronage issues. 64 Gyford's 
'stages' provide a useful prism through which to view Bulpitt's 'processes'. 
62 G. W. Jones, Borough Politics: A Study of Wolverhampton Borough 
Council 1888-1964, London, Macmillan, 1969, pp. 149-150. 
63 J. Gyford, `The Politicisation of Local Government', in M. Loughlin, 
M. Gelfand and K. Young (editors), Half a Century of Municipal Decline, 
London, Allen & Unwin, 1985, pp. 75-97. 
64 J. G. Bulpitt, Party Politics in English Local Government, London, 
Longmans, 1967, particularly, pp. 123-130. 
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Figure 1.1. Party Systems in Local 
Government. 
Source: Bulpitt, Party Politics in English Local Government, p. 130. 
Gyford's initial stage of diversity from 1835, does not imply the total 
absence of party organisation and activity in local government, merely that 
this had not settled into a clear two-party structure. Party existed in the 
local setting, and the party label, amongst others, was used to secure the 
election of candidates to an array of representative bodies. 65 This period 
was however characterised as one of confusion, with local politics 
adopting a 'kaleidoscopic form', and being conducted by a variety of 
political actors and a 'bevy of personal cliques and factions'. 66 
65 For a detailed discussion of the many causes of diversity amongst 
councillors including party during this period see E. P. Hennock, Fit and 
Proper Persons. 
66 Gyford, `The Politicisation of Local Government', p. 79. Shifting the 
time scale of the debate Grant concedes that when independent 
organisations or 'sponsoring groups', such as chambers of commerce, back 
a council candidate it is difficult to distinguish sponsoring group from 
ordinary political party. Although, unlike political parties, sponsoring 
groups may avoid or lack mechanisms for the discipline of councillors, 
they may remove their support or endorsement at any time. Grant, 'Non- 
Partisanship in British Local Politics', p. 243. 
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The period of crystallisation identified saw the 'solidification' of a two 
party system. 67 Whilst the use of the independent label continued in this 
period, the developing Conservative-Liberal competition energised the 
gradual absorption by the party system of independent councillors, 
pressurising them to adopt a party label, or membership. 68 There was a 
greater tendency in this period for candidates to adopt party labels to 
contest elections, making it easier for councillors to act en bloc in 
conducting council business. 69 Indeed, during this period the contest for 
the government of London saw a vicarious two-party struggle between the 
Conservative and Liberal parties in the guise of Moderates and 
Progressives, a contest which was as much about national political 
concerns as it was about local government. 70 
The period of realignment saw the gradual replacement of the Liberal 
party by the Labour party, as the principal opposition to the Conservatives, 
with the decline in Liberal candidacies and seats held, matched by Labour 
67 The label Conservative or Liberal was not necessarily adopted and the 
use of the moderate, progressive or radical label continued. See Davis, 
`The Progressive Council' 
. 68 For examples outside of this period see, Jones, Borough Politics, p. 66. 
Bealey, Blondel and McCann, Constituency Politics, pp. 344-350. 
Pressure on Independents to join a party is described on p. 347. 
69 See, Hennock, Fit and Proper Persons. Saint, Politics and the People 
of London. 
70 K. Young and P. Garside, Metropolitan London: Politics and Urban 
Change 1837-1981, London, Edward Arnold, 1982, pp. 58-59. K. Young, 
`The Politics of London Government 1880-1899', Public Administration, 
51 (1), Spring, 1973, pp. 91-108, p. 97. Grant noted the Labour Party 
policy of intervening in local elections 'under its own banner' whereas 
'persons of Conservative or Liberal sympathies would use labels of the 
`citizen or progressive type'. W. P. Grant, `Local Parties in British Local 
Politics: A Framework for Empirical Analysis', Political Studies, 19 (2), 
1971, pp. 201-212. p. 203. 
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increases in the same. 71 The rise of the Labour Party in local government, 
its use of standing orders and group discipline as a device to ensure 
councillors acted en bloc as coherent units, had an important impact on the 
conduct of council affairs and the interplay of party relationships. 72 This 
period accelerated development of `primary mature' systems, relying on 
Labour as a majority group, (or, when Labour were in opposition, Liberals 
or Conservatives), taking all patronage positions. With Labour absent, 
Conservatives and Liberals were not likely to 'adopt the same degree of 
organisation and discipline, or take patronage so seriously'. 73 
The distinctive element of the period of nationalisation was not a 
domination of a subordinate level of political activity by national parties, 
but a reciprocal acknowledgement by key political actors of the benefits of 
assimilating local with national party concerns. The spur to this process 
was the consensual atmosphere of the post war period, the stability of 
economic and social development and the 'shared assumptions and values 
of local and national politicians', rather than the centralising tendency of 
national parties. 74 The period of 'nationalisation' saw the re-emergence of 
the nineteenth century trend of local voting patterns reflecting national 
71 For example it was in the 1920s that Labour steadily increased its 
representation on the LCC, finally taking control in 1934. See M. Clapson, 
`Localism, the London Labour Party and the LCC between the Wars', in 
A. Saint (editor), Politics and the People of London, pp. 127-145. Also 
see, Young and Garside, Metropolitan London, pp. 173-174. 
72 Bulpitt, Party Politics in English Local Government, pp. 99-102. pp. 
119-123. 
73 Ibid, p. 129. 
74 Gyford, `The Politicisation of Local Government', p. 87. For a 
perspective linked to local government re-organisation see, M. Steed, 
`The New Style of Local Politics', New Society, 5 April 1973, pp. 11-13. 
M. Schofield, `The Nationalisation of Local Politics', New Society, 28 
April 1977, pp. 165-166. 
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concerns, and national party standing. 75 Local elections thus became 
overshadowed by the national contest and votes were cast according to a 
national preference. 76 
The period of reappraisal involved a 'further escalation in the spread of 
party politics' . 
77 The absence, however, of machinery by which 
councillors could be forced to comply with the national party, provided a 
local political independence. 78 Indeed, save the disciplining of individual 
councillors and councillors voluntary compliance to national, model 
standing orders, national parties had little means of controlling the 
activities of local party groups. 79 The period of reappraisal continues. A 
more recent development (1995) in the Labour Party's national rules gave 
the National Executive Committee power to suspend councillors from 
group membership and oversee councillors' adherence to group standing 
orders and rules. 8° The shifting relationship in this period of reappraisal 
75 Gyford, `The Politicisation of Local Government', p. 86. This process 
is also documented by K. Newton, Second City Politics: Democratic 
Processes and Decision Making in Birmingham, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1976. P. Dunleavy, Urban Political Analysis: The Politics of 
Collective Consumption, London, Macmillan, 1980, pp. 135-140. Also 
Railings, Temple and Thrasher, `Community Identity and Participation in 
Local Democracy'. Hennock noted that the end of the nineteenth century 
saw local and national politics 'part company' and local voting `no longer a 
mere reflection of changing party effectiveness' nationally. Hennock, Fit 
and Proper Persons, p. 287. 
76 Gyford notes the influence of local and national factors on local 
elections, Local Politics in Britain, Croom Helm, 1976, pp. 125-132. 
77 Gyford, `Politicisation of Local Government', p. 89. 
78 Ibid, pp. 91-92. 
79 For a discussion of party networks and culture see, Game and Leach, 
`The Role of Political Parties in Local Democracy'. 
80 Labour Party Rule Book, Rule 6.6A. 6A1 (a), (b), (c), London, The 
Labour Party, 1995, p. 35. 
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saw Hackney Borough Labour group disbanded in a national party attempt 
to restore discipline, damaged by investigations into council corruption. To 
rejoin the group councillors were required to give an `undertaking to abide 
by party rules', accept `whips approved' by the national party's general 
secretary, and accept the `authority of the group leader'. The national 
party acted to prevent the activities of a 'party within a party' and ensure 
the proper functioning of the group. 81 
Also in 1996, a local-national party policy dispute in Walsall was resolved 
by the expulsion of 15 councillors from the Labour Party. Even so, this did 
not represent an ability to control the activities of councillors, only a 
reserve power to expel them from a national party. They were still able to 
act as a distinct and organised grouping, contesting both policy and 
patronage issues, and indeed local elections. 82 
Not all local politicians may go along with a reappraisal in favour of the 
national party machine. Party concerns recently led a former Liberal 
Democrat councillor in one of the authorities covered in this study to 
resign from the party to form a localist-orientated group entitled 'Chase 
Residents'. He had originally joined the Liberal Democrats because they 
did not 'toe a party line without question, unlike others', but links with 
other parties `had eroded that'. Chase Residents was to be a non-political 
organisation based on the proposition that 'local government should be run 
81 Guardian, Thursday May 23, Thursday May 30, Friday August 2 1996. 
82Such councillors, expelled from the national party, would not be able to 
contest seats as Labour Party candidates. 
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for and in the interests of local people, not of political parties' and 'to give 
local people a real say in the decisions that very often affect their lives'. 83 
Overall, the five stages identified by Gyford, from diversity to 
reappraisal, represent a process of developing influence for political 
groupings or parties in local government. It also confirms that, since 1835, 
political organisations of one sort or another, whatever label adopted, have 
contested elections and controlled local councils. In the early stages of 
diversity and crystallisation, conditions existed whereby a majority of 
Independents, parties or other groupings coalesced, but operated a 
negative system by nonetheless rejecting responsibility for the control of 
council business. Similarly, a concealed party system could operate were a 
'grouping' not elected on a party label, nonetheless organised and co- 
ordinated their activities to control council business. 84 The equal 
distribution of patronage via a secondary party system was particularly 
open to these earlier stages, but also possible in the latter stages of 
movement from realignment to reappraisal. These early stages were 
however open to patronage and policy disputes being resolved by 
reference to 'party' as well as to any other label. 85 
83 Cannock Mercury, 18 January 1996. For a consideration of the 'purely 
local party' see, Grant, `Local Parties in British Local Politics'. 
84 Bulpitt, Party Politics in English Local Government, 
85 For a discussion of the nature of such disputes between various 
groupings of councillors which clearly indicates the existence of the 
developing group system, and the competition between political parties 
and organisations for control of council business, see E. P. Hennock, Fit 
and Proper Persons. 
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Throughout these stages, candidate adoption of an overtly party political 
label was not universal. 86 Yet the conditions were always present for the 
organisation and activities of coherent, or identifiable 'groupings' of 
councillors, and for the existence of Bulpitt's party systems. 87 The factors 
necessary for the party group to develop, and then to exert, an influence 
over local representative democracy, and to influence and discipline its 
members, have been a long established feature of local government. 88 
Jones has identified four `broad types' of local political systems. These he 
described as, non-party, partially party, emergent party and wholly party 
systems. Jones highlighted the importance of the political party for 
bonding councillors together and for focusing their loyalty. Any political 
grouping however, whether a formal political party or some other more 
informal bloc, can generate similar cohesive properties and act as a focus 
for the councillor's loyalty. 89 Thus, the systems Jones outlined would 
equally exist alongside those identified by Bulpitt, within Gyford's stages 
of politicisation. 
The contribution made by Gyford, Bulpitt and Jones to our understanding 
of party within local government throws light on the development of the 
party group as a loyalty-demanding pull on the councillor's representative 
activities. Indeed, Jones noted, the party group filled the vacuum left by 
the absence of a political executive in British local government and it came 
86 Gyford, `The Politicisation of Local Government'. 
87 Bulpitt, Party Politics in English Local Government. 
88 Hennock, Fit and Proper Persons. See particularly the discussion of 
the division in the Liberal Party in Leeds in the 1840s over the Liberal 
government's policy on education, pp. 199-200. 
89 G. W. Jones, `Varieties of Local Politics', Local Government Studies, 1 
(2), 1975, pp. 17-32, pp. 19-21. 
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to be seen as 'the place where council decisions were taken'. 90 It is not 
however the decision-making processes of the group that has heightened 
the profile of party politics in local government, but the adoption by both 
councillors and groups of a national party label. 
The national party as the basis for local representation 
In 1986 the Widdicombe committee referred to the 'near universality of the 
phenomenon of politicisation' in local government, with party labels 
predominating in 'about 80 per cent of all councils. 91 Whilst only 30 per 
cent of the Widdicombe survey's respondents could name their councillor, 
54 per cent could identify their party and 61 per cent the party in control of 
the council (56 per cent for the upper tier council). 92 Party, then, has a 
public resonance which links local representatives to national political 
entities. It is not surprising that many councillors accept Newton's 
contention that local elections are won or lost almost irrespective of 
themselves and that neither they, nor their local party, are held to account 
on local election day, particularly, if whilst voting, scant attention is given 
to what councillors 'have or have not been doing'. 93 
The debate concerning the impact of local and national factors and 
political parties on local elections remains to be settled. 94 There is 
90 Jones, `Varieties of Local Politics', p. 30. 
91 Widdicombe committee Research Vol. I, The Political Organisation of 
Local Authorities, p. 25, and p. 197 
92 Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. III, The Local Government 
Elector, p. 31. 
93 Newton, Second City Politics, p. 7, p. 17, and p. 223. 
94 For a detailed discussion of the factors influencing elections see, 
Hampton, Democracy and Community, chapter seven, `The Local 
Electorate', pp. 153-182 looks, inter alia, at the class composition of 
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however a widespread conviction 'that local government elections are a 
judgement on central rather than local government'. 95 Miller however 
draws the distinction between nation-wide trends, and local trends and 
variations, noting that national trends only 'explain a proportion of the 
variation in actual results'. 96 The notion of local government elections as 
solely determined by the popularity of national government has elsewhere 
been described as a Tallacy'. 97 Miller notes the importance to local 
election results not only of local taxation and other policies, but also 
variations in style, presentation, local media coverage and candidates' 
personal qualities. Thus both local and national issues can affect local 
results. 98 Local impact is here understood in terms of inter-authority 
variation. What is excluded from Miller's conclusion is the impact of ward 
level local 'issues' which may affect only a small number of voters in a 
single ward, and may not be reflected in local electoral behaviour at all. 
Indeed, the importance of national factors in local elections is open to 
exaggeration and as Green identifies, voting in local elections consists of 
Sheffield and party support. See also Bealey, Blondel, and McCann 
Constituency Politics, chapters 11 and 12, pp. 219-227 and pp. 228-248. 
A. H. Birch, Small Town Politics: A Study of Political Life in Glossop, 
London, Oxford University Press, 1959. He notes that 'in some towns 
voting in municipal elections.. . 
is based fairly clearly on national party 
allegiances' (underlining Newton's findings) but that in Glossop this was 
'very far from being the case', p. 100. 
95 Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. III, in part two Miller considers 
in detail local electoral behaviour. He also cites a comprehensive list of 
references which underline the influence of national politics over local 
elections, pp. 105-172. p. 146. 
96 Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. III, pp. 146-147. 
97 G. W. Jones and J. Stewart, The Case for Local Government, London, 
Allen and Unwin, 1983, pp. 16-18. 
98 See, Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. III, pp. 157-170. 
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three components; the national, the local authority-wide and a 'truly local 
factor, one unique to a particular ward'. 99 The fact that local electoral 
swings may comprise an important local or ward-based element 
emphasises the representative links between the councillor and his or her 
electoral area. The blurring of electoral accountability inherent in the 
difficulty of disaggregating the component elements of voting helps to 
maintain the view that national concerns dominate local elections. Thus the 
party group is able to capitalise on this process and demand the loyalty of 
the councillor as a party affiliate. 
So exactly who or what does the councillor represent: the party group, the 
council or their ward or division? Confusion on this amounts to 
'representative failure', and a weakening of the link between councillors 
and their ward or division. Indeed, this weakening makes it all the more 
difficult for councillors to be 'community leaders who emerge from the 
wards they represent' and more likely to be those 'interested in public 
affairs who seek an opportunity to represent their fellow citizens wherever 
it may conveniently be found'. 100 This observation - based on research in 
Sheffield - implies that a councillor need have no relationship, other than a 
questionable loyalty, to the ward or division he or she represents, which is 
simply an electoral convenience. As it is political label rather than the 
candidate's local profile that is instrumental in securing electoral success, it 
follows that loyalty is to the party and, more importantly, to the party 
group. At least in urban areas, it is only after election that the councillor 
99 G. Green, `National, City and Ward Components of Local Voting', 
Policy and Politics, 1 (1), September, 1972. pp. 45-54, p. 45. Green's 
findings are underpinned by the work of Young and Rao in their survey of 
electors' opinions of the important influences on councillors' decision- 
making. Young and Rao, `Faith in Local Democracy'. 
100 Hampton, Democracy and Community, pp. 203-204. 
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may develop a local profile and area loyalty. Such loyalty may however be 
severely tested if a divergence of opinion occurs between the group and 
the local electorate over any local event. 
In other parts of Britain, the path to election may be very different, and the 
claims to party loyalty and local connection have a different weight. Rural 
England and Wales may see the persistence of 'social leaders', but their 
gradual displacement by the 'public person' emphasises the importance of a 
councillor's relationship with party and not community. 10 1 In this context 
the strength of councillor's partisan attachment to the party group can be 
considered as a result both of time and place. Equally important is the 
electorate's acquiescence in the dominance of political parties in local 
government, witnessed by the degree to which local electoral choice 
manifests itself through a party preference. In turn the group is able to 
interpose itself between the councillor and the community. 
THE PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR PARTY POLITICS 
Despite the importance of the relationship between councillors and their 
electorate to the working of representative democracy, there has been little 
research on what electors think about local democracy. Major national 
101 J. M. Lee, Social Leaders and Public Persons: A Study of County 
Government in Cheshire Since 1888, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963. For 
a consideration of differences between rural and urban factors on local 
politics see N. Rao, The Making and Unmaking of Local Self- 
Government, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1994, pp. 103-105, pp. 109-110 and 
pp. 168-169. 
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surveys were carried out only in 1965,1985,1990, and 1994.102 Their 
findings throw some light on the issues central to this study; attitudes 
towards party politics; expectations of the councillor as a representative; 
and trust in councillors to act up to those expectations. 
In comparing electors' 'images' of what they thought their local councillors 
were like with what they would like them to be, the Maud committee 
reported that 74 per cent believed their councillor to be 'someone 
belonging to a political party' whilst only 40 per cent stated that their 'ideal' 
councillor would hold party membership. 103 Twenty years later the 
research for the Widdicombe committee reported that a little under two- 
thirds of respondents thought 'party politics in local government to have 
increased over the past decade'. 104 In 1965, some 77 per cent of 
respondents agreed that voting in council elections decided how things 
were run locally: in 1985 this figure had declined to 60 per cent. 105 By 
1990 a slight increase had occurred to 68 per cent. 106 But 1994 saw a 
decline to 54 per cent. 107 In 1986 research identified a greater cynicism in 
attitudes towards the workings of the local electoral system `than that 
found by the Maud Committee'. 108 To further test the electorate's feelings 
in regard to the party system in local government, Young and Rao asked 
respondents in 1994 the same question as the Widdicombe survey: 
102 Maud committee, Research Vol. III. Widdicombe committee, 
Research Vol. III. Bloch and John, Attitudes to Local Government, Young 
and Rao, `Faith in Local Democracy'. 
103 Maud committee Research Vol. III, Table 127, p. 91. 
104 Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. III, p. 81. 
105 Ibid, table 6.13, p. 94. 
106 Bloch and John, Attitudes to Local Government, table 25, p. 34. 
107 Young and Rao, `Faith in Local Democracy', p. 101. 
108 Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. III, p. 100. 
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In most areas all councillors come from one of the political 
parties and councils are organised on party lines. There are 
some areas where most councillors are independent and the 
council is not organised on party lines. Which do you 
personally think is the better system ... the party system or the 
non-party system ? 
Table 1.1. Trends in attitudes towards party politics in local 
government. 
Which do you 1985 1994 
personally think is the %% 
better system ? 
The party system 34 34 
The non-party system 52 33 
Don't know/can't choose 14 33 
Source: Young and Rao, `Faith in Local Democracy', p. 104. 
Young and Rao noted that the 'growing politicisation' of local government 
brought a 'growing public acceptance of the role of party politics in local 
government', but there was also a striking stability in support for the party 
system. Moreover party identifiers' views corresponded with the 
'traditional stances of their parties' with Labour 'most closely associated 
with politicisation', Conservatives, accepting it with 'reluctance' and 
Liberal Democrats taking 'the most independent line'. 109 
That the party system has a resonance for the electorate is reflected in the 
high proportion of respondents who vote for a party irrespective of the 
109 Young and Rao, `Faith in Local Democracy', p. 104. 
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candidate. Young and Rao found that a bare overall majority of 
respondents vote for a party, regardless of the candidate's quality. 
Table 1.2. How people vote in local elections 
I vote for a party, regardless of candidate 52 
I vote for a party, if I approve of the candidate 28 
I vote for candidate, regardless of party 6 
I do not generally vote at all 14 
Source: Young and Rao, `Faith in Local Democracy', p. 105. 
Labour party identifiers most favoured the party system and voted for 
party irrespective of candidate, with Liberal Democrats least likely to act 
in that fashion. 110 Party, then, has a greater resonance for the Labour 
voter. 
The work of Young and Rao indicates that whilst the party system in local 
government receives the support of only a third of the electorate, party 
affiliation is still a key criterion for electors in considering voting intention. 
Party is used to 'locate' a vote in accordance with political preferences, but 
at the same time, many using that criterion would prefer a non-party, local 
electoral system. 
110 Young and Rao, `Faith in Local Democracy'. Young found a similar 
pattern of responses in 1983, concerning the election of a Member of 
Parliament. In this respect 58% vote for party regardless of candidate, 
24% for a party only if approving of the candidate, 5% for the candidate 
irrespective of party and 12% generally not voting at all. Young, `Political 
Attitudes', p. 17. 
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Do electors, behaving in such a fashion, expect their councillors to act as 
party loyalists? Electors' expectations of their councillors are inescapably 
conditioned by the prominence in local government elections of national 
party politics. Equally important are electors' attitudes towards the balance 
needed between a councillor's own personal views, those of his or her 
party and those of the people he or she represents. The results of what 
respondents thought the 'most important' influence on councillors should 
be (or indeed, what was their focus of representation), by Young and 
Rao's own admission, are `startling'. 
Table 1.3. Most important for councillors to take into account: 
His or her own views 1 
The interests of the ward he or she represents 40 
The interests of all people in the Council's area 52 
His or her party's views 2 
Source: Young and Rao, `Faith in Local Democracy', p. 109 
Whilst selecting a candidate by party, the electorate expect the focus of 
representation not to be that party, but the electorate themselves. The 
expectation that councillors should focus almost as much on their own 
specific electoral area as on the needs of the authority as a whole acts as a 
counter-weight to the policy-broadening influence of the party group. 
Young and Rao conclude that in a system dominated by the party group: 
there is an overwhelming expectation that councillors should place 
local interests - either at ward level or across the local area - first. 
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And there is also a clear indication that the public thinks there are 
limits to the role of party politics. I l1 
The public then, want councillors to be loyal to their electorate in 
preference to their party. 112 But do they consider that councillors can be 
'trusted' to do this? Young and Rao inquired of respondents: 
How much do you trust local councillors of any party to place 
the needs of their area above the interests of their own party ... 
just about all the time, most of the time, only some of the time or 
almost never ? 
Less than one in three thought councillors could be trusted to do so either 
'all' or 'most of the time'. Fourteen per cent thought they could never be 
trusted. The majority of respondents possessed a wary cynicism about 
their councillors, who could be trusted 'only some of the time'. Thus the 
electorate expect that for the councillor: 
their overriding concern should be the representation of local 
interests. That they are not widely trusted to do so betrays a 
degree of cynicism; that electors should then vote the party ticket 
111 Young and Rao, `Faith in Local Democracy', p. 109. 
112 This may reflect a carefully drawn distinction between the local and 
the national approach to political parties. Indeed, an ICM poll for the 
Observer reported that, in regard to the recent change of political 
allegiance of MP Emma Nicholson, `when asked where a politicians first 
loyalty should be, 47 per cent said 'party' compared with 45 per cent who 
were for conscience". ICM Poll of 500 voters in Torridge and West 
Devon. Observer, 7 January 1996. 
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regardless of the qualities of their candidates appears perverse. 
113 
Such 'cynicism' in the expectations electors have of their councillors may 
well be reciprocated in councillors' expectations of the electorate. Such a 
situation would undoubtedly loosen the bonds of the representative 
relationship, a matter to which we shall return in chapter three. Rao 
presents pressing evidence of elector's concern that councillors should 
indeed represent their local area above the demands of party. The 
electorate's trust in councillors to do so however, is limited. 114 
Table 1.4. Trust in councillors to put the interests of the area above 
party 
almost always/ Some of almost never 
most of time the time 
Party Identification %%% 
Conservative 36 49 13 
Labour 29 53 14 
Liberal Democrat 37 54 9 
Other/NoneIDK 21 47 21 
All respondents 31 51 15 
Source: Rao, `Representation in Local Politics', p. 29. 
Labour supporters display the least trust that the councillor will represent 
area over party compared with Conservatives and Liberal Democrat 
supporters. Rao goes on to comment that 'few electors find party 
acceptable when it leads their councillor to act against the local interest'. 
Furthermore there is a powerful demand that the councillor should 'set 
113 Young and Rao, `Faith in Local Democracy', pp. 114-115. 
114 Rao, 'Representation in Local Politics'. 
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aside party considerations in the face of a pressing local issue'. Rao notes 
that the representative process comprises the `represented, the party and 
the representatives' and furthermore that the councillor's `party mandate 
may well take precedence over the electoral mandate. 115 
There is however, a fourth element of the representative process, the party 
group, which indeed may take precedence over the wider local political 
party and is a further mandate for the councillor to consider. Indeed, the 
traditional tripartite relationship between the party, the councillor and the 
electorate should then be seen as -a four cornered relationship which 
includes the party group as a distinct and separate element of the local 
representative processes. 
Rethinking the role of party 
Sir Ivor Jennings notes that J. S. Mill completed Considerations on 
Representative Government without mentioning parties, while 'a realistic 
survey of the British Constitution to-day must begin and end with parties 
and discuss them at length in the middle'. 116 Although concerned with 
central government, it is equally important today to consider the impact of 
political party, and more specifically the party group, within British local 
government. The importance of the party group is well recognised, but the 
interference that 'group' may cause in the representational process, and its 
ability to act as a loyalty-generating source, remain to be fully 
investigated. The group can be considered as an integral part of a wider 
political party, but also as a discrete body. Its members act as a decisional 
115 Rao, 'Representation in Local Politics. 
116 W. I. Jennings, The British Constitution, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1947, p. 31. 
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reference group, the actions of which are of distinct community 
interest, 117 which is separate from the influence of the group on the 
policy-making process. 118 Indeed much of the literature considers the 
party group in relation to the councillor as a decision and policy- 
maker. 119 
The blurring of representational responsibilities between party and 
electoral area is further confused by the councillor's management function. 
Can representation be separated from what councillors do in committee? 
Indeed, if it is not, councillors may pursue representation through the 
management function. 120 Councillors' activities have often been 
considered by separating out from representation time allocations between 
council and committee work. Representation becomes marginalised to 
dealing with electors problems, casework, welfare work or public 
consultation. Such a narrow approach to representation can not fully 
account for the relationship between the councillor, the electorate and 
117 S. J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioural Analysis, Chicago, 
Rand McNally, 1964, pp. 3 80-3 8 1. 
118 See Jones, Borough Politics. Also see, J. Dearlove, The Politics of 
Policy in Local Government: The Making and Maintenance of Public 
Policy in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, London, 
Cambridge University Press, 1973. D. Green, Power and Party in an 
English City: An Account of Single Party Rule, London, Allen and Unwin, 
1981. 
119 Bealey, Blondel, and McCann, Constituency Politics, Dearlove, The 
Politics of Policy in Local Government, T. Karran, "`Borough Politics" 
and "County Government": Administrative Styles in the Old Structure', 
Policy and Politics, 10 (3), pp. 317-342. 
120 J. Stewart, `The Role of Councillors in the Management of the 
Authority', Local Government Studies, 16, July/August, 1990, pp. 25-37. 
pp. 28-29. 
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important local issues. 121 Some councillors may not however view 
dealing with electors problems as 'being amongst their most important 
tasks'. 122 Others may see casework as the 'routine way of organising local 
representation'. 123 
If the councillor is faced with a party group decision that is in conflict with 
the opinion of the electorate, patterns of time allocation will tell little about 
the quality of the representative processes, and still less about how 
councillors synthesise the representation of an electoral area with the 
conduct of council business and the demands of the party group. The party 
group is a product of an electoral process, and the very vehicle through 
which the councillor experiences the demands of representation. Little is 
121 Rao, The Making and Unmaking of Local Self-Government, pp. 149- 
174. N. Rao, Managing Change: Councillors and the New Local 
Government, York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1993, pp. 25-39. A. 
Bloch, The Turnover of Local Councillors, York, Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, 1992, pp. 12-15. K. Young and N. Rao, Coming to Terms 
with Change: The Local Government Councillor in 1993, York, Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, 1994, pp. 17-29. These texts compare the time 
allocation made by councillors in regard to their various roles for the years 
1964,1976,1985 and 1993. Young and Rao used Maud, Robinson and 
Widdicombe data with their own 1993 research. Interestingly, table 3.1 p. 
18. with figures 3.3 to 3.6, pp. 25-26, shows that although councillors 
claim that dealing with constituent or ward issues are the most important 
activities they undertake, they spend less time on these matters than 
attending and preparing for, committee and council meetings. See also, 
Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. II, pp. 41-53. 
122 For a discussion of councillors' approaches toward electors' problems 
see, A. Rees and T. Smith. Town Councillors: A Study of Barking, 
London, The Acton Society Trust, 1964, pp. 46-49, p. 47. H. Heclo, `The 
Councillor's Job', Public Administration, 47 (2), 1969. pp. 185-202, pp. 
190-193. Indeed, an exclusively representative role may be unattractive to 
councillors. Taking Charge: The Rebirth of Local Democracy, 
Commission for Local Democracy, Municipal Journal Books, 1995, p. 16. 
123 Lambert, Paris and Blackaby, Housing Policy and the State, p. 141. 
52 
known of how the party group interposes itself between councillor and 
community, and thereby becomes an important player in the representative 
process. Still less is known about the ways in which the organisation, 
discipline and loyalty expected by the party group act as a 'pull' on the 
councillor's representative 'focus'. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The aim of this study is, then, to analyse the nature of the impact on local 
representation exerted by the party group, to consider the extent and depth 
of group influence as a focus for representation, and to examine how 
councillors experience and balance competing representative tensions. It 
asks why councillors focus loyalty on the group, and whether their 
political affiliation influences this attachment. The thesis is divided into 
four parts. The first is entitled Dilemmas of representation, the second, 
Theatres of representation, the third, Crises of representation and the 
fourth, Conclusions. 
The first part (chapters 1,2 and 3), considers the development of party 
within local government and the tensions that are created by the conflicting 
demands for representation made on the councillor by the electorate and 
the party group. It looks at the current understanding of the party group 
and the approaches of the three main national political parties to the 
organisation of councillors. It also examines attitudinal similarities and 
differences to representation between councillors of the three main 
political parties, as revealed by a survey of 629 councillors for this study. 
The second part of the thesis (chapters 4,5 and 6) applies a theatrical 
metaphor to the councillor as a representative. The councillor performs a 
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series of representative acts - speaking and voting - in a range of open and 
public, or closed and private, theatres of representation. Councillors' 
performances are open to critical review by these private and public 
audiences. The open theatres of representation considered are the council, 
committee, public meetings, the press and electronic media. The closed 
theatres of representation considered are the party group, the local political 
party and other private meetings. This part looks at the influence of the 
group, the location of any issue and political affiliation on the councillor's 
use of the discretion attached to their office. Discretion allows the 
councillor to select both their acts of representation and the theatre within 
which they will perform to solve a crisis of representation. A crisis of 
representation is generated for the councillor when the group demands 
public loyalty to its decisions whilst the electorate demands action from 
the councillor in opposition to the group's decision. This part examines 
councillors' self-reported likely acts of representation and their actual 
action in a crisis of representation. 
The third part of this thesis (chapters 7,8 and 9) contains three separate 
case studies each of which considers an actual crisis of representation 
experienced by councillors. The case studies set out the context of each 
crisis, how the councillors concerned reacted and the influence of the party 
group and affiliation in each case. They provide an illustration of event- 
driven democracy; that is, the stimulation of sections of the community 
into protest as a result of a decision or policy of the council, or one with 
which it is associated. 
The final part of the thesis consists of a single chapter which establishes 
the impact on local representative democracy of the existence and 
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activities of political party groups. It also establishes the party group as the 
very body which councillors come to represent. 
As described in the account of the research methods set out in appendix 1 
the author was able to use his own position as both a Labour county and 
district councillor, and thus a member of two party groups, to apply an 
element of participant observation to the research. Thus it was possible to 
observe councillors in what might be called their natural habitat, the party 
group. Such observation provided both a richness of material, and a 
confirmation of the results of the questionnaire and the interviews 
conducted. In addition the author's closeness to the issues and key actors 
within the three case studies also added to the analysis of the issues 
involved by enhancing access. 
The common bond of councillors operating in a group system and the 
problems all councillors experience when a crisis of representation occurs, 
subjecting them to the competing pressures of electorate and group, is 
something which transcends party affiliation. 124 The analysis which 
follows is designed to increase our understanding of the relationship 
between the councillor, the party group and the electorate and to assess the 
influence of the group over the processes of local democracy. It also raises 
questions about the validity and sustainability of the processes of local 
democracy. 
124 Clements went as far as to note that in Bristol there was `more in 
common between politicians of opposing parties than between them and 
those they represent', R. Clements, Local Notables and the City Council, 
London, Macmillan, 1969, p. 190. 
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2. THE PARTY GROUP IN LOCAL DEMOCRACY. 
Jones and Stewart described the problem of party politics in local 
government as a dual one, arising from the 'conduct of the group' and 'the 
extent of group discipline'. Whether a group's approach to discipline was 
firm or relaxed lay 'at the heart of the democratic processes of local 
government'. Despite this importance, political groups were unconsidered 
'in all reviews of organisation and management in local government'. 1 
Moreover the group can now be said to be an intermediary, positioned 
between the councillor and the electorate. This chapter addresses the 
factors that have enabled the group to achieve this position in the 
processes of local representation. In doing so, it offers an approach to 
understanding the party group in its political and legal aspects as an entity, 
membership of which can be distinguished from political affiliation. 
The chapter first sets out the current understanding of the process by 
which councillors come together in identifiable party groups. It examines 
the factors that enable the group to maintain a cohesive and disciplined 
approach to the conduct of local representation. Secondly, it accounts for 
the differing approaches to the concept of party 'group' within and 
between the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties. Thirdly, 
it considers the legal construction of the group. Fourthly it sets out an 
approach to understanding the influence of the group over local 
representation and the handling of representational or 'locational' issues by 
councillors. 
1G. W. Jones and J. Stewart, `Party Discipline Through the Magnifying 
Glass', Local Government Chronicle, 30 October 1992, p. 15. 
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PARTY GROUP, PARTY, AND DEMOCRACY AT THE LOCAL 
LEVEL. 
The organising of councillors into definite party groupings for the conduct 
of council business, the influence of those groupings on the processes of 
local representation, and the degrees of cohesion they exhibit will be 
demonstrated in this chapter. Group cohesion, and the varying reasons 
across the main political parties for its existence, means that councillors 
often act differently from the ways in which they would act as independent 
representatives. The group demands loyalty, and the councillor must either 
comply with or dissent from it. Thus the relationship between the 
individual councillor and the individual elector is not such that they 
interact upon one another in an 'ideal representative system'. 2 Indeed, a 
'crisis of representation' arises when the views of the group and electoral 
pressures collide over specific issues. The ability to generate such crises 
places the group in an intermediary position between councillor and 
represented and indicates the strength of the group system. 
The independent existence of the party group as an important element of 
political party structure was demonstrated by Gyford and James in a 
model comprising the party at headquarters, the party in Parliament, local 
party units and the local authority party group. 3 As a discrete (and indeed 
discreet) unit of party structure it is important to consider the influence of 
the group over its membership. This influence includes its ability to 
generate loyalty, its provision of a theatre for representative activity, and 
the willingness of councillors, as party affiliates, to subordinate their 
2 L. J. Sharpe, `The Politics of Local Government in Greater London', 
Public Administration, 38 (2), Summer, 1960, pp. 157-172. pp. 170-171. 
3 Gyford and James, National Parties and Local Politics, p. 7. 
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relationship with the electorate to the group. The diagram below presents 
the group as holding a central position in local democracy placed between 
the political actors as a filter of communication. 
Figure 2.1. 
Political linkages 
POLITICAL PARTY LOCAL AUTHORITY 
(local Group liaison) (officers, committees, ) 
PARTY GROUP 
ELECTORATE COUNCILLORS 
(Issues and events) 
As membership of the group entails expectations of public adherence to 
group policy and decisions, it exerts a pull on the councillor's 
representational activities, and is a powerful alternative to demands for 
representation made by the electorate. The imbalance between the 
demands for councillor loyalty made by the group and the electorate holds 
the key to understanding the current experiences of local democracy and 
the outcome of the competition for the councillor's loyalty. 
Group expectations of councillor loyalty create an 'exclusive' political 
decision-making environment, the outcomes of which may conflict with 
the expressed wishes of sections of the electorate. This is a major source 
of tension in the representational process, a tension which need not be of a 
partisan nature, but related to particular issues or decisions. Even so, the 
councillor's election, often as a result of party affiliation alone, produces 
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an affinity with the 
electorate. 
group, drawing the councillor away from the 
THE CURRENT UNDERSTANDING OF PARTY GROUP 
Studies have confirmed that party group is now prevalent within local 
authorities. 4 The very existence of large numbers of councillors elected on 
a shared political platform requires them to organise to ensure their 
political success, or to oppose a majority party. In 1967 the Maud 
committee considered the largely urban phenomenon of councils operating 
on 'party political lines', with political discussion and decision-making 
taking place in groups which operated 'outside the committee structure'. 5 
Indeed, Maud referred to a minority of authorities where parties had a 
'stranglehold' on 'day-to-day operations' and councillors followed the party 
line with a 'forced' and 'unnatural' regularity. 6 
The committee noted the distinctions in approach to the party group 
system between Conservative and Labour parties. Conservative Central 
Office were described as 'wary' of the group reducing the council to a 
'rubber stamping' exercise, but felt the system desirable to attain 'co- 
ordinated action and to ensure that information is available to members'. 
The Labour Party were more supportive of the role of party politics as a 
device for 'voter recognition' and to 'ensure a consistent direction of 
4 See, Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. I, K. Young and M. 
Davies, The Politics of Local Government since Widdicombe, York, 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1990. Game and Leach, `The Role of 
Political Parties in Local Democracy'. 
5 Maud committee, Vol. I, Report of the Committee, para 24, p. 6. 
6 Ibid, para 33, p. 8. 
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policy'.? Maud, however, made no study of the work of party groups. 8 
Volume 5 of its research reports did note that party group was 
'fundamental to the influence of party politics in local government'. 9 It 
also observed that 'almost invariably, party groups of all political 
persuasions meet before each council meeting, to receive information 
about the business and in most instances to decide on a party line (even 
though this may not be obligatory)'. 10 
Reflecting on this, Maud commented: 
Whether a party group is engaged in vetting recommendations 
originating in committees, or considering a line to be taken in 
council or committee, it is a closed organisation which the 
electorate may not be able to influence. In so far as the decisions 
of the group are 'binding' on the member he can be regarded as a 
delegate of the group or party organisation rather than a 
representative of the electorate. There is a possible contradiction 
between the stimulus to public interest and contact caused by the 
election campaigns and the appeals of party controversy on the 
one hand, and the tendency towards an inward-looking 
7 Ibid, para 376 and para 377, pp. 110-111. 
81bid, para 383, p. 112. 
9 M. Harrison and A. Norton, Maud committee, Vol. V, Local 
Government Administration in England and Wales, Chapter 5, `Some 
Effects of the Presence or Absence of Party Politics on the Operation of 
Local Authorities', para 27, p. 103. 
10 Ibid, para 37, pp. 105-106. 
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organisation in the party group, unresponsive to the needs of the 
electorate as a whole, on the other. 11 
In sum the group serves to distance the councillor from the represented. It 
sets itself up as the beneficiary of the aggregation of political support that 
flows from the processes of a local democracy. Local government and 
democracy may be 'impoverished by the strait jacket of party politics', 
which constrains public involvement, but some defend it nonetheless as 
the most appropriate method of ensuring that local decisions are 
democratically made. 12 Moreover, secrecy establishes the group as a 
forum within which representative activity is conducted away from the 
gaze of the represented, in turn enabling the group to influence the ways in 
which councillors behave in more open and public settings. 
The Maud committee produced the foundations of a working definition of 
group politics and its impact on the representational relationship between 
the councillor and the electorate. The important characteristics were its 
closed and secret nature, its existence as a decision-making mechanism 
outside and alongside the council as a representative body, its acceptance 
by Conservative and Labour parties as having a valuable policy co- 
ordinating role, and its ability to invert the position of the councillor as 
representative of the community to one of 'delegate' of the group. 
Subsequently, these components were to be added to and elaborated by 
other inquiries. 
11 Maud committee, Vol. 1, Report of the Committee, para 383, pp. 112 - 
113. 
12 For a consideration of the participatory processes and councillors' 
reactions to them as party politicians see P. Chaberlayne, `The Politics of 
Participation: An Enquiry into Four London Boroughs', 1968-74, London 
Journal, 4 (1), 1978, pp. 49-68. p. 65. 
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The sources of group cohesion 
Nearly 20 years later the Widdicombe committee considered the 
organisation and activities of party groups, the importance of group 
discipline, and the phenomenon of group members voting en bloc in 
council and committee. Widdicombe received advice from its researchers 
on the importance of these factors as an indicator of the ability of the 
group to direct, if not control, the activities of councillors in council and 
committee. 13 They were important because Widdicombe found party 
label predominant in 80 per cent of councils. 14 Subsequently, little 
evidence was found to 'sustain the notion of a rising tide of politicisation 
beyond the obvious and trivial observation that most councillors wear a 
party label'. 15 The party label marks out the cohesiveness of groups 
within council and committee and councillors' 'marked reluctance to vote 
against group decisions'. 16 
Party groups maintain cohesion by the adoption of varying degrees of 
discipline, the effect of which is to elevate the private group meeting 
above the formal arena of the council and its committees. This condition is 
judged by the extent to which councillors are considered bound by its 
decisions; and measured by the extent to which they vote en bloc in 
council and committee meetings. 17 Widdicombe's research team identified 
13 Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. I, chapter two, `The Patterns of 
Local Politics', pp. 23-40. 
14 Ibid, p. 25. 
15 Young and Davies, The Politics of Local Government since 
Widdicombe, p. 61. 
16 P. Saunders, Urban Politics: A Sociological Interpretation, London, 
Hutchinson, 1979, p. 221. 
17 Young and Davies, The Politics of Local Government Since 
Widdicombe, pp. 43-50. 
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stronger cohesion within Labour groups compared to Conservative 
groups, with 49 per cent of Labour groups, but only nine per cent of 
Conservative groups never having experienced votes against decisions 
'previously agreed within groups'. Group cohesion was stronger in council 
than committee with 92 per cent of Conservative and 99 percent of Labour 
groups, usually or always voting together in Council and 79 per cent and 
85 per cent respectively so acting in committee. 18 Examining the extent to 
which councillors were either 'routinely bound', 'bound on special issues 
only' or 'not bound', Young and Davies subsequently identified an increase 
in group discipline in their own findings in 1989 over the 1985 
Widdicombe committee results. 
Table 2.1. Mandating by Party: effect on members of group decisions 
1985 
Not bound 6 
Routinely bound 68 
Special issues only 26 
Source: Young and Davies, 




16 - 10 
The Politics of Local Government Since 
Young and Davies noted the move amongst both parties in the direction of 
'routine mandating' with 92 per cent of Labour and 50 per cent of 
Conservative authorities adopting this practice. Looking for a more direct 
measure of group cohesion they examined the extent to which councillors 
of majority groups actually voted together at council or committee or 
18 Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. I, Tables 2.3 and 2.5, pp. 27- 
30. 
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never voted with the opposition. 19 They concluded by noting the largely 
urban phenomenon of councillors being increasingly bound by, and 
supporting, the group in both council and committee. 20 
A behaviour pattern is discernible from the Widdicombe research and the 
work of Young and Davies, with group cohesion greater in council than 
committee. However, an analysis of voting patterns in council and 
committee may not produce a subtle enough measure of group influence 
on the representative activities of the councillor. Equally it says nothing 
about any of the other theatres of representation within which councillors 
act. A measure of cohesion based on councillors' voting as a group in 
council or committee, the frequency of cross-voting or the degree to which 
councillors feel bound by group decisions, is insufficiently sensitive to 
capture the realities of group discipline. Concentrating the analysis on 
majority groups also underestimates the extent of group cohesion and 
discipline. To examine this we need to distinguish between a councillor's 
votes and a councillor's speeches. We also need to differentiate the open 
and closed theatres in which those acts are performed, rather than simply 
whether the group is in the majority. 
Widdicombe's principal research team noted the duality of party group 
existence; first, its relationship to the council, of which it was an important 
decision-making body (particularly for the majority party), but which gave 
it no formal recognition. Secondly, the group and its councillors have 
19 Young and Davies, The Politics of Local Government Since 
Widdicombe, tables 6-7, pp. 46-49. 
20 Ibid, p. 44. pp. 47-48. p. 51. The urban nature of politicisation was also 
noted by the Maud Committee, Vol. I, Report of the Committee, para 24, 
p. 6. 
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relationships with the political party outside the council. Relations with 
the party vary 'within and between parties and types of authority'. 21 
Indeed, groups are rarely 'homogeneous' and social characteristics of 
gender, age, class and ethnicity, add to internal divisions and external 
variations. 22 
Party group: a disciplined approach to representation 
Group cohesion is maintained, but only in part, by group discipline. The 
adoption of a 'strict' or loose interpretation of discipline (or standing 
orders), is important to understanding the influence of the group over its 
membership. Such interpretation is often reflective of councillors' political 
values and political affiliation. 23 However the use of a disciplined 
approach to council affairs (notwithstanding the absence of 'disciplinary' 
mechanisms or procedures), can be the product of political circumstances, 
rather than an ideological approach to representation. Indeed, the early 
introduction of a party 'caucus' to council affairs has been undertaken with 
reluctance and deprecated by some councillors as undermining the council 
as a representative body. 24 The current phenomenon of group cohesion 
has developed over time and some resistance has occurred to adopting a 
cohesive approach to speaking and voting, even to the extent of refusing 
to attend group meetings. 25 Equally some councillors have indicated a 
21 Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. I, p. 82. 
22 Ibid, p. 88. 
23 For a discussion of the interpretation of discipline see Bulpitt, Party 
politics in English Local Government, pp. 99-103 and 120-121. 
24 Young and Garside, Metropolitan London, p. 61. 
25 For a consideration of party group cohesion see Hennock, Fit and 
Proper Persons, interesting examples are given on 
p. 97, p. 145, and p. 249. 
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'strong resentment against group control' and against the 'principle of 
obeying majority decisions'. 26 
Such literature as does exist on the development of a cohesive approach to 
group activity indicates its uneven progress across both time and place but 
also indicates a longstanding tendency for councillors to operate as 
identifiable groups, with varying degrees of success in maintaining 
councillor loyalty. 27 The group 'converts a collection of individual 
councillors elected under a common party label, into an effective political 
force'. Group unity however cannot always be guaranteed without 
effort. 28 It is the effort required to secure that unity that is often criticised 
for restricting the 'freedom of the individual member', but which at the 
same time provides support. Group unity will in part rest on councillors' 
ability to influence group decisions, to freely express themselves, 
influence party policy and 'dispose of any doubts and disputes'. 29 
26 Bealey, Blondel and McCann, Constituency Politics, p. 372. 
27 For a discussion of the development of group politics, the political 
conditions encouraging a group approach to council affairs and examples 
of differing cohesion amongst councillors in the conduct of council 
business see, Hennock, Fit and Proper Persons. A. Saint, Politics and 
the People of London. Young and Garside, Metropolitan London. Also 
see, K. Young, `Political Party Organisation', in G. Rhodes (editor), The 
New Government of London: The First Five Years, London, Weidenfield 
and Nicolson 1972, pp. 16-49. Also, in the same text see K. Young and G. 
Rhodes, `The Electoral System and Elections', pp. 50-84. Young, Local 
Politics and the Rise of Party. Clements notes that the `hegemony of the 
two major parties in Bristol', goes back to the early1920s, R. Clements, 
Local Notables and the City Council, p. 172. 
28 J. Gyford, S. Leach and C. Game, The Changing Politics of Local 
Government, London, Unwin, 1989, pp. 172-173. 
29 W. E. Jackson, Achievement: A Short History of the LCC, London, 
Longmans, 1965, p. 53. A similar point is made by Rees and Smith, Town 
Councillors, differences of opinion within the ruling Labour group are 
66 
Such free expression within group is itself not guaranteed. The group as a 
centralised and hierarchical decision-making process often makes 
adequate questioning of its leadership and their decisions, difficult for its 
'less well placed members'. Even so, this, alongside feeling the 'party's 
pulse' and cajoling 'members to follow the agreed line' by the chief whip, 
can still accumulate to 'an exhibit of democratic leadership in action'. 30 
The leadership however must not 'offend the core political values and 
commitments of back-benchers', 31 whilst any disputes that are played out 
in the group risk backfiring and strengthening the leadership. 32 
The result of group discipline and cohesion is to ensure that representation 
is conducted in private group meetings and not so much in the observable 
and accountable public theatres of council and committee. Discipline may 
indeed extend to communication with the press, but such a firm approach 
to group discipline may lack support within the very group adopting it, and 
be the target of criticism by both political opponents, and party 
members. 33 
The defining point is the degree to which disciplinary mechanisms exist 
within groups or to which discipline operates as an informal process. It is 
here that party affiliation may have something to tell about the 
examined, pp. 86-94. The importance of the group leadership reflecting 
currents of political opinion within the group is commented upon, p. 90. 
30 For a full discussion of discipline in practice in Herbert Morrison's 
London County Council see B. Donoughue and G. W. Jones, Herbert 
Morrison: Portrait of a Politician, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1973, pp. 191-195. p. 193. p. 194. 
31 G. Stoker, The Politics of Local Government, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 
1991, pp. 95-98. p. 98. 
32 P. Saunders, Urban politics, pp. 221-222. 
33 For an example see Young, 'Political Party Organisation', pp. 31-32. 
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organisation and activities of councillors as discrete groupings. Once 
decisions are made in the private group meeting, the group expects the 
councillor's loyalty and public support, or at least avoidance of opposition. 
It is that expectation and the disciplinary mechanisms available to ensure 
compliance, that sets the private party group between the councillor and 
the electorate and which ensures that representation is conducted 
privately. 34 Indeed, even criticism of party rebels has been publicly 'more 
in sorrow than anger' with harsher accusations of treachery kept private. 35 
In Wolverhampton Borough Council, Jones noted the tendency for 
approaches to group discipline to fluctuate over time, depending on 
personalities and the contentiousness of any issues. Labour discipline 
could be of a loose kind, requiring only 'explanation' of deviations from 
group decisions, as cohesion rested not on 'coercion' but 'agreement 
underpinned by social ties'. Such expulsions as did occur were 'rare' and 
reserved for the long term rebel, 'out of tune with the party'. 36 
In Wolverhampton at least, the group system did not develop because 'the 
Labour Party happened to conduct its affairs in that way. It arose to enable 
the Town Council to fulfil its functions in the twentieth century'. 37 It did 
however prompt the 'informal get togethers' of the Conservative and 
Liberal Party groups, in the early years of the century, to develop into an 
'anti-socialist caucus'. This caucus met in response to the organised 
34 D. Green, Power and Party in an English City, Labour group 
discipline is discussed in Chapter 7, `Group Discipline', pp. 75-89. 
35 R. Butterworth, 'Islington Borough Council: Some Characteristics of 
Single Party Rule', Politics, Vol. I, May, 1966, pp. 21-31. p. 25. 
36 For a full consideration of Labour group discipline see, Jones, Borough 
Politics, pp. 183-186. pp. 183-184. 
37 Ibid, p. 185. 
68 
Labour threat, but which lacked Labour's 'discipline and compulsion'. 38 
Elsewhere, the 'deliberate policy of the Labour Party' is seen as 
responsible for bringing 'the formal group system into being'. 39 Indeed, 
organisation by one party may generate its own organised political 
opposition, even if the move to greater solidarity and organisation amongst 
some councillors is a reluctant one, rather than one of political 
predisposition toward a group system. 40 Conservatives have similarly 
blamed their political opponents for the need to fight elections on party 
grounds. 41 Jones traced the development of the Wolverhampton anti- 
socialist councillors' adoption of a group approach and the pressures they 
experienced to conduct their affairs in a cohesive fashion. 42 Conservative 
group discipline was less structured than Labour's and often manifested 
itself as 'moral' or some other pressure, to maintain unity, rather than 
expulsion from the group. 43 
Group unity ensured not only that a minority can act cohesively against a 
majority, but also that the majority group can be sure its decisions become 
decisions of the council. Here, as elsewhere the group is arguably the 
most important and influential decision-making forum of the council. 44 In 
Sheffield Hampton noted the council managed on 'strict party lines with 
38 Ibid, p. 190. 
39 Bealey, Blondel and McCann, Constituency Politics, p. 370. 
40 Ibid, p. 373. Bulpitt, Party Politics in English Local Government, 
p. 100. Maud committee, Vol. I, Report of the Committee, para. 379, p. 
111. Also, Vol. V, para. 32, p. 104. Jones, Borough Politics, p. 190. 
41 Young, Local Politics and the Rise of Party, pp. 35-55, particularly pp. 
43-44. Also p. 190. Young and Garside, Metropolitan London, pp. 58-59. 
42 Jones, Borough Politics, pp. 187-194. 
43 Ibid, pp. 200-201. 
44 Saunders, Urban Politics, p. 221. Hampton, Democracy and 
Community, p. 61. Stoker, The Politics of Local Government, p. 98. 
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regular group meetings'. Despite any conceptual differences between 
Labour and Conservatives in regard to the proper influence of the group 
over its members, both parties expected their members to support group 
decisions 'within the council chamber' and had whips to 'supervise group 
management and discipline'. 45 Indeed, the Conservative group leader 
could appoint 'other group officers' and with sole discretion, 'issue whips 
on any matter before the city council'. 46 Hampton found group unity 
maintained, with protestations of independence rarely resulting in cross- 
voting, and loyalty to the party expected and usually received. 47 
Loyalty of the councillor to the group has even been sought before 
election by both Conservative and Labour parties. 48 Indeed all Labour 
candidates, are required to give an undertaking to abide by the standing 
orders of their Labour group if elected. 49 The approach of the group 
leader or leadership toward group loyalty and discipline also bears upon 
councillors' adherence to group policy or decisions. The automatic 
imposition of the 'whip' on all decisions, as a rule rather than an exception, 
is symptomatic of attempts to control councillors' actions. 50 Even in 
45 Hampton, Democracy and Community, p. 61. 
46 Ibid, pp. 64-65. 
47 Ibid, p. 66. 
48 Both Dearlove, The Politics of Policy Policy in Local Government, p. 109. 
and Green, Power and Party in an English City, p. 33. considered 
assurances of loyalty being required before a councillor secures election. 
49 Labour Party Rule Book, Rules, 5A. 3 (c) and 5B. 5, London, The 
Labour Party, 1995, pp. 29-31. 
50 The automatic or selective imposition of the whip has been considered 
by Bulpitt, Party and Politics in English Local Government, pp. 100-101. 
Green, Power and Party in an English City, p. 77. Groups are able to 
adopt an approach to the imposition of the whip that suits the political 
arithmetic of the council as well as policy, personal and wider 
environmental considerations. A strict interpretation and imposition of the 
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decentralised structures, with a controlling party supporting decentralised 
decision-making the group system prevails. Stoker and Lowndes noted in 
their study of a Tower Hamlets neighbourhood, that Globe Town's Liberal 
Democrats 'found it necessary to maintain group discipline through pre- 
meetings prior to committees'. The Globe Town area committee consisted 
at the time of only five Members, four Liberal Democrats and one 
Labour. 51 
The complex relationship between loyalty and discipline is such that party 
groups can operate coherently without a rigid approach to discipline or 
disciplinary mechanisms, but that where such mechanisms exist their use 
is a rarity. Loyalty to the group is indicative of an approach to 
representation at the local level as well as reflecting the needs of council 
decision-making. 52 Group loyalty exists despite, rather than because, of 
'disciplinary mechanisms' and thus we must look elsewhere for sources of 
loyalty. 
The councillor's relationship to both the electorate and party group is 
mediated by the discretion which attaches to the office of councillor. As a 
fit and proper representative, the councillor may be expected to follow his 
or her own judgement. The discretion to do so is fettered when the 
whip sees democracy based on the principle of majority rule. Green 
discusses the majoritarian approach to democracy taken by some Labour 
councillors in Newcastle compared to Aneurin Bevan's concept of 
democracy, pp. 76-77. In conducting their affairs party groups can adopt a 
`majority rule' principle or a `unanimity principle' see, Dunleavy, Urban 
Political Analysis, pp. 140-144. 
51 G. Stoker and V. Lowndes, Tower Hamlets and Decentralisation: The 
Experience of Globe Town Neighbourhood, Luton, Local Government 
Management Board, 1991, pp. 22-23. 
52 Jones, Borough politics, pp. 185. 
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councillor feels bound to respond to either expectations of loyalty to the 
group or the electorate. Yet the councillor retains the ability to choose 
between alternative actions - 'voting' or 'speaking' and whether to 
undertake those acts, in 'open' or 'closed' theatres of representation. Their 
use however is just as open to influence by the party group and what 
Young and Davies identified as a 'tightening of party political 
organisation'. 53 
Coherence, group discipline and the councillor's scope of 
representation 
The influence of the party group is based on first, the presence of a 
common attitudinal or political perspective amongst its councillors, drawn 
together by membership of a political party outside the council chamber. 
Secondly the phenomenon of group cohesion, as a consequence of the 
loyalty given to it by the members and the discipline it imposes (or 
implies). 54 Research for the Widdicombe committee identified the 
sources of group cohesion as either normative, that is, centred on an 
ideological commitment as a source of a strong or loose attachment to 
group discipline, or situational, that is where circumstances dictate the 
internal cohesion of the group. 55 A number of factors underpin the need 
for group discipline: the political arithmetic of a council; personal and 
53 Young and Davies, The Politics of Local Government Since 
Widdicombe, p. 50. 
54 Wiseman goes as far as to comment that `nothing is less to be desired 
than open disagreement between members of the same party', `at least on 
important issues' or decisions sought by a committee chair. 
H. V. Wiseman 'The Working of Local Government in Leeds: Part II. 
More Party Conventions and Practices', Public Administration, 41 (2), 
1963, pp. 137-155. p. 141. 
55 Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. I, p. 82. 
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political relationships; the distribution of power and positions within the 
group; and the relations between the group and its own leadership. 56 
Such 'cohesion' as might exist risks disruption by 'elements of 
territoriality', and 'long established localist sentiments'. 57 The ways in 
which 'localist sentiments' are perceived and responded to by the group of 
course goes to the heart of the issue of political representation. Despite the 
general spread of party politics in local government, local loyalties can 
persist and occasionally 'run counter to party solidarity'. Councillors in 
these circumstances are 'well entrenched in their communities' and their 
role is primarily one of 'defending their local interest regardless of party 
considerations'. 58 For much of urban England, however, this is not the 
case, and the extent to which the group can contain within itself 'localist 
sentiments' and therefore representative demands on issues emanating 
from wards or divisions, is important for any assessment of the power of 
the group. 59 
The group may be able, whilst reflecting and managing localist sentiments, 
to also eliminate their expression from the public arenas of representation. 
The expression of 'localism' may be tolerated internally within the group. 
However, when issues affecting 'localities' spill into the public arena the 
councillor is faced with the choice of focusing on either the locality 
before the party, and thus expressing dissent from the group, or 
conforming with it, so focusing on group before locality. Eulau et al 
56 Ibid, pp. 82-83. 
57 Ibid, p. 82. 
58 Ibid, p. 89. 
59 For a consideration of urban and rural differences see Young and 
Davies, The Politics of Local Government Since Widdicombe, pp. 63-67. 
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distinguished between the 'style' and 'focus' adopted by the representative, 
the former referring to the 'criterion of judgement' used by the 
representative and the latter to 'a geographical unit, a party, a pressure 
group or an administrative organisation'. The councillor can focus on the 
locality as both a 'free agent' or delegate, but if focused on the group can 
adopt only a delegate style - bound by group instructions. 60 
In a comprehensive discussion of representative 'role' and 'focus' Rao 
indicates that such distinctions enable us to tell whether the representative 
'acts more as a delegate or more as a trustee' and importantly whether the 
representative is more a 'party man, a constituency servant, or a mentor'. 61 
To the question of representative focus, for the British councillor at least, 
can be added the party group, as distinct from being a 'party man'. 
Whether he sees himself as a delegate, politico or trustee, the group is best 
placed to demand the focus of the councillor, over and above those other 
'clients' noted by Rao. The attitudinal predispositions of the councillor 
toward representation assists in magnifying the pull of the group, as it is 
easier for the councillor - whichever style is adopted - to distance him or 
herself from the electorate than from the group. The more - ward focused 
and 'tribune' orientated the councillor the greater the pull needed by the 
group, by exaltation or discipline, to maintain group coherence and 
loyalty. 62 
60 H. Eulau, J. Whalke, W. Buchanan and L. Ferguson, 'The Role of the 
Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund 
Burke', American Political Science Review, 53 (3), September 1959, pp. 
742-756. 
61 Rao, The Making and Unmaking of Local Self-Government, pp. 34-35. 
62 For a full discussion of representative role and style see, Eulau, 
Whalke, Buchanan and Ferguson. 'The Role of the Representative". 
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As Jones noted, as well as representing a `geographical' area the 
councillor may also act as a representative of a broad section of the 
community, a particular organised group, another local authority or 
individual citizens. The process is however, primarily 'defensive and 
reactive' . 
63 Indeed, it may be from a decision of the councillor's party 
group that the represented seek protection. When such a situation occurs 
the councillor's view of his or her self as a local representative, or as 
reflecting an ideology or party, is thrown into sharp relief. Indeed, the 
councillor's attachment to party may also vary in intensity and purpose as 
indicated by Corina's typologies. His party politician, ideologist, partyist, 
associate and politico-administrator vary in the nature of their relationship 
with the group. 64 Irrespective of which of Corina's typologies a 
councillor may fall into, they conduct representation within the group. 
Thus even for the councillor with the loosest attachment to party the group 
is an important arena for representation. The group is a decision-making 
forum and a place were ward issues are settled. On the other hand the 
Newton, Second City Politics. Gyford, Local Politics in Britain. Rao, The 
Making and Unmaking of Local Self Government. 
63 G. W. Jones, `The Functions and Organisation of Councillors', Public 
Administration, 51 (2), Summer, 1973, pp. 135-146. p. 142. Also see, N. 
Rao. Managing Change: Councillors and the New Local Government, 
York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1993, pp. 18-19 and p. 25. She also 
notes the tension between representation and decision-making, p. 30. 
Young and Rao found that a majority of councillors gave 'first preference 
to dealing with individual problems... while ward commitments came a 
close second'. Young and Rao, Coming to Terms with Change? The 
Local Government Councillor in 1993, York, Jospeh Rowntree 
Foundation, 1994, pp. 24-27. p. 24. 
64 L. Corina, `Elected Representatives in a Party System', Policy and 
Politics, 3 (1), September, 1974, pp. 69-87. For a consideration of 
Corina's typologies see, B. Barker, The Operation of Bristol Labour 
Party: A View from the Edge, School of Advanced Urban Studies, 
Working Paper 27, Bristol University, 1983, p. 9. pp. 20-22. 
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councillor may have only a loose attachment to electoral area which in 
turn creates a `representative vacuum' which is filled by the party 
group. 65 
In a subtle analysis of patterns of community leadership Glassberg 
categorised the extent to which councillors see the borough, or their ward, 
as the 'scope of representation'. 66 Those with a ward scope were 
classified as 'classic parochials' or as ascribing to an 'ideology of localism' 
or 'localists'. The localist approached ward representation in a broader 
political context than the parochial, to make sense of, and understand local 
issues within a national framework. The ward has distinctive interests to 
be articulated while the localist continues `to serve in borough-level 
politics. 67 Glassberg's approach toward representation is useful for 
understanding the ability of the group to draw the councillor toward an 
authority-wide perspective, or at least containing within the group, the 
ward focused councillor. Indeed, in a party political system of local 
government, the party group may be the only theatre in which local issues 
are seriously considered. Furthermore, the `critical tension' between city- 
wide or ward-based representation may result in the councillor's first 
loyalty being to the group, not the electorate. 68 
65 H. Heclo, `The Councillor's Job', He placed councillors into three 
broad categories: the committee member, the constituency representative 
and the party activist. 
66A. Glassberg, Representation and Urban Community, London, 
Macmillan, 1981. 
67 Ibid, p. 16. Glassberg describes the similarities and distinctions 
between the parochial and localist in detail, pp. 79-105. 
68 Lambert, Paris and Blackaby, Housing Policy and the State, pp. 159- 
160. 
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It is a norm in British local government, identified by Glassberg, that 
councillors should adopt a broad focus. 69 The numerical superiority of the 
broadly focused councillor serves to weaken localist sentiments but this 
however, does not wholly account for the ability of the party group to 
exert pressure on the parochial or localist to widen their scope of 
representation. Moreover, crisis situations may arise in which a local 
community demand a local focus and the group demand loyalty to the 
group. Such a 'crisis of representation' can affect any councillor, whatever 
the 'scope of representation'. 70 
Although the councillor may focus on an electoral area, the pull of the 
group will create tensions for that orientation. If the councillor's 
orientation is towards policy, he or she will attitudinally focus on the 
group rather than the community. The councillor's willingness to articulate 
and act upon the interest of an electoral area needs to be considered in the 
context of the theatres within which the councillor is prepared to act. A 
localist or parochial may be prepared to both articulate and vote in support 
of local interests but the crucial question concerns the theatre within which 
those activities are conducted, and the willingness of the councillor to shift 
from the secrecy of the group to a more open forum. The extent to which 
this move to more public theatres can be contained indicates the power of 
69 A broad focus of representation is mainly a feature of urban politics, 
as Glassberg's research was itself located within urban communities. Rural 
England and Wales is different in this regard. See, Young and Davies. The 
Politics of Local Government Since Widdicombe. Rao, The Making and 
Unmaking of Local Self-Government. 
70 See, D. Muchnick, Urban Renewal in Liverpool, Occasional Papers on 
Social Administration, the Social Administration Research Trust, London, 
Bell & Sons, 1970, pp. 105-107. p. 106. He considers the pressures on 
councillors resulting from city-wide party programmes, to adopt a wider 
representative focus than their own immediate ward. 
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the group to direct councillor activity and confine dissent to its own 
private meetings. Moreover, the group may act as a defence mechanism, 
protecting the councillor from `extra-party pressures' or their own `ward 
party', let alone the electorate. 71 
If representative acts - speaking and voting - are undertaken within the 
group and not repeated in public, then, despite the local focus of the 
councillor, the group becomes the prime arena for the expression of local 
interests. But councillors' activities are not confined to the council 
chamber and will spill over into other theatres. If councillors accept that 
the group can 'bind' them in those theatres, the ability of the localist to 
pursue local issues is restricted and, in the end, neutralised. More subtly, 
councillors may be granted freedom by the group to pursue local issues, if 
no question of policy arises, but are expected to support the group when 
wider policy collides with local opinion. 72 
THE PARTY GROUP AS A THEATRE FOR REPRESENTATION 
AND DECISION-MAKING. 
Three elements of the group system interpose the group between the 
councillor and the electorate. First, the secrecy of its activities as a closed 
71 A. P. Brier, `The Decision Process in Local Government: A Case Study 
of Fluoridation in Hull', Public Administration, 48 (2), Summer 1970, 
pp. 153-168, p. 166. 
72 Councillors adopting a 'borough as a whole' focus, Glassberg, 
Representation and Urban Community, or the broad policy orientation of 
the policy advocate, broker or spokesperson, Newton, Second City 
Politics, conflict with the orientation of the localist councillor. They will 
also conflict with the narrower focus of sections of the electorate, 
identified by Young and Rao, `Faith in Local Democracy". 
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theatre of representation. Secondly, the restricted access to the group 
meeting for non-councillors, access being available to officers, by 
invitation and to some party members, beyond this however, access to 
group meeting is in the hands of the group itself. 73 Thirdly, the 
expectation of loyalty to the decisions made at group meetings. 
The privacy of the group and its status as a political forum creates a 
degree of reluctance amongst officers and councillors to meet in such a 
way which may add to the blurring of responsibilities. 74 It also raises a 
confusion of constitutional roles between the workings of central and local 
government and relationships between ministers and civil servants, and 
between councillors and officers. It has also been argued improper for 
officers to attend group meetings. 75 Today however, such insulation is 
difficult to sustain and officers and councillors work closer together than 
use to be the case. 76 Even so the officer need not 'accept instructions from 
an individual councillor, however exalted his status'. 77 
73 Access to group meetings is facilitated by the main political parties' 
national rules and model standing orders. 
74 For a full consideration of the nature of officers attendance at group 
meetings see, Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. I, tables 5.4,5.5, 
5.6, pp. 116-120 and p. 144. Also, Report of the Committee, para. 6.173- 
6.177, pp. 152-153. Gyford, Leach and Game, The Changing Politics of 
Local Government, pp. 131-132 and pp. 204-207. 
75 H. V. Wiseman, `The Working of Local Government in Leeds: Part 1, 
Party Control of Council and Committees', Public Administration, 41 (1), 
Spring 1963, pp. 51-69. p. 52. Wiseman provides an interesting discussion 
of his nine years as a Leeds City councillor and Labour group member. 
76 M. Laffen and K. Young, Professionalism in Local Government, 
Harlow, Longman, 1990, p. 92. 
77 W. Hampton, Local Government and Urban Politics, London, 
Longman, 1991, p. 86. 
79 
Widdicombe discovered that officers rarely attended group meetings and 
such attendance as did occur was to aid group decision-making on special 
issues where professional advice was required. 78 Indeed, Green reports 
that in Newcastle between January 1976 to October 1978 'officials were 
invited to only 3 [group] meetings' where they were 'confined to providing 
information and answering questions'. 79 Although officers attend party 
group meetings, they remain acutely aware of the need for 'even 
handedness' and the dangers of becoming both too close to the majority 
group and too distant from the minority group. These matters can be 
overcome by formalisation of officer availability to all groups. 80 
Attendance by officers as does occur reflects the importance of officers as 
a 'main source of information' for councillors. 81 The group then plays an 
important role in adjusting, in councillors' favour, the balance of power 
between them and officers. 82 Equally, the stability provided by 'well- 
entrenched party rule' and 'party organisation' has also 'promoted rather 
than constrained professional influence'. 83 
78 Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. I, p. 144. 
79 Green, Power and Party in an English City, p. 64. 
80 Laffen and Young, Professionalism in Local Government, p. 97. 
81 Dearlove, The Politics of Policy in Local Government, p. 179. 
82 For a discussion of the role of the party group in redressing the relative 
power of the officer and member see, Bealey, Blondel and McCann, 
Constituency Politics. Jones, Borough Politics. Newton, Second City 
Politics. For a general discussion of the interrelationships between officers 
and members see, H. Elcock, Local Government: Politicians, 
Professionals and the Public in Local Authorities, London, Methuen, 
1982. See particularly chapter 5 `The Local Government Officer: 
Professionals and Politicians', pp. 91-105. For a detailed discussion of 
the relationship between officers and members see Laffen and Young, 
Professionalism in Local Government. 
83 Laffen and Young, Professionalism in Local Government, p. 27. 
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PARTY APPROACHES TO THE ROLE OF THE GROUP. 
Attendance at group meetings by observers from the political party is 
governed by national rules or local convention and access is granted to 
group meetings on a speaking, but non-voting basis. The Labour Party 
national rules provide for a number of representatives of the local 
government committee (or borough and district parties) to attend group 
meetings, receiving all documentation. 84 All members of the appropriate 
Labour group have the right to 'attend meetings of the party management 
committee'. 85 This contact is further underpinned by an appeal for 
enhanced communication between group and local party thus: 
the provisions for consultation between party and group set out 
in these model standing orders are the minimum arrangements 
required. Parties and groups are encouraged to secure the 
greatest possible degree of co-operation and consultation on all 
matters concerning local administration in their area. 86 
The Liberal Democrats national model standing orders for council groups 
provides for 'one representative of each local party within the council's 
area' to attend group meetings on a non-voting basis. The group is able to 
invite 'other members of the local party, either for a particular item, a 
meeting, or indefinitely'. They may also invite 'duly approved and selected 
prospective candidates for the council and PPCs (prospective 
Parliamentary candidates) or MPs from within the council area'. Notes 
84 Labour Party Rule Book, `Rules for Labour Party Local Government 
Committees', section 12, IX. 1, p. 60. 
85 Ibid, IX. 2, p. 60. 
86 Ibid, section 13,13A11 (b), p. 63. 
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attached to these model standing orders point out that 'communication 
must be balanced by practicality' and that non-voting members may be 
omitted in 'favour of regular reports to local party meetings'. They also 
provide for attendance by party chairs, other Liberal Democrat group 
leaders or 'experts to reinforce the group's talents', as well as encouraging 
a wide distribution of minutes and agenda to 'keep people involved and 
informed'. 87 
The Conservatives are not so prescriptive in the relationship between the 
group and local party units with Conservative Central Office offering 
'encouragement to those seeking advice on such communication, to invite 
the chair of the Association and agent to group meetings. ' Equally 
encouragement is given to 'groups to send representatives to Association 
meetings'. The relationship between local Conservative parties and the 
group is 'decided on a local basis by individual groups and local 
Associations'. 88 Communication is also encouraged through the Local 
Government Advisory Committee, although these bodies do not exist in 
every constituency and their composition is 'a matter for local 
Associations'. There is no provision for the 'local Association to have 
automatic right to send representatives to Conservative group meetings'. 89 
87 Model Standing Orders for Liberal Democrat Groups, section 2. 
`Membership', B i), ii), iii) and notes, Association of Liberal Democrat 
Councillors, Hebden Bridge, 1994, p. 2. 
88 Interview with Conservative Central Office, Local Government 
Officer. 
89 Gyford, Leach and Game, The Changing Politics of Local 
Government, p. 163. 
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Such communication is formalised in model rules by both the Labour 
Party and Liberal Democrats. 90 
Whilst officers and local party members can attend group meetings the 
community represented has no such access. National party rules may not 
preclude attendance by outside bodies or individuals at group meetings, on 
any basis, but, this is at the group's discretion ( the local party could act as 
a conduit for such communication). The group has a collective 
representative discretion (mirroring the councillor's individual 
representative discretion) to either grant or refuse access to its meetings to 
the very community represented. Of all the non-councillors attending 
group meetings, the electorate experiences the most restricted of access. 
The filter of political affiliation has an important bearing on the tripartite 
relationship between electorate - councillor and group. Viewed through 
the prism of political affiliation, any variations in representative behaviour 
may result from a differential approach to the group system by councillors 
of different political background. The use of political affiliation in this way 
will indicate whether the influence of the group on the councillor as a 
representative cuts across the political spectrum, or has a stronger 
influence on councillors of a particular political affiliation. 91 In turn it 
90 For a discussion of the relationship between council groups and the 
party see, Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. I, pp. 98-102. Gyford, 
Leach and Game, The Changing Politics of Local Government, chapter 5, 
`Party Politics', pp. 161-187. For the Conservative party's flexible 
approach to group and party rules and communication see Newton, 
Second City Politics, pp. 92-95. 
91 For a consideration of the influence of party affiliation and organisation 
on councillors, see, J. Brand, `Party Organisation and the Recruitment of 
Councillors', British Journal of Political Science, 3 (4), 1973, pp. 473- 
486. 
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indicates whether the influence of the group system is indeed all- 
pervasive. As political affiliation is reflected in the membership of a 
national political party, to examine the influence of the group over the 
councillor as a representative, it is necessary to compare the 'national' 
party expectations of loyalty to the group, and how national political 
organisations interpret the party group as an entity. 
The importance of the activities of party groups to their national political 
parties is reflected in their varied attempts to bring cohesion to the group 
system. However, any document that purports to be a 'model' for the 
cohesive organisation of councillors, is as much a construction of political 
ideology, culture and attitudes toward representation, as it is an attempt to 
ensure the existence of recognisable political party organisation on 
individual councils. Similarly such models provide valuable clues to 
national party expectations of councillor loyalty to the group. 
The Labour Party and the party group 
The latest version of the Labour Party's rule book was adopted at its 1995 
annual conference and sets out the rules concerning the organisation of the 
group and the relationship between the councillor and the group. It 
excludes any consideration of the relationship between the councillor and 
the electorate, and lays no preconditions for, Labour members to hold 
surgeries or conduct ward or division specific tasks. 92 
The rules clearly prescribe what is expected of the Labour councillor in 
regard to 'Action by Individual Members'. Labour councillors are 
precluded from submitting or moving 'resolutions or motions or 
92 The Labour Party Rule Book. 
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amendments at any meeting of the council, unless such ... 
have first been 
submitted to and received the approval of the group'. Labour members are 
able, 'without consultation [to] ask questions at meetings of the council, 
provided the tendency of such questions is not likely to be in conflict with 
the policy of the group'. 93 
The Labour councillor who wishes to publicly express dissent from group 
policy and represent local interests, must then concentrate on the impact 
of the policy and not its merits. Labour members must be clear that the 
intention of any question asked is not to criticise the group. A Labour 
district councillor interviewed for this study commented: 
I have two big issues in my ward that are causing quite a stink, 
so I got people to give me a petition, I can hand that in and 
everyone knows where I stand, but I haven't broken any rules. I 
just make sure I am careful when the report comes to 
committee. It gets difficult when you want to oppose something 
and people are watching in the gallery, especially the press but 
so too is the entire whips office. 
Labour councillors are `expected not to speak or vote at meetings of the 
council in opposition to group decisions, unless the group has decided to 
leave the matter to a free vote'. On 'conscience issues (e. g. religion, 
temperance)', abstention is possible providing the councillor 'first raise the 
matter at a group meeting in order to ascertain the feeling of the group'. 
When a council or committee act in a quasi-judicial capacity, such as 
93 Ibid, `Rules for Local Government Labour Groups', 13A8 (a)-(b), p. 
62. 
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licensing decisions where councillors cannot fetter their discretion, 'each 
member shall form his or her own judgement according to the evidence'. 94 
The emphasis in normal circumstances is on group loyalty, and on the 
councillor having to seek permission to dissent. Thus all issues are whip 
issues. The Memorandum accompanying the 'Labour Councillors' 
Handbook', points out the need for 'effective action in the council and on 
its committees and sub-committees' and identifies the need for 'a 
reasonable measure of group discipline', clearly focusing the Labour 
councillor on the group thus: 
any differences of individual opinion must be thrashed out within 
the group and not in public; for it is a serious source of political 
weakness and embarrassment to have public conflict between 
representatives and nothing can be more fatal to electoral 
success... Members of the group are expected to abide by group 
decisions and not to speak or vote in opposition in the council, 
unless the group has decided to leave the matter in question to a 
free vote. 95 
Individual Labour groups may however impose different interpretations of 
discipline. 96 Such ability to 'interpret' is located within the Memorandum 
which, despite emphasising expectations of loyalty to the group, also 
94 Ibid, 13.8 (c), p. 62. 
95 The Labour Councillors' Handbook, Appendix 4, Memorandum 6.3.1. 
London, The Labour Party, 1995, p. 73. 
96 For a consideration the groups ability to interpret standing orders see 
Bulpitt, Party Politics in English Local Government, particularly pp. 99- 
103. pp. 120-121. Gyford, Local Politics in Britain, p. 78. 
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encourages a flexible approach to the interpretation of standing orders 
thus: 
The desirable amount of elasticity depends to some extent on the 
atmosphere of the particular council and the personnel of the group; 
too great rigidity would be unwise. The maximum amount of 
flexibility should be allowed for members to raise issues that are 
not contrary to party or group policy and whenever possible, 
submitting such non-political matters to a free vote. 97 
With this degree of flexibility, the strict interpretation of standing orders 
by many Labour groups, even on local issues, becomes all the more 
surprising. Whilst membership of a Labour group is conditional upon 
accepting the party's rules, which in turn grants specific authority to the 
whips to act on disciplinary matters, the disciplinary and appeal procedure 
is carefully prescribed within model standing orders. 98 
The power of the group rests on these rules; particularly the condition that 
any councillor, who, after an appeal has upheld a decision to 'withdraw the 
whip without a time limit being determined, becomes ineligible to be a 
Labour candidate at any level of election whilst not in receipt of that whip 
(this condition does not apply when the suspension is for a fixed 
period)'. 99 Retiring Labour councillors who have had the whip withdrawn 
indefmitely are not eligible for membership of any panel-100 Where an 
97 The Labour Councillors' Handbook, p. 73. 
98 Labour Party Rule Book, `Rules for Local Government Labour 
Groups', 13A. 10, pp. 62-63. 
99 Ibid, 13A. 10 (4), p. 63. 
100 Ibid, 5B4, p. 31. 
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appeal upholds the indefinite suspension of the whip, the councillor can 
after six months 'apply to the Labour group for re-admission. In such cases 
the Labour group shall be responsible for restoration of the whip'. 101 The 
indefinite suspension of the whip can cut short the political career of the 
councillor, who also runs the risk of immediate expulsion from the Labour 
Party in the event of standing for election against an officially endorsed 
Labour candidate. 102 
The loyalty of the Labour councillor is clearly to the Labour group and the 
representative acts of the Labour councillor are also focused on the group, 
rather than the open theatres of representation that are the council and its 
committees. Although the rules make reference only to the conduct of the 
councillor within the council and its committees, Labour groups may take 
it upon themselves to extend the scope of their disciplinary reach to other 
theatres of representation. Chapters 4 and 5 consider this phenomenon in 
detail. 
Loyalty to group decisions is underpinned by democratic procedures and 
by a deliberative environment conducive to member input. Group 
meetings should be 'conducted in a comradely fashion, in such a way as to 
maximise participation'. The rules also eschew 'harassment or intimidation 
of members on the basis of gender, sexuality or race'. 103 In other words 
if all councillors can participate freely in private group meetings to pursue 
an issue, none should need to dissent from the result of that process in 
public. As Gyford indicates, 'clearly group organisation and procedures 
101 Ibid, 13A. 10 (5), p. 63. 
102 Ibid, 2A. 4 (a), p. 9. 
103 Ibid, 13A. 2 (c), p. 61. 
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are not ends in themselves'. 104 Organisation and procedure, however, 
clearly impact on the process of representation at the local level. In 
practice it is for Labour groups to mitigate or magnify that impact. 
The Liberal Democrat approach to party group 
The 'Model Standing Orders For Liberal Democrat Council Groups' was 
published in 1994 by the Association of Liberal Democrat Councillors, 
and was 'based on Liberal Democrat groups' best practice'. 105 That this 
document emanates from the Association of Liberal Democrat Councillors 
(ALDC), rather than the national Liberal Democrat party, reflects the 
uncertainty and shifting nature of the relationship between the national 
party organisation and its councillors represented by an organisation 
whose origins are uncertain. This local and central organisational 
separation arose in 1978 when, the 'formal links between national party 
organs... and local government virtually ended'. The nature of that 
separation and the original purpose of the Association of Liberal 
Councillors was 'so that councillors could be serviced independently of the 
party's national bureaucracy, which was felt to be increasingly indifferent 
to local govemment'. 106 
The model standing orders provide a firm appreciation of the expectations 
of group loyalty that impact on Liberal Democrat councillors and the 
disciplinary powers underpinning that 'expectation'. Although not 
emanating from a national 'party' in the same way as Labour group model 
104 Gyford, Local Politics in Britain, p. 78. 
105 Model Standing Orders For Liberal Democrat Council Groups, p. 1. 
106 R. prey, `Nationalizing Local Politics and Localizing a National 
Party: The Liberal Role in Local Government', Government and 
Opposition, 18,1983, pp. 347-358. p. 350. p. 353. 
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standing orders, they are an attempt to construct a unified and cohesive 
approach to group activity and organisation. 
The Model Standing Orders for Liberal Democrat Council Groups go as 
far as to contain a section entitled 'Group Loyalty' which presents a clearly 
stated expectation on Liberal Democrat councillors 'to publicly support all 
group decisions'. The note appended to the section expands on this 
expectation: 
Some people maintain that Liberal Democracy means there 
should not be group discipline and group lines - this is simply 
not the case. If we are to operate effectively on the council to 
achieve our Aims, there has to be group loyalty and group 
discipline. Every candidate who comes for approval should be 
asked to agree to these standing orders and this clause at the 
time of approval. 107 
Loyalty expectations are related to three areas; organisational, policy and 
local ward matters, recognising thereby the differentiation of councillor 
activity. The specific acknowledgement of a ward 'focus' to representation 
distinguishes these standing orders from those of the Labour Party. On 
matters of 'deeply held conviction or conscience' where councillors are 
unable to support the group, they are asked 'to inform the group leader or 
group whip in advance and refrain from speaking or voting against the 
group position'. 108 Equally, if a councillor is unable to support the group 
on any 'organisational, policy, or local matter s/he should inform the group 
107 Model Standing Orders For Liberal Democrat Council Groups. 
section 7, `Group Loyalty', p. 6. 
108 Ibid, section 7 ii), p. 6. 
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secretary/committee spokesperson/ group leader or whip or ward 
councillor as appropriate in advance'. 109 The Liberal Democrat who 
does not attend group meetings or fails to make their intentions known 'on 
matters discussed at the group meeting', is still expected to abide by group 
decisions. `It is not sufficient to abstain from voting'. 110 
The model standing orders make provision for disciplinary matters thus: 
A member shall be excluded from the group if s/he has 
persistently conducted himself or herself in a manner seriously 
in conflict with the provisions of Paragraph 1 (Aims) or 
paragraph 6 (Group Loyalty) of these standing orders, and a 
motion to exclude him/her has been passed by a two thirds 
majority of the voting membership of the group. 111 
No such restrictions on the disciplinary processes exist for the Labour 
councillor who may be excluded from the group for a single incident of 
dissent and on a simple majority vote. Labour party standing orders are 
more specific on disciplinary offences and more prescriptive in regard to 
representative acts, than are those of the Liberal Democrats. The 
reflection in national model standing orders of variations in political 
attitudes towards representative democracy, indicate the real distinctions 
concerning group loyalty across the parties. As one Liberal Democrat 
county councillor and former group leader interviewed for this study 
stated: 
109 Ibid, section 7. B, p. 7. 
110 Ibid, section 7. C, p. 7. 
111 Ibid, section 2. B. E, p. 2. 
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I have been a member of this county for 15 years and have seen 
the size of the group both chopped down and expand and in all 
that time we have never withdrawn the whip from any member, 
despite having numerous differences of opinion and people 
speaking and voting against the group. 
A stark distinction between the approach of the Liberal Democrats and 
Labour Party to the issue of discipline is indicated by the affect on a 
sitting councillor of withdrawal of the whip. The Liberal Democrats (and 
Conservative Party) have no constitutional bar on candidacy for any 
councillor having the whip withdrawn. This distinction was underpinned 
by an officer of the Association of Liberal Democrat Councillors in an 
interview: 
You must understand that the party's constitution devolves 
power to the local party. It is they who decide if someone is a 
fit and proper person to be a candidate and being an approved 
or selected candidate is not dependent on being a member of 
the Liberal Democrat group; so you could have the whip 
withdrawn and still be selected by the local party if that's what 
they want. There is a difference between an approved candidate 
and a selected candidate, once you have been approved as a 
candidate then you can be selected by a local branch. 
Liberal Democrat model standing orders recognise the representative 
nature of local politics. The Liberal Democrat councillor is not only 
expected to be loyal to the group but also adopt a community-focused 
approach to representation. Liberal Democrat councillors are expected to 




copies of which should be kept by the group 
This community politics approach was adopted at the Liberal Party 
Assembly of 1970, which resolved: 
A primary strategic emphasis on community politics; our role as 
political activists is to help organise people in communities to 
take and use power, to use political skills to redress grievances, 
and to represent people at all levels in the political structure. 113 
Despite the rule given freedom of representative manoeuvre, not 
specifically recognised in national model standing orders as existing for 
the Labour councillor, the Liberal Democrat still experiences a crisis of 
representation in the same way as both Labour and Conservative 
councillors. Indeed, community politics could create problems specific to 
Liberal Democrats, in balancing the need for representative focus on the 
electorate, with expectations of group loyalty. 
To ensure a cohesive and unified approach to the organisation and 
activities of Liberal Democrat party groups model standing orders contain 
a firm rejection of the concept of the Liberal Democrats as merely a 
collection of individuals, rather than a cohesive party grouping at the local 
112 Ibid, section 11, p. 8. 
113 R. Pinkney. `Nationalizing Local Politics and Localizing a National 
Party, from I Hopton, Directory of Liberal Party Resolutions, London, 
Liberal Publication Department, 1978, pp. 143-4. p. 351. 
93 
level. The firm expectation, on all Liberal Democrat councillors is of 
'loyalty' to the group. 114 
The Liberal Democrats' popular image as community politicians can be 
compromised by their own model standing orders which state an 
expectation of group loyalty and discipline. 115 These expectations are 
similar in tone, if not in content, to those that exist for the Labour 
councillor. Both parties, for example, require the group to be informed or 
made aware of the possibility of any act which may conflict with a group 
decision. The parties also have similar provisions for dealing with matters 
of 'conscience'. The expectation on both the Labour and Liberal Democrat 
councillor, in conflict with the group, is clear however, they neither speak, 
nor vote, against the group. The question remains do Liberal Democrat 
and Labour groups, in practice, act on the expectations of group loyalty, 
so explicit in standing orders? 
The Conservative approach to party group 
The Conservative party approach to ensuring cohesive and recognisable 
Conservative groups is distinct from that of both Labour and Liberal 
Democrats. The Conservative party nationally has had to reconcile the 
ordinary Conservative's 'values of localism ... emotive symbolism of the 
values of the smaller place, fear of strong central institutions, and a 
distaste for the presence of nationally-orientated and controlled parties in 
114 For the Liberal's approach to party discipline see, R. Pinkney, `An 
Alternative Political Strategy? Liberals in Power in English Local 
Government', Local Government Studies, 10 (3) May/June, 1984, pp. 69- 
84, particularly see, p. 75. p. 77. 
115 Model Standing Orders for Liberal Democrat Groups, section 7, 
pp. 6-7. 
94 
local affairs', with Conservative Leaders 'colluding in the subordination of 
local government to central authority through the medium of party'. 116 
This political balancing act is not required of the Labour Party or Liberal 
Democrats who see strong central and local institutions in a different light. 
These political antecedents make it difficult for the Conservative party 
nationally to attempt co-ordination of group organisation. Yet the 
publication by Conservative Central Office, of the 'Model Constitution for 
Conservative Groups', is just such an attempt to balance the philosophical 
rejection of central control and party interference, with the need to 
promote a cohesive and recognisable form to Conservative groups. It is 
from such 'form' that Conservative councillors become more than 
Independents using party label to secure election, but an organisation 
through which the more ideologically inclined Conservative or 'political 
elite', can pursue a policy objective over any localist interest. 117 
The existence of a model constitution for Conservative groups was 
however unknown to any of the Conservative councillors interviewed for 
this research, which included four group leaders (it was also unknown to 
a metropolitan Conservative group political assistant). Conservative group 
organisation is very much a product of local circumstances and political 
traditions, handed down, developed and evolved, rather than a creation of 
the national party. The existence of the 'Model Constitution' since 1977 
however implies that it may very well have been incorporated, over time, 
into the terms of reference of many Conservative groups. This 
terminological difference, terms - of reference, as opposed to Liberal 
116 Young, Local Politics and the Rise of Party, pp. 219-220. 
117 See Bulpitt, Party Politics in English Local Government. Saunders, 
Urban Politics. Glassberg, Representation and Urban Community. 
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Democrat and Labour use of standing orders - implies a difference of 
emphasis in the way rules are constructed and applied to regulate the 
relationship between the councillor and the group. 
Compared to the high recognition factor amongst Labour and Liberal 
Democrat councillors of their own national model standing orders (every 
member of the two interview sub-groups was aware of such documents), 
the Conservative councillor reflects a political tradition that is suspicious 
of central party interference. The existence of the model constitution, 
dating as it does from 1977, compared with the more recent versions of 
the Liberal Democrats (1994) and the Labour party (1995), provides less 
of a clue as to the expectations of group loyalty required of the 
Conservative councillor. But, nonetheless some indications are inherent 
within them. 
The Model Constitution takes a similar approach to the Liberal Democrats 
in terms of the nature and scope of group discipline: 
The group may withdraw the privilege of membership of the 
Conservative group from any member when the action of that 
member is considered to be against the best interests of the 
py. 118 
As with the Liberal Democrats, withdrawal of the whip requires a two 
thirds majority of the group but this condition is only advisory as the 
group may impose other penalties. The advisory nature of the model 
118 Model Constitution for Conservative Groups, London, Conservative 
Central Office, 1977. 
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document was emphasised in interview by the Conservative Party's local 
government officer: 
This document is referred to as national guidelines for standing 
orders and it is only advisory, most Conservative groups have 
their own local standing orders drawing on these guidelines, or 
more likely not at all. 119 
Again, as with the Liberal Democrats, local Associations are able to 
approve and select candidates that may have had the group whip 
withdrawn. He explained: 
you see the local Association have the power to approve 
candidates. If the whip is withdrawn the local Association 
decide if the councillor is able to stand as the Conservative 
candidate. In fact the position is exactly the same with our 
Members of Parliament and if the MP's that have had the 
Parliamentary whip withdrawn were re-selected by their local 
party, they would be able to be the official Conservative 
candidate. 
He added rather ruefully 'Labour can tell its people what to do, we can't, 
unfortunately'. 120 
119 Interview with Alan Mabbut, Local Government Officer, 
Conservative Central Office. 
120 Alan Mabbut, Local Government Officer, Conservative Central 
Office. 
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The procedure for selection of candidates contained within the model rules 
for Conservative and Unionist Associations states: 
Whenever it may be necessary to select for support a local 
government candidate the branch or committee shall recommend 
a candidate to the Executive Council and if he (or she) is 
approved by the Executive Council they shall present him (or 
her) to a general meeting of the branch for adoption. 121 
A sitting Conservative councillor needs to make a written application to 
the Executive Council for re-adoption and the decision 'should be taken in 
reasonable time having regard to mutual convenience'. 122 All of which 
serves to emphasise the decision on candidacy rests with the local party 
organisations, not the disciplinary mechanisms of the group. 
The distinction between the Conservative /Liberal Democrat and Labour 
Party approach to the impact on the councillor's re-selection and political 
career should not be over-stated. Despite misrepresentation of that 
situation by Conservative and Liberal Democrat councillors in interview, 
the national standing orders and rules of the Labour Party are clear, and 
only the 'indefinite' withdrawal of the whip excludes the councillor from 
re-selection by the local party-123 
121Model Rules For Constituency, Branch and European Constituency 
Councils, section 19 (2) (b), `Procedure-Local Government Candidates', 
Reading, The National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, 
1993, p. 11. 
122 Ibid, Section 19 (2) (c), p. 11. 
123 Labour Party Rule Book, 5B. 4, p. 31.13A10,4, p. 63. 
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National Conservative Party attempts at ensuring cohesive and 
recognisable Conservative groups, is reflective of the underlying political 
philosophy of Conservatism and ideals of independence emanating from 
the 'localism' of its local representatives. An important distinction is drawn 
by the Conservative Party nationally between its councillors as 
representatives and its local party organisation and structure. The national 
party is more concerned with regulating local party units via the national 
model rules than organising its councillors into cohesive groups to which 
loyalty is owed. 124 
The question remains as to whether freedom from central party influence, 
indicative of the organisation and activities of Conservative groups, is 
transferred by those very groups, to its members and their ability to 
represent the electorate. The central Conservative Party may have the 
loosest of impacts on the structure and functioning of the party group of 
the three main parties, but do its groups impose such a loose rein on their 
councillors? Such freedom from central party control need not imply for 
the councillor an equal freedom from group control. 
THE PARTY GROUP: A LEGAL ENTITY 
The group through which councillors make collective decisions has no 
clear legal construction. Prior to the Local Government and Housing Act 
1989 the group existed outside of legislation. 125 As a result of the 
124 Conservative Model Rules for Constituency, Branch and European 
Constituency Councils. 
125 H. Maddick and E. P. Pritchard, `The Conventions of Local 
Authorities in the West Midlands: Part I- County Borough Councils', 
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Widdicombe committee an attempt was made to control certain aspects of 
group activity. The committee recommended that local authorities should 
be statutorily required to include provisions in their standing orders.. . 
for 
the composition of such committees and sub-committees [as have 
delegated powers] to reflect as far as practical, the composition of the 
council as a whole'. The chief executive of an authority was to be 
responsible for the 'detailed application of this rule'. 126 
The Widdicombe committee was concerned with minority party rights 
within the processes of local government but noted that the 'corporate 
nature of the current system [of decision-taking in local government] does 
not recognise the existence of adversarial party politics'. This factor in turn 
caused particular difficulties in authorities which were 'controlled by the 
majority party, with the minority party acting as an opposition' not 
contributing to the formulation of decisions. The committee recognised 
that political parties had 'created arrangements of their own, outside and 
alongside the formal statutory framework, whereby they can develop their 
policies in a one party setting. ' Indeed, policies would often be 'developed 
in meetings of the full party group'. The committee went as far as to 
comment that the formal decision-making process of a council can become 
'a hollow ritual devoid of substance if the issue has been pre-determined 
elsewhere'. 127 
Public Administration, 36 (2), Summer 1958, pp. 145-155. Maddick and 
Pritchard stated that a local authority made 'official diary entries and 
provides accommodation for a political group which in local government 
law does not exist'. The legal situation has changed little in the intervening 
39 years since that observation, p. 146. 
126 Widdicombe committee, Report of the Committee, s. 5.54, p. 81. 
127 Ibid, s. 5.7, p. 69. 
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Despite recognising the central importance of the party group to the 
processes of local government the Widdicombe committee offered no 
definition of the group to which legislation could turn. The group remained 
as it had prior to the Widdicombe committee investigation and report, that 
is, undefined in law. Indeed, the 1989 Act which regulated the 
appointment of political advisers/assistants to party groups contained the 
following footnote to section nine: 128 
there is nothing to prevent members forming themselves into 
political groups in order to secure the ten per cent qualifying 
seats, [for the appointment of political assistant] e. g. a number 
of Independents or, theoretically members of two wholly distinct 
parties - perhaps customarily and/or nationally in opposition to 
one another - who determine to do so provided that which they 
agree amongst themselves can properly be described as a 
'political group' (of which there is no statutory definition), e. g. 
by agreeing some common, local policies. 129 
128 The Widdicombe committee's report considered the form of 
administrative support or political assistance given to party groups. They 
identify that officers of an authority may be seconded to work for, or 
specifically recruited and appointed, to serve a party group. The 
committee was concerned that in some local authorities officers had been 
'singled out by the political parties as being sympathetic sources of 
advice'. The committee went on to make recommendations to control the 
appointment of such staff. Report of the committee, paras 6.170-6.172. 
pp. 151-152. and para 6.179 (a) and (b), p. 154. 
129 Local Government and Housing Act, 1989, Encyclopaedia of Local 
Government Law, Vol. 2, Sweet and Maxwell, 1995, sub-section (5)-(7), 
(10), p. 3697. 
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The Local Government (Committees and Political Groups) Regulations 
1990, provide a basis for a 'legal' understanding of the group. 130 Section 
7 of the regulations state that the 'Members of an authority are to be 
treated as divided into different political groups when there is at least one 
political group in existence constituted in accordance with regulation 
8'. 131 To be legally constituted as a party group (despite the lack of a 
legal definition), members must comply with Regulations 8 (1) to (5) (b), 
which require written notice to the proper officer of the council indicating 
that 'the members of the authority who have signed it wish to be treated as 
a political group'. The notice should specify the title of the group, its 
leader and deputy leader. Changes in details previously given under this 
regulation must also be notified to the proper officer. 132 A group must 
comprise a minimum of two members, if falling below two it 'shall cease 
to be constituted'. 133 
These regulations are not specifically to define the party group but to 
facilitate the proportional allocation of committee places, reflective of the 
size of party groups on a council. Proportionality was introduced as a 
consequence of the recommendations of the Widdicombe committee and 
via the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 (subsequently amended 
by the 1990 Regulations). 134 The Maud committee had identified as far 
130 The Local Government (Committees and Political Groups) 
Regulations 1990 (S. I. 1990 No 1553), Encyclopaedia of Local 
Government Law, Vol. 3, Sweet and Maxwell, 1995, pp. 273-276. 
131 Ibid, section 7, p. 273. 
132 Ibid, Section 8 (1), to (5) (b), pp. 273-274. 
133 Ibid. Section 8 (2), p. 274. 
134 Local Government and Housing Act, 1989, Encyclopaedia of Local 
Government Law, Vol. 2, section 15, pp. 3707-3709. 
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back as 1967 that proportionality was as an already important factor in 
Swedish local government. 135 
A definition of party group based on the allocation of committee places 
and the regulations concerning the 10 per cent of seats required before a 
group can appoint a political assistant, would be simplistic in the extreme. 
The current legal situation does however acknowledge that the process of 
councillors coming together in identifiable groupings for the conduct of 
council business arises from a number of causes not necessarily related to 
political parties outside the chamber. Indeed, a legal definition could 
dangerously restrict the room for political manoeuvre by councillors 
depending on the results of local elections. Thus the law outlines what a 
party group must do to be legally recognised as such. It does not go on to 
set out an adequate definition of a party group and say exactly what it is 
once it has been legally constituted, save for a minimum number of 
members required to register as a group. Indeed, it says little about what 
groups can and cannot do, save for committee composition and the 
appointment of support staff. 
The lack of any statutory definition led a Labour council leader to state 
that: 
we have not given notice that we are a group, when obviously 
we are, as that would mean we would have to give more places 
to the opposition. They are small in number and if the Labour 
group gave the legal notice that it was a group we would have 
to give the opposition some of our places. The electorate has 
chosen us overwhelmingly, so why should we give places up 
135 Maud committee, Vol. I, Report of the Committee, para 27, p. 7. 
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when we don't have to? But obviously I expect all Labour 
members to support the group whip, this is after all a political 
point, not a legal one. 
AN APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING THE PARTY GROUP. 
There is a duality to the councillor's relationship with the group. First, it is 
a 'theatre' in which the councillor undertakes acts of representation, that 
they may or may not choose to transfer to any other setting. Secondly, the 
group itself, by laying a superior claim to the loyalty of the councillor, 
over the electorate, becomes that which is 'represented'. The decision of 
the group is thus that which the councillor is expected to pursue, at least in 
public. 
As a result of group expectations of loyalty it has an impact on the ability 
of the electorate to 'participate' in local affairs and influences the 
representative activities of the councillor. It is the ability of the group to 
place itself at the centre of the local representative processes, as far as its 
members, are concerned, that is the defining element of the group system 
and its impact on representation. 
The party group in government and opposition 
That councillors elected as candidates of a political party meet in private 
to consider issues for decision, 'disseminate information' and decide voting 
strategies' reflects a governing and opposition approach to council 
business. 136 malst this takes no account of the impact of this 'coming 
136 Saunders, Urban Politics, p. 221. 
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together' of like-minded councillors, it does identify what is essentially the 
'exclusivity' of the group. 
To ensure that the group operates effectively, either as a governing 
machine, or opposition bloc, councillor loyalty to decisions is necessary to 
enhance the party's political success within the council as a representative 
of sectional interests. 137 Or, does the narrowing of political focus 
encouraged by the group system within a governing/opposition model 
draw the councillors' loyalty toward the need for group cohesion and thus 
away from representing local interests? 
Parkinson notes that political divisions can be exposed by secretive or 
dogmatic decision-making as a result of a governing approach where 
council leaders attitudes were that a 'party intent on governing was bound 
to break a few eggs'. 138 By accepting government and opposition 
adherence to a party line become a necessity for practical political 
decision-making. 139 This approach in turn reinforces the need for secrecy 
and a group system, designed to exclude political opposition and public 
137 Wiseman shows how the Labour group of Leeds City Council acted 
as a governing party. He also provides an example of apparent political 
embarrassment that can be caused by a `free vote' for group members in 
council, H. V. Wiseman, `The Working of Local Government in Leeds, 
Part I', pp. 52-53. Also see, `The Working of Local Government in Leeds, 
Part II' 
. 138 M. Parkinson, Liverpool on the Brink, Policy Journals, 1985, p. 153. 
139 Rees and Smith, Town Councillors, Labour councillors in Barking 
maintained their unity as a group inter alia their consciousness of being 
the 'administration or government in Barking', a government in which all 
members shared 'to a greater or lesser extent', pp. 88-89. See also, Jones, 
Borough Politics, pp. 67-68 and p. 204. Bulpitt, Party Politics, p. 123. 
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alike from policy and decision-making and thus distance the councillor 
from the represented. 
Group: loyalty and dissent 
Expectations of group loyalty is an experience common to councillors 
across the political spectrum and is coupled to the willingness of the 
councillor to accede to it. The occasions on which councillors defy, in 
one way or another, the decisions of the group, whether under pressure 
from the electorate or not, is seen as somehow acting pathologically. The 
group views disloyal behaviour as errant and not correctly focused on the 
proper recipient of councillor loyalty, that is the group itself Acting 
against the group and reflective of the expressed wishes of the electorate 
or section of it, is the exception, rather than the rule. 140 Councillors who 
dissent from the group are often categorised as party 'rebels', which may 
be taken to imply some inherent tendency to be a professional 
dissenter. 141 
Dissent by the councillor from the group represents a rejection of majority 
decisions and undermines the influence on the policy process that the 
group provides for its membership. 142 Equally, such dissent signifies a 
rejection of the notion of councillors as 'lobby fodder' for the group 
leadership. 143 Indeed, leadership style is an important element of group 
140 See, Hampton, Democracy and Community. S. Elkin, Politics and 
Land Use Planning: The London Experience, London, Cambridge 
University Press, 1974. Newton, Second City Politics. 
141 Newton, Second City Politics. 
142 Stoker, The Politics of Local Government, pp. 95-98. 
143 Gyford, Leach, and Game, The Changing Politics of Local 
Government, p. 173. 
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discipline. 144 As Cutler recalls, during his time as Leader of the GLC 
only three of 63 Conservative members were consistently dissident, 'a 
greenhorn, a professional dissenter and a councillor who had been out of 
step with the group for years'. Cutler claimed leadership success as a 
result of this 5 per cent dissent rate. 145 It is however, the elimination of 
councillor dissent from the group system that sets up the group and the 
electorate as competitors for councillor loyalty. 
The party group as a product of political culture and processes 
Councillors' political predispositions and attitudes towards representation 
display what they believe is the proper balance between the inputs to local 
democracy, made by the group and demanded by the electorate. 
Councillors' attitudes are examined in this work and provide evidence on 
the question of whether the group is of greater influence on acts of local 
representation by the councillor, than is the electorate. The predisposition 
toward representation produces a 'style' of politics that favours the closed 
and secretive processes of decision-making inherent in the group system. 
The strength of loyalty expectations generated by this style, makes the 
group the focus of councillor attention. 146 The group is also a 'theatre' for 
representation within which councillors can take part in decision-making, 
and stands aside from any other open or closed theatre in which 
councillors undertake representative activity. This position enables the 
144 Glassberg, Representation and Urban Community. 
145 H. Cutler, The Cutler Files, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982, 
p. 93. 
146 Eulau, Whalke, Buchanan and Ferguson, `The Role of the 
Representative'. Rao, The Making and Unmaking of Local Self- 
Government. 
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group to influence the representative activities of the councillor in each 
and every other representative theatre. 
An essential indicator of the influence of the group over the local 
representative processes is the extent to which councillors are 'bound' or 
at least influenced in their activities in various arena of representation, by 
the group, and whether that 'binding' process is mandatory. If bound, the 
councillor has no option but to act in a particular way, as this is enforced 
by a disciplinary machine, or is self-imposed, when the councillor believes 
in the right of the group to expect loyalty, without any recourse to 
disciplinary procedures. The councillor's relationship to his or her group is 
as much a product of personal political beliefs and attitudes towards how 
democracy should be done, as it is any fear of discipline by that party 
group- 
The group, then, is a pivotal component of local representative 
democracy. It commands the loyalty of its members and will provoke a 
crisis of representation when it demands councillor loyalty, on local 
issues, above the electorate. It is a part of the closed processes of 
democracy, being accessible only to members of the particular group, a 
few party representatives, or on occasions council officers. Its 
exclusiveness is linked to a concept of representative democracy in the 
Burkean mould where the 'representative' must be free from the 
'represented' to be able to 'represent' effectively and which results in the 
group becoming the focal point of representative activity. 147 
147 Eulau, Whalke, Buchanan and Ferguson, `The Role of the 
Representative'. Eulau and Whalke clearly identify Burke as a `party man' 
and state that, `above all freedom from local connections and instructions 
was for Burke a necessary and very practical condition to work for a 
Parliamentary party, be its leader, and accept the commitments of a party 
108 
Several factors combine to make it probable that the group will be a 
powerful player in local democracy. The secrecy that attaches to its 
activities, its impact on the relationship between the councillor and the 
represented, and its acceptance by councillors of the three main parties as 
a legitimate decision-making forum, all serve to sustain the group's 
position. To these factors can be added the all-pervasiveness of group 
within British local government, the scope of its reach across the theatres 
of representation available to the councillor, its loyalty-generating 
expectations and its linking of the local democratic system with the 
approach and priorities of national politics. 148 These factors serve to 
make it essential for any study of local politics and democracy to account 
for the impact of the group on the processes of representation. 
The chapters that follow will consider the tension inherent in the processes 
of local representation as they are experienced by the councillor, as when 
a crisis of representation occurs and the party group and electorate make 
competing claims on the councillor's loyalty over a local issue. In such 
crises councillors are called upon to use the representative discretion 
which attaches to their office to select which representative acts to 
perform, the combination of those acts and the theatres within which they 
are to be employed. The thesis assesses the impact of the party group on 
the representative actions of the councillor. It does this through an analysis 
man', H. Eulau and J. Whalke, The Politics of Representation, California, 
Sage, 1978, pp. 43-48. p. 47. Similarly the councillor - through the 
mechanism of party allegiance - could distance him or her self from the 
ward or division represented and focus representation on the party group. 
148 For a consideration of councillors' attitudes toward party politics in 
local government see, J. Blondel and R. Hall, `Conflict, Decision-Making 
and the Perceptions of Local Councillors', Political Studies, 15 (3), 1967, 
pp. 322-350. 
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of the complex set of interrelationships between: the councillor as a 
representative of an electoral area; the location of significant local issues; 
the councillors political affiliation-, their attitudes towards representation 
and the organisation and activity of the party group. 
The tables within the following chapters may not necessarily add back to 
100 due to the rounding of figures to a whole number, and non-response to 
questions. 
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3. COUNCILLORS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS REPRESENTATION 
The politicisation of local government created the political conditions in 
which the party group could become the prime focus of a councillor's 
representative attention. This chapter shows that local councillors are often 
willing to give this primacy to the party group. 
Exploring the influence of the party group over councillors' representative 
activities requires an assessment of councillor attitudes towards the 
business of representing their electors. This analysis can show the extent to 
which councillors' strength of attachment to the electorate and party group 
is in turn influenced by their own interpretation of the nature of the 
representative process. 
MEASURING ATTITUDES TOWARDS REPRESENTATION 
The survey conducted for this study (and further described in appendix 1) 
sought to make a general assessment of councillor attitudes towards the 
organisation of local government in its representative aspects. This process 
involved reproducing some of the attitude statements used in the research 
for the Widdicombe committee, with which the responding councillors 
were invited to express agreement or disagreement. 1 
The organisational focus of the Widdicombe survey was important 
because it tested beliefs in the ability of local government to reflect 
popular feeling, as well as attitudes towards the distribution of power 
within the local authority. These structural and power allocation issues in 
1Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. II, table 7.1, p. 65. 
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turn influence councillors' assessments of their own position. Thus, 
councillors' attitudes towards the manifesto as a reference point for 
decision-making becomes important. So too does their willingness, or 
otherwise, to open up the decision-making process to enhanced citizen 
input. The party and the public can each, in different ways, present, the 
councillor with a counter-balance to organisational and professional 
power. This chapter seeks to understand which of those counter-balancing 
elements councillors are disposed-to focus upon. 
It does so by constructing a new approach to identifying councillors' 
specific attitudes towards representation which drew on statements used 
by the Widdicombe committee, in conjunction with statements specifically 
designed for this study. The statements used by Widdicombe to assess 
councillor attitudes were not all useful in identifying what councillors felt 
was the appropriate input to local political decision-making by the 
electorate. Nor did they sufficiently test the attitudes of councillors 
towards what motivates the electorate to seek involvement, or make it 
possible to discern whether councillors focused on the needs of the 
electorate, the party or the council when it came to making decisions. 2 It 
was accordingly necessary to devise new statements for these purposes, 
organised around six indicators of representation, attitude statements with 
which the responding councillors were invited to agree or disagree. These 
statements tested councillors" attitudes towards the nature of citizen 
involvement, who should take local decisions, the influence of the party 
manifesto and the motivation for electors' interest in local government. 
2 Ibid, table 7.1, p. 65. 
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The six indicators have been used to construct an index of representation. 
The index highlights the existence amongst the sample group of councillors 
of both positive and negative attitudes towards representation. The index 
enables the allocation of a representative score to the sample as a whole 
and to sub-groups within the sample. The most important factor shaping 
these sub-groups is party affiliation, and the chapter first considers these 
party comparisons in detail. 
Having identified councillors' attitudes and orientations towards 
representation, the chapter then considers the influence of the party group 
on the councillor as a local representative. It considers the relationship 
between attitudes towards democracy and the importance given by the 
councillor to the party group. It also explores the link between 
predisposition and political affiliation, on the one hand, and acts of 
representation on the other hand. Acts of representation are defined as 
'speaking', 'voting', 'abstaining', 'absenting' or 'complying'. The chapter then 
considers the venues, or theatres, within which such acts can be 
conducted: both public and open, or private and closed. Where it is useful 
to do so for illustrative purposes, material drawn from interviews with 
councillors is also presented here. 
COUNCILLORS' ATTITUDES IN 1985 AND 1994. 
As a result of the questionnaire survey for this research a total of 629 
responses were received from a total of 1067 Councillors drawn from 20 
councils across the West Midlands and surrounding region. This 
respondent group comprised 548 party affiliates, 64 Independents or 
members of other groupings, and 17 that did not respond to the party 
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affiliation question. Much of the analysis that follows is confined to the 
identifiable 'party' councillors. As part of the questionnaire five of the 
statements used by the Widdicombe committee's research study on 
councillors' attitudes were included. Those statements were: 
Ordinary citizens should have more say in the decisions made 
by local government; 
The way local authorities are presently organised prevents them 
from dealing adequately with today's problems; 
The first concern of the elected members of the majority party is to 
implement the party manifesto; 
Back-bench members have little real influence over decision- 
making; 3 and 
Council officials have too much influence on decision-making. 
Comparisons between 1985 and 1994 are used only to suggest general 
developments in councillor attitudes towards representation, as the more 
limited and geographically restricted nature of the research for this work 
counsels caution in any comparison with a larger-scale national survey. 
However when allowance is made for the different geographical span and 
sample design of the two surveys, there are indications here that some 
3 The term back-bench member is used here for convenience to distinguish 
between the position of the councillor that holds office either within the 
council as leader, deputy leader, chair or vice-chair of a committee or sub 
committee, or within the party group, from those councillors holding no 
offices. This distinction is of interest because as Widdicombe notes 'office 
-holding might be of some importance in shaping attitudes to local 
authority administration'. Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. II, p. 68. 
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developments may have taken place in the intervening decade, although it 
is worth noting what has not changed: as table 3.1 shows, the responses to 
'the way local authorities are presently organised' and 'Council officials 
have too much influence' are remarkably similar in both years and display 
a consistency of attitude towards these aspects over the period between 
the surveys. 
While it is impossible to disentangle the effects of place (a regional survey 
compared with a national) and time (an interval of nine years between the 
two surveys) it would nonetheless be reasonable to assume that some 
element of the difference between 1985 and 1994 responses can be 
attributed to councillor attitudes shifting over time. There are no time- 
series studies of councillor attitudes, in the sense of surveys of the same 
individual councillors. Between one survey and another, councillor 
turnover would be considerable, 4 and successive cohorts of councillors are 
very likely to display changes in social and political attitudes. 
It is difficult to asses the impact on comparisons between the two surveys 
of the difference in size and proportion of the total survey made up of 
councillors from the three main political parties. The smaller size of the 
1994 survey and the almost equal number of Conservative and Labour 
respondents, compared to Widdicombe's respondent political party sub- 
groups, could be an influence on attitudinal variations between the two 
surveys. Equally though, any similarities are all the more striking for this 
difference in survey base. It should also be noted that by 1994 the Liberals 
had become the Liberal Democrats, and the social and political 
developments in that party could also have influenced the responses of 
4 Bloch, The Turnover of Local Councillors. 
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Liberal Democrat councillors. Table 3.1 compares the findings from the 
statements used in both the 1985 and 1994 surveys, and the final column 
summarises the percentage shifts in overall response. In this table, as in 
some later tables, the response categories 'strongly agree/agree' and 
'strongly disagree/disagree' are collapsed in order to avoid over reflecting 
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Bearing in mind the need for caution in comparing the results of the 
Widdicombe committee research and the research conducted for this 
study, two factors are interesting to note. First, the general similarity in 
responses to the statements concerning the organisation of local 
authorities, the importance of the manifesto, the role of back-bench 
councillors and the power of council officers. The results are close enough 
to suggest that despite both the passage of time and the very different 
geographical scope of the two surveys, there is a constancy in councillors' 
attitudinal predispositions to these aspects of the situation. Both the 
sample groups reflect similar levels of dissatisfaction with organisational 
issues and with the influence of the officers over decision-making. 
The responses to these two topics are remarkably constant over the 
intervening period and indicate the existence of a feeling of distance 
between the councillor and the representative body of which he or she is 
an elected member. The reasons for the 11-point reduction in the 
importance allocated to the 'manifesto' are explored in more detail in the 
next section. 
A reluctance to admit to any diminution of influence for the back-bench 
councillor was also common to the two surveys, although the inclusion of 
council leaders, deputy leaders, chairs and vice-chairs of committees and 
sub-committees (and opposition shadow roles) in those responses 
influences the results where the proportion of these office-holders differ 
between the two surveys. Widdicombe reported expected differences in 
attitude towards this aspect between leaders, other office-holders and 
back-benchers with some '18 per cent of leaders agreeing that back- 
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benchers have little real influence, compared with 34 per cent of other 
office-holders and 43 per cent of the back-benchers'. 5 
Leaders and office-holders are close to the council machinery and the 
levers of power, but as active members of their party group may be 
reluctant to admit that their position is anything other than 'first among 
equals'. Back-benchers on the other hand, with far less day-to-day contact 
with the council machinery open to them, will experience their own 
distancing from the council and their inability to input to decisions, in any 
other forum than the group, as indicative of their own lack of influence. 
Simply, leaders and other office-holders are reluctant to admit that the 
majority of their members have little influence, whilst back-benchers 
experience that very aspect first hand. The conclusion here is that 
councillors from the two surveys broadly share similar satisfactions and 
frustrations, at least on this point. 
That two of the statements (local authority organisation and officer 
influence) show a similarity of response, is itself a prima facie argument 
for comparability, and an indication of the reliability of the measure. We 
can, therefore, regard substantial differences in the reported figures as 
reflecting real differences between the two samples. Thus the first 
statement, 'ordinary citizens should have more say', indicates a 
considerable 14 point difference in attitude between the two surveys, with 
the later sample showing a far more positive attitude. 
5 Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. II, p. 69, and Table 7.7, p. 70. 
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ASSESSING REPRESENTATIVE ATTITUDE: INDICATORS OF 
REPRESENTATION. 
To assess councillor attitudes towards representation a set of indicators is 
required which addresses the 'representative crisis' faced by the councillor 
as outlined in chapters 1 and 2. Councillors were accordingly asked to 
respond to six specific statements regarding aspects of the representative 
processes. Two of the statements were re-runs of the statements posed by 
the Widdicombe committee, regarding citizen 'say' and the priority to be 
accorded to the party manifesto, and the 1985 and 1994 results are 
compared in this section. 6 Specifically excluded from the 1994 survey 
were the four statements which Widdicombe criticised as producing 
almost 'unanimous agreement', in other words, they had resulted in 
conventional normative responses which revealed little if anything of 
councillors' actual attitudes to the electorate. 7 These four were replaced 
with statements constructed specifically for this survey, to test councillors' 
attitudes toward the value of citizen input to local government. 
Councillors were asked to respond to the following six statements as 
indicators of their orientation to representation: 
Ordinary citizens should have more say in the decisions 
made by local government; 
6 Ibid, p. 65. 
7 Ibid, pp. 64-67. Statements criticised by Widdicombe were i) councillors 
should represent the views of all the people in their Ward, ii) local 
councillors not central government should make local decisions, iii) most 
important role of local government is to represent the interest of people in 
the area iv) councillors are too busy to give much time to the public. 
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More should be done to interest people in local 
government; 
More should be done to involve ordinary people in 
local decision-making; 
It is for councillors rather than the public or pressure 
groups to make decisions on local issues and 
priorities; 
The first concern of the majority party is to implement the 
party manifesto; and 
People only become interested in local government 
when an issue directly affects them. 
Statements 1 and 5 are a re-run of those used in the Widdicombe 
committees' research, and statement 4 is a re-working of 'It is for local 
councillors rather than central government to determine local needs and 
priorities'. This has been developed to turn the attention of the councillor 
away from central government (to which attitudes had earlier been shown 
to be fairly uniform) towards the local community, and was framed in such 
a way as to reflect the idea of the community as a body of opinion, 
organised around some purposeful objective, and not simply the citizen as 
an individual seeking some generalised input. 
In accordance with the precepts of attitude research, councillors were 
provided with a balance between three statements with a positive 
orientation toward the community and three which were indicative of a 
more negative attitude toward the community. The three community 
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orientated statements were; 'ordinary citizens should have more say in the 
decisions made by local government'; 'more should be done to interest 
people in local government'; and 'more should be done to involve ordinary 
people in local decision-making'. 
These three statements use the concept of 'citizen input' as the focus of 
representative attention. The three key elements of citizen 'say', 'interest' 
and 'involvement' are discrete but linked aspects of input, as the councillor 
can (and in practice does) discriminate between them. The citizen can be 
provided with both the facilities and opportunities for enhanced 'say', but 
if local authorities and the decisions they take lack salience for the 
electorate, then this will depress levels of interest and thus lead to a lower 
degree of involvement. The councillor is thus both a gatekeeper to power, 
and a potential facilitator of enhanced citizen interest in the processes of 
local democracy. As the concept of event-driven democracy suggests, the 
councillor can channel citizen interest around specific issues and events of 
community significance into the political processes, thus raising interest 
and then involvement and ultimately citizen 'say'. This process is 
dependent of course on the councillor accepting the commitment to 
enhance 'say' rather than just enhance 'interest'. 
The topic of 'involvement' enables councillors to respond to a generalised 
statement regarding increases in contact and communication between local 
government and the citizenry which do not conflict with the councillor as a 
decision-maker and final arbiter of local affairs. Most councillors 
expressed the wish that people were more interested in what they do, and 
this was not seen as threatening the councillor as a decision-maker, but 
expressing a more generalised interest in the activities of local government. 
The issue of enhanced citizen 'say' builds logically on the idea of interest 
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and involvement but has a sharper focus on a specific input to decision- 
making. 
These three positive (or community-orientated) statements recognise, as 
did Arnstein, that there are logical steps of progression for citizen input to 
local government. 8 The survey for this thesis allowed councillors to 
discriminate between citizen interest, involvement and say. This 
discrimination was necessary to determine the nature of citizen input that 
was congruent with councillors' own attitudes to the proper balance 
between the citizen and the councillor as a local decision-maker. 
The three negative (or councillor-orientated) statements were 'it is for 
councillors rather than the public or pressure groups to make decisions on 
local issues and priorities'; 'the first concern of the majority party is to 
implement the party manifesto'; and 'people only become interested in local 
government when an issue directly affects them'. 
These three statements present the councillor with an opportunity to 
display an orientation away from the community or citizen and toward the 
elected representative and his or her party as a focus of representation. In 
the first, councillors were presented with a statement which clearly sets out 
their office as the arbiter of local affairs and final decision-maker, over and 
above any input for the community. In the second they were also given the 
opportunity to express their attachment to the broad set of election 
promises that are made within a local manifesto. The final statement tests 
councillors' attitudes towards community interest in local affairs and 
8 S. Arnstein, `Ladder of Citizen Participation', Journal of American 
Institute of Planners, 35,1969, pp. 216-224. 
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presents them with an opportunity to express their own scepticism towards 
the electorate as a focus for their representative activities. 
More 'say' for the citizen 
In order to establish the influence on councillors' representative activities 
and focus on the party group of the councillor's own political affiliation, 
the responses to the six statements are broken down by the important 
variable of political party affiliation. Only the responses of those 
councillors from the Conservative, Labour or Liberal Democrat parties 
have been included in the following tables, the small number of non-party 
councillors being excluded for this purpose from all the following tables. 
Table 3.2 shows responses to the statement 'ordinary citizens should have 
more say in the decisions made by local government'. The final column 
showing the percentage margin of agreement over disagreement, discounts 
those respondents who neither agree nor disagree. 
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Table 3.2. Support for more say for citizens in decisions, 
by political party 
Agree Neither Disagree Margin of base 
% % % Agreement 
1985 
Labour 74 14 11 63 (496) 
Liberal 87 8 3 84 (133) 
Conservative 35 30 34 1 (595) 
1994 
Labour 84 13 3 81 (223) 
Lib Dem 92 62 90 (99) 
Conservative 57 26 17 40 (223) 
Source: 1985 figures, Widdicombe committee Vol. II, table 7.15, p. 75. 
Comparisons of two very different surveys must be treated with caution 
because of the different geographical scope of the two works and the 
obvious differences in sample size and design. Even so, a general but 
striking observation is possible, that in both 1985 and 1994, the 
Conservative councillors were considerably less supportive of the idea of 
increased 'say' for the citizen in the decisions of local government than 
either their Labour or Liberal Democrat counterparts. Widdicombe 
discovered party differences to be considerable when responding to this 
issue, and those differences have remained. 9 Comparison of the two sets 
of figures also indicates that in 1994 councillors generally showed a 
greater willingness to support an increased 'say' for citizens in local 
9 Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. II, p. 75. 
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government, with an increase in positive responses to the item across all 
parties. 
Table 3.2. presents a clear centre-left balance in favour of agreement with 
the proposition regarding citizen 'say', with Labour and Liberal Democrat 
councillors showing a close affinity on this aspect. What is not shown in 
the table is that Liberal Democrats, recorded the greatest 'agree strongly' 
response at 68 per cent, against 33 per cent Labour and 14 per cent of 
Conservative councillors. The table shows that the Conservative councillor 
records the greatest shift in opinion on this question, but Conservatives 
had the greatest amount of ground to make up in terms of a positive 
responses to the issue. Widdicombe also reported that the 'Liberals were 
almost unanimous in favour of more say' with 58 per cent registering 
strong agreement and similarly that only four of their 133 Liberals 
dissented from the idea of more 'say' for the citizen. ' 0 This survey found a 
further increase in Liberal Democrat support for more citizen say, with 68 
per cent agreeing strongly with the proposition and only two of the 99 
Liberal Democrat respondents dissenting from the proposition. 
These findings underpin the conclusion from the research for Widdicombe, 
that in response to this question, 'the party affiliation of the councillor was 
a uniquely powerful discriminator'. The findings also indicate the existence 
of a clear centre-left affinity on this issue, rather than a simple single party 
distinction. ll 
10Ibid, table 7.15, pp. 75-76. 
11 Widdicombe identified the problem for attitude measurement generated 
by a safety net response of `neither/nor', stating that 'the often large 
proportions of councillors who neither agreed nor disagreed with the 
statement [citizen 'say' ] complicate the picture', finding some 21 percent of 
councillors in this category. Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. II, p. 
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Citizen input does not necessarily result in a transference of power from 
the elected representative to the community. Councillors can quite 
rationally indicate they favour more 'say' for the citizen whilst retaining 
final decision-making power as the legitimised public representative. 
Decisions thus made are filtered through the party group. Despite this, the 
responses indicate however general support for the concept that citizens 
should have a 'say' - and more of it. 
Interest in local government 
Councillors across all parties overwhelmingly shared the view that the 
interest of the local community in the activities of local government should 
be increased, although on this issue the Conservative councillors lag 
behind their Labour and Liberal Democrat counterparts. Table 3.3 shows 
the responses to the statement more should be done to interest people in 
local government' and in this case the degree of agreement is shown, as the 
overall results are so strongly skewed in that direction. 
Table 3.3. Support for more interest in local government, 
by political party 
Agree Agree Neither Disagree Disagree Margin base 
strongly strongly of Agree- 
ment 
Party % % % %% 
Labour 46 50 3 ** +96 (224) 
Lib Dem 54 42 4 -- +96 (97) 
Con 25 60 14 1- +84 (224) 
76. In this study 18 per cent of councillors selected the neither/ nor 
response option and this slightly lower proportion was reflected across the 
political parties. 
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On the question of raising the level of community interest in the activities 
of local government the three parties record high levels of positive 
agreement. This supports the view that councillors across all parties wish 
the electorate to give a higher level of attention to local government. That 
position is evenly supported across the three main political parties as a 
positive relationship with the concept of representation, as defined and 
experienced by the councillor however and not by the represented. 
Conservative councillors record the lowest level of agreement to this 
statement and when the 'agree' categories are compressed Conservatives 
are some 11 per cent behind both the Liberal Democrats and Labour 
councillors' responses. 
The responses clearly indicate that councillors feel the electorate should be 
encouraged to take an interest in the activities of local government. The 
high margins of agreement to this proposition - across the parties - indicate 
the underlying acceptance amongst councillors for a more interested 
electorate. This argument is supported further by looking at the responses 
from councillors to a similar proposition, that more should be done to 
involve ordinary people in local decision-making. 
Involving people in local government 
Table 3 
.4 shows responses to the statement 
'More should be done to 
involve ordinary people in local decision-making'. Once again, the shift in 
responses call for different degrees of agreement to be shown here. 
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Table 3.4. Support for more 'involvement in local decision-making' 
by political party 
Agree Agree Neither Disagree Disagree Margin base 
Strongly Strongly of Agree- 
ment 
Party % % % % % 
Labour 24 57 15 3 * +78 (223) 
Lib Dem 51 43 4 2 - +92 (95) 
Con 10 42 25 21 2 +29 (219) 
The centre-left agreement on the concept of a 'citizen orientation' is again 
displayed in responses to the proposition concerning enhanced citizen 
involvement. Labour and Liberal Democrat councillors indicate a high 
level of support for unspecified actions to ensure greater citizen 
involvement. These responses mirror almost exactly those given to the 
issue of greater citizen 'say'. There is clearly less enthusiasm from 
Conservative councillors for action to ensure greater citizen involvement. 
Labour and Liberal Democrats express a stronger desire to see an 
enhancement of citizen involvement in local government, with the Liberal 
Democrats recording the highest level of compressed 'agree' responses to 
the proposition, standing at 94 per cent compared to 81 per cent Labour 
and 52 per cent Conservative. Only two Liberal Democrats of the 95 who 
responded to this statement, and seven of the 223 Labour councillors, 
disagreed with the proposition that more should be done to 'involve' 
citizens in local government. Yet again party affiliation is shown to be an 
important discriminator of councillor attitudes towards this aspect of 
democracy. This point is further underlined by the margin of agreement 
which places the Conservative councillor some 49 points behind Labour 
and 63 points behind the Liberal Democrats. 
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Councillors should decide 
Table 3.5 shows responses to the statement 'it is for local councillors 
rather than members of the public and pressure groups to make decisions 
on local issues and priorities'. 
Table 3.5. Support for 'local Councillors should decide' by 
political party 
Agree Agree Neither Disagree Disagree 
strongly Strongly 
Party % % % % % 
Labour 14 43 18 21 4 
Lib Dem 9 44 15 29 3 
Con 29 51 7 12 1 






An interesting link has emerged here with the propositions set out in tables 
3.1 and 3.2. Whilst some 74 per cent of all councillors, in the sample 
group respond positively to the idea that ordinary citizens should have 
more 'say', 66 per cent of them 'agreed' or 'agreed strongly' that councillors, 
rather than the public, should make the decisions on local issues and 
priorities. A majority of councillors across all political parties, including 
the Liberal Democrats, took this position. In all parties, however, a far 
larger proportion of the responses fell into the 'agree' rather than the 'agree 
strongly' category. 
The compressed results indicate the striking divergence in responses 
between the centre-left and Conservative councillors who express more 
and stronger agreement with this statement and far greater support for an 
unhindered role for the councillor as the arbitrator of local issues and 
decisions. Some 80 per cent of Conservatives, against 57 per cent of 
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Labour and 53 per cent of Liberal Democrats fell into the compressed 
'agree' category. Again, the margin of agreement underlines the strength of 
attachment of the Conservative councillor to the view that 'councillors 
should decide'. The sheer scale of the disparity between centre-left and 
Conservative councillors is indicative of an attitude toward representation 
which is peculiar to the Conservative, who seemingly wishes decisions to 
be unfettered by citizen input. Councillors of all parties however, clearly 
draw a boundary between a citizen orientation and involvement in local 
government, and their carefully guarded position as the final arbiters of 
local issues. The centre-left perspective is somewhat more willing to see 
decisions kept closer to the community, but a large majority of the centre- 
left still supports the councillors role as final decision-maker. 
Implementing the manifesto 
Councillors were asked to respond to the statement 'the first concern of the 
elected members of the majority party is to implement the party manifesto'. 
This question was asked in 1985 by the Widdicombe committee, so table 
3.6 compares the 1985 findings with the findings of this survey. 
When presented with a statement which specifically addresses the priority 
given to the concept of the party and party policy, councillors could 
respond normatively to this statement, thinking that the manifesto should 
be implemented as a priority; while recognising that political 
circumstances and varying degrees of attachment to particular manifesto 
items may result it those policies not being implemented for lack of 
political will. Or, councillors may take a 'positive' orientation toward the 
manifesto and report the fact that it is given priority in practice. 
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Table 3.6. Agreement that implementing the party manifesto has 
priority, by political party 
Agree Neither Disagree Margin of base 
% % % Agree- 
ment 
1985 
Labour 79 9 19 +60 (496) 
Liberal 33 21 56 - 23 (133) 
Con 49 20 44 +5 (595) 
1994 
Labour 67 13 20 +47 (222) 
Lib Dem 33 20 47 - 14 (95) 
Con 32 21 47 - 15 (222) 
Source: 1985 figures, Widdicombe, Research Vol. II, table 7.17, p. 78. 
A minority party may view the majority group's implementation of 
manifesto policies in wholly negative terms, as they would oppose 
politically those policies, but when faced with commenting on their own 
manifesto may then provide normative responses or positive commitment 
to it. Even so, research for Widdicombe noted that 'half of the 
Conservative councillors acknowledged the pre-emptive claims of the 
manifesto, even when they sat as minority members on Labour controlled 
councils'. 12 Care must be taken, then, in interpreting the responses. 
In 1994 some 47 per cent of all councillors agreed that the manifesto is 
given priority, which indicates the levels of acceptance amongst 
12 Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. II, p. 78. 
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councillors that the party manifesto should be the first concern of at least 
the majority party members and is also a powerful indicator of the 
acceptance of 'party' as a councillor's representative focus. The responses 
must be treated with some caution and an appropriate interpretation placed 
on the meaning of the term 'party'. It is clear that both in 1985 and 1994 it 
is the Labour councillor that places a far greater emphasis on the 
manifesto, than either Conservative or Liberal Democrat councillors. 
There are differences between the responses for this work and the findings 
of the Widdicombe committee, presented in table 3.6 which at first glance 
suggest a softening in this 'manifestoism'. 13 The variations in responses 
could too easily be inferred as representing a shift away from party, but the 
exclusion in this research of London boroughs and the predominance of 
district councils over metropolitan areas, prohibits such an interpretation. 
The research for Widdicombe covered seven metropolitan county councils, 
16 London boroughs and 18 metropolitan district councils in England. 14 
This survey contained only three metropolitan boroughs from a total of 20 
local authorities. The Widdicombe research, whilst noting its 'fairly strong 
phrasing of manifestoism' reported that '52 per cent were prepared to go 
along with it' and in addition that 'there was notably more agreement in the 
London boroughs and the metropolitan counties'. 15 Whilst 47 per cent of 
the 1994 survey of 20 authorities (14 of which were district councils) 
responded in agreement with manifestoism, Widdicombe found in 1985 
that 44 per cent of district councillors also agreed. The findings of this 
survey thus underpin rather than undermine Widdicombe's results, and 
13 Ibid, table 7.17, p. 78. 
14 Ibid, table 1.2, p. 16. 
15 Ibid, p. 76. 
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support that type of authority exerts a powerful effect on attitudes to the 
manifesto . 
Given this impact of the type of local authority involved in the surveys and 
the apparent effect on the findings, it may be concluded that the sample 
design reduced the number of representatives of the more politicised style 
of politics. Equally, there could also be a trend away from the manifesto as 
a first priority. This would be consistent with the earlier findings, although 
it is important not to discount the actual scale of agreement, noted in 
Widdicombe's observation that it would appear that councillor's 
acceptance of obligations which derive from election on a party platform is 
both more widespread and more long-standing than casual observation 
would suggest. 16 
That said, in this survey the Labour councillors in agreement with the 
proposition exceed the total of 'neither/nor', responses and 'disagrees' 
which stand at 33 per cent. The reverse is true with the responses received 
from both Liberal Democrats and Conservative councillors, Labour 
councillors score highest over Conservative and Liberal Democrats in both 
the 'agree strongly' and 'agree' categories. Party, in the guise of a manifesto 
placed before the electorate, is clearly still a higher priority for Labour 
councillors than their counterparts in either of the other two major parties, 
both of whom display a considerable negative margin in response to this 
statement. 
16Ibid, p. 78. 
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People's interest influenced by the impact of issues 
Table 3.7 shows the responses to the statement 'people only become 
interested in local government when an issue directly affects them', and 
clearly indicates a level of scepticism amongst councillors in regard to the 
motivations of those they represent. 
Table 3.7. Agreement with `people are only interested in local 
government when an issue affects them', by political 
party 
Agree Agree Neither Disagree Disagree Margin of base 
Strongly Strongly Agree- 
ment 
Party % % % % % 
Labour 25 54 7 12 2 +65 (224) 
Lib Dem 29 58 4 8 1 +78 (99) 
Con 35 50 6 7 2 +76 (224) 
The stated support amongst councillors for an increased 'say' for the public 
in decisions made by local government is counterpointed by the equally 
firm view that people only become interested in local government when an 
issue directly affects them. Some 83 per cent agreed with that proposition, 
reflecting a well-entrenched cynicism amongst councillors of all parties. 
That attitude is displayed to a slightly lesser degree amongst Labour 
councillors than those of the other two parties. When the responses are as 
high as presented in table 3.7. the questions of degree fade in significance, 
the clear and conclusive majority in all parties indicate a deep feeling 
amongst the political representatives of the community that the citizenry 
are primarily motivated by self-interest. 
The Liberal Democrat figure of 87 per cent in agreement with the 
statement, the highest response amongst the three parties, is intriguing, as 
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this appears at first sight to sit uneasily with the Liberal Democrat 
approach to local 'community politics'. In fact, the response may actually 
reflect the Liberal Democrat experience of organising local campaigns and 
motivating the local community around particular issues and events, in 
which the electorate do not share the same level of general interest or 
commitment. Councillors specialising in a community-orientated approach 
may be the more acutely aware that the community will only be interested 
in issues of direct relevance to it. At the same time, the community politics 
approach becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, as it encourages local 
communities to fix on very local issues that affect their own interests. 
Across all parties the majority of responses to this statement fall into the 
'agree' rather than the 'agree strongly' category, it is however, again, the 
margin of agreement which underscores the depth of councillors' 
scepticism toward the electorate. The responses show that the levels of 
agreement with the statement exceed, for all parties, the total of the 
'neither/nor' and 'disagree' responses. Such negative attitudes towards the 
electorate, when displayed by their representatives, seriously call into 
question some of the assumptions of representative democracy and lend 
support to the notion of event-driven democracy. Other research indicates 
that the scepticism is mutual, councillors' scepticism about the electors 
being mirrored by the unwillingness on the electors part, to trust 
councillors to place the interests of their electorate above those of their 
political party. 17 This mutual scepticism is potentially damaging to the 
fabric of local representative democracy and probably sustains the 
councillors' propensity to make the group the centre of their representative 
attention. 
17 Young and Rao, 'Faith in Local Democracy', p. 109. 
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AN INDEX OF REPRESENTATION 
Responses to the six statements indicate an orientation amongst 
councillors that is indicative of both a sharing of attitude between the 
centre-left and centre-right on particular aspects of representation. In order 
to further explore councillors' attitudes towards representation and the 
ways they understand and make sense of their day-to-day experiences as 
councillors, the six statements have been used to construct an index of 
representation. This index was designed to assess councillors' overall 
orientations towards representation and to locate the electorate within their 
'mental map'. This process enables us to gauge the strength of 
representative attachment to the electorate, which can then be compared to 
the countervailing pressures generated by the party group. 
The index uses the six statements sorted into their negative and positive 
categories, and takes the sum of the responses received to present a 
numerical score for councillors' attitudes toward representation. 
The figures presented in table 3.8 below are a total of responses to the 
positive, community-orientated statements, from all 'party' councillors. The 
final column in table 3.8, showing the margin of agreement, is the total 
'agree' figure remaining after the 'disagree' and 'neither agree/ nor disagree' 
responses are taken from the sum of the replies. It has been calculated thus 
to avoid artificially inflating the margin of agreement by including those 
that 'neither agreed/nor disagreed' in that total. 
Table 3.9 presents the responses to the negative orientation statements, 
which focus the councillors' representational attention away from the 
community. Similarly the final column in table 3.9 showing the margin of 
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agreement is the sum remaining after the total of the 'disagree' and 'neither 
agree/nor disagree' responses have been taken from the total. 


























From these raw figures an index can be calculated. The index scores could 
range from -3.00 that is no 'agree' response given to the three statements, 
and all responses are to disagree, to a maximum score of 3.00, which 
would be achieved were 'agree' responses to be given to all three items by 
all respondents. The total of agree (or positive) responses sums to 1287. 
This figure is then divided by the total number of party councillors (548) to 
produce a score 2.34 from a maximum of 3.00. This is the score from all 
the relevant respondents: an analogous score can be calculated for 
councillors of different political affiliation for the purpose of inter-party 
comparison. 
A similar approach is taken to the negative index, which likewise can 
range from a score of -3.00 to a maximum of 3.00: table 3.9 displays the 
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raw data. The total number of 'agree' statements on the negative index is 
1062, which, when divided by the respondent group of 548, produces a 
score of 1.93 from the range of -3.00 to 3.00 maximum. 









Agree Neither Disagree Margin of 
Agreement 
357 71 116 +170 
251 94 194 - 37 
454 32 61 +361 
The positive and negative indexes present an overall picture of councillors' 
attitudes towards community and representation. These can be further 
refined, using the index to examine the pattern of attitudes across the main 
three political parties. The results presented below display these variations. 
The influence of political affiliation on councillors' attitudes to 
representation 
How far do the variations in attitudes towards representation reflect the 
councillor's membership of a particular political party? This question can 
be answered by calculating the two representative indexes for each sub- 
group of councillors, defined in terms of their political affiliations. 
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Table 3.10. The influence of councillors' political party affiliation: 
the positive index 







Labour 187 29 7 + 151 
Lib Dem 91 6 2 + 83 
Con 126 59 38 + 29 
Do more 
to interest 
Labour 216 6 2 +208 
Lib Dem 93 4 0 + 89 
Con 190 31 3 + 156 
Do more 
to involve 
Labour 182 34 7 + 141 
Lib Dem 89 4 2 + 83 
Con 113 55 51 +7 
Again, the total responses are calculated, the raw data being shown in 
table 3.10. The final column shows the total margin of 'agree' responses 
over 'neither agree/nor disagree' and 'disagree' responses. The index is 
derived by taking the total positive 'agree' figures for each party, dividing 
them by the number of respondents in each sub-group to produce the 
positive index score on the range of -3.00 to 3.00 for each party as shown 
in table 3.11. 
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Table 3.11. The positive index score by political party 
Total Total Positive 
positive respondents index score 
agree 
responses 
Labour 585 224 2.61 
Lib Dem 273 99 2.75 
Con 429 225 1.90 
This approach is then replicated to create a negative index. First the raw 
data are displayed in table 3.12. The final column shows the resultant 
'agree' figure after taking the 'disagree' and 'neither agree/nor disagree' 
responses from the 'agree' replies. 
Table 3.12. The influence of councillors' political party affiliation: 
the negative index 










Labour 126 40 56 + 30 
Lib Dem 52 15 31 +6 
Con 179 16 29 + 134 
Labour 149 29 44 + 76 
Lib Dem 31 19 45 - 33 
Con 71 46 105 - 80 
Labour 178 15 31 + 132 
Lib Dem 86 4 9 + 73 
Con 190 13 21 +156 
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Using the same approach as with the positive index the following negative 
index score on the range of -3.00 to 3.00 for each party affiliation is 
derived, and the results shown in table 3.13. 
Table 3.13. The negative index score by political party 
Total agree Total Negative 
responses respondents index score 
Labour 453 224 2.02 
Liberal Dem 169 99 1.70 
Con 440 225 1.95 
The party affiliation and positive and negative representative index scores 
can then be viewed thus: 















Analysis by political party indicates a clear-cut attitudinal difference 
between political affiliates and the existence of a centre-left alignment 
when it comes to a positive attitude towards representation based on a 
generalised approach to the concept of 'citizen input' to local government. 
However, the negative scores of Labour and Conservative councillors 
converge, and on this measure the Liberal Democrats stand out as by far 
the lowest group on the negative index. The reason, however, is not hard 
to find in table 3.12. Labour councillors are strongly oriented toward the 
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party manifesto, while Conservatives are the most inclined to assert that 
'councillors should decide'. The result in terms of the 'closure' of the 
decision process in both these parties is remarkably similar, even if it 
reflects quite different orientations to decision-making. 
Comparing the two representative scores indicates that Liberal Democrat 
councillors maintain the highest positive attitude towards representation 
and the community and the lowest negative attitude. 
VARIETIES OF COUNCILLOR ATTITUDE TOWARD 
REPRESENTATION 
The responses to the six statements used as indicators of representation 
compare councillors' attitudes to the concept of 'community input' to local 
government and their attitudes to their own position as decision-makers. 
The responses fall into a clear pattern bearing upon three distinct issues: 
citizen/community involvement; community motivation for interest; and 
the councillor as decision-maker. 
Within each of these sets of responses there exists a variation across party, 
and the centre-left and centre-right axis shifts according to the issue or 
statement itself. Clearly, party affiliation and the very fact of 'party' itself 
are powerful factors shaping councillors' attitudes toward representation 
and the electorate. The responses reported are considered here in more 
detail and interview material is introduced both to illustrate and elaborate 
the points. Details of the interviews conducted with councillors from the 
three main parties are to be found in Appendix 1. 
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Councillor attitudes towards citizen/community involvement 
When considering councillors' responses to issues of community/citizen 
involvement in local government, a distinction emerges between 
Conservative councillors and those of the centre-left. Conservative 
councillors respond with clear agreement with the need for more citizen 
interest but that does not lead the Conservative councillor, to support 
greater involvement, for they respond far less positively than the other 
parties on the issues of involvement and 'say' for citizens. The variation in 
attitudes between Conservative councillors and those councillors from the 
Labour and Liberal Democrat parties is marked. 
The idea of citizen involvement finds most favour with Labour and Liberal 
Democrat councillors, although they are responding in generalised, rather 
than specific terms. To support involvement in general terms is not to deny 
the need for a wider perspective, which many councillors perceive to be 
the task of themselves as elected representatives. 
Local communities, as will be seen from the case study material in 
chapters 7-9, demand a more specific and more potent involvement, 
always around issues of significance to them as a particular community. 
The 'involvement' which councillors support may not be the involvement 
that communities demand, which is issue-specific, rather than policy- 
general. Although Labour and Liberal Democrat councillors are 
distinguished by their support for involvement, their perspective may be at 
variance to that sought by the community. 
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Community motivation for interest 
Councillor attitudes towards the motivations of communities to take an 
interest in local politics transcends party affiliation. There is an 
overwhelming scepticism amongst councillors of all parties towards the 
electors they represent, with the attribution of purely self-interested 
motives reflected in similar proportions across the party divide. The 
location of councillors within a party political organisation, in a council 
setting, is the factor common to all councillors, and appears to be a 
powerful determinant of their response. This common experience appears 
to outweigh their background as members of different political 
organisations who bring different philosophical and political interpretations 
to bear on the business of being a councillor. 
A Conservative district councillor illustrated this point, commenting: 
I've attended public meetings and consultations and no one 
comes but as soon as a factory unit is being built nearby or 
the school little Johnny goes to is under threat you have to 
beat them off with a stick. 
These comments were echoed in similar terms by a Liberal Democrat 
councillor thus : 
Liberal Democrats support and encourage community 
action and campaigns, we're good at it and we're known for 
it, but sometimes I wish people would stop thinking that the 
community, started and ended at their front door. 
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This type of comment was echoed in many of the interviews and by 
councillors of all political parties. Councillors applied the term 'NEMBY' 
('Not In My Back Yard') to the electorate with considerable regularity. As 
a Liberal Democrat county councillor commented: 
we can't all have the green belt on our doorstep, it is 
possible to travel to green areas, but some people think 
they should live next door to trees and fields and that 
no development should ever take place. You have to get 
the right balance. 
Councillors' responses indicate that the generally high level of scepticism 
towards the electorate's scope of interest in local affairs, is reflected in 
similar proportions across the three main political parties. Councillors 
across parties then are sceptical of electors' motivations, and see the 
nature of the interest expressed by the very electorate they represent as 
transient. 
The councillor as decision-maker 
Responses to those issues which bear upon the councillor as a decision- 
maker indicate that whatever their expressed attitudes are towards the 
need for citizen interest and involvement, for many decision-making 
remains the responsibility of the elected representative. This decision- 
making responsibility, legitimised by public election, is jealously guarded 
by councillors, as without it they have little, other than the virtue of elected 
office, to distinguish them from any individuals or groups motivated by 
concern for issues and events of local significance and demanding a 'say'. 
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The responses from councillors to the two statements in this category 
show a centre-left affinity around citizen input and a Liberal 
Democrat/Conservative affinity around the role of the party manifesto. All 
parties record a majority of respondents agreeing that the councillor 
should remain the decision-maker, over and above any community 
involvement in local affairs. Conservative councillors are unambiguous in 
their willingness to proclaim the decision-making role of the councillor, 
whilst more than half of the Labour and Liberal Democrat councillors 
agree. 
The strength of Conservative councillors' attitudes toward their position as 
local decision-makers and arbitraters of local affairs is indeed seen as a 
virtue. A Conservative district council committee chair commented: 
All councillors listen to people but there would be no 
purpose in being a councillor if you are constantly asking 
your constituents what to do next, once elected they want 
you to get on with it. If there is a considerable disagreement 
between what we want to do and what local people think 
they have their chance to judge at the council election, that 
is why I support annual elections, people don't forget over a 
year and if they disagree they can elect someone else. 
This statement reflects a localist view, in that the electorate have the 
opportunity to overcome their partisan attachments and to 'punish' the 
council or their councillor at an election when they feel he or she has not 
represented the locality. This argument turns a blind eye to partisan 
attachments amongst the electorate. It is a view - the classic view, perhaps 
- which maintains that political parties 
have a negligible impact on 
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decisions, or at least an impact which can be negated by the significance of 
local issues. It supports the concept of the councillor as a 'representative' 
exercising judgement on particular local issues. How does this square with 
realities of party group control of local authorities and its impact on the 
councillor's experiences of representation? 
THE PARTY GROUP AND PARTY REPRESENTATION 
Political parties have a two-fold influence on councillors' experiences of 
representation. There is first the actuality of councillors securing election 
as the nominees of political parties, and being thus beholden to the 
organisation, and secondly, party affiliation as an indicator of political 
philosophy. Councillors, then, share experiences as party nominees and as 
holders of political opinions which, as we have seen, are themselves 
reflective of attitude towards representation. Scant attention has been 
given to the fact that councillors not only represent their wards or 
divisions, but also the political party, to which they owe a debt of 
allegiance for the very tenure of their seat. That debt may be subject to 
periodic reminders, as one Labour district councillor reflected: 
Whenever Igo to a district party or GMC (General 
Management Committee), not so much my own ward, I am 
always reminded by someone that they raised the money, 
walked the streets, canvassed, and leafleted in all weathers, 
and it was they that won the seat for me. As a result they 
should be able to tell me what to do in the council chamber, 
as though I didn't do all those things myself. 
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In a similar vein a Conservative councillor reported that: 
The local Association certainly does not attempt to mandate 
councillors in any way but we are made well aware of the 
opinions of prominent Association members and they are 
seriously considered, not formally you understand, in 
council, but in another place. 
Councillors of the three parties indicate a focus away from the community 
they represent. For the Labour councillor this is towards party, for the 
Conservative towards the office of councillor itself. This is a view shared, 
though not so intensely, by Liberal Democrats. Not that Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat councillors are completely free of any focus on party 
election commitments, or the continuity of those commitments through 
their term of office, but they claim greater room for manoeuvre than do 
their Labour counterparts when considering the specifics of representation. 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat councillors are less likely to claim - or 
defer to - an electoral mandate to justify policy decisions on local issues, 
and are correspondingly less accustomed to it being used to underpin 
disciplinary action against individual councillors. 
A Liberal Democrat district councillor put it in proportion: 
Yes we have a manifesto, if you want to call it that, but we 
like to think that it reflects the feelings and opinions of local 
people, not what we think as a political party. Of course we 
do have our own politics to keep sight of in all of this. 
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This shared experience of party membership and partisanship is the 
beginning of a process which draws the councillor's representative focus 
away from the community itself, towards the party. The party controls 
councillors' electoral opportunities through its selection procedures and 
once elected the councillor, as a party nominee, is subject to magnified 
pressure to adhere to a party as it manifests itself in the party group. This 
pressure draws the councillor away from the community he or she 
represents. The group and the wider party also hold the key to the 
councillor's tenure of office, as one de-selected, former Conservative 
district councillor bitterly complained: 
I found I was less and less willing to support them and after I 
spoke in favour of a Labour motion, I did not vote for it 
however, they withdrew the group whip. The next thing I 
knew was they had selected some 20 - year - old 
hairdresser to stand as the Conservative candidate in my 
ward. What could I do, I had to stand against her as an 
Independent just to save face, that is why I am no longer a 
councillor, but at least neither is she. 
The power of the party group, granted by the present system of local 
government, has been described as 'inordinate'. 18 Indeed, the groups 
power may be limited only by the need to respect the restraints of its own 
composition of individuals and factions. It is not the community or the 
opposition councillors that restrict group power, but the need to ensure 
that the balance of party opinion is accounted for in the allocation of 
positions and responsibilities within the group itself. Ken Livingstone, one- 
18 Commission For Local Democracy, Final Report, Taking Charge: The 
Rebirth Of Local Democracy, Municipal Journal Books, 1995, p. 16. 
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time leader of the Greater London Council, accepted that the limits to 
political power lay within the group itself. He states that the lack of 
balance within the Labour group, in terms of an acceptable allocation of 
positions and power across the composite elements of the group (he uses 
the term left and right wingers), is 'a recipe for disaster'. He goes onto 
report that as a result of his election as leader of the Greater London 
Council in 1981 and the complete control taken by the left, it took the 
controlling Labour group a year to settle down to a point when it then 
became 'possible to achieve a proper balance representing the various 
factions within the group'. 19 
The group is a focal point for councillors as representatives and it is 
through the party group that we observe the 'significant impact of parties 
on the operation of local authorities'. 20 This impact of party group on 
council affairs not only emulates its Parliamentary counterpart but may 
exert greater control over its members then the equivalent Parliamentary 
Party. Widespread practices and procedures ensure that 'subsequent 
council or committee meetings will have been pre-empted: the proceedings 
will be cut and dried and the result a foregone conclusion'. 21 
19 K. Livingstone, If Voting Changed Anything, They'd Abolish It, 
London, Fontana, 1987, p. 140. Livingstone goes as far as to document the 
power of the party group in considering alleged illegal activities by a 
member. The group was to decide if withdrawal of the whip was 
appropriate, but as Livingstone reports, when faced with alleged 
wrongdoing by one of their own, 'we [the group] behaved exactly as the 
Police usually do. We took no action'. Group power and discipline extends 
as far, in this case anyway, as consideration of alleged legal wrong doing, 
p. 295. 
20 T. Byrne, Local Government in Britain, Harmondsworth, Penguin 
Books, 1983, p. 116. 
21 Ibid, p. 117. 
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Councillors require a stable reference point for evaluating their 
experiences of representation, one which matches their underlying 
attitudes toward representation. The party group provides that stability and 
attitudinal framework, but in turn influences the focus and activities of 
councillors and the outcomes of their activities as representatives. 
A MODEL OF COUNCILLOR PREDISPOSITION AND 
REPRESENTATIVE OUTCOMES 
Representative discretion: acts and theatres 
The pattern of scores on the index of representation indicates that 
councillors view representation in ways that are characteristic of the 
shared environment within which they experience and make sense of the 
processes of representation. That environment is composed of two distinct 
sets of shared experiences. First, those that are common to all councillors, 
irrespective of party allegiance and that arise from council membership. 
Secondly, there are experiences that are shared by most councillors but 
which are felt differently, depending on their party allegiance: these are the 
experiences which accrue from the councillors' membership of the party 
group. Party groups will show variations in the intensity, degree and 
rigidity with which they try to encourage their members to focus their 
representative activities on the group, variations which exist between and 
within political parties. 
The assumptions councillors make about representation dictate the 'proper' 
balance between the councillor as a decision-maker and representative, 
and between councillor and citizen input to local affairs. They have an 
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immediate relevance to the councillor's orientation towards the focusing of 
representative activity - as something which stresses the community or the 
party group. In turn such assumptions will influence the ways in which 
councillors use the discretion attaching to their office to select both the 
nature of their representative acts and the theatre in which those acts will 
be performed. 22 This discretion extends to the transference of acts 
between the theatres of representation as the issue, and public reaction to 
it, develops. The discretion available is not infinite in that councillors have 
a limited number of activity options and theatres from which to select 
when faced with issues of community significance, and with pressure for 
loyalty exerted by the party group. The theatrical metaphor is deliberate 
and, arguably, of particular appropriateness to the business of political 
representation. 
'Representative acts' are here taken to mean the range of options open to a 
councillor who is disposed against a particular decision. At one extreme, 
he or she may speak against a decision, or may simply cast a vote against 
it or abstain from voting in its favour. A councillor may play safe by 
complying with the group line, or may avoid the issue by absenting him or 
herself. 'Theatres of representation' are the forums in which these acts 
might take place. They may be open and public, or they may be the closed 
and private theatres of the party group meeting or meetings of the party 
outside the council. There are, in addition, private meetings without party 
significance in which dissent might be registered. Figure 3.1. indicates the 
range of theatres for any acts of representation that are considered in this 
22 The Commission For Local Democracy have commented that 'the 
council and committee chambers become little more than a political theatre 
where decisions are given formal effect', Commission For Local 
Democracy, Final Report, Taking Charge, p. 15. 
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work and categorise these into open and closed theatres and private 
meetings. 
Figure 3.1. Theatres of representation and representative acts 
Open Theatres Closed Private Representative 
Theatres Meetings Acts (support 
or oppose the 
group) 
Council Party Group Senior Speak 
Councillors 
Committee Local Party Other Vote 
Councillors 
Press / Media Officers Abstain 
Public Meeting Community Comply 
Group 
Other Agency Absent 
M. P. 
Each of the representative acts detailed in figure 3.1, carry different risks, 
or exact a greater or lesser price for dissent when undertaken in opposition 
to a group decision. That price is in turn related to the theatre within which 
the act was conducted. A councillor will need to assess the potential cost 
of any act of dissent before acting and the cost will increase the more open 
the theatre becomes. Similarly the cost of dissent will vary for the 
combination by the councillor of any act of speaking and voting, in any 
theatre, and indeed with the nature and content of any act of speaking 
itself. Chapters 4 and 5 will show that councillors clearly distinguish 
between theatres for representation when considering acts of 
representation. 
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The representative activities under the private meeting heading are of a 
different nature and involve different processes than the open and closed 
theatres of representation. It is the open and closed theatres of 
representation that are of interest here, as representative activities 
undertaken in these arenas are quantifiable and as such provide more of an 
insight to the ways in which councillors use their representative discretion 
and the impact of the party group on that discretion. The representative 
activities of voting and speaking, assessed by means of the councillor 
questionnaire, can be used by the councillor in either open or closed 
theatres. To appreciate fully the power of the party group it is necessary to 
compare the ways in which councillors enact their representative role in 
the group, and the ways they do so in the open theatres of representation. 
while party groups have differing degrees of openness to party members 
and to officers of the council, as far as the general public are concerned the 
party group is a closed theatre of representation; they are unable to 
experience directly its processes, which remain backstage. The results of 
group meetings are observable by the public only when they transfer to the 
open theatres of the council or committee, when group decisions are 
endorsed by councillors in a public setting. 
The choice of representational activity, and the choice of the various 
theatres of representation in which to enact it, remain at the discretion of 
the councillor. The councillor can choose which of the representative 
activities to undertake, on which issues he or she will undertake them, and 
the theatres in which those acts will be carried out. Discretion translates 
into councillor choice, the choice between loyalty to the party group or to 
some manifestation of local community feeling. For the most part, such 
choices do not need to be made, and most councillors would hope to avoid 
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them. They arise only in the case of a conflict between party policy and a 
local issue of importance to the councillor and the community. 
What is a local issue? 
Willingness to use any or all of the representative actions available, and to 
use them in either open or closed theatres of representation, stems first 
from the councillor's predisposition towards representation. This 
predisposition, as we have seen, may view the councillor as final arbiter of 
community issues, may view the motivations of the electorate's interest in 
local affairs as self-seeking, and view the party group as the proper focus 
for representative activities. 
Secondly, the choice of action (or inaction) and of the appropriate theatre, 
is affected by the nature of the issue, and by location of that issue as 
internal or external to the councillor's own electoral area. An issue of 
significance to the community (and to the councillor), can exist on a 
number of associated levels. These can be distinguished as the supra- 
local, extending beyond the local authority area (often nationally 
determined issues); authority-wide; local (that is internal to the local 
authority but affecting less than the entire local authority area); and 
electoral-area only (that is, arising in a particular ward or division). 
The location of any issue of significance to the local community combines 
with the councillor's already existing predisposition toward representation. 
The location of an issue calls upon the councillor to use the representative 
discretion available, to select the appropriate representative outcome, 
balancing their own predisposition toward representation with the actual 
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location of the issue, and its significance for the authority or local 
community. 
The outcome - how a councillor decides to act and indeed where - may be 
influenced by a range of other variables. For example the length of service 
of the councillor, position on the council, age, gender, educational or 
social class background, but the process by which the councillor travels 
from bringing a representative predisposition to bear upon an issue, to 
choosing a course of action will be essentially the same. 
This process is represented diagramatically below: 






























The locational level of the issue will then work together with the 
councillor's existing predisposition toward representation to produce a 
particular representative outcome, in either open or closed theatres of 
representation. This model stresses the importance both of issue itself and 
of the location of that issue for the councillor. How in practice it operates 
is the subject of the next part of this thesis. 
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PART II 
THEATRES OF REPRESENTATION 
159 
The model presented in chapter 3 identifies the range of representative 
options available to the councillor and locates them in various open or 
closed theatres. The model indicates that councillors' acts of representation 
can be conducted in any of these theatres and can move across from the 
closed party group through the party meeting to the open theatres of the 
council, committee, public meeting or the media. 
This section considers how councillors employ the representative 
discretion attaching to their office. The term representative discretion is 
used in this thesis to indicate the freedom attaching to the office of local 
councillor to select acts of representation, and any combination of those 
acts to be performed on any local issue. Councillors can also use their 
discretion to decide in which theatres of representation their acts will be 
performed and indeed the issues on which they will act (or not). This 
discretion, and the power associated with it, is not unfettered, as the 
councillor must balance the pressures for councillor loyalty exerted by the 
party group (and of course the local and national party) and by the 
electorate. Equally, the decision as to how to employ representative 
discretion is influenced by the nature of a local issue, geographical 
location, and the interest in it taken by both the immediate constituency 
and the wider community. 
This section will consider how the councillor reacts when pressure from 
the electorate on a local issue collides with the position of the party group, 
thus creating for the councillor a crisis of representation, which he or she 
must resolve. Chapter 4 considers the councillors likely acts within the 
open theatres of representation that are the full council, committee, a 
public meeting, the local press and the electronic media. Chapter 5 
considers how the councillor would react to a crisis of representation 
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within the closed theatres that are the party group, the local party and other 
private meetings. Chapter 6 then compares councillors' hypothetical acts 
with their actual behaviour in a crisis of representation. 
A significant local issue that generates a crisis of representation can be 
located either inside or outside of the ward or division represented by the 
councillor. As such, issue location can be seen as an important 
discriminator of the councillor's use of their discretion to solve a crisis of 
representation. The section examines councillors' acts of representation, 
speaking and voting, against issue location, both inside and outside the 
electoral area they represent and considers the differentiated approach to 
representation councillors take as a result of such issue location. 
Central to understanding the influence of the party group within local 
representative democracy is the need to consider the impact of party 
affiliation on the use by the councillor of their representative discretion in 
a crisis of representation. Do councillors of different political affiliation act 
differently when faced with a crisis of representation, or do councillors 
across the political spectrum act in broadly similar ways? Does the 
political affiliation of the councillor indicate the attention he or she will 
give to representational matters of a locational or geographical impact and 
indicate their willingness to pursue such local issues in opposition to the 
decisions of their own party group? It is in answering these questions that 
the evidence and analysis set out in this section explains the relationship 
between the councillor's political affiliation and their likely and actual 
representative behaviour. Put simply, is political affiliation an indicator of 
the councillor's willingness to undertake representative action that reflects 
either the opinion of their electorate, or policies of their party group? 
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4. THE OPEN THEATRES OF REPRESENTATION AND THE 
INFLUENCE OF THE PARTY GROUP 
In order to understand the influence of the party group on the processes of 
representation this chapter will consider the use of the councillor's 
representative discretion in the open theatres of representation: that is, the 
council, committee, public meeting, local press and electronic media. It 
will present an analysis of councillors' propensity to use the various open 
theatres in regard to issues located both inside and outside their own 
electoral area. 
The chapter will consider the effect of party affiliation on variations in 
councillors' willingness to undertake acts of representation in these 
different theatres, and discuss how issue location influences councillors' 
representative discretion. It will introduce the concept of representative 
crisis, which occurs when the councillor is faced with competing demands 
to represent the community and to follow the party group, and consider 
the evidence on councillors' responses to such a crisis. 
THE COUNCILLOR: REPRESENTATIVE THEATRE AND ISSUE 
LOCATION. 
Influences on the open processes of representation 
Councillors were presented with the following two propositions, via a 
questionnaire: 
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If a group of electors from your ward/division were opposing a 
decision or policy of your party group on the council and you 
agreed with them on the issue please indicate how likely you are 
to speak out against the decision or policy of the party group. 
If a group of electors fron outside your ward/division 
were opposing a decision or policy of your party group on 
the council and you agreed with them on the issue please 
indicate how likely you are to speak out against the decision 
or policy of the party group. 
The response option to these statements were: very likely, likely, depends 
on the issue, not very likely and not at all likely. The statements were then 
repeated replacing 'speaking' with 'voting'. 
The respondents were also presented with five specific open theatres of 
representation: full council, committee, public meetings, local press and 
the electronic media. In the first and second of these the councillor can 
speak against a decision, vote against it, or do both, or neither. In the 
remaining three theatres they can only speak against it. The less formal 
nature of public meetings compared to council and committee suggested 
that councillors should only be questioned about speaking in this theatre. 
Councillors were asked to indicate how likely they were to vote or speak 
against the party group in each of the theatres presented, as appropriate. 
The three key factors in the question are, first location of the issue, 
(internal and external to the councillor's own electoral area). Secondly, the 
assumed pre-existence of a group policy or decision. Thirdly, the 
councillor's agreement with the position of the electors. 
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Location of an issue is important as it tests the willingness of councillors to 
act differently depending on the closeness of an event to their own 
electoral area, or its location within that area. The pre-existence of a group 
decision or policy sets the councillor between the group and the 
community and presents the 'representative crisis' in clear terms, that is, 
which of the two will be the recipient of the councillor's representative 
outcomes in open theatres of representation. The councillor's agreement 
with the position of the electors is an important element in the employment 
of the councillor's representative discretion. 
There is a distinction between a pre-existing group decision and the 
process of formulating group policies or decisions. The councillor may 
contribute to debate and voting as a part of the process of policy 
formulation. In this policy process the councillor is freer to 'represent' a 
local interest, assuming that local interest has been articulated. The 
councillor is undoubtedly freer to speak or vote at this stage which takes 
place in the closed arena of the group, than at any subsequent stage, when 
adherence to that position is required by the group. The point is illustrated 
by a Conservative county councillor: 
Before we have made a final decision on any issue the 
individual councillor is able to represent, if that is the correct 
word, any view, whether from their own constituents or from 
their own initiative. Once we have a decision then, in this 
county group, we support that decision. We do tend to be 
understanding if an individual county councillor has a 
particular problem with the impact of the decision on his own 
division. At the end of the day though we are all Conservatives. 
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A pre-existing group decision, then, presents the councillor with a set of 
alternative centres for representative focus, and at times, a clear cut 
decision on an issue with which the group and the community may be at 
odds. As the case study material in part 3 of the thesis indicates the 
councillor may still experience the dilemma of representing the group or 
the local community whether he or she is in the majority or minority group. 
How are such conflicts handled? Agreement with the community position 
places the councillor alongside the community rather than the group. If the 
councillor agrees with the community but acts with the group, then it is the 
group that benefits from the councillors' representative action. By exerting 
a powerful pull on councillor loyalty the group is able to place itself as an 
intermediary between the councillor and the community. In turn this 
loyalty demand produces the conditions by which the group, and not the 
electorate, can become the principal beneficiary of local representative 
democracy. 
Faced with a crisis of representation councillors decide whether to speak 
or vote and in which theatre of representation to act. Do councillors 
discriminate between theatres and acts and do they display a preference 
for a particular theatre and act? And is their choice strategy affected by the 
location of the issue concerned, as inside or outside the councillor's own 
electoral area? To examine this point further, tables 4.1 and 4.2 present 
responses to the statements presented to councillors regarding how likely 
they were to speak and vote against the group and in support of the 
community, for issues located inside (table 4.1) and outside (table 4.2) the 
ward or division represented. 
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Table 4.1. Internal issue: representative action and theatre: all 
councillors 
Theatre Act Likely Depends Unlikely base 
Full Speak 46 27 24 (533) 
council 
Vote 25 29 42 (526) 
Council Speak 57 24 16 (535) 
committee 
Vote 33 30 34 (531) 
Public Speak 51 33 14 (535) 
meeting 
Local Speak 35 31 30 (527) 
press 
Electronic Speak 29 30 35 (519) 
media 
Table 4.1 indicates that for issues located in their own electoral area, 
councillors across the three political parties are more likely to speak than 
to vote against the group in either full council or committee. The 
committee as a theatre is more popular amongst all councillors for both 
acts of representation compared to full council, councillors being more 
likely to use the theatre of a public meeting to speak out than full council. 
The local press or electronic media however is seen as less acceptable 
than the full council as a theatre for speaking against a decision. 
The significance of the 'depend' responses indicates that councillors were 
either avoiding the question or that a genuine assessment of a real issue 
would be necessary before the councillor would be willing to decide on 
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which representative act to undertake and in which theatre to perform that 
act 
Councillors were then asked to respond to the statement how likely they 
were to speak or vote against the group and in support of the community 
when an issue was located outside their own ward or division. Table 4.2 
presents the responses. 
Table 4.2. External issue: representative action and theatre: all 
councillors 
Theatre Act Likely Depends Unlikely base 
Full Speak 21 36 37 (515) 
council 
Vote 17 32 44 (508) 
Council Speak 28 36 30 (520) 
committee 
Vote 24 33 36 (509) 
Public Speak 25 43 26 (519) 
meeting 
Local Speak 16 39 40 (516) 
press 
Electronic Speak 13 37 43 (511) 
media 
Table 4.2 indicates that for issues located outside the councillor's own 
electoral area, there is a greater likelihood that councillors would speak 
out rather than vote against the group. At the same time, councillors are 
less likely to vote or speak out in any of the open theatres of representation 
when the issue is outside their own electoral area. 
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The impact of issue location on the councillor's disposition to act within 
council or its committees is interesting. There is a 25 per cent and 28 per 
cent variation between councillors 'likely' to speak out in council or 
committee respectively, when an issue is located outside rather than inside 
their own electoral area. There is however only an eight per cent and nine 
per cent variation between those that would vote against in council or 
committee. The issue location seems to affect councillors' likelihood of 
speaking more than that of voting. 
A similar pattern exists for issues outside compared to issues inside the 
councillors electoral area, with councillors more likely to speak at a public 
meeting than in full council, but less likely to use the press than full 
council or committee. The location of the issue then results in a similar 
pattern of likely behaviour regarding speaking and voting and the theatres 
for those acts, but indicates that councillors are simply less likely overall 
to act against the group when the issue is outside their own electoral area. 
The location of an issue and representative outcomes by political 
party affiliation 
To fully assess the impact of the party group on representative democracy 
it is necessary to consider if the patterns identified in tables 4.1 and 4.2 are 
replicated across the party spectrum, and whether political affiliation is as 
powerful a discriminator of councillors' representative behaviour in a crisis 
of representation, as it is of their predisposition toward democracy. Put 
another way does party affiliation enable a councillor's likely 
representative behaviour to be predicted? 
Table 4.3 shows responses from Labour councillors to a crisis of 
representation arising inside their own electoral area. 
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Table 4.3 Internal issue: representative action and theatre: 
Labour councillors 
Theatre Act Likely Depends Unlikely base 
°% °l° % 
Full Speak 25 32 41 (218) 
council 
Vote 10 21 65 (215) 
Council Speak 3830 29 (220) 
committee 
Vote 17 25 55 (218) 
Public Speak 40 40 19 (222) 
meeting 
Local Speak 21 3739 (218) 
press 
Electronic Speak 19 34 44 (218) 
media 
The Labour councillor differentiates between representative acts and 
theatres for issues located within their own electoral areas. Full council is 
clearly not the theatre Labour councillors select to oppose the group and 
support the community. They are more likely to use a committee or a 
public meeting to speak out and the local press also comes close to the full 
council for this act. 
The Labour councillor's rejection of the electorally legitimised forum of the 
full council is made all the more pointed by a preference for the public 
meeting. The location of an issue within the Labour councillors' electoral 
area tempts a relatively low proportion of councillors to either speak or 
vote against the group in any open theatre and in no case does the 
response rate rise above 50 per cent. 
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Labour councillors indicate a lack of willingness to speak or vote against 
the group, even when the issue is located within their own ward or 
division. It remains now to be seen whether the location of an issue outside 
the Labour councillor's electoral area magnifies that unwillingness. Table 
4.4 shows Labour councillors' responses to a crisis of representation 
arising outside their ward or division. 
Table 4.4. External issue: representative action and theatre: 
Labour councillors 
Theatre Act Likely Depends Unlikely base 
Full Speak 13 26 54 (210) 
council 
Vote 8 20 65 (210) 
Council Speak 18 28 49 (213) 
committee 
Vote 16 20 58 (212) 
Public Speak 20 37 38 (212) 
meeting 
Local Speak 9 32 52 (210) 
press 
Electronic Speak 9 33 53 (212) 
media 
The responses in table 4.4 indicate a dramatic decline in the likelihood 
amongst Labour councillors that they would speak against the group in any 
of the open theatres of representation when the issue is outside rather than 
inside their electoral area. For the Labour councillor the act of voting in 
council or committee, is less likely to be used whether the issue is internal 
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or external to their electoral area and as such issue location makes little 
impact on his or her vote. They are very unlikely to vote against the group 
in council or committee whether their ward or division is affected or not. 
The two sets of responses to issues located internal and external to the 
area represented, are reflective of a similar pattern of likely representative 
behaviour across all councillors. They clearly indicate that for the Labour 
councillor the impact of issue location does have some salience in that 
representative action against the group is less likely when the issue is 
external to the area represented, in each and every open theatre of 
representation. A differentiated pattern of representative behaviour exists 
in terms of both acts and theatres, with speaking a more likely 
representative outcome than voting and speaking in a public meeting more 
likely than in full council, committee or the media. 
To assess the actual extent to which councillor representative action is 
influenced by party affiliation and issue location, table 4.5 shows the 
responses of Liberal Democrat councillors to a crisis of representation 
arising from their own ward or division. 
Committee rather than full council represents a preferred theatre for 
representative action for the Liberal Democrat as with the Labour 
councillor. The Liberal Democrats however express a considerably higher 
degree of likelihood of using any of the open theatres of representation 
when compared to their Labour counterparts. Liberal Democrat councillors 
are more likely to speak within the council rather than a public meeting or 
the media, compared with Labour councillors. Liberal Democrats do 
however indicate a high degree of willingness to use the open theatres of 
representation that exist outside the council chamber, especially when the 
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'depend' response option is taken into account. Liberal Democrat 
councillors would rather speak than vote and would rather speak in council 
committee than any other theatre, but also indicate a likelihood that they 
would both speak (and vote) against the group in council or committee 
when the issue is related to their own electoral area. 
Table 4.5. Internal issue: representative action and theatre: 
Liberal Democrat councillors 
Theatre Act Likely Depends Unlikely base 
Full Speak 59 
council 
Vote 43 
Council Speak 66 
committee 
Vote 50 
Public Speak 56 
meeting 
Local Speak 44 
press 
Electronic Speak 37 
media 
28 11 (97) 
37 15 (95) 
27 5 (97) 
36 12 (97) 
34 8 (97) 
31 22 (96) 
30 27 (94) 
Although Liberal Democrats indicate the same differentiated pattern of 
behaviour between speaking and voting, they are simply more likely to 
undertake those acts in opposition to the party group than are Labour 
councillors. The Liberal Democrat then, is more likely than the Labour 
councillor both to speak and vote against the group when the issue is 
located within their own area. Is this so when the issue shifts, outside that 
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electoral area? Table 4.6 shows responses from Liberal Democrat 
councillors to a crisis of representation arising outside their own electoral 
area. 
Table 4.6. External issue: representative action and theatre: 
Liberal Democrat councillors 
Theatre Act Likely Depends Unlikely base 
Full Speak 28 46 23 (97) 
council 
Vote 28 48 18 (94) 
Council Speak 36 45 16 (97) 
committee 
Vote 31 51 12 (94) 
Public Speak 32 50 15 (97) 
meeting 
Local Speak 20 54 22 (96) 
press 
Electronic Speak 17 46 31 (94) 
media 
Liberal Democrats are, like Labour councillors, less likely to speak and 
vote against the group in all open theatres when the issue is external rather 
than internal to the electoral area represented. There is a stark difference 
between Labour and Liberal Democrats in reported likelihood of 
undertaking any representative act in any open theatres. The Liberal 
Democrat councillor reports to being considerably more likely to focus on 
the community and act against the group than the Labour councillor, 
wherever the location of the disputed issue. Liberal Democrats are then 
more inclined to speak and vote in committee than full council and prefer a 
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public meeting to full council when the issue is located outside their own 
electoral area: but they prefer a council theatre when the issue is located 
within their own area. This may seem a curious response when a public 
meeting would bring them closer to those they represent than speaking for 
them at a council meeting itself, and suggests the power of the symbolism 
of the council. 
Clearly a pattern is emerging of a differentiated approach to the selection 
of acts of representation and theatres in which they can be employed. It is 
only the degree of the variation in likelihood of acting that is influenced by 
the political affiliation of the Labour and Liberal Democrat councillor. It 
remains now to be seen if the Conservative councillor maintains that 
differentiated pattern of behaviour and where, if any, an affinity exists on 
the political spectrum around the selection of representative acts and 
theatres. 
Table 4.7 shows the responses from Conservative councillors to a crisis of 
representation arising in their own electoral area. 
The pattern of responses identified for both the Labour and Liberal 
Democrat councillor is reflected amongst Conservative councillors who 
clearly focus action on the committee, while recording a strong likelihood 
of speaking and voting against the group in full council. 
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Table 4.7. Internal issue: representative action and theatre: 
Conservative councillors 
Theatre Act Likely Depends Unlikely base 
Full Speak 62 23 12 (218) 
council 
Vote 32 34 30 (216) 
Council Speak 72 17 8 (218) 
committee 
Vote 43 32 21 (216) 
Public Speak 60 24 11 (216) 
meeting 
Local Speak 45 26 24 (213) 
press 
Electronic Speak 35 26 30 (207) 
media 
In comparison with the Liberal Democrat the Conservative councillor is 
marginally more likely to speak against the group in council, committee 
and public meetings although the difference is not considerable, being only 
three, six and four percentage points greater, respectively, than the Liberal 
Democrat responses. The variation between likelihood of the Conservative 
and Liberal Democrat speaking in the press or electronic media is too 
close for comparison. The Liberal Democrat councillor however is more 
likely to support their act of speaking against the group with a vote, than is 
the Conservative, in both council and committee; the margin of difference 
in favour of the Liberal Democrat over Conservative, voting in either 
council or committee being 11 per cent and seven per cent respectively. 
The Labour councillor is less likely to undertake either act of 
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representation, in any of the theatres when compared with both the 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat councillor. 
The public meeting is marginally less preferable a theatre for the 
Conservative councillor than the council and again a likelihood of using 
the media exists but to a lesser degree than the council chamber. The 
Conservative councillor then sees him or herself as the articulator of local 
concerns rather than a voter against the group. This supportive articulating 
role in relation to the community needs to be considered in relation to the 
strong predisposition (identified in chapter three) amongst Conservative 
councillors, for councillors themselves making decisions on local issues. 
Table 4.8 shows the responses from Conservative councillors to the 
prospect of a crisis of representation arising outside the ward or division 
represented. 
The Conservative councillor records, as with both Labour and Liberal 
Democrat, a similar dramatic decline in likelihood of speaking and voting 
in open theatre when the location of the issue is outside, rather than inside, 
their electoral area. The pattern remains similar in that they are more likely 
to speak than vote and are more likely to undertake those acts in 
committee than full council, and they also record a very slight preference 
for speaking at a public meeting than in full council. 
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Table 4.8. External issue: representative action and theatre: 
Conservative councillors 
Theatre Act Likely Depends Unlikely base 
Full Speak 26 41 25 (208) 
council 
Vote 20 37 33 (204) 
Council Speak 35 40 19 (210) 
committee 
Vote 28 36 26 (203) 
Public Speak 27 46 21 (210) 
meeting 
Local Speak 20 3835 (210) 
press 
Electronic Speak 16 36 39 (205) 
media 
The results show that for the Conservative councillor the location of the 
issue is as important a consideration when applying representative 
discretion to the selection of action and theatres, as it is for their Labour 
and Liberal Democrat counterparts. When the issue is located outside the 
councillor's electoral area the Conservatives are virtually indistinguishable 
from Liberal Democrat councillors. The Conservative is marginally more 
likely to speak than the Liberal Democrat when the issue is located within 
the ward or division represented but the Liberal Democrat is marginally 
more likely to speak when the issue is located external to the area 
represented. This close affinity of the centre-right is surprising because of 
the Liberal Democrats' concentration on community representation. 
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The responses indicate the existence of a pattern of behaviour common to 
councillors across the political spectrum and which varies only in the 
degree to which political affiliation and issue location influences 
representative behaviour in the party group system of local government. 
Deviation from that pattern of behaviour is definable by political affiliation 
but divergences that do occur are usually of a marginal nature. 
In overall terms the pattern of behaviour displayed among councillors is 
that they are more likely to speak than vote against the group and that the 
location of an issue, inside or outside of their own electoral area, makes no 
difference to that pattern, only its intensity. When faced with a crisis of 
representation councillors clearly distinguish between the acts and open 
theatres of representation available to them. They are more likely to speak 
than vote against the group in committee rather than full council and more 
likely to speak in a public meeting than full council. Liberal Democrat and 
Conservative councillors are marginally more likely to speak in full council 
when the issue is located within their own ward or division. 
Councillors are more likely to speak in full council or committee than in 
the local press or electronic media. Even so, the local press and indeed, the 
electronic media may report what councillors say in any open theatre. 
However councillors see this in a very different light to directly 
approaching the press or media. All councillors are more likely to speak at 
a public meeting than in either the local press or electronic media and 
prefer the use of the local press to television or radio. Location of an issue, 
inside or outside the councillor's own electoral area makes councillors 
more likely to act in any of the open theatres available than when the issue 
is outside their ward or division. 
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THE USE OF REPRESENTATIVE DISCRETION 
The influence of party affiliation 
The use of representative discretion by the councillor will result in 
different representative acts being employed in various open theatres of 
representation, dependent on the location of an issue, inside or outside the 
electoral area represented. When councillors are faced with the 
representative's dilemma of focusing representative loyalty on the group or 
community and use their discretion to select acts of representation and 
theatres in which to employ them, clear patterns are discernible. It is only 
the likelihood of undertaking such acts which varies between the parties 
and which in turn gives an indication of the influence of party group 
affiliation on representative outcomes. The councillor is more likely to 
speak than vote against the group when faced with community opposition 
to a group position or decision and is more likely to speak than vote 
whatever the location of the issue. The only exception is the Liberal 
Democrat councillor, who is as likely to speak and vote in full council on 
an issue external to their own electoral area. 
The Labour councillor is less likely to oppose the group by speaking or 
voting, than either the Liberal Democrat or Conservative, whatever the 
location of the issue. The likelihood of a councillor speaking and voting 
against the group and in support of a community position on an issue is 
greater for councillors of all parties when that issue is located within their 
own electoral area than when external to it. In that Labour councillors in 
no case exceed a 50 per cent likelihood of speaking and voting against the 
group, they display the greatest of loyalty to the group, against the 
perceived wishes of the local community. 
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The Conservative councillor is more likely to speak and vote than the 
Labour councillor but only more willing to speak than the Liberal 
Democrat, who in turn is more likely, when an issue is internal to their 
own electoral area, to vote against the group. The location of an issue as 
internal or external to the councillor's electoral area, is a clear determinant 
of the likelihood of the councillor acting in a representative capacity. 
The Conservative councillor's marginally greater willingness than the 
Liberal Democrat to speak against the group in open theatres for an issue 
located within his or her own electoral area has been considered earlier. 
The closeness between the two parties as 'speakers' indicates that the 
community orientation of the Liberal Democrat appears to converge with 
Conservative councillors' view of the councillor as a decision-maker to 
result in similar outcomes, albeit from different orientations. In interviews 
however, both Liberal Democrats and Conservatives stressed the need for 
group loyalty, a willingness to be loyal, and an orientation toward the 
group as a focus of representation, which superseded any other orientation. 
The Conservative and Liberal Democrat expressions of the need for group 
loyalty is counter-balanced by their willingness to speak against the group 
if necessary, but only after a process of negotiation, conducted within the 
group or with its leadership. The group then remains an important focus of 
representation, even if there is an expression of a likelihood to speak 
against it from councillors of a particular political affiliation. This is 
considered in greater detail in chapters five and six. 
Councillors of all parties are more likely to use a public meeting than the 
press or electronic media to speak against the group in a crisis of 
representation. The Labour councillor is more likely to speak out at a 
180 
public meeting than at either full council or committee wherever the issue 
is located, while the Liberal Democrat and Conservative councillor is more 
likely to use either council or committee than a public meeting when the 
issue is internal to their electoral area. Councillors are then less likely to 
vote than speak when faced with a disagreement between their own group 
and the community, whatever the issue location. They are also more likely 
to undertake representative acts in any theatre when the issue is located 
within their own electoral area. The Labour councillor is considerably less 
likely than the Conservative or Liberal Democrat to oppose the group in 
any theatre, for any issue location. 
Political affiliation and issue location appear to be important factors in the 
councillor's use of representative discretion. The use by the councillor of 
his or her representative discretion however raises a number of questions 
as to why the councillor is more likely to speak than vote against the 
group, speak and vote against the group in committee rather than in full 
council, speak and vote when the issue is inside rather than outside their 
own electoral area, and use a public meeting to speak out rather than the 
press or media. Integral to understanding these issues is the influence 
exerted by the party group over the application of representative discretion 
by the councillor when faced with conflicting demands on the focus of 
representative activity. 
Crisis of representation, the use 
impact on representative outcome 
of representative discretion and 
Representative action 
A crisis of representation occurs when the councillor is expected, or 
pressurised, to undertake certain representative acts, in open theatres of 
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representation, in support of conflicting positions held by the party group 
or the community, and the councillor agrees with one of the opposing 
positions. This crisis situation may not be connected to an isolated incident 
but may be an on-going issue which requires the councillor continually to 
apply representative discretion in response to pressure or expectations, or 
even to change their position as the issue develops. The 'crisis' may 
therefore be a long term process of development of the councillor's own 
position and the reconciliation of conflicting pressure to undertake certain 
representative acts in specific theatres of representation. 
As chapter 3 showed the councillor may abstain from acting or absent 
themselves from any theatre in which they would be expected to maintain 
a position in support of either the community or the group. The location, 
impact and salience of an issue however heightens the representative 
crisis, and in some circumstances the options of absenting and abstaining 
will no longer be available: an open act of defiance of the group, or 
support for it against the community, is needed and representative 
discretion will be required to solve, or abate, the crisis. 
The research discloses that the representative act of speaking presents the 
councillor with less of a problem than that of voting and the two activities 
are not necessarily mutually supportive and applicable as acts of 
representation. Speaking against group policy may be an open act of 
defiance of the position of the party group, but if it is not supported by a 
vote, the party is not threatened with defeat and the issue is secured at 
least in the council chamber. This unwillingness to support the act of 
speaking with a vote is particularly important as the construction by 
councillors of cross-party single issue alliances, as the case study in 
chapter 7 indicates, could add an uncertainty and fluidity to the passage of 
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particular decisions through council and committee. Party group discipline 
operates to ensure that such alliances do not hold in the council chamber 
but are confined to those open theatres of representation that lack a 
decision-making function. 
A councillor may speak against the group in the knowledge that its 
position will remain secure if he or she does not add to any vote against 
that position. But it is not only the likely success of the group's position 
that influences councillor willingness to speak, as a Labour district 
councillor reported: 
I will speak against the group but if I know I am going to 
lose I don't vote. I'll speak to raise the issue in the open, to 
get a point over, or score a point if you like, but there's no 
point to voting if you're going to lose. The group are more 
lenient if you don't go as far as voting, nothing is gained by 
voting and being expelled from the group and still losing 
on the matter whatever it is, but I will raise the issue. 
A Labour councillor from the same authority added: 
With the size of our majority there are so many arguments 
in the group with areas of the district set against each other, 
what's happening here is that arguments are spilling into 
the council and we sort of agree to disagree as long as you 
don't go too far, speak yes and you'll get a slap on the 
wrist, vote and you're out. You can't give the Tories a 
chance to embarrass the party, mind you there's only three 
of them and we can embarrass ourselves without them. 
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Voting against the party group is seen as a symbolic act of defiance that 
will result in expected retribution by the group: speaking is seen as an 
issue-raising and recognising process. Speaking need not refer to 
discourse, debate and attempts at persuasion, but might be no more than 
the isolated and atomised act of a verbal contribution as an identifiable 
representative act available to the councillor. 'Speaking' in this sense 
requires no debate, no discourse and no justifying logic or attempts at 
persuasion as it can be a purely symbolic act of local representation. 1 
Even the act of speaking has its critics, as a Conservative group leader 
explained: 
The majority of members that run into this problem 
[speaking in open theatres against the group] are simply 
not very bright, the bright councillor finds a way around the 
problem with officers and appropriate senior councillors, 
the, shall we say, dim councillor is simply not up to this. 
Frustration is the problem, the dimmer councillor can not 
frame suitable and acceptable alternatives and win support 
for them, or develop a compromise, they only see questions 
and solutions as having a yes or no answer. It really is just 
I See, D. Prior, J. Stewart, and K. Walsh, Citizenship: Rights, Community 
and Participation, London, Pitman, 1995, pp. 75-77. pp. 86-87. They set 
out deliberation as 'a process of realising the public interest', p. 75 and 
highlight the distinction between debates as a 'statement of party positions 
rather than the discussion of issues', p. 87. Speaking, however, need not 
result in deliberation, merely a symbolic representative act, a statement of 
a position which may or may not be held by the councillor speaking, but 
which fulfils some representative obligation they may feel in relation to 
their own electorate. 
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intelligence and loyalty, with those two concepts present 
there are no problems of fitting in with what we decide. 
The variation in councillor willingness to speak or vote is related to the 
impact of those acts on the group of which the councillor is a member. The 
Labour councillor, although considerably less willing than Liberal 
Democrats and Conservatives to speak and vote against the group, is not 
alone in differentiating between the two acts. Labour councillors were far 
more ready in interview to refer directly to the group as the reason for this, 
one Labour councillor simply stating: 
If you want a one word answer it's fiear' that's why I've 
never gone as far as voting against the group, they can be a 
vicious lot when roused and it's normally going against the 
group that rouses them. You see some of our people are 
much more likely to come to a group meeting than to a 
council meeting and once a decision is made they don't 
expect to have to go to council to support it again, vote 
against and you're in trouble. 
A former Labour chief whip added to this: 
Look, it is the Labour group that make the decisions here 
not the public, if a member of the group wants to go against 
the group, even if it's for something in their own ward, then 
they suffer the consequences. 
The same councillor reported that after ceasing to be chief whip and 
becoming chair of the district council, he had proposed, spoken and voted 
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for an amendment to a resolution in committee, against the decision of the 
pre-committee party group meeting. With the assistance of a number of 
other Labour councillors, and the combined votes of other parties, he 
defeated the group meeting's earlier decision. He added: 
Frankly it was a very bad day, we had a horrendous group 
meeting the night before and the bitterness of that argument 
was still there, also I had spent all that day with the officers 
trying to cut my chairman's entertainment allowance, do 
you know there may not be a chairman's charity ball this 
year for the first time in decades because of what they want 
to do. By the time of that particular meeting I had had a 
bloody bowl full of the officers, so I moved and voted on 
that amendment, which was absolutely nothing to do with 
the chairman's allowance but spending money on Christmas 
lights in my area and of course I will no doubt suffer the 
consequences. If you want to know, which I suppose you do, 
no I wouldn't do the same in full council, that just isn't on. 
The party group recognises however the need for the individual councillor 
to reflect a position or body of opinion existing within their electoral area. 
When a councillor has reached a crisis of representation for an issue 
located in his or her own electoral area, then varying degrees of flexibility 
are reported in the application of party discipline. A Labour county council 
deputy leader stated: 
If an issue affects a member's own patch, we are 
sophisticated enough to understand their problem, they can 
come to an accommodation and speak in committee, 
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carefully mind you, but on their conscience, it can even go 
as far as council. Never criticise the council and certainly 
never the group, only criticise the policy, that is the watchword. 
We do not take this approach if the issue is not in the members 
patch, then they follow the group, it's up to the local member to 
protest. 
Similar approaches to the issue of group discipline and the councillor 
speaking and voting have been expressed by both Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat councillors. The latter express loyalty to the Liberal 
Democrat ideal and policies but are often trapped by the self-fulfilling 
element of their own 'community' approach to politics. Liberal Democrats 
are much more likely to speak and vote against the group because they 
have raised such expectations amongst their own constituents. One Liberal 
Democrat rather sadly reported that: 
Now we have a balanced council, we could have some 
committee chairs and vice-chairs and I want one, I just pray 
nothing comes up in my area because if you go against a 
decision you damage your chances of a chair. The Labour 
lot wont support anyone for a chair if they have opposed a 
decision in public and for that matter why should my fellow 
Liberal Democrats? Community politics has its downside, 
but when push comes to shove if anything comes up I 
suppose I would back the voters, what else can you do? I 
just hope nothing comes up! 
The emphasis here is on loyalty borne of circumstance, rather than 
predisposition. 
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Theatres of Representation 
The selection of a theatre within the council for the acts of speaking and 
voting is dependent on the impact the councillor requires from the act and 
on self preservation for the councillor. The committee is clearly seen as a 
safer theatre within the council for speaking and voting. It is the often less 
formal and more deliberative nature of exchanges at committee and the 
possibility that the points raised by the individual councillor may become 
'lost' in a wide-ranging general debate, which distinguishes committee from 
council. As committees are often less formal, ritualistic and symbolic than 
council, acts of defiance or divergence from group decisions have less 
impact in this business-like atmosphere than they would in the formalistic 
theatre of local politics that is the full council. One Conservative county 
councillor stated quite simply: 
I find it much more comfortable in committee, we have our 
committee meetings in a committee room not the council 
chamber and you do not feel quite so on view as you do in 
the chamber. I am much happier speaking there, as for 
voting you say, well I can not see myself voting against the 
Conservative group, it would have to be a very major issue 
and that sort of thing just does not happen in my division. 
Councillors generally report from experience that 'reprisals' by the group 
(to use the word often quoted), are far less likely or serious when speaking 
or voting against the group takes place in committee. Councillors and the 
group itself differentiate between acts and the theatres of representation 
within a council setting when it comes to the application of discretion in a 
crisis of representation. Equally however many groups will not 
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differentiate and expect from their members the same loyalty to decisions 
of the group meeting in committee as in full council. 
The impact of issue location 
The location of any issue and its salience to any local community has a 
major impact on the use of representative discretion by the councillor. An 
issue located within the electoral ward or division will condition certain 
assumptions concerning the councillor's relationship to that issue, in ways 
which do not arise in the case of external issues. Those assumptions are: 
1. The issue will have a high salience for the councillor, as a result of the 
activities or reactions of the community directly represented. 
2. The councillor will be physically closer to the issue as a representative, 
whether living in the electoral area or only representing it, and this 
'closeness' will be a factor in the councillor identifying with the local 
community. It will also be a factor in the electorate's expectations that the 
councillor will reflect their views on an issue. 
3. The councillor will have a greater knowledge of issues located inside 
the area represented. 
4. The councillor may be directly affected by any impact of that issue on 
voting behaviour and turnout. 
The councillor will, despite often asserting the need to take a general 
overview of policy issues and to make decisions for the benefit of the 
authority as a whole, have a closer affinity with, and desire to respond to, 
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issues arising from the area directly represented. Issues of impact which 
significantly affect particular electoral areas are rare, and the existence of 
articulated community opinion on those issues enhances the likelihood of 
the councillor speaking and voting against the group in any theatre, 
without appearing to raise issues of general policy. 
Several factors then enhance the influence of the party group over the 
representative focus and action of the councillor. Those factors are: (i) the 
rarity of issue occurrence; (ii) the restricted nature of the impact of an 
issue in terms of electoral areas directly affected (despite its significance 
and enormity to those areas); (iii) that the number of councillors directly 
affected will be only a small proportion of the total number of councillors 
in any group; and (iv) the greater likelihood that councillors will speak and 
vote against the group for an issue located within their area rather than 
external to it. 
The most significant issue dealt with in this study in terms of physical 
impact and impact on numbers of local authorities was the construction of 
the Birmingham Northern Relief Road (see chapter 9). In the Staffordshire 
local authorities for example, with controlling groups that supported the 
construction, the road would run through ten district wards, represented by 
24 district councillors. Within the three district councils concerned the 
total membership was of 148 councillors representing 68 wards. The road 
would also affect only six county divisions within that area, from a total 
county council membership of eighty-two. Most issues - including the 
others discussed in chapters 7 and 8- are of more restricted impact than 
the relief road. 
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Finally, acting against the group becomes a process largely doomed to 
failure by virtue of the size of any party's majority, and the councillor must 
then weigh the likelihood of retribution by the electorate against 
disciplinary action by the group. If as Newton suggests the local election is 
a reflection of national party preference, then the electorate may forgive a 
councillor for insufficient representative support over issues and reward 
the party with a vote because of its national standing, thus doubly 
enhancing the power of the party group. 2 As both Miller and Green noted 
however, local issues do indeed impact upon local election results. In 
reality a proportion of the electorate may not be forgiving of the 
councillor's past representative action on local issues but local election 
results, both across an authority and within particular electoral areas, turn 
on a combination of factors. 3 Thus the electoral significance of an issue 
depends very much on a local community turning it into a factor in a local 
election. If this is not possible, for whatever reason, it makes the party 
group's ability to exert a pull on the representative actions of the councillor 
even more powerful. 
Acting outside the council chamber 
The likelihood of a councillor using a public meeting rather than council, 
press or electronic media, common across all parties whatever the issue 
location, is an intriguing point. The public meeting can take a number of 
shapes. It may be highly issue concentrated, poorly attended, have a very 
specific local focus, affecting a small number of citizens and receive little 




3 Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. III, chapter 2, `Local Electoral 
Behaviour', pp. 105-172. Green, `National, City, and Ward Components 
of Local Voting' 
. 
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if any media attention, or may be the opposite in each of these respects. 
Whatever format the public meeting may take, the councillor speaks to a 
particular audience at a moment in time. A public meeting represents for 
the councillor a theatre in which to speak out on issues affecting their own 
area, away from the spotlight of group discipline and policy, although they 
may be expected publicly to at least not oppose the position of the group 
(and other members of both the group and party may of course attend any 
such public meeting). 
The distinction made by councillors between the press and electronic 
media and the public meeting is largely a false one, as the media can 
attend these meetings and report on the proceedings. Yet the councillor 
has one simple but effective defence which was summed up in the words 
of a Conservative county councillor: 
It is much easier to speak at a public meeting than in 
council because you can claim you were misquoted or 
misrepresented or taken out of context and of course you 
still support the line, even demand a reference to the press 
council on some spurious grounds of inaccuracy. It really is 
difficult for any one not present at a particular meeting to 
prove what you may or may not have said. 
Councillors can, then, draw a distinction between being reported in the 
press or media, when they can claim the defence of being misquoted, and 
speaking directly to the press or electronic media. Editorial practice, and 
the councillor's relationship with the group and the press or electronic 
media, will determine how safe public meetings actually are for the 
dissident councillor. 
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It is possible that actions at a public meeting will be reported back to the 
group, and may be used by the whips to instigate disciplinary proceedings, 
as one Labour district councillor reported: 
The group whip used a newspaper report of something I had 
said at a public meeting to report me to the group. He even 
distributed copies of the article to all group members. The 
point that I had made it clear at the public meeting and 
subsequently at the disciplinary hearing of the group, that I 
was speaking as a parish councillor (not a district 
councillor) and in support of parish council policy, made 
no difference, you are not to speak against group policy in 
public, that's it! 
The public and high profile nature of use of the local press and the 
electronic media sees the Labour councillor as the most reluctant to use 
this open theatre against group policy and in support of the local 
community. The situation is the same even when that community is located 
in the councillor's own electoral area. Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
councillors record remarkably close results indicating a greater willingness 
than Labour councillors to use these media to speak in favour of their own 
electorate against a policy or decision of their group. 
Traditional Labour mistrust of the press, and of the local press in 
particular, may underpin these responses. One Labour metropolitan 
borough councillor and committee chair stated that: 
We all know that they [a particular local newspaper] always 
support their Tory paymasters and whatever we do as a 
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council they will try and cause trouble for us. No one is a 
greater believer in the freedom of the press than me, but 
they do whatever they can to make things difficult. 
Another Labour back-bencher from a nearby district council reported: 
I am always very careful when I speak to them, I mean the 
reporters are OK, some of them are even on our side, but its 
the editors that are the problem. I talk to them because you 
feel silly saying no comment all the time and you end up 
looking silly in the paper, but I am very careful about what I 
say and never, ever, give them a chance to have a go at the 
party or council. 
A Liberal Democrat district and county councillor from yet another 
authority took a different approach: 
Labour councillors just don't understand the local 
newspapers, they want something to print. I've seen Labour 
councillors frothing at the mouth over the press, if they only 
used them properly, like we do, they'd have no complaints. 
I talk to the press, give them plenty of quotes and 
information, they don't always get it exactly right but the 
point Labour miss is that it is important for a councillor to 
get their name in the paper and to be saying something 
supportive of the community, people know you are working 
and it's cheaper than producing and delivering your own 
leaflets. 
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The responses to the use of the electronic media rest on the actual 
likelihood that councillors will be granted access to such a media. The 
issue itself is important here as it must have significant impact to interest 
the electronic media, and local issues have to be of a particular nature to 
warrant air time. Councillors may be prepared to use that media, but may 
never actually be offered the opportunity. 
What is clear is that Labour councillors are less willing to use the press to 
speak out against the group and that a centre-right affinity exists in relation 
to the use of this media for this purpose. What is also clear is that the 
nature of the issue itself emerges as having an impact on councillors' 
decisions to speak out, as the theatres in which they are able to speak 
becomes more public and less in their own control. Labour councillors 
indicate a general avoidance of direct contact with the press and electronic 
media, whilst the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives, although more 
likely to use these, still prefer other 'safer' and more legitimate theatres of 
representation. 
THE PARTY GROUP AND THE FOCUS OF THE COUNCILLOR'S 
REPRESENTATIVE ACTION 
The closed theatre of representation that is the party group influences 
councillor discretion in all open theatres of representation ensuring that 
the focus of representative action falls on the group. This influence over 
the deliberative processes of the council as one theatre of representation, 
has been recognised by Prior et al thus: 
the barrier to deliberation in representative assemblies is the 
operation of party discipline, which means that majorities for 
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proposals do not have to be built by persuasion, but are 
secured by the application of the party whip. The process 
robs assemblies of the quality of deliberation and in so doing 
limits their value both in expressing and informing the views 
of citizens. 4 
In fact however, such 'majorities for proposals' are 'built by persuasion', 
but that persuasion takes place in the closed party group meeting not the 
open theatre of representation that is council or committee. The whip 
system and party loyalty then ensures the passage through the open 
theatres, of decisions that have indeed been 'built by persuasion' but also 
by a deliberative process that excludes input by not only the minority 
group on the council, but also by the wider electorate. 
The debate turns on the linkages between the concepts of deliberation, 
persuasion and the expression of party values, but as we have already 
seen, when the councillor speaks the result is not necessarily collective 
deliberation. Prior et al argue strongly and persuasively for the 
enhancement of citizen input through improved deliberation and an 
informing of the deliberative acts of the councillor via improved links 
between representatives and represented. They provide a comprehensive 
strategy for moving from citizenship as a passive recipient of 
representation to the citizen as an active and powerful contributor to the 
representative processes. They recognise however the power of party 
discipline to prevent this development. It is the recognition of this power 
and the dangers of confusing representation and the expression of party 
values, with the government of an area, that is made clear when they state: 
4 Prior, Stewart and Walsh, Citizenship: Rights, Community and 
Participation, p. 94. 
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The problem lies not in the necessity of political parties but in 
the excess of party discipline, so that discipline is imposed for 
the convenience of government rather than for the expression of 
party values. In local authorities party discipline can be used to 
pass what are in effect officer recommendations rather than an 
expression of party position. 5 
Enhanced citizen input however, despite being supported by most 
councillors (as seen in Chapter 3), becomes not a concept of local control, 
representation or active citizenship, but a threat to the sustained control of 
local affairs by the party group. The position of the group on an issue can 
be used by councillors to justify their opposition to vehemently-expressed 
local opinion as reflective of the Not In My Back Yard (NIlVIBY) 
syndrome. A sub-committee chair of a Labour-controlled district council 
admitted during the course of this research that he had informed a recent 
well attended public meeting (to consider the siting of a young persons' 
housing complex) he had chaired, that, 'I was appalled at them and 
appalled at their opinion of young people'. 
Freedom from the local connection is essential for the effective operation 
and control of council affairs by the party group. With enhanced local 
connection the group could not maintain the loyalty of its members, 
particularly those members whose own electoral patch may be in dispute 
with the decision of a group meeting. 
The willingness of the councillor to give voice to, or to 'speak' as a 
representative of the group gives the group its influence and identifies it as 
5 Ibid, p. 94. 
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the inheritor of the Burkean approach to representation. Indeed, freedom 
from local control does not mean intellectual and representational freedom, 
for the representative, but freedom to 'speak' and 'act' for the party, in the 
deliberative body, over the local interest. 6 This de-coupling of the group 
from any notion of locality makes the party group the principal beneficiary 
of the processes of local representative democracy. 
Not that groups will necessarily flaunt local opinion. As Gregory has 
noted, the rule of anticipated reactions implies 'the local policy maker 
would have every incentive to try to anticipate the wishes of the 
electorate'. He goes on to comment that: 
If it is the case that elected representatives take the trouble to try 
to anticipate popular reaction partly because they overestimate 
their own salience in the eyes of the electorate, it is worth 
reflecting on the consequences of enlightenment ... if once they 
realised they need not worry unduly about electoral 
repercussions of their decisions, it is arguable that they might 
more readily pursue unpopular but necessary policies. 7 
Councillors hardly require enlightenment of their de-coupling from the 
electorate as they are predispositionally and politically prepared for and 
aware of that. But is it that, as this study indicates, the councillor, when 
faced with a crisis of representation, anticipates reactions not only of the 
electorate but also of the party group? This point is underpinned by 
6 Eulau, Whalke, Buchanan and Ferguson, `The Role of the 
Representative' 
. 
Eulau and Whalke, The Politics of representation. 
7 R. Gregory, `Local Elections and the Rule of Anticipated Reactions', 
Political Studies, 17 (1), 1969, pp. 31-47. p. 46. 
198 
political parties' expectations of loyalty from the councillor. As one Labour 
councillor commented after he had been expelled from the party group: 
I find the whole business ridiculous. I actually spoke at council 
and in the press in favour Labour Party national policy [against 
the construction of a proposed motorway], I mean the shadow 
transport spokesman has actually said a Labour government 
would not build this road, but the two councils of which I am a 
member support it, I spoke out at the district council against the 
road and in favour of national policy and they flung me out the 
group. The really funny point is that at my appeal in front of 
members of the regional executive they told me national policy 
is not the point it's what the group say that matters, according 
to standing orders anyway, so groups can do what they like and 
have no responsibility to the Party or the public, it makes you 
feel like giving up. 
Ideological Underpinning of Party Group as a Focus of 
Representation 
Theatre and impact on the party group 
So far, four categories of representative theatre have emerged: 
1. Those that are focused on the party group and the political party, in 
which the councillor associates with other councillors and party members, 
in closed or semi-closed theatres of representation. These may be termed 
'Associative' theatres. 
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2. Meetings of either a public or private nature, which involve sharing of 
common issues of concern in closed or open theatre, open to community 
participation, and are not limited to those sharing political opinions or 
party membership. These may be termed 'communal' theatres. 
3. The open theatre that is the media, may be termed 'distributive' theatres. 
4. The council or council committee as the legitimised theatre of activity 
and may be termed 'representational' theatres. 
Within each of these theatres the representative acts of the councillor can 
fall into three categories: 
1. positive (focusing on the community), 
2. neutral in which no action is taken, 
3. negative (focusing away from the community and toward the party 
group). 
The categorisations of representative act are weighted in favour of the 
group. The group benefit directly from negative activity and neutrality. The 
individual councillor is very rarely in a position where the act of speaking 
or voting will overturn a decision of a group meeting in an open theatre of 
representation. Thus the damage to the group position of positive acts of 
representation, focused on the community, is, in reality, negligible. 
The influence of group will impinge on councillors of different parties to 
different degrees within the four categories of representational theatres 
above, with Labour more willing to concede a legitimate role to the party 
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group as a focus for representation. All three political parties in their group 
form exercise a powerful expectation of compliance over their members 
and although party groups may respond with varying levels of flexibility 
when the member is faced with a crisis of representation, ultimately the 
group restricts the maximum willingness of the councillor to speak, vote 
and focus on the represented. This damages councillor willingness to act 
positively for the electoral area represented or the wider community. 
The ideological link: representation and the party group 
Across the three main parties, councillors consider themselves local 
decision-makers, articulators of local issues and concerns and holders of 
representative offices. In this last, they have the legitimate ability to apply 
to local issues the discretion attached to their office. The survey returns, 
supported by in-depth interviews, indicate that the party affiliation of the 
councillor is a determinant of the way local representation is interpreted, 
through different philosophical and political concepts, which are used to 
justify any focus of representation away from the community represented. 
Labour councillors take an old-style corporatist approach to 
representation, focusing on the group (and group meetings) as a body with 
a legitimate right and power over its members, and as a comprehensive 
and coherent decision-making body with a clear concern for the general 
public good. The group could expect, and is entitled to, loyalty, as it 
represents the mechanism by which the electoral policy supported by the 
councillor and the electorate can be implemented. This is underpinned by 
an expansive interpretation of 'collectivism', not only as a method of 
meeting collective needs but also as a unifying force for decision-making. 
It is also similar in interpretation to democratic centralism, or collective 
201 
ministerial responsibility. The consequence is the same: a high degree of 
loyalty to the group. 
Conservative councillors explain their activities by reference to concepts 
of liberty or freedom, particularly from state authority, and ideals of 
personal responsibility. These concepts, for the Conservative, apply not 
only to the electorate but also to the councillor. The councillor is as 
entitled to such liberty and freedom from local interference in acting as a 
representative, as the citizen should be free from state (including local 
government); interference, oppression and any action which diminishes 
individual responsibility. A wholesale acceptance by the Conservative 
councillor then, of a Burkean approach to representation - that is, freedom 
for the representative from the represented. That freedom from the 
represented is transferred into a focus on the 'party' which constitutes a 
'deliberative assembly... with one interest, that of the whole'. 8 This 
Burkean approach was often linked by Conservative councillors to 
statements which supported a voluntaristic approach (linked to 
responsibility) but was underpinned by the local authority as a point of 
reference for legitimate decision-making. The Conservative, can combine 
representation based on individual responsibility, freedom and suspicion of 
authority, with support for respect for authority once a decision has been 
legitimately made. Individual responsibility implies the obligation to accept 
decisions and this provides Conservatives with a philosophical justification 
for the councillor as decision-maker, free from a local interference, but 
bound to a party group. 
8 Edmund Burke's speech to the electors of Bristol (1774), A. H. Birch, 
The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy, London, Routledge, 
1993, p. 75. 
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Liberal Democrats articulated an individualistic political ideology and 
philosophy but often made reference to 'Focus' or 'TalkBack' Teams as 
stemming from, and of, a community. They invoked an affinity of concept 
with Conservative councillors' approach to representation outlined above, 
but adopted their own essentially community orientation to representation; 
but community built on the concept of the individual. For the Liberal 
Democrat it is individual needs, rather than individual responsibility that 
matters and it is free individuals who comprise a community. As 
community consists of individuals, Liberalism can place the individual at 
the centre of its philosophy. Communities for the Liberal Democrat are not 
corporate, or collectivist identities, as for the Labour councillor; they are 
simple collections of individuals and Liberal Democrats represent them as 
such. By focusing on communities consisting of individuals and conceiving 
of, and working, with community as a collection of individuals, the Liberal 
Democrat rejects the extreme individualism and responsibility of the 
Conservative councillor and the corporate/collectivism of Labour 
councillors. 
All the councillors interviewed expressed clear political differences of 
belief and approach to representation between themselves and their 
political opponents, but they also emphasised a similarity in regard to the 
importance of parties in local government as a focus of representation. 
Labour corporate/collectivism and Conservative individualism provide sets 
of beliefs by which Labour and Conservative councillors, can justify 
shifting their focus of attention away from the represented and thus 
enhance the freedom of the representative to focus on the group. The 
Liberal Democrat individual/communitarianism does not provide such a 
strong justification for representation being focused away from the 
community. It is all the more interesting then that in interview Liberal 
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Democrats supported the idea of group loyalty and the need for an element 
of group discipline. It is the lesser degree to which they carry such loyalty 
and discipline, when faced with a crisis of representation, that 
distinguishes Liberal Democrat councillors from their Labour and 
Conservative counterparts. 
Councillors of different parties use political concepts relevant to their party 
affiliation to effectively de-couple themselves from the represented as and 
when it is required by the councillor acting as either an individual or 
member of a group. All councillors are supportive of party group and the 
need for group discipline when faced with political opponents. A 
Conservative district councillor emphasised this point: 
We used to run a tight ship, with a strong disciplinary 
approach, but since Labour took over last May (1995), for 
the first time ever on this council, we have been all over the 
place, discipline has gone completely, Labour have a 
majority now and are united, we can not afford anything but 
a cohesive approach, we can not have members saying and 
doing what they like. As it is in society, it is in politics, you 
have to have discipline. 
In interview Liberal Democrat councillors praised the power of unity and 
the need for discipline in the face of political opponents, they conceded 
that unity was the key to political success and that the individual had to 
support the team if Liberal Democrats were to achieve anything. In this 
way they echoed the notes attached to the Association of Liberal 
Democrat Councillors own model standing orders. 'If we are to operate 
effectively on the council and achieve our aims, there has to be group 
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loyalty'. However these standing orders do distinguish between specifically 
ward matters that 'have little or no impact politically on other areas of the 
council'. 9 Locating such a sanitised issue, may however in reality be 
difficult. 
It would appear that once the councillor has philosophically and pre- 
dispositionally de-coupled his or herself from the 'represented' the group 
can legitimately become the focus of representative activity. Councillors 
across all parties, although expressing differing predispositions, political 
philosophy and levels of support for increased citizen involvement, 
actually share a rejection of an approach to representation too heavily 
focused on the electorate. They also share a predisposition that party 
loyalty, discipline and unity are essential prerequisites to political 
effectiveness in the representative processes. As councillors across all 
parties justify the group as a legitimate focus of representation, the power 
of the group and of group meetings, as the main determinant of the 
outcome of the use of representative discretion in open theatres of 
representation is all but assured. It is to the closed theatres of 
representation and in particular the closed theatre of the party group itself, 
that the analysis must now turn. 
9 Model Standing Orders for Liberal Democrat Council Groups, pp. 6-7. 
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5. THE PARTY GROUP AND OTHER 'CLOSED' THEATRES OF 
REPRESENTATION 
This chapter will consider the exercise of councillors' representative 
discretion within 'closed' theatres of representation. These are defined as; 
the party group, the local political party and other private meetings 
attended by the councillor. As with the 'open' theatres of representation 
considered in chapter 4, the councillor is able to select in which of the 
'closed' theatres they will act and which act to perform, in which theatre. 
The chapter will consider the significance for the councillor of these 
choices. 
Secondly, the chapter will consider the impact of political affiliation on the 
willingness of the councillor to use the closed theatre of representation and 
to act in a particular way within it. In order to fully understand the impact 
of the party group on the representative link between the councillor and the 
electorate, a comparison will be made between the analysis in chapter 4 of 
open theatres of representation and representation in the closed theatres. 
This process will identify whether councillors have a preferred theatre 
within which to act and a preferred focus of representation, either on their 
local electorate or on the party group. Thirdly, the chapter will consider 
the impact of issue and issue location on the ways in which councillors act 
within these closed theatres of representation. 
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CLOSED REPRESENTATION 
The closed theatres of representation: the survey 
To consider representative activity within the closed theatres of 
representation respondents were presented with the same two statements 
earlier introduced in the discussion of open theatres of representation in 
Chapter 4: 
If a group of electors f om your ward/division were opposing a 
decision or policy of your party group on the council and you 
agreed with them on the issue, please indicate how likely you 
are to speak out against the decision or policy of the party 
group. 
If a group of electors from outside your ward/division were 
opposing a decision or policy of your party group on the 
council and you agreed with them on the issue, please indicate 
how likely you are to speak out against the decision or policy of 
your party group. 
The response options to the statements were: very likely, likely, depends 
on the issue, not very likely and not at all likely. The statements were then 
repeated replacing 'speaking' with 'voting'. 
In each case the respondents were presented with three particular closed 
theatres of representation; the party group, a political party meeting and an 
unspecified other private meeting. In the first and second of these the 
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councillor could speak against the decision, vote against or do both or 
neither. In the third the only option is to speak in opposition. 
Councillors were asked to indicate how likely they were to speak or vote 
against the party group in each of the theatres presented, as appropriate. 
The use of these same statements in both 'open' and 'closed' theatres 
enables a common focus on the criteria of councillor agreement, locational 
impact inside or outside the councillor's own electoral area, and pre- 
existence of a group decision. These issues are equally important to 
'closed' theatres, as to open theatres as they present to the councillor the 
same crisis of representation and the same conflicting pressures. The only 
significant difference between the two situations is the closed nature of the 
theatres within which the councillor may act and the secrecy which 
attaches to them. The outcomes of the councillor's action in these 'closed' 
settings are not witnessed by the electorate, and actions embarked upon 
there may differ from those chosen in more open settings. Thus the 
councillor may choose to defend local interests only in closed theatres, 
effectively excluding the community from the representative processes and 
from witnessing the use by the councillor of representative discretion. 
Closed settings may possibly encourage one form of representative focus 
and activity, and open theatres another. 
The analysis of locational impact, councillor agreement and pre-existing 
decisions enables a consideration of the strength of party group influence 
on the use of representative discretion. The more the councillor focuses 
action on closed theatres of representation and in particular on the party 
group, the more the party group takes on a legitimised decision-making 
and representational position at the expense of the council chamber and 
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other public settings. This process further excludes the community from 
having an effective influence on councillor decision-making and so 
balancing the impact of the group. 
The survey questionnaire did not specify any particular type or level of 
party meeting from within the local party structure. The stratified nature of 
local party organisation and the possibility of an overlapping membership 
of various party committees means that in reality the councillor can act 
differently in different local party meetings. 1 For example councillors may 
display support for their electorate over a local issue in their ward or 
branch party (depending on that party's own position). But, they may be 
less strident in articulating that view, or indeed may acquiesce to, or even 
be supportive of, the group's position, when attending other party 
meetings, especially if other councillors are in attendance. The councillor 
is not of necessity a party activist, and may play little or no role in party 
activity beyond the processes of candidate selection and campaigning. 
Whereas other councillors may be completely immersed in the activities of 
the local party structure at various levels in the intervals between elections. 
The response category of 'other private meetings' was used to distinguish 
those meetings attended by councillors outside of the party group and the 
local political party. These other private meetings could take a number of 
forms: councillors meeting with senior members and other councillors, 
meetings between councillors and officers, with constituents and private 
organisations. There are many permutation of this range of private forums. 
1 For a consideration of the stratified nature of democracy and political 
activity see, I. Budge, J. A. Brand, M. Margolis, and A. L. M. Smith, 
Political Stratification and Democracy, London, MacMillan, 1972. For a 
consideration of the organisational structure of political parties see, Game 
and Leach, `The Role of Political Parties in Local Democracy', pp. 16-30. 
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Councillors were asked only to respond generally in terms of private 
meetings that were not those of the group or local party, so as to enable 
the issue of privacy, whatever form it may take, to be considered. Privacy 
as a general concept was the focus here and not the specific types of 
private meeting. 
To consider if political affiliation has an impact on the selection of closed 
theatres and acts performed within them, responses to the survey 
questionnaire are presented in the next section, by political party. 
The effect of party affiliation on representative outcomes 
In order to fully appreciate the influence of party group on the 
representative activity and focus of the councillor, and the likelihood of the 
councillor acting in opposition to the group, it is necessary to consider the 
impact of particular party affiliation on the choices councillors make. This 
approach indicates whether councillors of different political affiliation are 
more or less likely than their counterparts to defy, or comply with, the 
group. It will also indicate whether political affiliation is a determinant of 
their preferred closed theatre of representation. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show 
the responses by political party to the statements regarding councillor 
action in closed theatres, in opposition to the group, and for issues inside 
and outside their electoral area. They show the likelihood of dissent by 
councillors from the group but within closed, and therefore unobservable, 
theatres of representation. 
Table 5.1 shows councillors from all political parties saying they are 
`likely' or 'very likely' to speak or vote against the group in closed settings 
for an issue located within their own electoral area. 
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Labour Lib Dem Con 
Speak 93 99 93 
Vote 77 91 79 
Speak 92 95 88 
Vote 79 87 76 
Speak 65 78 79 
What is striking from the responses in table 5.1 is that despite willingness 
amongst Labour councillors to speak against the group, in the group or 
party meeting on a pre-existing position, there is less likelihood of their 
speaking being supported by a vote. A clear distinction is made by the 
Labour councillor between the two acts even within the private confines of 
the group and party. The table indicates that the Labour councillor 
perceives a close relationship between the representative theatres of the 
party group and the wider local party. They are also much less likely to 
speak out when the theatre shifts from the group or party, to a private 
meeting of any sort. It is clear that the considerable willingness amongst 
Labour councillors to speak out in group or a party meeting and to a lesser 
degree, vote against the group, is indicative of a ward or divisional 
orientation, as when an issue is located outside their own electoral area 
there is a marked decline in the likelihood of them speaking or voting 
against the group. 
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Table 5.2 shows councillors from all political parties saying they are 
'likely' or 'very likely' to speak or vote against the group in closed settings, 
on an issue located outside their own electoral area. 






Labour Lib Dem Con 
Speak 76 81 67 
Vote 67 76 63 
Speak 76 78 62 
Vote 68 73 57 
Speak 45 54 47 
As table 5.2. indicates the reduction in likelihood of the Labour councillor 
speaking out or voting against the group for an issue located outside their 
own electoral area is dramatic but that the differentiated pattern of 
speaking and voting is maintained. The Labour councillor is more likely to 
speak than vote in opposition to the group and again marginally more 
likely to vote in the party than in the group. With issues located outside the 
electoral area the Labour councillor draws no distinction between acting in 
either the group or the wider local party and it appears that the boundaries 
between these two theatres of representation merge. In both theatres they 
are less likely to act at all than when an issue is located within their 
electoral area. The location of an issue outside their ward or division sees 
Labour councillors responses to speaking in any 'other private meeting', 
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fall to below 50 per cent. The response to the private meeting category, 
when compared to group and party, indicates the impact and importance 
of party, degree of closedness of any theatre, issue location and 
representative action, for the Labour councillor. Shifting the theatre 
outside the confines of an exclusively 'party' and 'Labour' orientation and 
locating the issue outside the Labour councillor's electoral area has the 
effect of reducing considerably the willingness even to speak in private 
and thus the willingness to use a varied assortment of private theatres to 
speak for the electorate. 
The Liberal Democrat councillor indicates that the group and local party is 
an important theatre of representation, particularly for an issue located 
within their own electoral area. Although reflecting the familiar pattern of 
differentiation between the acts of speaking and voting, the distinction 
between them is slight. The responses to the statements indicate that the 
Liberal Democrat views the group as a theatre in which they would speak 
and vote on an issue almost with impunity, whatever the issue location. As 
with the Labour councillor there is a blurring of boundaries between the 
group and local party as a theatre within which to act; but there is an 
identifiable decline in the likelihood of the Liberal Democrat voting against 
the group within the party meeting, as opposed to voting against the group 
within a group meeting. This maintains the differentiated pattern of 
representative responses. Despite that decline, Liberal Democrats are very 
likely to support their own act of speaking against the group in the wider 
party with a vote in that same theatre. There is less likelihood that the 
Liberal Democrat would speak in a private meeting of any sort, compared 
to group or party, but still a strong likelihood that they would use such a 
venue. The Liberal Democrat councillor, although remaining 'very likely' to 
speak and vote against the group in the group itself and in the wider local 
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party, does indicate a strong reduction in the level of 'likelihood', for an 
issue outside their electoral area. The pattern remains one of speaking 
being a more likely act than that of voting, and speaking and voting more 
likely to take place in the group than any other closed theatre. There is 
considerably less likelihood that Liberal Democrats would speak against 
the group in a private meeting, for an external issue, but this has to be seen 
in the light of a high 'likely' base for responses to the location of an issue 
within the area represented. 
The Conservative councillor reflects the general pattern of representational 
behaviour. There is a high degree of likelihood that they would act in the 
party group and wider party in opposition to the group in support of their 
own electorate's position on a particular issue. A distinction appears to be 
drawn by the Conservative councillor in the boundaries between group and 
party, although there is a considerable likelihood that the Conservative 
councillor would speak in the party against the group. The responses 
indicate that in the confines of the group and the wider party, the 
Conservative councillor is highly likely to display, through his or her 
representative acts, a focus on the electorate they represent. The 
unspecified private meeting is less likely to be used by the Conservative 
councillor than either the group or the wider local party, but there exists 
(as with Labour and Liberal Democrats) a high degree of willingness to 
use this theatre. The group and party represent the prime focus of attention 
for representative activity when an issue is located within the councillor's 
own electoral area. 
As expected, and in line with the pattern already identified for the other 
parties, Conservatives show a falling off in willingness to undertake acts of 
representation in closed theatres when the location of an issue shifts 
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outside the specific area represented. The decline in likelihood that the 
Conservative councillor would either speak or vote against the group in 
either the group or wider local party is marked. The pattern of speaking 
being more likely than voting and of either act taking place in the group as 
opposed to the other closed theatres of representation, is maintained by the 
Conservative councillor. It is, again, the impact of issue location which 
influences the likelihood that the councillor would conduct acts of 
representation in opposition to the group and in support of the community, 
and influences the theatres in which such acts are conducted. The 
likelihood that the Conservative councillor would speak against the group 
in an unspecified private meeting falls below 50 per cent for issues outside 
their electoral area. The responses display (as for the Labour councillor), 
the impact and importance of party, the degree of closedness of any 
theatre, and issue location for representative activity response. These 
factors are an important element of the application by the councillor of 
representative discretion and the resultant selection of acts of 
representation and the closed theatres in which such acts can be 
performed. 
To fully appreciate the influence of party group on the councillor as a local 
representative, it is necessary to consider in greater detail the impact of 
party affiliation on the use of representative discretion within closed 
theatres of representation. 
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REPRESENTATIVE DISCRETION: PARTY AFFILIATION AND THE 
CLOSED THEATRES OF REPRESENTATION 
The analysis of the survey evidence is supported here by interview and 
case study material which is used to elaborate the consideration of the 
themes so far identified in this chapter. The closed theatres of 
representation offer the councillor the opportunity to debate issues away 
from scrutiny by the public where the councillor is freer to debate, shift 
position and argue against the policy of the group, without the attendant 
fear of publicly embarrassing the group. The degree of secrecy that is 
affixed to the closed theatres of representation underlines the considerable 
influence of the location of issues as the councillor displays a greater 
willingness to pursue ward or divisional issues within closed settings than 
to pursue issues located outside their electoral area. 
The importance of closed representation 
Comparison of councillors' likelihood of opposing the group becomes all 
the more sharper when the extent of that likelihood is taken into account. It 
is the Liberal Democrat councillor that, faced with an issue located within 
their own electoral area, in all but one instance (the one percentage point 
difference in responses between them and Conservative councillors on the 
use of other private meetings), is the most likely to use the closed theatres 
of representation to speak and vote. In both the party group and the local 
political party, Liberal Democrats are more likely to speak and vote than 
either their Labour or Conservative counterparts, but voting, even in secret 
and for an issue located within the councillor's own electoral area, remains 
a less attractive representative option for the councillor of any party. 
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Once a decision on a community-orientated and locationally-focused issue 
is taken within the confines of the group, it becomes an extremely difficult 
prospect for the community and their elected representatives (even where 
agreement between the two exists) to change it. It is still more difficult 
when the issue is not specific to a councillor's ward or division. Faced with 
a choice between group solidarity and representative action, councillors of 
all parties appear to opt for the former. How do councillors themselves 
account for this situation? 
For the councillor to take identifiable responsibility for seeking to change 
an existing group policy may be a too costly victory over the group 
leadership. An assessment by the councillor of the possible consequences 
that will flow from a change of policy, will influence him or her when 
deciding whether to vote or not. A Labour metropolitan district councillor 
commented: 
I want to be able to protest if my ward is badly affected and I'll 
happily do that in the group, but the leadership will have 
spoken to officers, got statistics and legal advice from them, so 
not having the time to do the same you rely on the leadership to 
get it right. You can argue in favour of what local people want 
but if you change the decision you never really know what 
you're in for, best to argue and lose the vote, least then I can 
say I tried. 
This was supported by a Labour metropolitan committee chair who stated 
that: 
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My vice-chair argued very strongly in group against the 
closure, [of a youth club] but he did not vote because he knew 
we had to save the money somewhere, I tipped him the wink to 
sit on his hands at committee because I knew we had the votes 
and then at least he could say he didn't support it. Appearance 
can be everything in this game you know. 
A combination of factors serve to weaken the likelihood of a councillor 
voting against the group, even within closed theatres of representation. 
Support for the group leadership, fear of the consequences of changing an 
existing decision, lack of alternative strategies supported by evidence and 
research and the multiplier effect of decisional changes on a wider strategy 
or policy of the group. There is also a fatalism amongst many councillors 
who see much local decision-making as controlled by central government 
or the courts, and themselves as only ratifying decisions to which there are 
few, if any, real alternative courses of action. 
The party group still expects the loyalty of the councillor to that decision. 
Whether it is generated from, or simply ratified by, the group, it is after all 
a group decision. The impact of decision ratification will mean councillors 
are often confronted with supporting publicly a decision made via 
government policy, the courts or a planning inquiry, which they may 
possibly oppose. Government-generated mineral extraction or housing 
figures do provide some limited discretion for councillors, such as 
location, but as a Labour district councillor commented: 
The Government figures for house building were ridiculous, we 
couldn't possibly allocate land for that many, but there was 
nothing that could be done, despite arguing in group about the 
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figures and agreeing to protest, we still had to accept the 
officers' report. Once that was agreed at group then we 
supported it in committee. 
A Conservative district and county councillor summed up the often 
expressed views of councillors across the political spectrum thus: 
They did not want this housing development at any cost and you 
can have all the protest and argument in the world, but if the 
Government set you a quota of houses to build you have to 
build them. I could try and convince my fellow councillors to 
vote against the idea, but they will think, hold on, if it doesn't go 
in his area, it could go in mine, then I get the problems. Any 
way if we have a local plan then the people can use agreed 
procedures to object to anything in that plan and then if they 
convince the inspector to overturn elements of it, fine. If it is 
something that's not planning, then yes I would try to get the 
decision overturned but the same problem arises, close 
something in his area and you don't close it in mine. 
An element of shifting the problem then exists, a kind of representative 
NIMBY-ism amongst councillors, that is, 'I can support a decision that 
causes public opposition, so long as its impact is not in my area'. 
A Conservative group leader summed up the implications of councillors 
disrupting decisions, even in the closed arena that is the party group by 
saying: 
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The Conservative group is the place to argue for what you 
believe is right and you can do that openly, that is amongst 
fellow councillors, but there is this strange fear of winning a 
vote and I suppose carrying the can for what happens. A ward 
issue can be part of a wider scenario, stop your local park 
being closed and that's good but you blow a hole through an 
entire policy for rationalising a particular service and that can 
be had You're marked then and what councillor with any 
career intentions wants that on their record. You can say to 
your people though, look I did try. 
It is however the clarity of expression when referring to the group that 
particularly distinguishes Labour councillors. One such, a former district 
council leader and now a back-bencher, stated simply that: 
When accepted onto the panel of candidates you agree to accept 
group policy and the need to abide by it, have your arguments 
in group, that's the right place, but abide by any decision 
afterwards. Yes of course even if that affects your ward, no 
question about it. 
When an issue is located within the councillor's own electoral area then the 
pre-existence of a group decision on that issue will not be likely to prevent 
the councillor of any party from debating that issue and from expressing 
opposition to the group position that they share with their own electorate. 
That the Liberal Democrat councillor is more likely than either their 
Labour or Conservative counterparts to support an act of speaking with a 
vote on that issue may reflect either their political philosophy and the 
nature of their relationship with the group (considered in chapter 4); or, 
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their opposition, or third party status on any council at the time of the 
research. A Liberal Democrat may change the group position by voting 
and encouraging others to vote, but may not in effect be altering council 
policy. The same could of course be said of any minority party councillor. 
The discipline of power, or the possibility of obtaining or regaining power 
at some future point focuses the mind of the councillor on the 
consequences of overturning existing positions on local issues. In areas 
with prolonged one party domination, both Conservative, but particularly 
Labour councillors, when in the minority, indicated in interview the same 
reluctance to vote against the group within the group. The issue here 
becomes one of group loyalty and unity for the Labour councillor. There is 
a greater willingness amongst Conservatives to view parochial issues as 
non-political and therefore less demanding of group discipline. The Labour 
councillor is less likely to make this kind of distinction, with loyalty 
transcending parochial issues, with or without a political connotation. 
Interviews conducted with councillors recently experiencing the loss of 
council control by their political party, some for the first time, indicate the 
elusive impact on group solidarity of a fall from political power. Interviews 
indicate that a temporary 'blip' may occur in group solidarity as a result of 
the immediate shock of the changed political circumstances, especially 
after a long period of control. The temporary problem of the group 
reasserting itself as a centre of councillor loyalty, is less likely in councils 
that have a tradition of changes in political control. Councillors in 
interviews indicated that after settling down to the new position and with 
the prospect of regaining control in the future, little difference occurs in the 
expectations of group loyalty, or the willingness amongst councillors to 
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provide that loyalty. Councillors in marginal authorities indicate that loss 
of power makes very little difference, if any, to the focus on group. 
A Conservative metropolitan borough councillor commented, 'the group's 
attitude toward discipline did not change and has not changed one bit 
from when we were in power, it is exactly the same whether in power or 
not'. This was supported by a second Conservative metropolitan borough 
councillor, 'This is a highly political council, whether we are in control or 
not and that tends to concentrate the mind on winning, whether in power 
or not, if you see what I mean'. 
Group loyalty or discipline, whether it arises from Labour traditions of 
collectivism, Conservative political orientations toward discipline or the 
Liberal Democrats' recognition of the need for group organisation to 
secure political success, results in one conclusion. The party group 
represents a closed theatre of representation and the councillor is expected 
to undertake acts of representation within its meetings. 
The group is the theatre in which councillors are likely to deliberate local 
issues, but less likely to vote against a pre-existing decision and thus, 
through voluntary self-restraint, effectively negate the only opportunity 
they have to oppose the group. It is an important indicator of group 
influence over the representative processes that Labour and Conservative 
councillors are less inclined to vote against the group, in the group 
meeting, even when under no direct disciplinary control; and when the 
very theatre of the group meeting is accepted by councillors as a legitimate 
one in which to oppose the group itself. 
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The wider local political party is seen by councillors as another legitimate 
theatre of representation in which to oppose a group decision and to 
further the position of the local community, irrespective of the councillor's 
political affiliation. Councillors of different political affiliation however 
vary in the likelihood that they would use such a theatre. A clear majority 
of councillors across the main parties are likely to use the wider local party 
as an acceptable theatre in which to oppose the group, at least by the act of 
speaking. Voting represents a different prospect, and although clear 
majorities of councillors are likely to undertake this act when the issue is 
located in their own electoral area, they do nonetheless differ by party. 
Fifty-six per cent of Labour and Conservative, but 62 per cent of Liberal 
Democrat councillors, are 'very likely' so to vote, still high, but with 
significant margins for doubt as to the willingness amongst councillors 
across the parties, to vote within their own political party against the 
group. The symbolism of the vote is as strong a deterrent on councillor 
action in closed as it is in open theatres of representation. 
A Labour district council leader, faced with a vociferous local campaign 
against a decision of his group and council reported that: 
All the ward councillors, of which I am one, held a meeting with 
the residents campaign committee and what was obvious from 
this was that they were pressurising us as their local councillors 
to support them against the group without understanding our 
position. I am the leader of the council and one of the other 
ward councillors is the vice-chair of personnel, how can we 
argue publicly against our own group. I advised them to talk to 
the constituency [Labour party], if they back the residents it 
would ease our position and we would be able to take the views 
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of the constituency to the group far more easily then some self 
appointed residents group. Since you ask, although I am not a 
member of that particular constituency party no, I would not 
speak and certainly not vote against the group. 
Of the other two councillors for that particular ward, one would speak and 
vote in favour of the group policy not the electorate and admitted that: 
I am not exactly the favourite son down there at the moment, 
this will have been resolved, the road built and all forgotten 
about by the time I am up for re-election in 1998, any way I 
think they are wrong on the substantive issues and the group 
has a policy which I will stick by. My local branch [Labour 
Party] support the group and I would argue strongly at the 
constituency for group policy and vote for it. 
The remaining councillor for the area stated that: 
I support the residents, I don't like this road but it's group 
policy and I've been told by them [the group] to support it, 
things would be easier if the constituency opposed it, and if I 
was on the GC (General Committee) I would probably speak 
against, but no not vote, there are too many councillors on the 
GC, and they expect you to support the group. 
The political party represents for the councillor a legitimate theatre of 
representation in which they are readily prepared to 'speak' against existing 
group policy when in agreement with a community campaign. It should be 
remembered that in this question councillors were not given a specific 
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'party meeting' in which to locate 'speaking' and were thus able to consider 
party meetings generally. Some councillors will be bolder in party 
meetings of the ward or division they represent where there may exist a 
solid bedrock of support for, or opposition to, the community in which that 
party is located. As the councillor moves up the stratified structure of the 
local party, more opposition to the community and support for the group 
may be experienced, especially from other councillors. 
The councillor appears to be able to act as easily in the party meeting as in 
the group and will act similarly in each theatre. This approach is 
particularly the case for the Liberal Democrats, perhaps a product of the 
often smaller local membership base available to them compared to the 
other two parties. A Liberal Democrat county councillor summed this 
position up by stating: 
Locally we are very stretched, we have a borough by-election 
next week and have drawn on workers from far and wide, most 
of my local party are councillors of one sort or another and a 
party meeting is like a group meeting, except we are on 
different councils. 
Councillors consider the political party meeting, with its semi-closed 
nature and restricted membership, as a legitimate theatre of representation 
in which to speak. The closeness of the responses to this question, 
compared to the responses to the question which located speaking in the 
group is telling, and indicates the ease with which councillors move 
between the closed party group meeting and the semi-closed party 
meeting, especially when speaking against the group. 
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The impact of issue location 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 showed the local (ward/divisional) orientation of 
councillors across the political spectrum when considering the use of 
closed theatres of representation, but that closed theatres also encourage 
councillors to speak and vote when the issue is outside their own electoral 
area. The distinction made by councillors between the use of the three 
closed theatres of representation presented to them becomes clear when 
considering the shifting down in intensity of response from 'very likely' to 
'likely' that indicates the differentiation placed by councillors on these 
closed theatres. 
With an issue located within their own electoral area 87 per cent of Liberal 
Democrats, 84 per cent of Conservatives and 83 per cent of Labour were 
'very likely' to speak out in a group meeting and 73 per cent of Liberal 
Democrats, 62 per cent of Conservatives and 60 per cent of Labour were 
'very likely' to vote against the group, at a group meeting. Within the 
political party, for an issue located within the councillor's own electoral 
area, the responses became 76 per cent Labour and Conservative and 75 
per cent Liberal Democrat 'very likely' to speak against the group and 62 
per cent Liberal Democrat, against 56 per cent Labour and Conservative 
'very likely' to vote against the group within the party. 
The unspecified private meeting, for an issue located within the 
councillor's own electoral area, is the only closed theatre in which the 
Liberal Democrat is not clearly the most likely to speak out when strength 
of response is taken into account. With 54 per cent of Liberal Democrats 
'very likely' to speak out, against 63 per cent of Conservatives and 46 per 
cent of Labour councillors 'very likely' to speak out in this theatre. 
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Conservatives are seen to have a higher propensity to use the private 
meeting. 
The councillor of any party is more likely to speak against the group, 
within the group itself, than other closed theatres, with the Liberal 
Democrats more likely than Labour or Conservative councillors to support 
that act with a vote. The difference between the likelihood of the 
Conservative and Labour councillor speaking and voting in the group is 14 
per cent and 16 per cent respectively, for an issue within their area. The 
difference is only four per cent and nine per cent respectively for an issue 
external to the area represented (but from a lower preference anyway, as 
shown in tables 5.1 and 5.2). Both Labour and Conservative then, are less 
likely than the Liberal Democrat to vote after speaking. 
Councillors are clearly willing to articulate community concerns from their 
own electoral area within the confines of the party meeting and to dissent 
from and speak against group policy. Again, as with open theatres of 
representation, it is the symbolism of the vote that causes the councillor 
particular concern; representative discretion is not unfettered. Deliberation 
and debate, is a more sustainable action, than voting, even within the 
closed confines of the political party and the group itself. 
There is a clear shifting down in intensity of speaking and voting against 
the group when the issue location shifts outside the councillor's own 
electoral area. Not only are fewer councillors likely to speak or vote 
against the group when the issue is located outside their own electoral 
area, but the intensity of likelihood of those who might do so declines. 
Figure 5.1 shows the 'very likely' and 'likely' responses from Labour, 
Liberal Democrat and Conservative councillors to the prospect of them 
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speaking against the group, within the group, for issues located inside and 
outside of their own electoral areas. The shifting down in intensity of 
response between issues inside and outside of the ward or division 
represented is marked, with all councillors indicating a decline in 
likelihood of speaking in the group as the issue shifts outside of their own 
electoral area. 
Figure 5.1. Councillors 'likely' to speak against the group, in group 













Internal Issues External Issues 
The differentiation in intensity of response to speaking in the group as a 
result of issue location is matched in terms of voting in group. There is a 
greater likelihood that councillors would vote when the issue is located 
within their area, rather than external to it. Figure 5.2 shows the responses 
from councillors regarding the likelihood of them voting against the group, 
in group. 
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Figure 5.2. Councillors 'likely' to vote against the group, at group 














Internal Issues External Issues 
The differentiated pattern of responses follows through into the wider local 
party, with a similar but greater dilution of intensity in likeliness to speak 
and vote occurring between issues located internally to the area 
represented in comparison to those located outside of it. So, although 
councillors are prepared to speak within the party against the group, the 
intensity of that likelihood underpins the preference for the group meeting 
as the arena in which to speak out. Figure 5.3. shows the responses from 
councillors to the likelihood of them speaking in the party meeting. 
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Figure 5.3. Councillors 'likely' to speak against the group at a party 
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In terms of voting against group decisions at a party meeting, the decline in 
intensity of likelihood continues across the parties, with the Liberal 
Democrat indicating the strongest likelihood of voting in this setting for an 
issue located within their own area. Figure 5.4 shows the responses from 
councillors to the likelihood of voting in a party meeting. 
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Figure 5.4. Councillors 'likely' to vote against the group at a party 














Internal Issues External Issues 
The decline in intensity of likelihood of speaking against the group 
continues, across all parties when the theatre shifts to the 'private meeting', 
which produces the lowest 'very likely' responses from the three closed 
theatres presented to councillors. The impact of issue location is equally 
important in the private meeting, which by its nature may include very few, 
if any, fellow group members. 
Figure 5.5 shows the responses from councillors to the likelihood that they 
would speak at a private meeting, against the group. 
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Figure 5.5. Councillors 'likely' to speak against the group at a private 
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Internal Issues External Issues 
What is clear from figures 5.1 to 5.5 is that issue location has a consistent 
and pervasive impact on the intensity of likelihood of a councillor acting 
against the group, in private theatres of representation. This impact is 
common across the political spectrum. Such a behavioural pattern confirms 
the existence of a ward or divisional orientation amongst councillors, but it 
must be borne in mind that such orientation is more likely to be played out 
in the secrecy of the party group, than any other closed theatre of 
representation. 
Although the Liberal Democrat appears as the most likely to act against 
the group, in six out of the ten cases presented in the figures, they are not 
consistently the highest 'very likely' scorers, being marginally less likely 
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than Labour or Conservatives to speak out in the party for an issue located 
either inside or outside their own ward or division. In regard to speaking 
and voting against the group at a private meeting, the Liberal Democrats 
are eight per cent less 'very likely' to use this theatre than the 
Conservatives, but are eight per cent greater in this category than the 
Labour councillor. There are no real differences between them and Labour 
councillors disposed to vote against the group within the party for an issue 
outside of their own electoral area. 
There is therefore no clear pattern of greater likelihood that emerges, 
except that the Liberal Democrats produce higher 'very likely' responses in 
six out of the ten cases. The closeness in percentage terms of the response 
figures, for the ten cases in figures 5.1 to 5.5, do indicate however the 
importance of issue location on intensity of likelihood. The 'very likely' 
responses are more likely to result in action than the 'likely' responses. 
Closed theatres of representation: political expediency and the 
permanency of decisions 
Although the likelihood, and intensity of likelihood, of a councillor 
speaking and voting against the group is less when the issue is located 
external to their own electoral area, councillors across the party spectrum 
do not exclude themselves from speaking or voting on such issues. As a 
Conservative district councillor stated: 
It would of course very much depend on the issue and if it had 
already been raised by the ward member, once raised I would 
feel free to take part in the debate, if it was a Labour 
councillor's ward and we could embarrass that councillor then I 
would certainly raise the matter, not only in the group but in 
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public, if it is one of our own, I would be content to discuss the 
matter, albeit a parochial one, in the group. It's not my business 
to take someone else's matters up first off 
It would appear that councillors are motivated to act by a number of 
considerations, not least of which is the expectations of the party group of 
councillor loyalty. There also exists the possibility of an issue being used 
to highlight weaknesses in political opponents, either as individuals or as 
representatives from a political party. A local issue, and a councillor's 
stand on it, can be used not only to pursue the issue, but also a wider party 
political advantage. Casting blame on a political party for a particular 
decision and manipulating a local issue for party purposes, is an attractive 
proposition for many councillors interviewed for this research. 
Equally opposing a community position because of the involvement in the 
issue of councillors from an opposing party, in some local campaign, has 
also been highlighted as a tactic of advantage to the group position. One 
Labour councillor commented: 
they [a particular action group] are all Tories you know, 
councillor [named Conservative councillor] is advising them, 
or should I say mis-advising them and none of f them vote 
Labour, closet Tories and Liberals they are, only representing 
themselves. 
In other words, if all who protest the group's position are political 
opponents, their own arguments on an issue can effectively be de- 
legitimised, at least by the party group. This possibility must be considered 
against the willingness of councillors to form cross cutting single-issue 
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alliances with councillors of other parties, as identified in the case study in 
chapter seven. Those alliances may lead to active co-operation on a single 
issue, or at least working towards the same objective, but independently, 
and not opposing the actions of the other. 
The impact of the issue and other political considerations such as party 
advantage, personality, and nearness of an election, account for the use of 
local issues by councillors as either a political expedient and platform, or a 
genuine inter-party approach to a single issue. Interviews with councillors 
have indicated that although the issue itself may be of such local impact as 
to negate political expediency, the existence of an issue which can be used 
to secure an advantage over political opponents is seen as a preferable 
situation by many councillors. The preference however is for concentration 
on issues located within the ward or division and if possible mixing this 
with political advantage. 
A Liberal Democrat district councillor stated: 
Now if I want to speak or vote on something I'll do it but I am 
more inclined to concentrate on my own ward, get the best for 
the people that elect you that's obvious to almost anyone. What 
you must understand is that after all, the other wards have 
their own councillors, don't they, so it's up to them to fight their 
own corners, but if I am interested in the issue, I might dabble 
in it you could say, especially if it upsets the Socialists or 
Conservatives, or even my own side. I don't mind really! 
Local issues are also seen by councillors across the political spectrum as 
very much the property of local members. Whilst ignoring the distinction 
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between the local impact of policy and local issues, councillors support 
fellow councillors' right to raise and pursue ward or divisional issues, but 
within of course, the appropriate theatre of representation. Echoing the 
Liberal Democrat and Conservative above, a Labour metropolitan 
councillor stated: 
If it is not in my patch and it is not a major issue, you know 
some big policy question, then I'd let the local member get on 
with it, I mean I would speak if I was interested or the issue was 
relevant and of course if pushed to the vote I would vote, but 
you can't then keep going around changing things because they 
don't suit somebody in your patch. I don't think that local ward 
members should have the final say on their areas, there'd be no 
point in having a council if we didn't all consider these 
parochial matters, but after all that's exactly what they are. 
This comment raises another issue which has also been reflected across the 
political spectrum: the ability of councillors to make a virtue out of 
consistency of approach and maintaining a particular group position, 
despite community opposition and evidence to undermine and contradict 
that position. Speaking at a district council Labour group meeting one 
councillor commented: 
We made a decision on this, in this group, some years ago and 
we should stick to it, it would be hypocritical now start saying 
something else. We made a decision, based on believing this 
road would be to the benefit of the area, it doesn't matter what 
anyone says about it, we must stick to our guns on this decision. 
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This approach was supported at the same meeting by a councillor stating: 
We have a decision on this, and we know there are those that 
are against us and protesting and the like, but we can It go and 
change the policy of this group as is suggested now just because 
some one disagrees with it or argues against it. We took this 
decision in 1988 and should stick to it. 
The case study in chapter 9 which relates to the issue being considered 
here, indicates the existence of several different opinions on both the 
effectiveness and desirability of the road in question. The case in favour of 
the road made at a public Inquiry has been subject to widespread rebuttal 
and much contrary independent evidence to that on which the party group 
concerned made its decision. An apparent unwillingness exists, in this case 
anyway, to admit that the original decision may have been wrong or that 
the circumstances had changed drastically over the intervening years. 
In interview and from observation, councillors of all parties accept the 
need for a consistency - almost a permanency to decisions - once made, 
and the group would rather avoid losing face by changing its position, than 
respond to expressed local opinion. In these circumstances the position of 
the group is clearly set against local opinion and the group must not be 
seen to vacillate on an issue. In interviews councillors from all parties 
stressed the need for maintaining decisions once made and the political 
problems that could be generated by a group which, as one Conservative 
district councillor said, 'caved in at the slightest bit of pressure'. The 
Liberal Democrats interviewed did indicate a greater willingness to re- 
consider, if not change policy once made, with a county councillor stating 
that: 
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Nothing is forever, we must always be prepared to review our 
position, listen to new information, and think about what people 
say, but once a decision has been made it would have to be 
some very pressing new evidence, you might say, to lead to a 
'policy. change of policy. 
Generally, though, inflexibility appears as one of the damaging effects of 
the party group system on local democracy and representation. 
Lessons from issue location and closed theatres of representation 
Councillors across the political spectrum display the same pattern of 
behaviour in both closed and open theatres of representation. They are 
more likely to speak than vote, and more likely to undertake either of those 
acts in the group than in any other closed theatre of representation. They 
are also more likely to perform those acts when the issue is inside rather 
than outside their own electoral area. 
It is possible to conclude that whatever the party affiliation of the 
councillor, the party group - of all the closed theatres - is the one in which 
the councillor is most likely to undertake acts of representation. Liberal 
Democrats are more likely to follow up any act of speaking with a vote, 
whatever the location of the issue. Although there is a decline in 
willingness to transfer activities to the wider local party, there is also an 
ease of movement from the group to the party for the councillor (of any 
party), which is reflected in the high degrees of willingness to speak and 
vote in this arena. It is the unspecified private meeting, outside the 
confines of a purely political meeting that finds least favour with all 
councillors for speaking against the group. 
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Although the group is the theatre in which the councillor is most likely to 
act, there is an interesting degree of reluctance to vote against an 'existing' 
decision. The belief that once an issue has been settled, the demands of 
'democracy' imply the councillor must acquiesce in that decision was 
emphasised by a Labour district councillor: 
Look, put it this way, when an issue comes to group, whether 
brought there by the local member or on a committee agenda 
for a policy decision, we discuss it and vote, if you lose you 
have to accept that, now some might want to break the whip, 
well group standing orders deals with that. Even f you don't 
break the whip you can not keep coming backwards and 
forwards to the group with the same subject, you have to let go, 
democracy is about accepting defeat, discuss things in group, 
vote, but then get on with it. 
and by a Conservative group leader: 
I expect my members to accept the results of debate and 
decisions by the Conservative group, in all my time I have never 
met a real rebel, most decisions made are taken within the 
group on good sound logical argument and debate, now many 
may go along because they lack alternative information but it is 
not good enough to say Mr Jones at No 67 doesn't like it so I 
am against. You have to do better than that in my group. 
Although there is a difference between likelihood of speaking and voting, 
the councillor from any one of the three main parties is 'very likely' to 
either speak or vote against the group, within the group meeting. Despite 
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the decline in likelihood of voting compared to speaking and the impact of 
issue location, internal or external to the councillor's own electoral area, 
the group is still the main focus for undertaking representative activity. 
The group however is the theatre of representation that is most 
emphatically closed from observation by the electorate. The party group 
distances the decision process from the electors themselves, who are 
excluded from its deliberations, activities, decision-making processes and 
discipline. Although across the political spectrum the councillor expresses 
a high likelihood of representing the electorate within that closed theatre, it 
remains just that - closed. 
It is possible to argue, that like justice, democracy must be seen to be 
done. Therefore to fully appreciate the position of the party group as the 
prime beneficiary of representative democracy at the local level, it is 
necessary to compare the declared 'likelihood' of the councillor 
undertaking acts of representation in closed, unobservable theatres, with 
the 'likelihood' that they would also act in open, and observable theatres. It 
is also necessary to consider how both the group as a concept and the 
particular political affiliation of the councillor influences his or her 
willingness to perform acts of representation in either closed or open 
theatres. To undertake this analysis requires drawing together material 
from this and the previous chapter. 
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REPRESENTATIVE ACTIVITY: CLOSED AND OPEN THEATRES. 
To consider the influence of the party group on the use of representative 
discretion it is necessary to consider whether a differentiated approach to 
councillor activity exists across closed and open theatres of representation. 
To undertake such a comparison two particular theatres from the closed 
and open categories have been isolated for comparison, those being the 
full council and committee from the open category, and the closed theatres 
of the party group and the local political party. 
These particular open and closed theatres have been isolated because they 
enable a comparison of the representative activities of the councillor 
between those theatres of representation legitimised by the local electoral 
processes, against those not so legitimised. Council and committee are the 
theatres in which councillors undertake debate and decision-making that is 
open to observation by the public and press and in which local democracy 
is seen and heard to be done. 
The group and local political party represent the antithesis of these 
circumstances in that they are theatres of representation in which the 
public are either completely excluded or only able to attend by virtue of 
membership of a political party. In these theatres of decision-making and 
representation the acts of the councillor are not observable, not witnessed 
publicly, and are not therefore theatres in which they can be held publicly 
accountable. These contrasting theatres were also selected because they 
enable a comparison of the representative acts of 
both speaking and 
voting. 
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Tables 5.3. and 5.4. below indicate that councillors across the political 
spectrum, when faced with an issue located within their own electoral 
area, are more likely to speak and vote against the group, within that group 
and wider political party, than they are to undertake those acts in the open 
and legitimised theatres of full council and committee. In all cases the 
variation in the responses between open and closed theatres of 
representation are marked, with councillors indicating a rejection of the 
electorally legitimised theatres of representation in favour of the closed 
and unobservable group and political party. 
Table 5.3. A comparison of representative acts between closed and 
open theatres: all councillors; internal to the area 
represented 
Theatre Act Likely Depends Unlikely (base) 
Open Theatre 
Council Speak 46 27 24 (533) 
Vote 25 29 42 (526) 
Committee Speak 57 24 16 (535) 
Vote 34 30 34 (531) 
Closed Theatre 
Group Speak 94 3 1 (540) 
Vote 80 11 7 (538) 
Party Speak 91 4 3 (534) 
Vote 79 11 7 (530) 
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Table 5.4. A comparison of representative acts between closed and 
open theatres: all councillors; external to the area 
represented 
Theatre Act Likely Depends Unlikely (base) 
Open Theatre 
Council Speak 21 36 37 (515) 
Vote 17 32 44 (508) 
Committee Speak 28 36 30 (520) 
Vote 24 33 36 (509) 
Closed Theatre 
Group Speak 73 19 6 (534) 
Vote 67 17 10 (518) 
Party Speak 71 19 6 (523) 
Vote 64 18 11 (514) 
When an issue is located within the councillor's own electoral area there is 
marked decline in likelihood that the member would speak or vote when 
comparing the closed with the open theatres of representation. The decline 
is stark, falling by 48 per cent when comparing those councillors who 
would speak against the group in the group meeting, with those 'likely' to 
speak in full council, and by 55 per cent for those that would vote within 
the group meeting, compared to those 'likely' to vote in full council. 
Table 5.4 shows that similar reductions in the likelihood of the councillor 
speaking or voting in open and closed theatres of representation also occur 
when the location of the issue shifts to outside the councillor's own 
electoral area. The pattern remains that the councillor is more likely to 
speak and vote in group, than any other theatre and more likely to speak 
and vote in the closed rather than the open theatres of representation. The 
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responses indicate that the councillor prefers the security of the closed 
theatres, particularly the party group, for conducting acts of representation, 
over the open and electorally legitimised council and committee. That 
holds so whether the issue is either internal or external to the electoral area 
of the councillor but with the councillor more 'likely' to act when the issue 
is internal to the area represented. 
The impact of the party group and party affiliation on the representative 
activity of the councillor is indicated in tables 5.5 to 5.10 below which 
present the likelihood of councillors undertaking acts of representation 
between closed and open theatres, for issues internal and external to their 
electoral area, by political affiliation. 
Table 5.5. Likelihood of representative acts between closed and open 
theatres: internal issue location; Labour councillors 
Theatre Act Likely Depends Unlikely (base) 
Open Theatre 
Council Speak 25 32 41 (218) 
Vote 10 21 65 (215) 
Committee Speak 38 30 29 (220) 
Vote 17 25 55 (218) 
Closed Theatre 
Group Speak 93 4 1 (221) 
Vote 77 10 12 (221) 
Party Speak 92 6 1 (223) 
Vote 79 11 8 (220) 
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Table 5.6. Likelihood of representative acts between closed and open 
theatres: external issue location; Labour councillors 
Theatre Act Likely Depends Unlikely (base) 
Open Theatre 
Council Speak 13 26 54 (210) 
Vote 8 20 65 (210) 
Committee Speak 18 28 49 (213) 
Vote 16 20 58 (212) 
Closed Theatre 
Group Speak 76 15 7 (219) 
Vote 67 15 14 (214) 
Party Speak 76 14 7 (216) 
Vote 68 13 15 (214) 
Table 5.7. Likelihood of representative acts between closed and open 
theatres: internal issue lo cation; Liberal Democ rat 
councillors 
Theatre Act Likely Depends Unlikely (base) 
Open Theatre 
Council Speak 59 28 11 (97) 
Vote 43 37 15 (95) 
Committee Speak 66 27 5 (97) 
Vote 50 36 12 (97) 
Closed Th eatre 
Group Speak 99 1 0 (99) 
Vote 91 6 1 (97) 
Party Speak 95 3 0 (97) 
Vote 87 8 2 (96) 
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Table 5.8. Likelihood of representative acts between closed and open 
theatres: external issue location; Liberal Democrat 
counci llors 
Theatre Act Likely Depends Unlikely (base) 
0/ 
Open Theatre 
Council Speak 28 46 23 (97) 
Vote 28 48 18 (94) 
Committee Speak 36 45 16 (97) 
Vote 31 51 12 (94) 
Closed Theatre 
Group Speak 81 18 0 (98) 
Vote 76 17 2 (95) 
Party Speak 78 19 0 (96) 
Vote 73 19 4 (95) 
Table 5.9. Likelihood of representative acts between closed and open 
theatres: internal issue location; Conservative councillors 
Theatre Act Likely Depends Unlikely (base) 
Open Theatre 
Council Speak 62 23 12 (218) 
Vote 32 34 30 (216) 
Committee Speak 72 17 8 (218) 
Vote 43 32 21 (216) 
Closed Theatre 
Group Speak 93 3 1 (220) 
Vote 79 14 5 (220) 
Party Speak 88 3 5 (214) 
Vote 76 13 7 (214) 
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Table 5.10. Likelihood of representative acts between closed and open 
theatres: external issue location; Conservative councillors 
Theatre Act Likely Depends Unlikely (base) 
Open Theatre 
Council Speak 26 41 25 (208) 
Vote 20 37 33 (204) 
Committee Speak 35 40 19 (210) 
Vote 28 36 26 (203) 
Closed Theatre 
Group Speak 67 23 7 (217) 
Vote 63 20 9 (209) 
Party Speak 62 24 8 (211) 
Vote 57 23 11 (205) 
The responses presented in tables 5.5 to 5.10 above indicate that whatever 
the political affiliation of the councillor a preference exists for undertaking 
acts of representation within closed theatres away from the electorally 
legitimised full council and committee. Whatever the affiliation of the 
councillor, there is a greater likelihood that they will speak and vote 
against the group within the group, than in any other theatres and are more 
likely to speak and vote in either of the closed, as opposed to the open 
theatres of representation. The councillor, irrespective of party affiliation 
prefers the secrecy of the group and the political party in which to conduct 
acts of representation, but this is far more marked for Labour councillors. 
This preference for closed theatres of representation indicates that for 
Labour and Liberal Democrats, there is little distinction between the group 
and the local party for either speaking or voting against the group. The 
Conservative councillor is slightly more reticent to draw group issues into 
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the local party, a reflection of the freedom of the councillor to employ 
representative discretion, unhindered by party or electorate. The variation 
between speaking in group and local party, although greater for the 
Conservative than either Liberal Democrat or Labour, still indicates that 
the Conservative views closed theatres as preferable to open ones for 
opposing the group, and still prefers to do this within the group meeting 
itself. 
The research indicates the existence of strong inter-party differences but 
the crucial point at which political affiliation becomes a determinant of 
likely councillor representative activity and theatre selection is in the shift 
from closed to open theatres. Here, it is quite clearly the Labour councillor 
who is far more reluctant than either the Liberal Democrat or Conservative 
councillor to allow a crisis of representation to spill into the public arena. 
Labour councillors indicated a marked prioritisation of the democratic 
processes and a differentiated approach between theatres within which 
they would perform representative acts. Clearly Labour councillors prefer 
the secret and closed theatres of representation more than either the 
Liberal Democrat or Conservative. Across the three main political parties 
there is less likelihood that the councillor would both speak and vote 
against the group as the theatre for that action shifts further away from the 
group itself and into the open. 
Labour councillors are the least likely to undertake either act of 
representation as the theatre shifts outwards from the group, whatever the 
location of the issue, with the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives more 
likely to act in open theatres, although, all councillors indicate a very high 
likelihood of speaking and voting in the group itself, and also within the 
political party. The Labour councillor views the democratic processes as 
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quite legitimately conducted in the privacy of the group meeting and 
displays the greatest reluctance of councillors from the three main parties 
to transferring acts of representation into the open. Compared to the 
Labour councillor, the liberal Democrats and Conservatives, whilst 
preferring privacy and the party group meeting to conduct representation, 
have a greater propensity to transfer those acts into open and observable 
theatres in each and every case. 
Against the performance of representation in closed theatres must be 
considered the nature of the representation so conducted. If, as has been 
argued, the acts of representation conducted in open theatres are largely 
symbolic, with little, if any chance (or even intention), of success, perhaps 
representation conducted in private is more forceful, genuine and 
deliberative and thus of a higher quality than that observed in open 
theatres. If so, then the Labour councillor's reluctance to act in public has 
little effect on the result of the democratic processes but those processes 
themselves are impoverished for being privately conducted. The lesson is 
clearly that the councillor, when faced with a crisis of representation, is 
more likely to conduct acts of representation in opposition to the party 
group within closed rather than open theatres and specifically the party 
group meeting itself. The democratic processes are therefore more likely to 
be unobservable and therefore unaccountable to the public. 
There is a clear reduction across councillors of all political parties in 
likelihood that they would either speak or vote against the group in any of 
the closed or open theatres presented to them when the location of an issue 
is external to their own electoral area. The Liberal Democrat retaining the 
position as the councillor most likely, in any theatre of representation, to 
speak or vote against their group and in support of the community. The 
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pattern of preference for speaking over voting identified as existing with 
open theatres, also remains constant for councillors across all parties and 
in each of the closed settings of representation. As the theatre shifts 
outwards from the party group, despite the closed nature of those settings, 
there is less likelihood that the councillor will speak or vote against the 
group. 
Why councillors distinguish between act and theatre 
The issue that remains is, why are councillors of any party more likely to 
focus their representative action on the closed, rather than open theatres of 
representation? Interviews and case study material have indicated a shared 
acceptance of the necessity for closed debate where councillors can 
contribute to policy and decision formulation, free from observation by any 
other than their own party councillor colleagues. The need for some 
private debate is seen by Labour, Liberal Democrats and Conservative 
councillors as facilitating the free flow of deliberation leading to group 
policy or decision-making, by which the councillor is expected to abide. 
The matter goes deeper than this need for privacy, as councillors indicate 
that a legitimacy attaches to the closed group meeting as a theatre for 
representation in its own right, as well as a setting in which the councillor 
can express opinion free from the direct observance of the public. 
Councillors perceive privacy as a benefit to enable the consideration of 
unpopular alternatives, particularly when those alternatives have, as in so 
many cases, a locational impact and are likely to generate community 
opposition. A united front can be maintained against such community 
opposition if the decisions taken in private are supported in public. As one 
Labour district councillor stated: 
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It is just easier to consider in private dropping something in 
some ones back yard, that you know they won't like, especially 
if there are conflicting views in the group. Have the argument in 
private, say what you like, vote how you like and when you all 
stick together in public, you are less, frightened by opposition. 
The distinguishing factor highlighted by the political affiliation of the 
councillor is the degree of willingness, across the parties, to support the 
results of the closed meetings which privately make decisions to be ratified 
within open council or committee, especially when a crisis of 
representation occurs. It is here that the power and influence of the party 
group can be assessed, as councillors of different political affiliation 
express different degrees of willingness to shift the representative acts they 
may undertake in closed theatres of representation into the open. Liberal 
Democrat and Conservative councillors, although supportive of the right of 
the group to expect the loyalty of its members, are also inclined to 
consider locational impact on a member's electoral area as a legitimate 
source of conflict which the councillor must resolve. A Liberal Democrat 
county councillor stated: 
If a member of the group disagrees, as individuals they can 
abstain, being a fairly maverick lot that does happen, but no 
way would we force someone to vote any particular way. 
Labour have a stricter policy approach, they say, this is the 
policy so you vote for it. This is one area where we are very 
different to Labour, we do let people abstain or suggest they 
pop to the loo while the vote is being taken. If they voted or 
spoke against Liberal Democrat group policy that would be 
very serious but we don't have any real mechanisms for dealing 
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with it. You can abstain or be absent, we try not to speak or vote 
against the group, but if'you do, you do. 
The absenting by 'popping to the loo' tactic is supported across the parties 
with a Labour chief whip stating, 'Go to the toilet when the vote is taken, 
that's fine if your own division is affected and as we have a good 
majority, but if you're in the chamber you vote with the group, no 
question'. Abstaining is also seen as acceptable to some party groups and 
thus abstention allows the councillor to cope, with a crisis of 
representation, by avoidance of any public action. The public however, 
may demand action from the councillor, not acquiescence to his or her 
group. Voting against the group is not accepted by party groups with the 
same flexibility as abstaining or indeed speaking. 
The need for group discipline and loyalty is accepted by councillors across 
the political spectrum as important to political success and the avoidance 
of allowing political opponents an opportunity to criticise the 'party'. Unity 
against political opponents, and even against community protest, protects 
the integrity of the party group as a decision-making mechanism that can 
demand the loyalty of its members. The collectivist decision-making 
tradition of the Labour Party is one of demanding a greater loyalty of its 
group members and exacting a greater willingness to provide that loyalty 
compared with the Conservative or Liberal Democrat groups (as 
evidenced in chapter 2). Such loyalty however is specific to Labour only in 
its degree and intensity, not its existence. 
The Conservative councillor experiences a particular political paradox in 
squaring the Conservative philosophies of discipline and respect for law 
and order with the conflicting ideals of freedom and, particularly, free 
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speech. The Conservative councillor, whilst preferring the secrecy of the 
closed theatre of representation that is the group, to any other theatre, is 
more likely than the Labour councillor to oppose the group in public. A 
conflict exists then between expectations of loyalty and discipline to the 
group position and the belief in free speech. Conservative councillors often 
raised in interview the difficulty experienced in reconciling the need to be 
seen to be representing the electorate on a specific issue located within 
their own ward or division, with their feeling of loyalty to the group and a 
strong predilection for discipline. A Conservative district councillor stated 
that: 
It really is extremely difficult you know, I am loyal to the 
Conservative cause and so to the group but if my constituents 
wanted me to support them on something then I feel I would 
have to do it. It would cause a great problem though and I 
would feel very torn between my loyalty to the Conservative 
group and to the people I represent, In the end I would make a 
decision based on my own assessment of the particular details 
of the case. I would certainly speak to the leader of the council 
and fellow ward councillors before coming to any decision on a 
course of action. 
The paradox between discipline and freedom was rationalised through a 
process of consideration of apparently conflicting ideals, by a 
Conservative district and county councillor thus: 
Difficult, but not insurmountable this one I think, yes, 
Conservatives have this ideological preference for discipline, 
law and order and I suppose you could say, that with our own 
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councillors we don't put theory into practice, in our group, we 
protect free speech against discipline. It is an interesting point, 
I have never actually thought about it in this way before now 
but I suppose, it is because we have always done business this 
way. 
We give our members freedom to act outside the group, but they 
tend not to take this option. I suppose they don't because of a 
feeling of loyalty and a feeling that we have this traditional way 
of doing things, custom and practice you might say. We don't 
say you can not go against the group, but most don't, but they 
are free to. 
I suppose it's a sort of self-discipline, not an imposed discipline, 
yes that's it, you have free speech and freedom to vote but you 
discipline yourself, that is a sort of freedom too isn't it? so you 
can square freedom with discipline. 
This one instance of rationalisation condensed many of the comments and 
positions presented by Conservative councillors throughout the research, 
and it is interesting that it comes from a councillor sitting on both district 
and county local government. Conservatives referred to concepts such as 
loyalty, discipline, (this being shared by both Liberal Democrats and 
Labour in relation to the group as a body), freedom, custom and practice 
and particularly free speech. Freedom and free speech, for the councillor at 
least, is positioned above discipline in conceptual terms, although self- 
imposed discipline results in the same conclusion as discipline imposed by 
the group: that is, adherence to group policy. 
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The Conservative councillors' adherence to freedom and free speech is all 
the more important as they appear to adopt a self-imposed group discipline 
and loyalty. This process is particularly important if, as already argued in 
chapter 3, Conservatives can by the same adherence to freedom of action 
conceptually de-couple themselves as a representative from the 
represented. This process is achieved by all councillors but for different 
ideological reasons. The Conservative councillor however, is more likely 
to oppose the group in open theatres of representation, whilst the Labour 
councillor is far less likely than Liberal Democrat or Conservatives to 
consider this a legitimate course of action. The difference also reflects a 
pragmatic approach to discipline and loyalty, rather than an ideological 
one, as a Conservative metropolitan borough councillor stated: 
Conservative groups tend to be flexible, but we operate here in 
a politicised metropolitan borough and we need to bring people 
into line more so than our colleagues in the shire areas, it is 
also a matter of seeking a consensus on issues which helps 
when discipline is involved 
Political affiliation is a determinant of the likely outcome of the use by the 
councillor of representative discretion, but party makes less difference to 
representative acts than might be supposed. It is a difference of degree 
rather than a fundamental divergence between the parties in terms of acts 
and focus of representation. The affiliation of the councillor may result in 
the same outcome, a focus on the party group, but that process is 
rationalised through different political filters and interpretations of 
circumstances. Ultimately however, this rationalisation results in a similar 
practical conclusion, by a different ideological journey: the party group is 
255 
owed a debt of loyalty which is repaid by focusing on the group as the 
most important theatre of representation. 
The differences that do occur across the parties are reflected in differing 
degrees of willingness amongst councillors to shift from the group to other 
theatres of representation. Labour councillors are far less likely than either 
Conservatives or Liberal Democrats to make that outward shift from the 
closed to the open theatre of council and committee, even when the issue 
which precipitated a crisis of representation is located within the 
councillor's own electoral area. 
The Liberal Democrat and Conservative are more likely than the Labour 
councillor to oppose the group in open theatres of representation, whatever 
the location of an issue. They also indicate a gradual but not 
inconsiderable reduction in likelihood of speaking and voting against the 
group within the council and committee, as opposed to acting in a group 
meeting or the wider political party. Liberal Democrats and Conservatives 
also expressed a general reluctance or discomfort at the prospect but 
equally maintained a willingness to act against the group when faced with 
a crisis of representation, but would prefer to avoid this course of action. 
The dramatic nature and greater extent of the decline in likelihood of 
Labour councillors acting against the group in open as opposed to closed 
theatres is noteworthy. Conservatives and Liberal Democrats may have the 
same tendency to so act, but to far less an intensity than Labour 
councillors. 
There is, then, a pattern of behaviour which holds across the political 
spectrum. It indicates the influence on the processes of representation of 
the party group. Councillors do however indicate that, despite preferring 
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closed to open theatres of representation, they are `likely`, when faced with 
a crisis of representation, particularly for an issue located in their own 
electoral area, to act in opposition to their party group, in any theatre. To 
consider further the impact on local representative democracy of the party 
group it is necessary then to compare the stated likelihood of the 
representative behaviour and action of the councillor with actual incidence 
of opposing the party group, in any theatre. We must also consider 
whether political affiliation has an impact on the strength of the group to 
influence actual, rather than likely, representative action, focus and 
outcome. 
This comparison is important, as the research data presented in this 
chapter must be qualified by the fact that it is about hypothetical and not 
actual situations for the councillor, situations which nevertheless indicate a 
strong loyalty to the idea of party group. This conclusion is backed by 
interview and case study evidence. However it is necessary to take into 
account the possible bias in survey method resulting from hypothetical (or 
remembered) situations by setting it alongside evidence of actual 
representative behaviour. Chapter 6 considers the actual behaviour of 
councillors when faced with a crisis of representation and compares that 
evidence to the research presented in this chapter. This consideration of 
hypothetical against actual behaviour presents a sharp indication of the 
likely future representative behaviour of the councillor; his or her actual 
focus on party group; and the impact, in real terms, of political affiliation 
on the representative focus and action of the councillor. 
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6. PARTY GROUP INFLUENCE ON THE COUNCILLOR AS A 
REPRESENTATIVE 
Chapters 4 and 5 examined what councillors consider to be their 'likely' 
responses within open and closed theatres of representation, when faced 
with a crisis of representation. These 'crises' are situations which demand 
that councillors employ the discretion attaching to their office when faced 
with demands from the electorate for some form of action in opposition to 
a decision of the party group. This chapter will consider the extent to 
which councillors report having actually acted in opposition to the position 
of their group. It will consider which actions councillors report having 
actually taken, the circumstances of that action and the pattern of 
difference between self-reported 'likely' activity and self-reported actual 
activity. For the purpose of this study, self-reported actions are taken at 
face value as truthful reports, as the only record of most of the actions 
reported are the recollections of the councillor involved. The chapter will 
assess the reasons for variations between likely and actual behaviour; and 
consider the influence of the party group on the actual representational 
activity of the councillor and on the use councillors make of their 
representative discretion. This chapter will consider the extent to which 
political affiliation influences the selection by councillors of representative 
acts and theatres, and of the actual occurrences of actions which focus on 
the group rather than the electorate. 
The opportunity for issues of conflict to arise between any of the various 
manifestations of community within a local authority area and the party 
political groups on that authority is considerable. Gyford, Leach and Game 
identify at least three manifestations of community: the general public, 
ratepayers and service users, each with differing priorities and sources of 
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interest in local affairs. 1 The pluralistic and diverse nature of local 
communities was recognised by the Widdicombe Committee. 2 The local 
arena is an ideal setting for 'log rolling', the processes of alliance-building 
and support gathering for issues and causes. 3 There has also been a 
growth of demand for greater participation in local decision-making. 4 
Hampton noted however, that the 'formalities of representative democracy 
seem unable to capture the enthusiasm of the public at a local level' whilst 
at the same time there has been an increase in both 'official encouragement 
for methods of enabling public participation in local services and public 
demands for such opportunities'. 5 
In an arena of such diversity, pluralism and conflicting interests, it is 
unlikely that the community position in relation to an issue or event will 
fail to be articulated. If councillors do not find themselves acting against 
their group, it is unlikely to be due to a lack of such issues and events of 
community significance. The totally acquiescent ward or division is a rare, 
if not extinct, phenomenon. 
1Gyford, Leach and Game, The Changing Politics of'Local Government, 
pp. 257-266. 
2 Widdicombe committee, Research Vol. IV, Chapter 4, `Diversity, 
Sectionalism and Local democracy' pp. 106-131. 
3 P. Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, Hemel 
Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, pp. 3 9-42. 
4 H. Elcock, Local Government: Politicians, Professionals and the Public 
in Local Authorities, London, Methuen, 1982, p. 14. 
5 W. Hampton, Local Government and Urban Politics, p. 135. Hampton 
and Pike provide an analysis of an interesting experiment in public 
participation in the planning process undertaken by Leichardt Municipal 
Council, Australia, after a change of political control in 1971. W. Hampton 
and P. Pike, `The Open Council and Public Participation: The Leichardt 
Experience', Policy and Politics, 3 (1), September, 1974, pp. 37-50. 
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With the importance of issues and party affiliation already established, in 
earlier chapters of this thesis, the first section of this chapter considers the 
options available to councillors in terms of action and theatres for action. 
The second section considers the influence on the councillor of the theatres 
within which they are able to act. The third section looks at the importance 
the 'issue' itself has actually had on councillors' representative behaviour 
and the disparity between what councillors say they would do, and what 
they actually do. The consideration of actual occurrences as against likely 
activity and the search for the source of such variation is a necessarily 
tentative process which must recognise that, for some councillors, issues 
of this sort will simply have not arisen. Yet there is an increasing 
possibility that they will. 
The fourth section considers the influence of the party group as a 
determinator of actual councillor action and theatre selection and whether 
that influence is common to all councillors, irrespective of their political 
affiliation. It considers the influence of the group in two ways; first as a 
factor common to the experience of all party councillors and secondly in 
terms of the differences between councillors of different political 
affiliations. This chapter reports the findings of the research conducted 
amongst councillors of the three main political parties and excludes party 
independent councillors. Thus when the term 'all councillors' is applied this 
refers only to all councillors that have responded as a member of a 
political party. 
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ACTING AS A REPRESENTATIVE: CONSTRUCTING A MEASURE. 
As indicated in chapters 4 and 5 councillors face a range of situations 
requiring them to take representative action based on the use of the 
discretion attaching to their office. That action will be based on a number 
of factors: the issue concerned, the electorate's level of interest, and 
articulation of interest, in the issue; and the theatres and acts of 
representation available. This assessment will be set against the 
councillor's knowledge of the expectations of group loyalty from their own 
political party and the specific group of which they are a member. 
Councillors are faced with issues that may be located internally or 
externally to their own electoral areas but the issues themselves may fall 
into three further categories. First there are issues of general policy that 
may or may not have a specific locational impact. Secondly, there are 
matters of conscience, unconnected to a specific location. Thirdly, there 
are issues which emanate from, and are specific to, the area actually 
represented. Similarly an issue may impact on one or more electoral areas, 
either as a result of policy considerations or as a result of some specific 
local factors. As well as these categories of issues, councillors are faced 
with the need to decide which combination of theatre they will use and act 
they will perform in response. Moreover, as issues develop councillors 
may have to reappraise, if not change, their approach as pressure may 




To ascertain the actual occurrences of councillors speaking or voting 
against the group in a range of theatres of representation and the frequency 
with which they acted the respondents were asked the following question: 
i) during your time as a councillor have you ever spoken against 
group decisions? 
In response, of the 548 political party councillors that returned the 
questionnaire, 481 indicated that they had spoken against the group. Those 
councillors were then presented with a series of theatres in which they 
might have spoken and asked to indicate where they had spoken. The 
theatres presented were; the party group; party meeting; private meeting; 
public meeting; local press, local radio or television; council committee, 
and full council. 
All respondents were then asked: 
i) during your time as a councillor have you ever voted against a 
group decision? 
In response, of the party political councillors, 401 indicated that they had 
voted against the group. Those councillors were then presented with a 
series of theatres in which they might have voted and asked to indicate 
where they had voted. The theatres presented were the party group; party 
meeting; council committee, and full council. 
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Finally, councillors were asked to indicate on how many 'issues' - one, two 
or three - they had either spoken or voted against their group. The number 
of issues on which the councillor has acted against the group indicates the 
real impact of the group. If a councillor acts only on one issue of 
significance, but on all other issues and occasions accepts the group line, 
then the group can be considered to have a powerful influence on the 
representative undertakings of the councillor. The more issues on which 
the councillor has actually acted against the group the weaker is the 
influence of the group and thus its position within the processes of 
representative democracy. 
Three important considerations must be taken into account here. First, are 
the differences in the reported willingness to use particular open and 
closed theatres of representation reflected in the actual selection of 
theatres for acts undertaken? Secondly, are there differences between the 
actual percentage of councillors reporting that they had spoken or voted 
against their own party group in comparison to those indicating their 
'likelihood' of speaking or voting? Thirdly, are there any identifiable 
variations in reported acts of speaking and voting against group decisions, 
across the political parties? 
The questionnaire at this point did not differentiate between issues located 
internal and external to the councillor's own electoral area, as the 
collection of such data would rest too heavily on the accuracy of the 
individual councillor's recall of the details of issues and the causes of their 
own particular actions. This recall, especially if the issues occurred some 
time ago, cannot be guaranteed to produce accurate reporting of past acts 
or where they were conducted. As a result, presented here is evidence of 
all actual occurrences of councillors acting against the group. Use will be 
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made of interview material, case studies and participant observation to 
assess the rationalisation behind councillors' actions. 
When councillors report 'likely' behaviour they may be reporting actual 
behaviour undertaken; that is, that if you have undertaken an act you are 
obviously more 'likely' to undertake such an act. The existence of one 
enhances the possibility of the other. To overcome this bias the 
questionnaire asked specific questions regarding 'likely' behaviour when 
faced with a crisis of representation with the location of issues both 
internal and external to the area represented. With the reporting of actual 
behaviour, councillors were asked to report any incidents of speaking or 
voting against the group. 
ACTION AGAINST THE GROUP: THE INFLUENCE OF THEATRE. 
The logic of the discussion here follows that of chapter 5 in that the 
acceptance or rejection of open (and thus electorally legitimised) theatres 
of representation, for action by the councillor can be compared with action 
in closed settings. 
Tables 6.1 presents the responses from councillors when asked about 
occasions on which they had spoken against the party group, and in which 
theatre they had undertaken this act. 
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Table 6.1. Councillors: speaking against the group by party 
Spoken Labour Lib Dem Con 
Group 
Yes 87 88 88 
No 9 5 7 
base (217) (92) (213) 
Party 
meeting 
Yes 86 78 81 
No 11 12 10 
base (215) (89) (205) 
Committee 
Yes 32 54 61 
No 62 33 29 
base (210) (86) (203) 
Council 
Yes 21 42 46 
No 71 43 40 
base (205) (85) (195) 
As can be seen councillors across the political spectrum report that the 
party group meeting is the prime theatre above all others, open or closed, 
in which speaking against their own group has actually been undertaken. 
The percentage of those councillors across all parties reporting that they 
had never spoken against the group within the group itself is tiny by 
comparison. Party affiliation of the councillor makes little or no difference 
to the actual incidence of the member using the group meeting to speak 
against a group policy or decision. The party group is clearly seen by all 
councillors as a legitimate theatre in which to speak out and an important 
part of the mechanisms of representative democracy. 
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The ease with which councillors indicated in chapter 5 that they would 
shift between the group and a wider local party meeting is borne out in 
table 6.1 which presents the incidence of councillors having used the local 
party meeting to speak against the group. There is a lower actuality of 
councillors using this theatre when compared to speaking out in group, 
which is most marked amongst Liberal Democrat councillors. Those 
councillors reporting that they had never spoken against the group in a 
meeting of the local party were a relatively small proportion of the 
respondents, but Liberal Democrat councillors have used the closed local 
party meeting to speak against the group with less frequency than either 
Labour or Conservatives. This is perhaps a surprising result for a party 
underpinned by a balance of individualism and community politics. 
There is a dramatic reduction in the incidence of councillors having 
actually spoken against the party group when the theatre of representation 
shifts from a closed setting to the open council committee. This tendency 
is marked across all parties, but as table 6.1. indicates the reduction is 
most marked amongst Labour councillors. The variation between those 
councillors that had spoken in group as compared to committee is 55 per 
cent for Labour, 34 per cent for the Liberal Democrats and 27 per cent for 
the Conservatives. When the theatre of representation shifts from the 
closed arena to the open and electorally legitimised setting of the council 
committee meeting it is the Conservative councillor who reports the 
greatest use of the committee in which to speak out against a policy or 
decision of the party group. 
The reduction in actual use of an open theatre to speak continues as the 
arena of representation shifts to the open theatre of the full council. Again, 
it is Labour councillors who have rejected to a far greater degree than their 
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Conservative or Liberal Democrat counterparts, the open full council when 
it comes to speaking against the group. The variations between those 
councillors speaking against the group in closed group meetings as 
compared to open full council meetings are 66 per cent for Labour, 46 per 
cent for the Liberal Democrats and 42 per cent for the Conservatives. In 
no case has the percentage of councillors speaking out in council exceeded 
50 per cent for any party, although twice as many Liberal Democrats and 
Conservatives have so acted than have Labour councillors. 
The pattern, then, is of a decline in the actuality of the representative act of 
speaking as the theatre shifts outwards from the group to the public and 
electorally legitimised forum of committee or council. As can now be 
anticipated, when considering the representative act of voting against the 
group, it occurs, far less often than speaking and a similar pattern of 
decline is recorded as the theatre of representation moves away from the 
closed party group meeting towards more open theatres. 
Table 6.2 presents the responses from councillors when asked about 
occasions on which they had voted against the party group, and in which 
theatre they had undertaken this act. 
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Table 6.2 Councillors: voting against the group by party 
Voted Labour Lib Dem Con 
Oi0 OýO OýO 
Group 
Yes 74 71 74 
No 16 12 12 
base (200) (82) (192) 
Party 
meeting 
Yes 68 58 67 
No 21 21 16 
base (200) (78) (185) 
Committee 
Yes 24 49 51 
No 65 25 32 
base (199) (73) (187) 
Council 
Yes 13 44 40 
No 73 32 44 
base (194) (76) (187) 
The group represents for councillors the preferred theatre of representation 
for voting against that group. When the theatre shifts to that of a local 
party meeting a decline in instances of the councillor undertaking a vote 
against their group is recorded. The Liberal Democrats again show the 
sharpest decline of the three parties when the theatre shifts from group to 
Party in voting, as they did with speaking. Although 16 per cent of 
Conservatives had not voted against the group within a party meeting, both 
Labour and Liberal Democrats record some 21 per cent having not voted 
against the group in the closed local party meeting. 
268 
The decline in incidence of voting against the group continues unabated 
and across the party spectrum as the theatre of representation shifts from 
closed theatres to the open arena that is the council committee. The 
variation between councillors who had voted in the group when compared 
to committee is 50 per cent for Labour and 22 and 23 per cent respectively 
for Liberal Democrats and Conservatives. Twenty-five per cent of the 
Liberal Democrats, 32 per cent of the Conservatives and by comparison a 
not inconsiderable 65 per cent of Labour councillors had not voted against 
the group in the theatre of the council cormm. ittee. 
The responses display a decline in protest voting that is indicative of a 
pattern of the actual representative behaviour of councillors, but it is 
apparent from table 6.2 that in the theatre of the full council the act of 
voting against the group, is a rare, but a not unknown event. It is clear 
from this table that Conservative and Liberal Democrat councillors had 
'out-voted' Labour councillors in council by over 3 to 1, with only 13 per 
cent of Labour councillors reporting a vote against the group at full 
council. As can be seen from table 6.2 although 44 per cent of 
Conservatives and 32 per cent of Liberal Democrats had never voted 
against the party group in full council, neither had a staggering 73 per cent 
of Labour councillors. This indicates a very powerful rejection by the 
Labour councillor of the electorally legitimised and open theatres of 
representation in favour of party group loyalty. 6 
6 Newton asked his respondents 'Have you ever 'openly' disagreed with a 
policy decision of your group - by 'openly' I mean in council or 
committee? ' and 'Have you ever abstained or voted against your party 
group in council or committee? ' questions 27 and 29, p. 249. He found that 
'About half the sample were party faithfuls, the other half being equally 
split between rebels and abstainers', p. 124, also see table 6.2, p. 120. 
Indeed, he noticed the tendency for rebels to be more interested in policy 
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Table 6.3 presents the variation across the political spectrum between the 
act of speaking and voting, within the theatres of representation being 
considered. 
Table 6.3. Percentage difference between speaking and voting 
Theatre Party Spoken Voted Percentage 
%% Difference 
Group 
Labour 87 74 -13 
Lib Dem 88 71 -17 
Con 88 74 -14 
Party 
meeting 
Labour 86 68 -18 
Lib Dem 78 58 -20 
Con 81 67 -14 
Committee 
Labour 32 24 -8 
Lib Dem 54 49 -5 
Con 61 51 -10 
Council 
Labour 21 13 -8 
Lib Dem 42 44 +2 
Con 46 40 -6 
matters, whilst abstainers preferred dealing with individual problems. This 
policy or representational division was also related to the question of 
control and opposition with controlling Labour councillors more concerned 
with policy and the minority Conservative group with individual problems. 
P. 129. Policy rather than representation or locational issues then, more 
likely to encourage the councillor to act against the group. Newton, 
Second City Politics. 
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Across the parties there is an identifiable difference between councillors 
having spoken and voted against the group, although the differences 
between the parties is slight. The Liberal Democrats report the greatest 
variation between speaking and voting in group and local party, but the 
lowest in the open theatres of committee and council. In full council 
Liberal Democrats reported - uniquely - having voted against the group 
more often than they had spoken. It must be noted, however, that for the 
Labour councillor the percentage variation between having spoken and 
voted is reflective of a far lower base level of activity than either the 
Liberal Democrat or Conservative councillor. 
Tables 6.4 - 6.6 show the differences between councillors acting in the 
group and in other theatres of representation for each of the parties in turn. 
Table 6.4. Labour councillors: percentage variation between acting in 
group and other theatres of representation 
Theatre Spoken Voted 
Group 87 74 
Party 86 68 
% Difference +1 +6 
Group 87 74 
Committee 32 24 
% Difference +55 +50 
Group 87 74 
Council 21 13 
% Difference +66 +61 
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Table 6.5. Liberal Democrat councillors: percentage variation 
between acting in group and other theatres of 
representation 
Theatre Spoken Voted 
Group 88 71 
Party 78 58 
% Difference +10 +13 
Group 88 71 
Committee 54 49 
% Difference +34 +22 
Group 88 71 
Council 42 44 
% Difference +46 +27 
Table 6.6. Conservative councillors: percentage variation between 
acting in group and other theatres of representation 
Theatre Spoken Voted 
Group 88 74 
Party 81 67 
% Difference +7 +7 
Group 88 74 
Committee 61 51 
% Difference +27 +23 
Group 88 74 
Council 46 40 
% Difference +42 +34 
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When comparing the closed theatre of the party group and local party it is 
the Labour councillor who reports the smallest variation between the acts 
of speaking and voting. When comparing the difference between those 
same acts undertaken in the group with the open theatre of committee and 
council, Labour councillors record the highest percentage variation. 
Liberal Democrats report the lowest variation between voting in group and 
voting in council and committee, whilst Conservatives report the lowest 
variation between speaking in group and in council and committee. 
The Conservative and Liberal Democrat councillors have repeated in open 
theatres the acts undertaken in closed settings with a far greater frequency 
than their Labour counterparts. This indicates that for both Conservatives 
and Liberal Democrats the acts of speaking and voting in group or party 
have been transferred to the public arena to a greater degree than has been 
the case with Labour councillors. The Labour councillor, then, confined 
protest to the group and did not transfer that act to open and thus 
observable theatres of representation to the same extent as the 
Conservatives or Liberal Democrats. It remains now to consider the 
number of issues on which the councillor has undertaken the acts of 
speaking or voting against the group. 
ACTING AGAINST THE GROUP: THE IMPACT OF ISSUES 
Representative acts 
The analysis in the above section is based on the responses obtained 
from 
councillors to the question had they ever spoken or voted 
in the open and 
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closed theatres of representation presented to them. They were then asked 
for how many issues had they spoken or voted in any of those theatres. 
The responses presented below are based on a simple reporting by the 
councillor of the number of issues on which they have spoken and voted 
against the group, without asking them to further sub-divide their 
responses between theatre of representative act or issue location. The 
responses are from those councillors who have responded particularly to 
the 'filter' question about actual behaviour. 
Table 6.7. Action against the group: number of issues 
Acct Party One issue Two issues Three base 
% % issues 
Spoken 
Lab 26 17 8 180 
Lib Dem 24 22 4 70 
Con 26 19 6 185 
Voted 
Lab 18 14 4 123 
Lib Dem 24 10 6 53 
Con 19 12 6 132 
Table 6.7 displays the beginnings of a pattern indicating a number of 
approaches taken to actual representative behaviour. First, councillors 
speak more often than they vote against the group. Secondly, most 
councillors acted on a single issue and thirdly, acting against the group 
declines as the number of issues increases, up to a total of three issues. 
Thus it is the issue itself that is the determining feature of the behaviour of 
the representative, rather than any councillors tendency to be a party rebel 
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or to focus on the electorate. Although the 'issue' itself is important to the 
councillor's use of representative discretion, the overwhelming majority of 
councillors have used that discretion in such a way as to take no action 
against the group. 
The response pattern does however confirm the conclusions of chapters 4 
and 5. Councillors not only consider themselves more likely to speak 
rather than vote against the group but report having actually done so. With 
actual activity against the party group there is a similarity of response 
across the three political parties, which conflicts with the differences in 
reported 'likelihood' of so acting considered in chapters 4 and 5. This 
needs to be weighed against the small numbers that had undertaken acts 
against the group. The highest responses were in the single issue category, 
being the 26 per cent of Liberal Democrat and Labour councillors that 
report having spoken against the group, and the 24 per cent of Liberal 
Democrats that report having voted against the group. 
It remains now to be seen if there exists a divergence between what 
councillors say is their 'likely' use of representative discretion, and what 
they have reported as actually having undertaken in terms of representative 
activity and the focus of that activity. 
The councillor: disparity between intention and action 
The research for this work has been based on two approaches to the use of 
representative discretion by the councillor, first, the 'likelihood' of certain 
acts being undertaken and secondly, the actual undertaking of those acts 
within the various closed or open theatres of representation. Table 6.8 
below shows that there exists a divergence between the stated 'likelihood' 
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of a councillor acting against the group and the actual occurrence of such 
acts. The surprising element is the generally slight nature of that 
divergence in most cases. 
It was asserted earlier that the totally issue-free and acquiescent ward or 
division is a rarity in the local political environment, especially in the light 
of the idea of `event-driven democracy' as a motivator to community 
interest and activity in local issues. In that case, it is necessary to consider 
here the link between party affiliation and the reporting by councillors of 
'likely' and actual acts against the group. Are councillors of a particular 
political party more likely to diverge from their reported 'likelihood' of 
acting when actually undertaking representative acts? What influence does 
the party group have as a source of this divergence? To address these 
questions it is necessary to consider the scope of the divergence between 
likely and actual behaviour. 
Tables 6.8 - 6.10 below present the 'very likely' and 'likely' responses of 
action for issues located internally to the ward or division and compare 
these with the extent to which they were actually undertaken. In the table a 
negative score indicates that there were more 'likely' than 'actual' responses 
and a positive score indicates that there were more 'actual' than 'likely' 
responses. A positive score thus indicates an excess of positive action 
undertaken over the reporting of likely action, and a negative score 
indicates an excess of those indicating they were 'likely' to act, but in fact 
have not acted. 
The analysis is concentrated on a comparison between the responses by 
councillors to the statements regarding 'likely' action for an issue located 
within the ward or division represented and the responses for acts 
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undertaken. Chapters 4 and 5 showed that the councillor is far more likely 
to act against the group when the issue is located within their own 
electoral area rather than external to it. It is safe to assume for the 
purposes of this work then, that when the councillor reports acts of 
representation actually undertaken, that the issue location would be within 
their own electoral area, if they are not reporting action on a general policy 
question. 
Table 6.8. Labour councillors: disparity between likelihood of action 
and acts against the group; issues internal to the area 
represented 
Labour Likely/ Group Party Committee Council 
Have meeting 
acted %%%% 




Have 87 85 32 20 
spoken 
% -6 -7 -6 -4 
difference 




Have Voted 74 68 24 13 
% -3 -11 +7 +3 
difference 
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Table 6.9. Conservative councillors: disparity between likelihood of 
action and acts against the group; issues internal to the 
area represented 
Conservative Likely/ Group Party Committee Council 
Have Meeting 
Acted % % % % 




Have 88 81 61 46 
spoken 
% difference -5 -7 -11 -15 




Have 74 67 51 40 
Voted 
% difference -5 -9 +8 +7 
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Table 6.10. Liberal Democrat councillors: disparity between 
likelihood of action and acts against the group; issues 
internal to the area represented 
Lib Dem Likely/ Group Party Committee Council 
Have Meeting 
Acted % % % % 




Have 88 78 53 42 
spoken 
% -11 -17 -12 -16 
difference 




Have 71 58 48 44 
Voted 
% -20 -29 -1 +1 
difference 
Table 6.8 indicates that although a disparity between likelihood of action 
and acts undertaken by the Labour councillor is evident, the size of this 
divergence is not considerable, the largest, 'representational gap' for the 
Labour councillor is the 11 per cent drift between those combined 
responses for councillors 'likely' to vote against the group in a party 
meeting and those that have undertaken this act in such a setting. This 
difference is an identifiable, but not sizeable 'representational gap'. 
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What is evident from the table is the 'representational gap' between those 
that have acted in closed theatres and those that have acted in open 
theatres of representation. The divergence between the 85 per cent plus of 
Labour councillors that have acted in group and party compared to open 
theatres, indicates that these theatres of representation are greatly 
preferred by the Labour councillor. In two examples, committee and 
council, Labour councillors have actually voted in excess of their 
'likelihood' of voting. 
Table 6.9 shows that for the Conservative councillor a similar 
'representational gap' between likely and actual behaviour is evident and, 
as with Labour, this gap is not considerable. The greatest divergence 
existing between the combined categorisation for those Conservative 
councillors 'likely' to speak against the group in council, and those who 
have spoken, a difference which stands at a 15 per cent. As with the 
Labour councillor, the Conservative has also voted in committee and 
council to a greater extent than the reported 'likelihood' that they would so 
vote. In both cases this is probably a result of the same councillor voting 
on the same issue on different occasions in council and committee, despite 
the number of issues being stressed in the questionnaire. 
The gap between those Conservatives preferring to act in closed theatres 
as opposed to open theatres of representation is again evident, but not as 
pronounced as the preference gap between these theatres for the Labour 
councillor. 
Table 6.10 shows that the Liberal Democrat councillor maintains the 
pattern established by Conservative and Labour councillors in that a 
'representational gap' exists between 'likely' and actual behaviour. What is 
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interesting from the Liberal Democrat responses is that from the matrix of 
eight possible theatres and activities and the 'likely' and 'actual' behaviour, 
it is the Liberal Democrat who records the greatest disparity between 
likely and actual behaviour in seven of the eight elements of the matrix. 
The representational gap for the Liberal Democrat councillor ranges from 
11 per cent in regard to speaking in group to 29 per cent voting in the 
party. Unlike the Labour and Conservative councillors, actual incidents of 
Liberal Democrats voting in excess of their 'likelihood' of voting, occurs 
only in the case of the (highly public) full council. 
The disparity between likelihood of action and acts undertaken against the 
group, identified in tables 6.8 - 6.10 indicates that the likelihood of action 
is marginally greater than the actuality of such action and that the Labour 
and Conservative councillors display a closer relationship between the 
reported 'likelihood' of action and the actual undertaking of that action than 
exists for the Liberal Democrats. The quite dramatic divergence, by 
comparison, for the Liberal Democrat councillor between 'likelihood' and 
acts undertaken in regard to speaking in the party and voting in the group 
and party indicate a greater rejection of these closed theatres of 
representation than is evident amongst their Labour and Conservative 
counterparts. 
The Liberal Democrat as with the Labour and Conservative councillor, 
does however display a 'representational gap' between closed and open 
theatres, preferring the closed to the open theatre of representation for acts 
undertaken. The response rates for the Liberal Democrats here are closer 
to those of the Conservatives rather than Labour councillors, indicating a 
centre-right symbiosis in the actual conducting of representational acts in 
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open or closed theatres. However, the actual incidence of acts against the 
group in open settings exceeds their 'likelihood' for both Labour and 
Conservative councillors to a greater extent than that of the Liberal 
Democrats. The affinity in terms of acts in the closed group and party 
meeting is of the left-right with the responses from Labour and 
Conservative councillors closer on this aspect. The preference amongst all 
councillors is still however for the secrecy of the closed theatre and 
particularly the party group. 
THE POWER AND INFLUENCE OF THE PARTY GROUP. 
The research presented in the previous section indicates that, irrespective 
of party, councillors are not only more likely to act within the party group 
as opposed to any other theatre of representation but actually did so to a 
greater degree than in any other theatre. Councillors prefer the secrecy of 
the group and the party to open theatres of representation. It also revealed 
that party affiliation indicates only the degree of difference between 
councillors in preferring the group as a forum for representation, and that 
such a preference does not rest solely with the Labour member. It is clear 
that Labour councillors focus on the group and away from council and 
committee to a greater extent than do the Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats, but they are not unique in doing so, and this preference for the 
private theatre is shared by all councillors. It also appears to be the case 
that Labour councillors consider the group a legitimate theatre of 
representation, a view which, whilst not necessarily explicitly shared in 
comment by their Conservative and Liberal Democrat colleagues, is shared 
in the actuality of their behaviour. 
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The responses from councillors show that the 'speak' or 'vote' dichotomy is 
indeed a real one. Councillors are more likely to 'speak' against the group 
than they are to 'vote' against it and this holds so across the political parties 
and the various theatres of representation. Councillors across the parties 
indicate not only a preference in their actions for closed theatres - and in 
particular the party group - but also a divergence between their reported 
likelihood of acting in a particular way - in a particular theatre of 
representation - and the actuality of their behaviour. What is clear from the 
research is that this divergence is not peculiar to one particular party 
affiliation, but is a shared aspect of councillors' experiencing of 
representation within a local political system in which the party group 
holds a dominant position. 
A number of questions need to be addressed at this stage. Why have 
councillors acted in the group as opposed to the open and electorally 
legitimised theatres of representation? Why does there exist a divergence 
in likely and actual representative behaviour? What is the impact on these 
two questions of the party affiliation of the councillor? What is the role of 
the party group in solving this equation? To answer these questions 
requires moving away from the survey to consider other sources of 
evidence. 
Sources of group loyalty 
A Labour district council back-bencher in interview gave this categorical 
assurance of group loyalty: 
I have not ever, and cannot conceive of ever, doing anything in 
public, that would embarrass or go against the group. Look 
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what they are doing in (name of council) anyone could get 
involved in that decentralisation business, even the National 
Front. No the group comes first. 
This was reinforced by a Labour chief whip from a metropolitan authority: 
I am popular with the leader at the moment because I got the 
group to support the (named development) and there was a lot 
of opposition to it. I swayed some by saying that some of the 
money for this, matched by Europe would come into their 
wards. Others, I convinced them by saying that at the end of the 
day the group has got to stick together. You see we agree in 
group what will happen in council and don't leave anything to 
chance. That's the way we like to run things. 
This use of both an appeal to loyalty and an element of resource-linked 
inducement, (not to the individual only through benefits accruing to the 
ward represented), occurs across the parties and is also evident from the 
case study material in part 3 of this thesis. 
A Liberal Democrat county and district councillor however, in stating a 
preference for freedom of speech, in committee, although interestingly not 
in full council, stated that: 
Yes I have spoken against the group in committee on a number 
of occasions, a committee is a working body, the democratic 
process is that you tease out issues, the Labour attitude is that 
you can pre-determine everything in the group and you will 
hear nothing that will change your mind If you have to talk and 
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listen to other views then you may be swayed If the arguments 
are sound I want to give myself the opportunity to be swayed by 
them. Labour say no, we will not be swayed, in public any way. 
It is no use having these pre-determined block votes, it just 
doesn `t feel right. 
The same Liberal Democrat went on however to summarise much of the 
evidence collected from Liberal Democrat councillors. A preference was 
expressed for decision-making within group meetings, whilst maintaining a 
willingness to be open to persuasion and to avoid adopting a compulsion 
on their members to follow the group line: 
In the end I go back to loyalty, if I have not managed to 
persuade the majority of the Liberal Democrat group of my 
position then my action must be speaking my mind and an 
abstention, not a vote against. We try to generate loyalty to the 
group, but not at the expense of expressing a view and 
persuading, but it is how you do it. You generate loyalty by 
respecting the rights of the councillor to hold and express a 
view at variance with the majority of their colleagues, express 
it, even in public at committee, and abstain, but don't vote 
against. If you treat people fairly, and give them a hearing, 
most will go along. 
While we have this laissez-faire approach with a commitment to 
corporatism or collective responsibility at the heart of it, at the 
same time, if we, as Liberal Democrats don't respect the 
individual then where does the individual go as they wouldn't 
get anything from the other two parties. 
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A Liberal Democrat borough councillor however, took a different 
approach: 
Making a decision in private and then all following it in public, 
whatever you actually think is immoral if you ask me. I was 
talking to some of the Labour councillors the night before full 
council and they said to me "look, we don't all agree with what 
[named leader of the Labour group and council] is doing on 
this". But, when it came to the full council meeting they just sat 
there and stuck their hands up in the air for it and looked 
around as though nothing was happening. I shouted across the 
chamber to them "what the bloody hell are you lot playing at, 
you all disagreed with him [Labour leader] last night now what 
are you doing". I couldn 't act like that I just couldn't do it. 
In fact some of our lot have told me that the Labour people keep 
saying "oh he's all right old [his name] when is he coming over 
to us" but its that all act together business that stops me. I am a 
Quaker, and my family have been Quakers for 200 years and so 
I believe in making decisions by consensus, but even so I don't 
expect everyone to follow those decisions, regardless of what 
they think. 
This councillor did however recognise that: 
Yes, there is some merit to having an agreed line decided 
amongst ourselves, a sort of agreed objective, if you like, but it 
is whether you all have to go along with it, no matter what you 
think, or where you are that really counts to me. 
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The party group however, was noted by councillors across the political 
spectrum as the theatre in which ideas could be floated and considered in 
private and therefore unconstrained debate. It is seen as a place where 
councillors, and back-benchers in particular, can flex their muscles against 
the leadership and officers, without the repercussions of what would 
follow from doing so in public. Councillors also see the group as a private 
theatre for the consideration of officers' reports without the interference of 
the public, press or opposition.? 
It is the 'public' element of disagreement that councillors fear, as this holds 
their group and party up to ridicule, embarrassment and the possibility of 
defeat in council, as well as to accusations of disunity, conflict and double 
standards which may damage that party electorally in both the local and 
national arena. How real those fears are is open to debate, but this research 
indicates that such fears are 'real' to the councillors concerned and 
therefore worthy of note and comment. 
The 'protective' nature of the party group was not however the prime virtue 
of the secrecy which accrues through the focusing of representation on the 
group. It was the group as a loyalty-demanding source and the 
construction of a 'contract of loyalty' between the group and the individual 
councillor, which councillors referred to as a benefit of acting in the group 
meeting as opposed to any other forum for representation. The contract 
7Green provides examples of the difficulties experienced by councillors in 
challenging the recommendations of officers and committee chairs, even in 
the group. Green, Power and Party in an English City, pp. 122-124. 
Chapter ten also considers the group pre-meetings, the back-bench 
councillors 'main chance to exercise influence on committee decisions', p. 
111 and how these pre-meetings may not give councillors as much 
influence as they would like, pp. 111-134. 
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between the councillor and the group is considered in greater detail in the 
final chapter. It is based on a four dimensional model of sources of group 
loyalty: loyalty born of fear, loyalty born of a psychological agreement, 
loyalty born of commitment to a physical contract (this affects particularly 
the Labour councillor) and loyalty to the group as a team or family. 
Why is loyalty seen as a benefit of group membership rather than an 
obstacle to freedom of action for the councillor? A Conservative district 
councillor summed up the position thus: 
In the Conservative group you are amongst colleagues and 
often amongst friends, there is a feeling of kinship, yes we have 
our disagreements but like a family they are quickly forgotten 
especially when faced with the Socialists. If I have a problem in 
my ward I discuss it with my colleagues, explain the problem, 
try to convince them of my arguments, if I win them over they 
will back me in the council, if not, well i fl expect their backing 
if I win then I can't very well do my own thing if I don't manage 
to convince them, can I now? Once you get to a committee and 
even full council I could say my bit that is understood, but I 
wont get the support of the Socialists, or if I do their motives 
are not honourable they would only do it to make mischief if 
they could and any way I am not sure I would want their 
support. 
I would rather have lost an issue amongst Conservative 
colleagues and accept that in council than get the support 
Socialists and win an issue for my ward. 
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A Conservative metropolitan borough councillor spoke of the group in these 
terms: 
The influence of the group is a subtle one, you are a family, the 
idea is that we are all in this together, just like a family, the 
group even has this supportive and social side, we mix together, 
well some do, and if you stray from the path a sort of guilt is 
applied, just like in a family. You know the sort of thing, how 
could you do this to us, how could you not support us at a time 
like this. Its not even said in those words but you get the 
message soon enough, and some times it is said like that I 
suppose, we use guilt just like any family would but only as a 
uniting factor and we also give help, advice, support, 
friendship, a place to turn to. 
Times are not good for us at the moment so you look to your 
family for support. We know we will loose some good 
colleagues this May and it will be like a bereavement, for them 
as well as the group that is left. 
This vision of the party group as somehow representing a 'family' and thus 
being reflective of the loyalty offered to a family was not confined solely to 
representatives of the party of the family. 8 It also found expression of a sort 
amongst Labour and Liberal Democrat councillors. A Labour metropolitan 
borough councillor and committee chair stated: 
8 Newton found councillors using the same metaphor to describe their 
relationship to the party group. Newton, Second City Politics, pp. 123- 
124. 
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I know this sounds cliched but we are a team, I suppose you 
could say that we even have kinship groups made up of people 
who came onto the council together, there are old friendships of 
some length amongst us. Look, and this is the really cliched 
part, it is like supporting a football team, (sorry for the 
genderised example but it's the best I can think of), no matter 
how bad that team are, no matter how dreadfully they play or 
how often you criticise them or threaten never to go again, you 
just want to see them win. You don't like it when anyone else 
criticises them and you don't criticise them to supporters of 
other teams do you now? So we are together, Labour united you 
might say. So when problems occur there is a strong sense of 
loyalty people actually want to work problems out when they 
occur but work them out in the group, everyone has to give and 
take a bit and that is easiest in the group, then we can get on 
with the job of keeping the Tories out here and getting them out 
at the next general election. 
The theme of loyalty, family and kinship was also echoed amongst Liberal 
Democrats with a district councillor commenting: 
Politics can be lonely if you're not careful and you look for, 
well, shall I say, soul mates, now I would count every member 
of the Liberal Democrat group, except one, as a soul mate, I 
might have one soul mate amongst the Conservative group and, 
say, I might have three soul mates in the Labour group. I am 
happy to admit that, they wouldn't admit it though. 
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The group then is a place of comfort, support and mutual resolution of 
conflicts of conscience amongst political colleagues and often friends of 
some long standing. A danger exists here, of romanticising the group out 
of all proportion, and the existence of inter-group power plays, policy 
disputes and personality disagreements have been well- documented. 9A 
Labour metropolitan borough councillor commented of his political 
opponents within the party group thus: 
You don't know the sort of people I am talking about, they are 
the political hard men, when the Tories ran this council if they 
couldn't get their way in group they would vote with the Tories, 
but now we, or rather they [the hard men! ] are in control, if a 
Labour member so much as sneezes out of line they would have 
you out of the group. You_ just don't know what it is like here. 
The secrecy of the group provides the councillor with an environment for 
the resolution of conflict and the settling of representational issues and 
disputes which the open committee and council can not replicate. Group 
secrecy and the loyalty that attaches to it is a contradiction built into the 
representational processes. This contradiction is best rationalised by the 
Labour councillor who refuses to identify the contradiction in the first 
place; for him or her, the group is simply the place where the real task of a 
councillor in terms of any representational activity and focus is undertaken. 
9Green, Power and Party in an English City. K. Livingstone, If Voting 
Changed Anything they'd Abolish It,. D. Blunkett and K. Jackson, 
Democracy in Crisis: The Town Halls Respond, London, Hogarth Press, 
1987. Gyford, Leach and Game, The Changing Politics of Local 
Government. 
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The Conservative and Liberal Democrat councillor has to work harder to 
address the contradiction of the focus on the group being juxtaposed with 
the legitimate and open forums of representation of committee and council. 
Whilst the Conservative and Liberal Democrat have used the open forums 
to a greater extent than the Labour councillor, their preference for closed 
debate in the actuality of representative behaviour is squared by reference 
to the group as a source of kinship or fellowship, of supportive and like 
minded individuals. The group plays the role of the contemporary family. 
Divergence between likely and actual representation: as evidence of 
group power 
Tables 6.8-6.10 indicated the existence of the disparity between the 
likelihood and the actuality of representative acts and shows a clear pattern 
of behaviour amongst councillors across the political spectrum. That 
disparity supports the conclusions of chapters 4 and 5 which considered 
the reported 'likelihood' of councillor action. If the disparity is small then 
councillors' statements of a 'likely' act of representation are closer to reality 
then if that disparity had been a considerable one. 
Either way, the research so far has clearly indicated that the group exerts a 
loyalty-generating 'pull' on the representative action and focus of the 
councillor and that as a result there will be a shortfall between the 
'likelihood' of the councillor acting against that group and their actually 
doing so. Any loyalty-demanding centre with the ability to discipline its 
members can influence their actions. However when those members are 
members as a result of voluntary action on their own part and have a pre- 
existing philosophical and political linkage to the organisation they are 
Joining, the scope for disparity between likelihood of action and acts, is 
reduced. Leaving aside the possible absence of any issues which motivate 
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the councillor to disagree with the group, the question remains, what 
impact on the councillor as a representative is generated by the party 
group? 
There may be very strong feelings of attachment amongst councillors to 
the party group of which they are a member. One Labour district 
councillor, who had suffered the sanction of withdrawal of the whip 
described it thus: 
It is funny really, I had to do it I could not support the group 
policy in regard to this [named issue], but when at the group 
meeting they actually expelled me, it was like being ex- 
communicated, I imagine it is like what a teenage daughter feels 
if she gets pregnant and instead of getting the support of her 
family gets thrown onto the streets. Quite a few of my 
colleagues said they did not want to withdraw the whip and 
actually support my position on the [named issue], but they said 
I should have done it in the group, not in council. They 
reckoned that if I had of taken it to the group again we could of 
won, I doubt it. 
The disciplinary element however, although a consideration for the 
councillor of any party does not always result in the ultimate sanction of 
withdrawal of the group whip. Green notes that in Newcastle there was a 
'very strong support for the view that decisions of the majority must be 
supported' and that it was rare for Labour councillors to 'defy a decision of 
the full group or of a committee pre-meeting'. Despite a strong 
commitment to majority rule amongst the ruling Labour group in 
Newcastle at the time of his study, there was also an apparent reluctance 
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to withdraw the group whip from those Labour councillors that did defy a 
group decision. 
10 
Green goes on to cite examples of group discipline from the work of Jones 
and Newton, reporting Jones as commenting that in regard to the 
Wolverhampton Labour group 'the common practice was for a deviant to 
be reported to the group, when an explanation was invited and was usually 
accepted' and reminds us that Jones `found numerous cases where Labour 
councillors voted against group decisions'. 11 
Green reports Newton finding that in the case of four Labour councillors 
who rebelled on one occasion some 'hard words' were 'delivered by group 
members and officers' but none of the rebels had any 'formal action taken 
against them'. In the early 1960s however, Newton also notes that an 
internal group dispute and case of disciplinary action did involve the 
withdrawal of the whip from eight councillors and went as far as involving 
the Labour Party's national agent before being resolved. 12 Green himself 
reports that in Newcastle 'disciplinary action normally took the form of 
issuing warnings to individual councillors, or seeking assurances from 
them about their future conduct'. He reports that during the period of his 
research 'no Labour councillors had the whip withdrawn°. 13 The evidence 
presented here relates only to Labour groups; Bulpitt provides additional 
evidence of both the formal and informal nature of group discipline within 
Labour and Conservative groups. 14 Much of the literature reports actual 
10 Green, Power and Party in an English City, pp. 80-86. 
11 Jones, Borough Politics, p. 183. 
12 Newton, Second City Politics, pp. 259-260. p. 259 
13 Green, Power and Party in an English City, p. 81. 
14Bulpitt, Party Politics in English Local Government, pp. 99-103. 
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disciplinary action. and indeed even withdrawal of the whip, as being 
relatively rare, or something to be avoided. Equally, cohesion amongst 
councillors can be generated by means other than disciplinary action. 
Jones provides examples of the approach of Wolverhampton Conservative 
group to group discipline which did not rely so much on formal 
disciplinary action, but more often on some other 'moral pressure'. 15 
Dearlove has considered how recruitment and behavioural rules ensure 
councillors' actions are 'predictable' and do not 'challenge the maintenance 
of established council policy'. 16 Indeed, he reports a Conservative 
councillor as commenting 'they seem to be terrified on the council of 
Conservatives standing up in the council meeting and criticising a 
decision. You really have to be careful how you go about it'. 17 
The findings for this study indicate that although councillors and leading 
councillors in particular, stressed the existence of and willingness to use 
disciplinary action, a preferred course of action is to avoid withdrawal of 
the whip and deal with differences of opinion and possible breaches of 
discipline by discussion, compromise and agreement. All of which, for 
each of the parties, would be considered within the party group with the 
aim of avoiding any expression by the member of public dissent from the 
position of the group, not only in committee or council but wider public 
arenas such as the press, media or public meetings. 
Interviews were conducted with the leading councillors for a small sample 
of party groups: four Labour, two Conservative and two Liberal Democrat, 
15 Jones, Borough Politics, pp. 200-201. 
16 lDearlove, The Politics of Policy in Local Government, pp. 140-141. 
17 Ibid, p. 147. For a full discussion of how recruitment and behavioural 
rules were used in Kensington and Chelsea, see pp. 140-153. 
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who were questioned as to the number of occasions on which the whip had 
been withdrawn over the last four years. This line of questioning revealed 
that four Labour councillors, two Conservative councillors and no Liberal 
Democrat councillors had suffered that sanction and that three of the four 
Labour councillors had all been members of one particular district council. 
A Labour councillor on a neighbouring district council said: 
Yes, (name of group) have a reputation for treating every slight 
misdemeanour as a disciplinary offence, they are known for it. 
Silly really because the appeal meeting either re-instates the 
councillor concerned or puts a time limit on the suspension 
period. They have just got a reputation for this and make 
themselves look silly, one or two individuals that are a bit 
carried away with things I suppose. 
When questioned as to the frequency of the use of the ultimate sanction at 
the hands of the group itself, a Labour metropolitan borough councillor 
recalled, `I can only remember two occasions on which that has happened 
in my 18 years on this council'. 
A Labour metropolitan chief whip from another authority stated: 
we have only had one whip withdrawal in the last four years and 
that was for a local thing not national policy, you know nothing to 
do with when Militant were about. We withdrew the whip for not 
following the line and voting against the group. 
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A Conservative group leader said 'I have been leader for six years and we 
have not done that to any one in that time, or the eight years I remember 
before becoming group leader'. 
A Liberal Democrat gave a different opinion stating: `er, I don't think we 
can do that, can we? I'd have to check the rule book, I don't ever 
remember anyone having the whip withdrawn, that's more Labour than us 
isn't it? 1 
The feeling amongst councillors of all parties is that you do not vote 
against the group within the open theatres of representation. Speaking is 
accepted, normally after consultation with the group itself or the chair or 
shadow chair of a committee. Councillors from the three political parties, 
and from front-bench and back-bench positions accepted the need to 
restrict any acts of defiance or dissent to speaking or abstaining, falling 
short of voting against the group. Labour councillors were far more willing 
than Conservative or Liberal Democrat members to fetter themselves and 
accept that any acts against the group should be restricted to the party 
group meeting itself and not occur in the public theatres of representation. 
If the question of disciplinary action is such that withdrawal of the whip is 
not a frequent method of securing the loyalty of the councillor to existing 
policy and decisions, then what are the other causes of group loyalty? Why 
are councillors across the political spectrum, willing to focus activity and 
loyalty on the group rather than the community they represent? 
If fear is not the key then loyalty is born of political philosophy and the 
pre-dispositions toward representative democracy identified in chapter 3. 
Those predispositions indicated a fundamentally exclusive approach 
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amongst councillors, particularly Labour and Conservative, to the nature of 
their position as a decision-maker and to the various forums within which 
they operate. The attitude of councillors toward both representative 
democracy and their own position as 'representative' indicates support 
across the political parties for a 'focusing' on the party group as a theatre 
for representation. This attitude results in the group holding a powerful 
position within local democracy by virtue of the support for that role given 
by councillors and by the 'closed' nature of the group meeting as a theatre 
of representation. 
The importance of the visibility of councillor action was emphasised by 
Green thus: 
Many local government decisions and outcomes are visible to 
the citizenry, but there are many which are not. The utility of the 
election as a protective device is weakened in direct proportion 
to the lack of visibility of the actions of local government policy- 
makers. 18 
The party group is the least visible theatre for undertaking acts of 
representation and thus the least accountable. It is however the theatre 
favoured for acts of representation by councillors of all three political 
parties, over and above any other open or closed setting. 
It is necessary to consider in more detail the impact of political affiliation 
On group loyalty and hence group influence in local democracy and to 
identify whether political affiliation generates shared or divergent attitudes 
18 Green, Power and Party in an English City, p. 204. 
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towards such loyalty. It is also necessary to consider whether any source 
of group loyalty is a result of what might be termed 'affiliation' factors, that 
is resulting from political allegiance or 'non-affiliation' factors, that is, from 
the common experiences of representation which all councillors shared. 
THE GROUP: PARTY AFFILIATION AND ACTS OF 
REPRESENTATION. 
Tables 6.1 to 6.6 indicated the frequency with which councillors have 
spoken or voted against their group in either the closed or open theatres of 
representation. They also displayed the preference amongst all councillors 
for constraining such action to closed theatres, where that preference is 
strongest amongst Labour councillors. Why do councillors view the group 
as the focus of representation and what is the source of the affiliation 
differences in approach to the group? 
The focus by councillors across the parties on the group as the main arena 
of representation can be categorised on two levels. First, there are sources 
common to all councillors irrespective of party affiliation ('non-affiliational' 
sources). Secondly there are sources reflective of, or resulting from, party 
affiliation, ('affiliational' sources). These categorisations apply to policy 
issues as they do to the representational issues which place the councillor 
in conflict with either the community represented or the party group. 
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Non-affiliational categories of group loyalty 
The family 
The group represents a 'safe' or 'representationally clean' environment in 
which the councillor can consider both straightforward and complex, 
politically contentious issues, within an atmosphere that is seen to be 
mutually supportive. Evan though deep political and, on occasions 
personal matters will influence events, and despite many councillors 
reporting in interview that group meetings can be hard-fought affairs 
involving much personal animosity, the 'family' metaphor is often used to 
describe the group. That is, arguments are contained within this supportive 
environment, and that once a decision has been made it is maintained 
against a potentially hostile external political environment. 
The idea of councillors 'keeping it in the family' presents a realistic image 
for many councillors of the way in which they approach the group. It is 
important that the 'family' is not criticised in the public theatres of 
representation, no matter how deep or wide-ranging the areas of 
disagreement. 19 The family analogy for councillors is often merged with a 
view of the group as a protective and supportive 'kinship', 'team' or even 
'clan' which defends the councillor from outsiders but in turn demands 
loyalty to the group against outsiders. This is a loyalty which most 
councillors seem happy to grant. 
19 indeed, Newton reports a councillor as saying 'one doesn't wash one's 
dirty linen in public', Newton, Second City Politics, p. 124. 
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A theatre for decision-making 
Councillors from the three main parties see the group as a legitimate 
decision-making forum. It is only in respect of the rigidity with which 
those decisions are transferred into the public theatres of representation 
that party affiliational differences begin to arise. The group represents for 
all councillors an important and legitimate part of the decision-making 
processes that enables issues to be widely considered. It is an important 
counterbalance to the power of the officer and to pressure from the public 
or organised groups. The group is part of the decision-making process in 
which issues can be considered more freely than in open committee or 
council and therefore enables the airing of opinions that could not, and 
would not, be aired in the more public theatres. 
As was stated by one metropolitan Labour councillor 'You can't have 60 
or so people, jumping up and down all over the place, you would never 
get anything achieved that way'. The group enables decisions to be made, 
in private, and in a way that the open and more critical theatre could not 
facilitate. The jumping up and down all over the place' is a process best 
conducted in private. In public the group 'jumps together'. 
The advantage of organisation 
The development of a group line is perceived by councillors across the 
party spectrum as providing a tactical, political advantage, a unified and 
cohesive approach offering the advantage of a solid bloc of support for or 
against particular issues. In this way it enhances the chances of success in 
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the committee or council chamber for a party line, thus indicating the 
benefit of group cohesion. 20 
The acceptance of a particular councillor's need to pursue an issue located 
within their own ward or division to committee or council also has a 
greater chance of success if that councillor can secure the support of the 
group. Most councillors of both back-bench and front-bench positions, and 
across the party spectrum, indicate support in interviews for the concept of 
the 'local member' pursuing a local issue, a situation for which councillors 
have expressed sympathy and understanding, so long as that pursuance is 
conducted in a manner that does not threaten the group or conflicts with 
some policy matter or group decision. 
A dichotomy arises in the question, at which point does a local issue 
become an issue of policy? The case study material reported later in this 
study indicates that the separation of subjects for decision into policy and 
local issues (the latter accruing greater support for councillor freedom to 
act in open theatres), indicates that for the local councillor a local issue on 
which the electorate expect the focus of representation to be placed on 
them, can often be, for the group, an issue of policy. The closure of a 
school, the construction of a road, the development of a major industrial 
area or the closure of a library or day centre are often issues for a local 
area but result from wider policy decisions taken by the group. The 
councillor may then be faced with a local issue but constrained by group 
policy on how to act with regard to that issue. Stoker has noted a number 
20 see, Young and Davies, The Politics of Local Government Since 
Widdicombe, pp. 47-50. 
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of cases in which ward-focused activity by councillors has successfully 
challenged local council policy. 21 
Councillors may accept the local member's right or duty to pursue a ward 
or divisional issue, but the greater the linkages of that issue to general 
policy decisions, the weaker the connection, from the perception of the 
party group, with the councillor's own local area. In reality, local issues 
can be almost 'de-localised' by the party group and thus expectations of 
councillor loyalty to the group are generated. Action aimed at the resultant 
local effects of policy issues on the member's ward or division are as likely 
to be confined to the privacy of the party group as any of the open theatres 
of representation. Councillor's willingness to shift that action beyond the 
confines of the group into open theatres, this research indicates, is a less 
likely option to be selected. It is also less likely to be taken by Labour 
councillors than Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. 
Affiliational sources of group focus 
It is the Labour councillor who displays the strongest attachment to the 
concept of the group as a focus for representative activity and as a body 
which benefits from the representational processes. The attachment of 
21G. Stoker, The Politics of Local Government. As evidence of local ward 
councillors successfully challenging council policy, Stoker cites Saunders, 
Urban Politics. G. Stoker and T. Brindley, `Asian Politics and Housing 
Renewal', Policy and Politics, 13 (3), pp. 281-303. G. Stoker, The 
Politics of Urban renewal in Withington Village, Manchester. 1962-1983, 
Ph. D Thesis, University of Manchester, 1985, p. 99. For a case study of 
ward councillors acting in pursuit of `objectives set by the local 
community' see, N. Dennis, 'Community Action, Quasi-Community 
Action and Anti-Community Action', in P. Leonard (editor), Sociological 
Review Monograph, 21 (2), 1975, pp. 143-163. p. 147. 
303 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat councillors to the group is constructed 
around philosophical and political needs, at variance with those of the 
Labour councillor. These come from an approach to the group based on 
the needs of practical politics but with a greater emphasis on 'local' needs, 
i. e. those stemming from the area represented. Labour councillors are not 
unsupportive of the councillor's right to conduct acts of representation that 
focus on the area represented, but they are more inclined to see those acts 
as properly taking place within the group itself. This is an approach taken 
to a lesser extent by Conservative and Liberal Democrat councillors. 
Approaches to representation 
The Labour councillor views the party group as a legitimate beneficiary of 
the representational processes. It is the group which controls the council 
and it is the group, as a centre of democratic decision-making, to which the 
councillor owes representational loyalty. Although Labour councillors 
accept that certain issues will emanate from the area represented and will 
place the councillor in conflict with the group, that conflict should be, and, 
by and large is, contained within the group. It is rare for such issues to spill 
into the open arenas of representation. If they do, as with all councillors, 
the Labour member is more 'likely' to speak than vote against the group. 
The group is therefore seen as an integral part of the democratic processes 
of decision-making. 
In a discussion at a Labour District Party meeting around an issue 
contained in the case study in chapter 8, the ability of a local ward party to 
select any Labour candidate who may, or may not, oppose a particular 
existing group policy, was called into question. An existing Labour 
councillor and committee chair commented: 
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I can't see what he's talking about selecting some one who 
might support the anti [named policy], resident people, that 
road is a policy of the Labour group and anyone selected 
supports the policy of the group, there's no room for people like 
that who do what they are told by people outside the group. 
It was subsequently pointed out that the manifesto for the forthcoming 
local elections was constructed by a joint committee of officers of the 
Labour group and officers of the district party and that any policy options 
could be included in that, not necessarily existing Labour group policy. 
At the same meeting a Labour councillor for the ward concerned 
commented 'all three [name of ward] councillors and the county 
councillor support the council's plans for the area we fully support our 
balanced approach to the issue'. To which another of the councillors for 
the area responded 'oh do I, I don't and I have every sympathy for the 
protesters people, I just don't tell them or say it in public, you [the group] 
wont let me'. 22 
Liberal Democrat and Conservative councillors approach representation 
from a philosophical and practical base which results in a greater 
acceptance, in conceptual terms anyway, of the need for the councillor to 
be able to employ representative discretion without hindrance by the party 
group. The Conservative bases this approach on the rights of the individual 
councillor, the Liberal Democrat on a community-orientated focus. The 
member is free (or perhaps freer than the Labour councillor) to undertake 
22 Labour councillors speaking at a district party meeting, November 
1995. 
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acts of representation against the group, particularly if these acts are as a 
result of a local issue arising from the members own electoral area. 
The expectation on Liberal Democrat and Conservative councillors is of 
loyalty to the group but there is an acceptance of the individual member's 
right to speak against the group and to abstain. Voting against the group, 
whilst accepted as legitimate by Liberal Democrats and Conservative 
councillors, is not seen as a wise move and is certainly an act of last resort. 
The Conservative councillor that votes against the group may find him or 
herself the recipient of group discipline, the intensity of which will reflect 
the nature of the group of which he or she is a member. Indeed, depending 
on the circumstances of an incident, abstention, could also result in a 
disciplinary response from the party group. A Conservative district 
councillor explained a particular experience of group discipline over a 
local issue thus: 
At the end of the day I felt I could not support [ named scheme] 
and when a vote was taken I, together with three of my fellow 
Conservative councillors, abstained and the vote was lost. All 
the rebels had to attend a special meeting of the group and we 
were all asked individually why we had abstained and not voted 
with the group. We then had to wait outside while the group 
decided what punishment we were to receive. I felt like 
resigning there and then. After about three quarters of an hour 
we where called back in and told that on this occasion we would 
all be seen individually by the group leader and made to 
apologise. It was like being back at school and going to see the 
Headmaster. After that I did vote against the group but I 
always made sure that I gave notice. 
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This approach to Conservative group discipline - being interviewed by the 
group leader or leadership - was refereed to by a number of Conservative 
councillors in interview by reference to the 'headmaster' analogy. It is as 
though acting against group decisions is a form of errant behaviour worthy 
only of a troublesome schoolchild. It would appear that the sanctions do 
not necessarily end there, depending how strongly the group feel the 
recalcitrant members need to be taught a lesson. The Conservative 
councillor last quoted above continued: 
Later that year two Liberal councillors joined the Conservatives 
and we took control of the council from no overall control, we 
were already the largest party. It was decided that the group 
would take all the chairmanships and vice-chairmanships and 
every Conservative councillor except one, me, got a position. I 
shall no doubt again be having differing views to my party and 
although unpleasant at the time at the end of the day I shall 
have the knowledge that I did what I thought was right. 
Discipline, then, can be both formal and informal, and is often more 
effective when councillors impose their own self-discipline when faced 
with acting against the group over what is seen as a local issue. 
Approaches to the office of councillor 
Linked to the orientations to representation evident amongst councillors is 
the attitude taken to the office of the councillor. It is clear from interviews 
with councillors that the purpose of this office is interpreted differently by 
councillors of varying political affiliation. Labour councillors reject the 
notion of being a delegate of the electorate, and are more prepared to act 
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as a delegate of the local ward party if the issue is appropriate. They are 
still more prepared to act as delegate of the party group. The Labour 
councillor often views the office held as obtained by the virtue of a party 
label and thus to be used to pursue party advancement on two fronts. First 
is the local manifesto or group policy. Secondly, important to all Labour 
councillors interviewed, was the good behaviour of Labour councillors 
across the country as crucial to displaying Labour's general ability to 
govern and thus secure the return of a Labour government. One councillor 
summarised this view by stating: 
We have to show we are credible in Government, everything 
you do as a councillor reflects on peoples' impression of our 
ability to govern nationally and that is extremely important for 
all Labour members, whatever council they may be on. 
As well as a local decision-maker, the office of councillor is also one of 
party ambassador and as a result the party group must act in a 'governing 
fashion'. This approach accounts for the strength of loyalty to the group as 
a governing body transcending the needs of local representation around 
issues or events. 
Conservative councillors in interview and from observation have an 
approach to the office of councillor which reflects an approach to 
representation which stresses the councillor as a decision-maker. The party 
group therefore assists in, but does not dictate that process. Are 
Conservative councillors more likely then to focus representation on the 
electorate rather than the group? The tables contained in this chapter 
indicate that may be so, for Conservative councillors have acted against 
the group in council and committee to a greater degree, in all but one case 
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(voting in council), than either Labour or Liberal Democrat councillors. 
But does that imply a focus on the electorate? Conservative councillors see 
the office of councillor as an unencumbered decision-maker and whilst 
they are less likely than Labour to follow a group line they are equally 
reluctant to allow the electorate outside the council chamber to direct their 
representative activities and decisions. 
In interviews Conservative councillors were as forceful as their Labour 
counterparts in stressing the need for group loyalty and legitimising the 
group as a forum for, and focus of, representation. They also expressed 
considerable divergence from what they perceived to be the 'populist' 
approach of the Liberal Democrats. A Conservative metropolitan 
councillor criticised the Liberal Democrats thus: 
The trouble with them is that they think they invented 
community. We have been working in our ward for ages on 
what you could call a community approach, that is how when 
we were losing seats all over the country last May, my 
colleague was re-elected with an increased majority in what 
was once a safe Labour seat. The Liberal Democrats say 
anything to anyone, they say what they think people want to 
hear and go public on things straight away with out thinking of 
the consequences six months down the road Then even before 
the issue is dead, they move onto something else. 
We work in the community and we are very forth right in our 
opinions, we will say in a leaflet we are going to crack down on 
this estate on rent arrears, scroungers, prostitutes, or whatever, 
but we don't say anything that we haven't considered in group, 
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or with the group leader and we don't say anything that we 
could not repeat anywhere in the borough. The Liberals just 
look for causes to use and say what people want to hear. 
This form of community Conservatism sees the Conservative councillor 
with an active role within the area represented but one which is rooted in 
the dominant position within local democracy held by the party group. The 
community activity undertaken, is sanctioned by the group or at least 
notified to its leadership and is not contradictory of any decision or policy 
taken by that group. The same Conservative councillor also recalled 
attending a very difficult public meeting to defend the council's policy 
(then Conservative controlled) of privatising the laundry service on a 
council estate within his ward: 
It was a very difficult meeting, but I agree with the policy. The 
people did not want it privatised, I stuck to the group decision, 
had a rough time on the night, but now two years latter 
everyone has forgotten about it and are happy with the service. 
Conservative councillors were particularly scathing in interview of the 
mechanisms of influence that are available to the electorate to 
communicate a community opinion on a local issue. Petitions, letter 
campaigns in the local press and public meetings and wider campaigns 
have come in for criticism as unrepresentative, easily manipulated, 
contradictory, or as a biased sources of information. The Conservative 
councillor, then, uses the office of councillor as an information gathering, 
sifting and filtering position, from which the 'councillor' acts as a local 
decision-maker. 
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Conservative councillors have accepted in interview that this approach to 
the office of councillor is more prone to influence from the closeness of 
relationships with other councillors in the group than it is from attempts at 
influence from the electorate. This approach to representation is clearly a 
product of political philosophy. The family that is the group is able to exert 
a greater informal influence on the member than is the electorate. This 
approach in turn gives the group as much influence over the councillor as a 
representative, as any Labour group obtains by the use of a more 
structured approach to discipline, but which also rests on the informality of 
pressure from the group. 
A Conservative group (and indeed a Liberal Democrat group) has as much 
impact on the activities of its members as any Labour group. The resultant 
perceptions of both Conservatives and Liberal Democrats of the activities 
of any Labour group with which they have had indirect experience, leaves 
them with a greater sense of freedom to act as a councillor than they 
perceive is possible for the Labour member. 
Loyalty to the group then displays itself in different ways across the 
parties. A comment at a council meeting by the Labour chief whip 
accusing the Conservative group of lacking direction, contradicting one 
another, and then criticising the Conservative leader for disunity in his 
ranks, brought this retort: 
Councillor [named councillor] is obviously very concerned 
even jealous of the freedom of speech we have on this side of 
the chamber, there may not be many of us but at least we can 
express more shades of opinion in meetings than the Labour 
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group, who only ever seem to have one opinion. He is jealous, 
he is jealous of our free speech. 23 
The Liberal Democrat approach to the office of councillor is reflective of a 
community orientation toward representation but shares with the 
Conservative a need to feel unhindered by a firm policy line, particularly 
on ward or divisional issues. The councillor makes a decision within a 
group meeting and expectations of loyalty to that decision exist. The office 
of the councillor however can be used to pursue representational issues 
emanating from the area represented. If that brings the councillor into 
conflict with the group, then a deep appreciation has been expressed (by 
all councillors, but by Liberal Democrats in particular), that the office of 
councillor should be used to pursue these issues while ultimately loyalty is 
to the party group. 
Avoidance of open defiance of the group has been stressed by Liberal 
Democrats as necessary for effective political action but the acceptance 
that such conflict may be unavoidable has also been stated quite firmly by 
Liberal Democrats in interviews. The group is a source of assistance to the 
office of councillor in pursuing representational issues, as well as a 
preferred centre of loyalty and representational focus. 
The 'pull' of the party group in the representational process 
The conclusions of the research presented in this chapter are that the 
divergence between 'likely' councillor representative acts and the actual 
occurrence of such acts is generated by a number of sources. Those 
sources include the existence of issues of community significance, the 
23 Conservative group leader, full council meeting, September 1995. 
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impact of those issues on a given location, the nature of any theatre for 
representation, the acts of representation open to the councillor, party 
affiliation and the expectation and acceptance of the need for loyalty to a 
party group. Factors generating the latter can also be sub-divided into 
affiliational and non-affiliational sources. 
The 'pull' of the party group on the representative acts of the Labour 
councillor is greater than the pull of the party group on the Conservative or 
Liberal Democrat councillor. The representatives from these two parties 
indicate a predilection and actuality for acts against the party group that 
exceeds any such approach to representation amongst Labour councillors. 
Labour councillors reject the open theatres of representation in favour of 
the privacy of the party group, to a greater extent than Conservatives or 
Liberal Democrats. They also legitimise a focus on the group both as a 
theatre for, and a beneficiary of, representation, over and above that 
expressed by their Conservative and Liberal Democrat counterparts. 
That the Labour councillor focuses to a greater degree on the group as a 
theatre for and a beneficiary of representation, in comparison to both 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat councillors, is clear. The key 
distinction is whether the reluctance on the part of Liberal Democrat and 
Conservative councillors to identify the group as much more than a forum 
for deliberation, advice, support and direction (albeit one to which a 
rightful expectation of loyalty exists), results in councillors from those 
parties placing the electorate as the prime focus of their representational 
activities. 
The evidence suggests that the approach of the Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats purports to lessen the image of the power of the group, 
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especially by reference to what is seen as unacceptable group coercion and 
power within the Labour Party. They also, however, reject the right of the 
electorate to expect the focus of representation and resultant representative 
activity to be solely an articulation of community demand. Although 
Liberal Democrats are uneasy at being seen to replace a focus on the 
community, with a focus on the group, they do attest to the need for group 
loyalty, but with a more flexible interpretation than that imposed by both 
Conservative and Labour groups. 
This issue is not a repeat of the delegate or representative argument in 
regard to representation, which has already been considered as presenting 
an inadequate basis for an appreciation of the power of the party group 
within local representative democracy. Rather, it is an analysis which 
considers the group as benefiting from representative democracy because 
Labour councillors award to the group that legitimate right. Additionally, 
whilst Conservative and Liberal Democrats are at pains to avoid 
accusations of dictate by a party group, the very processes of group 
activity, the acceptance of a need for group loyalty and the role of the 
group as a forum for debate and decision-making, draws them away from 
the electorate and into the group. 
The research presented so far indicates that the group does not have to 
use discipline to obtain loyalty. It merely has to exist within the framework 
of local representative democracy to ensure that the councillor will be 
drawn toward it as a decision-making forum and as a recipient of the 
loyalty of that councillor. The process may be intensified by the party 
affiliation of the councillor, but both Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, 
whilst expressing their rejection of the group as a body to which they must 
always adhere, also express the need for loyalty to the group and 
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willingness to bestow it. Thus limiting the opportunity for the electorate to 
influence any councillor around an issue of significance for that 
community. 
In order to explore these issues further and to fully understand the 'pull' on 
the councillors representative activities that the party group generates the 
next three chapters present and consider case studies in which councillors 
across the party divide have been faced with actual crises of 
representation. The chapters consider the issues inherent in those case 
studies and how councillors resolved the crisis of representation presented. 
As a result the case studies look particularly at the activity of the 
councillors for the wards or divisions most affected by the impact of the 
issues, and how they coped with the pressure they experienced from the 
electorate and the party group. The case studies look at where councillors 
concentrated their representative activities and where they focused their 
loyalty as a representative, to their electorate or the group. 
The case studies taken together with the survey and interview material, 
alongside the opportunity for limited participant observation that has also 
underpinned this work, provide for an assessment of the power of the party 
group over the processes of local representative democracy. They are used 
to illustrate the processes by which the party group exerts a 'pull' on the 
representative focus of the local councillor. They also indicate the strength 
of the relationship between the councillor and the group and how, if at all, 
the councillor manages the tensions that occur when the group and the 
councillor experience pressure from the electorate. 
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PART III 
CRISES OF REPRESENTATION 
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The three case study chapters that follow exemplify the interaction 
between councillors, the electorate and the party group. Specifically they 
consider the crisis of representation created for a councillor when 
decisions of the party group collide with the expressed opinions of the 
electorate and where both demand the councillor's loyalty on a particular 
issue. 
Each of the case studies have been selected, first, because their specifics 
hold particular lessons for the experiencing of local representative 
democracy. Secondly, there are distinct differences in the cases in regard 
to the nature and level of the involvement by the three participants; the 
councillor, the group and the electorate, and in the activities undertaken by 
each. Thirdly, opportunities for participant observation existed as a result 
of the author's status as a councillor. Participant observation provided a 
closeness to the issues and a depth of understanding of the interactions 
between the group, councillors and the electorate and thus supplemented 
examination of the representative processes by other research techniques. 
The subject of each episode is not the important aspect, and details are 
kept to the minimum necessary to understand the context of the 
interactions being considered. Two of the three cases studies - the open 
cast and the link road - are located within the same district council area. 
The third, a much larger issue of the construction of a new Relief Road, 
impacts on a number of local authority areas. However as the aspect of the 
case presented here is the conflict engendered between councillors and the 
electorate, only the areas in which such conflict arose are considered, so 
making a large and complex case study easier to manage and present. 
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The cases were selected as current and developing issues which are still, 
at the time of writing, the focus of community concern and councillor 
activity, rather than historic case study examples of past activity. In each 
episode, therefore, no firm conclusion to the issue had been reached. 
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7. THE OPEN CAST MINE EXTENSION. 
This case study concerns the application for an extension to an existing 
open cast site. The National Coal Board gave Notice of Prospecting land 
at Heath Hayes, Rawnsley and Prospect Village in the District of Cannock 
Chase in 1978. In July 1983 The NCB submitted a Notice of Authorisation 
to extract 19 million tonnes of coal over 23 years on a site of 533 
Hectares. Changes in legislation taking effect on 1 March 1984 meant the 
application had to be made to the mineral planning authority, Staffordshire 
County Council, which had already objected to the proposal. Subsequently 
the application was not pursued. 
In May 1985 an application was submitted to work 6.3 million tonnes over 
12 years on a 334 hectare site. Staffordshire County Council refused 
planning permission in December 1985. The former NCB, now British 
Coal, appealed against this refusal and in December 1986 the first of two 
Public Inquiries was held. The Secretary of State refused the appeal on the 
grounds of adverse effects on a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI). 
On 30 January 1989 British Coal submitted a revised planning application 
for 3.2 million tonnes over a five year period on a site of 314 hectares. On 
13 June 1990 the county council again refused planning permission. British 
Coal appealed and after a second Public Inquiry, in September 1992, 
permission for the coaling of 3.2 million tonnes was granted. Coaling 
commenced on 11 April 1994, intending to cease in 1998. Restoration 
activities would continue until 2000, after-care and management 
responsibilities until 2005 with an additional after care period lasting on 
the site until 2015. 
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The period from the Notice of Authorisation in July 1983 to the grant of 
permission by the secretary of State in September 1992, was set against a 
high profile, if intermittent, community campaign. Opposition to the 
proposals came from, local action groups, three parish councils, a town 
council and district and county councillors and councils. 
The opposition was partially successful as the permission granted by the 
Secretary of State, was for a site reduced in size and duration of coaling 
than that originally intended by British Coal. However, there was a widely 
held belief amongst councillors and community that British Coal would 
continue to apply for extensions until it secured by increments permission 
for mining of the entire reserve. At best all that could be hoped for was 
partial and temporary victories until this inescapable conclusion. By July 
1994 public awareness of British Coal's intention to extend mining 
activities was widespread and this was officially applied for in October 
1994, just six months after coaling had commenced. 
The extension proposals were for an increase in site boundary by 38 
hectares and in excavation area by 64 hectares to a total of 194 hectares. 
This would allow the winning of an extra 2.2 million tonnes, above the 
existing three million tonnes and extend the coaling period by three years 
to 2001. The geographical extension was towards the northern boundary 
with Prospect Village, Cannock Wood and eastwards toward Chase 
Terrace. The map below presents the existing site and proposed 
extension. 
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The areas which surrounded the open cast site were served by 14 district 
councillors and four county councillors. At the time of writing the political 
composition of the group of district councillors was; nine Labour, two 
Conservative and three Independent. All four county councillors were 
Labour. Although the site was located within Labour controlled Cannock 
Chase District Council, a residential area to the eastern boundary was 
within the then Conservative controlled Lichfield District Council. The 
timing, sequence of events, a break in campaigning activity at the granting 
of permission to coal in 1994, shifts in the position of some councillors 
and councils, the impact of the existing site and a well organised public 
relations counter-campaign by British Coal, made the 'extension' an event 
distinct from the campaign against the original site. 
THE PLAYERS 
The parish councils 
The affects of the extension would be felt to varying degrees within the 
boundaries of three parish councils and a town council. The Parish 
Councils of Cannock Wood, Heath Hayes and Wimblebury and Norton 
Canes, shifted from opposition to the original site, to support for the 
extension. They maintained that their areas had not been adversely 
affected by the site, which caused minimal disturbance and been well 
managed and responsive to the community. This position was held despite 
vociferous public opposition to the proposals from the community within 
those parish areas. Burntwood town council on the other hand, opposed 
the original site and the extension. 
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Political control of the three parish councils was diverse. Liberal 
Democrat, Conservative, and Independent/Liberal run parishes provided 
an interesting political spread within a Labour held county and district. By 
contrast however the town council, which was Labour-controlled, sat 
within Conservative-controlled Lichfield District Council (Labour after 
May 1995), The two Lichfield District Council wards which bordered the 
open cast site, returned three Labour and three independent councillors (all 
Labour after May 1995). Although Conservative, Lichfield District 
Council supported the extension, the case study concentrates on Labour 
Cannock Chase. This is because, no Conservative councillors from 
Lichfield were representing wards impacted on by the site, and as such no 
conflict between group, councillor and community existed. 
The district and county councillors 
Although the group of councillors involved in this issue totalled 18, there 
existed dual (in some cases triple) membership of parish, district and 
county councils, so just 15 individuals held a larger number of elected 
offices. Table 7.1 sets out the political composition, council membership 
and known public position on the extension of those councillors. Parish 
council membership has been included to indicate the concentration of 
political office. 
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Table 7.1. Political composition, council membership and view on 
the open cast 
Councillor Party Council View on open cast 
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Amongst these councillors, opposition and support for the extension was 
fragmented politically and between representative bodies. The Liberal 
Democrats had no district or county councillors representing the affected 
area, but did control a parish council and their parish councillors were 
active on the open cast liaison committee and supportive of the site and the 
extension. 
The position of councillors opposed to, or supporting, the extension was 
not straightforward, and intensity of support or opposition could be 
categorised as active or passive. Some councillors, on both sides of the 
argument engaged in intense political activity, whilst others remained on 
the side lines making minimal contribution to the debate. 
Turning now to the local party organisations, the Liberal Democrat ward 
parties and constituency party supported the extension and Liberal 
Democrat parish councillors were an important part of the pro-extension 
campaign. 
The District Labour Party opposed the extension, on the casting vote of its 
chair, (also the leader of the district council). Of the ward Labour parties 
concerned, one supported the extension, a second was vehemently 
opposed, and a third was divided and an informal 'truce' on the issue 
ensured it remained unconsidered here. An employee of the open cast 
latter joined this branch and secured election to the parish council as a 
Labour candidate. Another Labour district councillor, a supporter of the 
extension, lived and was politically active in the ward but represented a 
seat elsewhere, unaffected by the site. 
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Within the Lichfield District Council area the Burntwood Labour Party, 
Chase Terrace branch party, and the district council Labour group, 
opposed the extension. On taking control of Lichfield District Council for 
the first time, in May 1995, the Labour group, reversed the council's policy 
of support for the extension. 
Nationally both Labour and Liberal Democrats parties had policies that 
supported a planning presumption against open cast mining. As the site 
was sold to a private mine operator, some Labour councillors found 
themselves supporting the activities of a privatised mining concern in 
opposition to national party policy. The Labour chair of the district's, 
planning and works committee, also chair of the open cast liaison 
committee, was an ex-miner and a strong supporter of the extension. 
The Conservative Association and district council Conservative group had 
not considered the issue and had no plans to debate the extension. The 
Association, the local Conservative branch parties concerned, and 
councillors, had vigorously opposed the original application, but saw no 
benefit in objecting to the extension and preferred to see the coal mined as 
soon as possible. 
British Coal / RJB Mining U. K Ltd 
Since the commencement of coaling in April 1994 British Coal ran a well 
organised public relations exercise to counter opposition to the extension. 
Representatives of British Coal visited all three parish councils and, on 
the request of the chair of Cannock Chase Council's planning and works 
committee, attended a meeting of the district Labour Party. They provided 
lectures, slide displays and answered questions from the public and 
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councillors at public and private meetings. Councillors were given guided 
tours of the site and were impressed by the standards of environmental 
care and operational management. This exercise created a ground swell of 
support amongst councillors for the extension. Local schools visited the 
site, and were engaged in a competition to design a site logo, this was 
latter replaced by the new owners corporate logo. 
At midnight on 31 December 1994 the open cast site passed to the 
ownership of R. J. Budge Mining (UK) Ltd. Privatisation provided a 
political back drop for the issue, and the government saw advantage in 
securing early agreement to an extension, which would enable the transfer 
to the private sector of a prime site, with permission to extend. Labour 
councillors supporting the extension thus operated within this politically 
ambiguous environment. 
The open cast liaison committee 
On the 12 August 1993 British Coal convened an inaugural meeting of a 
liaison committee to enable representatives of the community and site 
management to meet on a regular basis. The committee comprised nine 
parish, 15 district and four county councillors. Only eight members of the 
local community, who held no elected office, sat on the committee. 
The committee met on a monthly basis to receive progress reports, or 
responses from the site management to complaints about it's activities. 
Pro-extension councillors used the meetings to give vocal support to the 
extension, counter any criticism of it and support the day-to-day running of 
the site. 'Anti' councillors and non-councillors used the meetings to 
criticise the company, site, and those councillors supporting the extension. 
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The initial meetings of the committee lasted for over two hours, meetings 
within the last six months lasted between 30 minutes and an hour, as one 
Labour councillor stated: 
They are pointless now, I used to come to stick my neck out and 
have a go at them [the company] but I am sick and tied of them 
['pro' extension Labour councillors] sitting there saying how 
good this place is. I've told the management here more then 
once I want them out and if I could close this place tomorrow I 
would, sitting listening to them avoid questions is no use to 
anyone. 
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE COMMUNITY 
The campaign against the extension 
A distinguishing feature of this issue was that although a community action 
group was formed to oppose the original site no such group emerged to 
campaign against the extension. Instead individuals supported by local 
'anti' councillors, undertook activities normally associated with pressure 
groups, but without such a group being formed. It is perhaps surprising 
that the original action group did not re-emerge, but the period between 
original proposal and extension application, would have seen changes in 
the local community, and possibly a degree of fatalism or fatigue amongst 
campaigners. As a result the 'anti' campaign was unstructured, but vocal 
and effective in promoting its opinion. 'Anti' councillors and members of 
the community worked closely together, as a Labour district councillor 
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commented, 'I wish we had a, few councillors like these people, we might 
get something done'. 
The issue was highly emotive and aroused passions from the 'anti' and 'pro' 
groupings amongst councillors and the community. The 'anti' campaign 
took the form of public meetings and a letter-writing campaign to the local 
press and the planning authority. Petitions were submitted to Cannock 
Chase and Lichfield District Councils and the county council. Individual 
'Pro' and 'anti' councillors were contacted by letter, telephone and home 
visits. 
The local press was an important forum for criticism of councillors and 
councils that supported the extension and for the expression of much of the 
deep community resentment generated by this issue. One local resident 
wrote of a particular parish council and its members that supported the 
extension: 
For a cosy clique of unelected and co-opted parish councillors 
[the parish had failed to secure sufficient candidates in 1995 to 
warrant an election and thus co-opted additional members] to 
accuse democratically elected representatives of trying to get 
political mileage out of the open cast issue takes some brass 
neck but cannot be taken seriously... She [named parish 
councillor] says that the parish council neither supports nor 
opposes any extension and that the public inquiry costs should 
be spent on environmental improvements, allowing further 
mining to go through quickly. 
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Such views are naive, showing shallow awareness in sharp 
contrast to the depth of the hole... [named parish councillor] 
states that she wants mining on the site to be over quickly. This 
can only be achieved by the refusal of any extension, thus 
allowing RJB Mining to pick up their kit and go. I 
Another summed up a deep sense of community frustration thus: 
Should we not recall the reason that this site came about in the 
first place? I seem to remember some official of British Coal 
saying that Bleak House was necessary to mix with deep mined 
coal at pits like Littleton [a local deep pit closed by British 
Coal] if coal could not be taken from the open cast source, the 
future of deep-mined pits would be in doubt. We cannot be in 
any doubt today about the future of pits like Littleton - there 
isn't one. I feel the local population were conned into accepting 
Bleak House and to allow the site to be extended, knowing that 
would cast doubt on our intelligence. 2 
A letter from another local resident is worth quoting at length: 
Fifty six years ago I was employed by [named company] as a 
chain lad to the surveyor in order to prove the existence of 
suitable coal for outcropping... I went on as second man on the 
excavator that took the first trench out of [named landowner's] 
field, a beautiful field of winter wheat, as I remember it about 
1 Letters page, Chronicle, 31 May 1996. 
2 Letters page, Chronicle, 7 June 1996. 
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six inches high when we destroyed it. There was reason then, 
there was war on... 
Look at it now, nearly sixty years on... there are no hedges all 
wire fences. It's boggy, all the natural aquifers and land drains 
were cut through and could never be replaced. One crop was 
taken from it, the coal crop, and that spoilt it forever. 
Regardless of what is said at the inquiry [for the proposed 
extension] the land will never be the same again, we don't need 
the coal as we did in 1940. Why ruin our natural heritage 
Look for yourselves at the result of outcropping and then attend 
the inquiry with the knowledge and experience of 56 years. 
Don't be bamboozled by the operator who will tell you it will all 
be over in two years. It won 't be the same in 200 years. 3 
Five well-attended public meetings were organised by councillors and 'anti' 
campaigners. Attendance at only one of these fell below 100 to 75. After 
one particularly well-attended meeting a Labour district and county 
councillor commented: 
I can't understand it sometimes, you can't get them out at 
election time, even if the weather is nice, but now they want to 
extend the open cast site in my ward we've had public meeting 
with standing room only, it was 5 degrees below freezing and 
England were on telly that night as well. 
3 Letters page, Chase Post, 4 July 19 96. 
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As with the press, these meetings were an important focal point for the 
expression of local opinion on both the issue itself and councillors' 
reactions to it. At one such meeting a member of the public made a classic 
denunciation of councillors who supported the extension: 
I may be naive but I just can't understand that we elect people 
to do as they please, they are there to do what we want, not 
anything they feel like. I can't believe councillors don't 
understand this. What do they think they are there to do, we 
don't want this bloody thing can't they understand that either, 
its simple vote against it that's what we want, they should forget 
what they think, its our lives they are ruining 
Another local resident commented at a meeting: 
How on earth do councillors like that stupid [named councillor] 
get away with saying there is no problem with the open cast, he 
wants to come and live in my house for a while. 
Pro-extension councillors were not invited to any of these public meetings. 
Tactically this was an error on the part of the 'anti' campaigners as it left 
'pro' councillors without direct experience of the strength of feeling against 
the extension. At these public meetings, resolutions of opposition to the 
extension were passed and on each occasion, of those voting, no 
dissenting votes were cast. Any 'pro' feeling did not express itself in 
outright vocal support and particularly not as a vote. Many in attendance at 
these meetings pledged to write to the county council and the local press to 
object to the extension. 
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The lobby for the extension 
The 'pro' camp within the community was also unstructured and 
manifested itself through letters to, or statements in, the local press, one 
such statement from a 'pro' parish councillor stated: 
I stood up in the original inquiry as a Cannock Chase 
councillor speaking against the mine. Councillors on other 
councils are trying to get political mileage out of the issue but 
now the mine is here we think it is pointless opposing the small 
extension. The quicker it goes through, the quicker the mining 
on the site will have ended. The inquiry will be expensive, that 
money could be better spent on environmental improvements. 
All parish councils have their own views, if we had united as 
one, we would have been a more powerful pressure group to 
demand money from the mine's owners for community 
projects. 4 
Other pressure was applied to 'anti' councillors. In one case an 'anti' 
councillor was threatened with violence for his opposition by an employee 
of the site, who was also a local resident. The police were involved and 
this incident, whilst progressing no further, indicated the strength of feeling 
over the issue. 
Some support for the extension was based on the prospect of employment 
opportunities within the area. 170 people were employed at the site, 43 of 
whom lived in Staffordshire or the surrounding area, in other words a 
small number of local jobs existed from the total number employed at the 
4 Chronicle, 24 May 1996. 
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site. Whilst probably not generating additional employment, the extension 
could secure the existing jobs for another three years. Although open cast 
employees attended some of the anti-campaigners' public meetings, 
surprisingly they did not vote in opposition to anti-extension resolutions 
moved, nor spoke in favour of the extension at these meetings. Employees, 
whilst visible at meetings, did not in general, become an active lobby for 
the extension. 
Beyond the prospect of local employment, support for the extension was 
based on three factors. First, some sections of the community that had 
experienced campaigning against open cast proposals or remembered 
British Coal's success in pursuing this site, were prone to fatalism on the 
issue and a feeling of powerlessness which tended to acquiescence. 
Secondly, the belief (widely held), in the community, that as there existed 
on site some 23 years of reserves, it was inevitable that it would be mined, 
and this should be completed sooner, rather than after a protracted 
campaign and period of uncertainty. That is, not so much support, more a 
weary resignation to the situation. 
Thirdly, support for the extension was based on a British Coal 
announcement that in the event of the planning authority permitting the 
extension, a series of 'community benefits' would be proffered to local 
communities. This last point was to prove an important factor. 
THE COMMUNITY BENEFIT ARGUMENT 
The provision of compensatory funding to local communities, by British 
Coal and then RJB Mining, for the activities of the open cast, came from 
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three sources. First, a section 106 agreement by which the site owners 
were legally bound (in addition to the planning permission granted by the 
Secretary of State for the Environment), to provide a range of community 
facilities. 5 
Secondly, RJB Mining made of its own accord a series of corporate 
donations to local communities, and continue to do so as part of its on 
going public relations exercise. The company have provided land at a 
peppercorn price, to Hednesford Town Football Club for the development 
of a new football ground, and agreed an annual sponsorship of the club. It 
provided sponsorship for a local youth theatre group, funds for new stage 
curtains at a village community centre, the cost of hiring a lorry as a float 
at a village fair, Christmas trees for a number of local schools and 
additional heath land transplantation, over and above that contained in the 
section 106 agreement. 
Thirdly, British Coal made it known in the press and in meetings with the 
public and councillors, that a quarter of a million pounds was available to 
fund the presentation of its case at any public inquiry. British Coal stated 
they would rather donate these funds as 'community benefits' to be used on 
a range of local projects, rather than for an expensive public inquiry, which 
they were confident would be determined in their favour. Thus a 
considerable sum of money that could be used for various local projects 
would be wasted on an inquiry. The strategy, then, was to place a high 
price on objection. 
5 Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, gives local 
authorities power to enter into an agreement which places a planing 
obligation on developers to provide specified facilities related to a 
particular development - at the developers expense. 
335 
As a result of that offer three parish councils which had opposed the 
original open cast, declined to object to the extension when consulted by 
the county council, although in no case was that decision unanimous. 
Parish councillors (amongst which were also district councillors), from all 
parties, then lent public support to the extension application. Those parish 
councils, which decided not to object did so, not on planning grounds, but 
in view of 'community benefits' accruing to their areas. District councillors, 
and in one case a county councillor, that were not parish councillors were 
also swayed by the offer of community benefits. As one Labour district 
councillor stated: 
It would be wrong to reject this [extension] out of hand 
without looking at what benefits could come into the area. 
There is a salutary lesson here in making your mind up to 
quickly, as some councillors have, stating your position publicly 
and not giving yourself room for manoeuvre, especially when 
the situation changes and the offer is made of a large amount of 
money that could be put to good use in the community. 
We have to look at what could be achieved from the benefits 
offered against only another three years [of open cast activity]. 
Some people in this area will always be against open casts, but 
look at what we can gain from it. If we object we get nothing. 
Conversely, another Labour councillor, who neither lived in nor 
represented a ward close to the site and in an unusual display of interest 
and opposition from a councillor so placed, commented: 
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They want to take that site 150 metres, 150 metres, away from 
houses in old [named councillor's] ward, they could offer us 50 
million pounds and I wouldn't support it, they couldn't pay 
enough to that community to make it right bringing that bloody 
great hole 150 metres away from where those houses are. 
The district council was consulted on the extension proposal by the county 
council, and the district Labour group was divided on the matter. Meetings 
of the Labour group were open to all Labour councillors and to five 
observers from the district party, with speaking but not voting rights. Some 
councillors' opinions were influenced by British Coal activities within the 
area, particularly past open cast workings, the closure of local deep mines 
and subsequent redundancies, and the 1984 miners' strike. British Coal 
was not popular amongst a group of councillors in the ruling group and 
their approach to the decision would reflect that history rather than 
immediate community concerns. In particular, a number of ex-miners 
within the ruling Labour group were not supportive of their past employer 
conducting open cast mining activity within the area. Strong environmental 
objections were raised by some group members who used the Labour 
Party national policy document 'In Trust for Tomorrow', which 
emphasised the environmental impact of open cast mining, to pursue their 
position within the group. 6 
The formal response to the county council's consultation would however 
be provided by the district council's planning sub-con mittee which acted 
under delegated powers. Its decisions did not require ratification by the 
parent, planning and works committee or indeed the full council. The sub- 
6 In Trust for Tomorrow: Report of the Labour Party Policy Commission 
on the Environment, London, The Labour Party, 1994, p. 29. 
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committee did not involve a whip, as this would prevent any planning 
application from being considered by Labour members, on its own merits 
and expose the decision to legal challenge. Even so, divisions within the 
Labour group were evident on the issue, with some senior councillors, 
which included the chair of the planning and works committee, interested 
in the community benefits package. The leader of the district council, 
however, opposed the extension, but those senior councillors that favoured 
it enjoyed the support of a group of loyalist councillors, that could be 
called upon to support them on most issues. The group leader could not 
guarantee carrying the group with him. 
The Labour group took no formal vote on the extension, and although it 
was discussed at group meetings, it was never a formal agenda item, or 
discussed as a discrete issue, rather raised by councillors when referring to 
other issues. For example, if a councillor supporting the extension was 
informed, usually via an officers report on a committee agenda, that 'no 
funds were available' for a particular scheme, then reference was often 
made to the use of the community benefits offer as a possible source of 
funds, so long as the council did not object to the extension. 
One councillor was particularly firm in support of the open cast as the 
community benefit offer could be used to fund a pedestrian crossing and 
an extension to a local school in her ward, both of which she had been 
campaigning hard for over a protracted period. She commented, 'it's the 
only way I am going to get this crossing, what do they want, someone to 
get killed on this road, just so they can keep a bit of dust off the washing 
line'. 
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Support for the extension within the group was based on the 'community 
benefits' and possible job creation and debates reflected what appeared to 
be a majority opinion in support for the extension. Subsequently, and 
without a vote being taken, anti-extension councillors experienced an 
informal 'whip' and were criticised for their opposition. To all intents and 
purposes the situation was addressed as if a policy had been agreed to 
support the extension. This enabled the 'pro' councillors to justify their 
position in public as support for an informal policy and to marginalise the 
'anti' councillors within the Labour group. Those opposed found 
themselves faced with a hostile political environment within the group. 
In response to the community benefit offer an informal district council 
'shopping list' of projects was developed, which drew on schemes favoured 
by the district and parish councils. The list was divided into 18 projects 
under the headings: highways, leisure and miscellaneous. The cost of 
which was in excess of a million pounds and was to be funded by British 
Coal as part of the community benefit package. Many of the projects on 
the list would otherwise have to be funded from committee budgets, if they 
were to be undertaken at all. 
The possibility of a considerable sum of money being available for works 
across the district influenced a number of councillors and this resulted in a 
shift of opinion within the ruling Labour group from its opposition to the 
original open cast site, to support for the extension. Councillors that 
represented wards distant from the open cast had every motivation to 
support the extension, their areas were not affected by the site, whilst the 
community benefit package could lead to projects being undertaken in 
their wards. 
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important then is the relatively small geographical impact of the site in 
terms of the district council area and the influence this had on councillors' 
decision-making. The site was described by Friends of the Earth as 'the 
largest hole in the ground in western Europe' but still only affected three of 
fifteen wards, and eight district councillors (six Labour, two Conservative) 
from a total of 42. Four from the six Labour councillors representing those 
three wards supported the extension and one offered only passive 
opposition, whilst his ward Labour party was firmly opposed. He 
commented: 'I will vote against it because you know what [named local 
party members including the branch chair] think about it. You can protest 
all you like but they will get that coal and we will get nothing'. The offer 
of 'community benefits' had an important impact on the position some 
councillors took on the issue and was described by one Labour anti- 
extension councillor as: 
An unspecified sum of money for unspecified projects in 
unspecified areas, at an unspecified time, all a bit unspecified 
really, but definitely an interference in the local democratic 
processes and verging on bribery. 
The community benefits were described by a Labour county councillor as: 
`a bribe, pure and simple, that's what it is, just a bribe that some people 
are just too willing to take' 
They were conversely described by a Labour pro-extension councillor as: 
A strong sign of good faith and a desire to give something back 
to the local community for the minor inconveniences the site 
caused as well as brining the prospect of yet more local jobs. 
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The offer of community benefits provoked disagreement in the 
communities affected by the extension and thus diluted opposition. The 
main-stay of the 'pro' extension argument was that British Coal somehow 
'owed' the area for past open cast sites as well as this site. Parish and 
district councillors were prominent and quick in forwarding 'projects' to be 
considered for funding. The offer had a considerable affect on the level of 
support for the application amongst some councillors on, all three tiers of 
local government, and across the major political parties. It is all the more 
surprising that the new owners of the site, R. J. Budge, wrote on 28 
February 1995 to the councils affected by the development apparently to 
withdraw the offer of community benefits, and replace it with a land deal 
that would limit future site extensions. The letter included an invitation to 
councillors to a meeting on Saturday 11 March at 9.30am on the site. 
Councillors attending this meeting were informed by the new mine owners 
that the package of community benefits floated by British Coal had been 
replaced by the transfer of land ownership to the district council. This 
would provide a 'buffer' zone making almost impossible future movement 
of the site boundaries towards Heath Hayes and Wimblebury and Prospect 
villages. In the latter case the boundary would be 150 metres from the 
nearest residential properties. Although this would freeze the site 
boundaries it would not protect the local environment from noise, dust and 
pollutants. The meeting was also informed that £50,000 might be placed in 
a trust fund, the interest accrued on which could be used for community 
projects. The meeting became extremely acrimonious and parish and 
district council delegations walked out. 
The chairs of two of the three parish councils concerned stated their 
intention to take the issue back to their parish councils to move objections 
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to the extension. The chair of the district council planning and works 
committee was - as a result of the withdrawal of community benefits - also 
to seek objection by the district council. In the period after this meeting, 
support amongst the district council Labour group was less vocal and 
opinion shifted amongst some, though by no means all councillors. A core 
group of supporters of the extension remained and were not swayed by the 
removal of the offer, believing that other means of ensuring that funds 
flowed into the community could be found. 
The result of the meeting on the 11 March 1995 was to sow confusion 
amongst the pro-extension campaign, to undermine the positions of three 
parish councils and a district council and of councillors that supported the 
extension. 
On 16 August 1995 the district council planning sub-committee resolved to 
inform the county council of its objection to the extension on three 
grounds, first the proposals would lengthen the period of detrimental effect 
on the environment and general amenity of local residents. Secondly, the 
increased risk of pollution to a site of special scientific interest. Thirdly, 
that the applicant had failed to provide a bond to ensure implementation of 
the restoration strategy. 
Interestingly, of the councillors listed on table seven, four Labour and one 
conservative were members of the planing sub-committee, so too was 
another 'pro' Labour councillor that lived in a ward affected, but did not 
represent it. Of the Labour members mentioned here, four had supported 
the extension and maintained that support after the community benefits 
offer had been withdrawn. They also maintained a high public profile of 
support for the extension and continued to seek funding from the site 
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owners for various community projects. All four however voted against the 
extension at the planning sub-committee meeting on 16 August 1995. 
on the 21 September 1995, the county council's strategy sub-committee 
considered the extension application. As none of the four county 
councillors for the divisions concerned were members of that sub- 
committee they were invited to the meeting, and permitted to speak, but 
not vote. Councillors A, B and D (table 7.1) spoke against the extension. 
councillor C, who had maintained firm support for the extension because 
of the community benefit package, spoke in favour of the extension, 
despite that package having been withdrawn. The sub-committee, which 
acted under delegated powers, voted unanimously to refuse the 
application. 
On 20 October 1995 R. J. Budge Mining (UK) Ltd lodged an appeal against 
the refusal to the Secretary of State for the Environment and a public 
inquiry was arranged to commence on 8 October 1996. 
ISSUES AND LESSONS FOR REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
Cross cutting, single issue alliances 
In this first case study, councillors from different political parties, elected 
to parish, district and county councils, found themselves in public 
agreement with political opponents, and public opposition to councillors 
from their own party. Liberal Democrat, Labour and Conservative 
councillors had shared objectives, whilst conflicting with party colleagues 
and the wider community. This pattern of conflict was not confined to 
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councillors, but was reflected throughout political party organisations 
locally. 
The issue transcended party political boundaries and led to cross-cutting 
alliances amongst elected representatives. It indicated a willingness 
amongst councillors of different parties to supersede their political 
allegiance by agreement on a specific local issue, to ignore party labels 
and national party policy and to link with councillors in other parties. 
Those links vary in the level of informality and are often the result of 
personal contacts which influence political and representative activities. 
Some of the Labour and Liberal Democrat councillors supporting the 
extension for example, had maintained social contacts with each other over 
a number of years. They however did not speak together on any public 
platform other than to rebut criticism of the extension at liaison committee 
meetings. Labour and Conservative district councillors spoke in support of 
the extension and commented on what they considered to be the high 
quality management of the site. 
No apparent social ties bound anti-extension councillors, although in 
contrast it would be wrong to suggest that the unity of the 'pro' lobby 
councillors rested on that fact alone. Social interaction, however, presents 
better opportunities to discuss issues and plan tactics than formal 
meetings, and eases the process of agreement around specific issues 
amongst councillors of opposing political parties. This gave the 'pro' and 
'anti' lobbies a different texture. 
The community benefits offer added a financial element to the equation 
which deepened the rift between councillors, particularly those of the same 
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party. Financing for local community facilities for which some councillors 
had campaigned over long periods of time and might not otherwise 
achieve, intensified disagreement between councillors despite party ties. 
Supporting the extension on the grounds of community benefits would 
enable councillors to claim their support had resulted in an identifiable 
community advantage, a useful claim at election time. 
The Liberal Democrat support for the extension contradicted the party's 
usual community politics and placed Liberal Democrats in opposition to 
expressed community opinion. Rather than reflect this opinion Liberal 
Democrat parish councillors and district council candidates, campaigned 
against the 'anti' extension lobby. The Liberal Democrats of a parish 
council which had opposed vigorously the original site, found themselves 
affected by the extension, only on the eastern border of the parish, and 
dropped their opposition. The prospect of 'community benefits' and the low 
level of site impact on the parish, encouraged the Liberal Democrats to 
support the extension position, rather than the 'anti' campaign, which 
would have obtained more favourable press coverage and possible 
electoral benefits. 
The blurring of party lines over single issues indicates a flexibility amongst 
councillors to work with shared objectives and seek support wherever it 
may politically be found, if the issue is of significant magnitude to warrant 
cross-party co-operation. While the single issue link is in existence the 
normal interplay of party competition continues - particularly in council 
and committee - but the intensity and regularity of that 
interplay is open to 
influence by the existence of co-operation on a single issue or event. 
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Sources of change in councillors' positions 
There was a major shift in the position of a number of councillors who 
supported the extension based on the offer of community benefits, to 
opposition, precipitated by the withdrawal of the offer by the site's new 
owners. In contrast the existence of a vigorous community campaign and 
pressure from the community in opposition to the extension, did not shift 
these councillors in their support. Indeed, in some cases their support was 
strengthened by opposition tactics. Even after the withdrawal of the 
community benefit offer, a number of councillors still saw the site owners 
as a possible source of funds for community projects. 
Councillors used the community benefit offer to justify their support for 
the extension, which also manifest itself in general support for the day-to- 
day management of the site. This support was a method of ensuring the 
community realised that the site was, as one councillor stated: 'of very 
little disturbance at all really' and that any extension would equally be of 
little disturbance. Community benefits then were in another councillor's 
words: 'too good an opportunity to miss'. 
The removal of the proposed benefits undermined these councillors, the 
loss of public face inherent in the new situation was a greater catalyst to 
shifting their position than the arguments of the anti-extension campaign. It 
could be safely concluded that the campaign to oppose the extension 
would not have been successful had the community benefit offer remained 
on the table and that it failed to secure a shift in position from those 
councillors involved. 
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To act against the expressed wishes of local people, any slight division in 
the community was used by councillors to justify their stance. Councillors 
attempted to minimise and isolate the existence of opposition by arguing 
that this was somehow unrepresentative of the wider community and, that 
the councillor's position on each and every issue, was legitimised by the 
electoral process. 
The geographical impact of the issue 
The pattern of feeling within the community resulted from the impact of 
the existing site and the extension proposals on a distinct geographical 
area. However, the community was more directly motivated by this than 
councillors, for as has already been seen, from six of the eight district 
councillors for the area, four Labour and two Conservative, supported the 
extension as did one of the four county councillors. 
Councillors whose electoral areas were located around the site led the 'pro' 
and 'anti' campaigns and so the geographical impact of the development on 
councillor's own patches became an issue in its own right. 'Pro' councillors 
argued strongly and publicly that the impact of the existing site was 
minimal and that the extension would, with proposed improvements in 
environmental management, reduce it further. 
Those opposed to the extension argued that the impact of the existing site 
was considerable, and stated that noise, dust, health issues, traffic 
movements and occasional breaches of conditions on working hours (not 
substantiated by British Coal investigations), had detrimental affects on the 
local wards. They highlighted links between open casting and asthma, and 
argued that the extension would increase respiratory diseases in an area 
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already high in the health authority's table of such complaints. As one 
member of the local community commented: 
When it's sunny you can see the dust for miles around and we're 
breathing that in all the time. My four year old boy has asthma 
and I blame it on that open cast. Since we have lived here he 
has been up and down to the hospital with it. 
Councillor's residence in, areas affected seemed to be of little influence on 
support or opposition to the extension, as some of both the 'pro' and 'anti' 
councillors lived in and represented wards affected by the site. Councillors' 
discretion enabled them to select their own decisional criteria and allowed 
them to come to different conclusions as to the impact of the extension 
when faced with the same evidence and the same community pressure. 
Those councillors that lived in or represented wards distant from, and 
unaffected by, the site could still see a gain from employment 
opportunities, and the offer of 'community benefits'. Those councillors 
were therefore open to influence by other 'pro' councillors closer to the 
site, but remained uninfluenced by the high profile anti-extension 
campaign. 
Although the county council was the mineral planning authority in this 
issue most of the campaigning took place at district level. This was for two 
reasons: first, the dual membership of district and county of three of the 
four county councillors; secondly, the county council had twice refused 
Planning permissions for the site and had a record of opposition to open 
cast mining, whilst being careful not to compromise the legal requirement 
to determine each case on its own merits. It was the district council that 
vacillated on the issue and was thus open to greater pressure. 
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SEQUEL 
The 'pro' and 'anti' campaigns continue but the announcement of an 
increase in profits for RJB Mining from an expected £54 million to £173 
million prompted two 'anti' extension councillors to renew the call for 
community compensation. A newly-elected Labour councillor in Lichfield 
commented: 
In the light of these huge profits I am writing to RJB to ask that 
they put some of this money into those communities affected by 
the development. Residents of the areas suffering the 
consequences of open cast mining should benefit from these 
profits. 
A Labour county and district councillor commented: 
If they have made massive profits of this nature then I think it's 
only right that the communities suffering from the activities of 
the site get some of that money to compensate. But there has to 
be no strings attached to planning permission with any 
payment. I still oppose the extension. 
The company's response was that profits were reduced after tax to £115 
million and were in line with expectations. 'Pro' councillors continue to 
pressurise the company for funds for various community projects, one 'pro' 
district councillor commented: 
If the county had granted this and not forced the company to go 
to appeal then there would have been a lot of money for local 
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people and we would of got the community centre we have been 
trying to get for the last 20 years, and we could have got much 
more besides. 
'Anti' councillors were divided amongst themselves on the issue of 
community benefits, some rejected any offer of funding from the company, 
described by one councillor as '30 pieces of silver'. Whilst others, opposed 
to the extension argued that the site should compensate the local 
community for its impact. An 'anti councillor commented: 
The level of profits shows me that the government sold off 
British Coal too cheaply but the managing director tells me that 
profits are what they expected. Well despite all the promises 
they have done very, very little to make up for all the problems 
caused by that site. In the meantime RIB are laughing all the 
way to the bank and they still want to extend even further and 
completely ignore local peoples' views. Typical ! 
In fact the issue of community benefits and the company's profits is in 
itself the subject of a single issue, cross cutting alliance, which was 
demonstrated in a local press report of a 'cross party plea to RJB' to 'sink 
some of their profits back into the local community'. A Labour district 
councillor stated: 
In spite of their promise to work with the representatives of 
communities taking due regard to the concerns of local 
residents and the environment, they have done little to 
compensate for the effects of the [open cast] operations 
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She was supported in these sentiments by a Conservative district 
councillor and former planning committee chair thus: 
We had an understanding that the area around the mine would 
benefit from the company, country parks and other recreation 
facilities were talked about as well as other projects. I think free 
enterprise comes with a moral obligation and it would not be 
unreasonable to ask for at least five per cent of the company's 
profits to be put back into the community. 
Clear from these demands is cross party unity on an element of an 
important single, local issue.? 
Finally, despite the lack of a formal group decision in this case, the Labour 
group was still an important theatre for deliberation as distinct from 
decision-making. Those councillors who opposed community feeling could 
take comfort in group processes, support from other councillors, and the 
use of the group as a protective mechanism for their own position. The 
general, across the board and continued solidarity of the group and the use 
of the group as a forum to defend their position, was thought to outweigh 
the single-issue impact of an unpopular development. This study indicates 
that the pattern of opinion within the community does not supersede the 
councillor's own reactions, even when the party group has not made a 
formal decision on the issue and shows that councillors discretion can 
focus on their own 'office' as an important focal point for decision-making. 
In other words, when faced with difficult decisions and a divided 
community, councillors must 'decide'. 
7 Chronicle, 19 July 1996. 
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8. THE LINK ROAD. 
This case study concerns the political activities around the proposed 
construction of a link road to service a housing development of some 300 
properties in the Pye Green Valley area of Cannock Chase district. The 
proposed road would be a mile and a half of dual carriageway, to run 
through green belt land and link to the existing road network, to form in 
effect a by-pass. The proposals for the road were included in the Pye 
Green Valley development brief prepared by Cannock Chase District 
Council in March 1981 but it was its inclusion in the Cannock Chase, 
District Wide Local Plan, Draft for Consultation, in 1993 that resulted in 
the first real public awareness of the development. In a report to the 
district council planning and works committee on the 18 March 1993, the 
proposal was described as a 'key road scheme'. The report also identified 
the possibility of redefinition of the green belt boundary to facilitate the 
road and housing development. 
A report on the consultation on the draft plan to the planning and works 
committee on 9 November 1993, resulted in the committee agreeing that 
'no change be made to the housing proposals for the Pye Green Valley' and 
that 'the proposed Pye Green Valley distributor road be subject to further 
detailed appraisal on the technical and planning merits of the route'. 
The same committee on 10 March 1994 considered further objections to 
the local plan, and resolved that the Pye Green Valley link road be 
incorporated as a proposal in the district wide local plan which was then 
approved for formal deposit. At this meeting, the leader of the 
Conservative group, (councillor A), a councillor for an adjacent ward to 
the one in which the road would run, was recorded as having voted against 
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the elements of the plan which incorporated the distributor road. By the 
time of the committee's meeting on 21 September 1995 the road was firmly 
established within the District Plan. 
At each and every stage of the committee's consideration of the plan, the 
Labour group's pre-meetings had discussed and agreed the officers reports 
prior to formal ratification at committee. All Labour group pre-committee 
meetings were full meetings of the group. Every Labour councillor could 
attend, speak and vote on any item, whether a member of that committee 
or not. In addition the district party sent five delegates to group meetings 
with speaking, but not voting rights. This process resulted in a firm Labour 
group policy to construct the road, which had therefore been agreed by the 
full group. That policy and the loyalty of councillors to it was to be tested 
by a residents' action group formed to campaign against the roads 
construction. 
Party political representation: councillors and the group 
At the time of these events Cannock Chase Council consisted of 35 
Labour councillors, five Conservatives, one Liberal Democrat, and one 
vacant seat. By unhappy political coincidence for the Conservative group, 
all their seats were up for re-election in May 1996. Pye Green Valley 
ward, through which the road was to be built, was represented by three 
Labour councillors (referred to here as councillors B, C and D) and had 
returned Labour members for the last ten years and beyond, although only 
narrowly in 1986 and 1995. 
The local ward councillors at that time included the leader of the council 
(councillor B), who along with councillor C, firmly supported the Labour 
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group's policy on the road. Councillor D professed support for the 
resident's campaign against the road in an interview, but did not play an 
active part in the opposition and did not speak or vote against the proposal 
in council. She did however make statements of opposition in the Labour 
group and at one group meeting commented, '1 nearly lost my seat 
because of this road, why won't you listen to people about it'. She was not 
supported in her opposition at group, by her fellow ward councillors. 
Councillor C in particular maintained very firm support for the road and 
opposition to the residents' action group and its individual members. 
The Conservative approach 
The main political support for the residents campaign, came from 
councillor A, the leader of the Conservative group, who, along with two 
Labour councillors represented the neighbouring Anglesey Ward. 
Councillor A had been a member of the council from 1976 to 1980, when 
he lost his seat, but secured re-election for Anglesey Ward in May 1992, 
after his thirteenth attempt. The Labour defeat in this ward was the cause 
of considerable political bitterness targeted at councillor A. His 
involvement in the road issue which did not impact on his ward (only Pye 
Green Valley ward), intensified this political bitterness. Councillor A had 
also identified an important environmental weakness in the ruling Labour 
group's general policy approach, and moved to exploit it with a 'green 
Conservatism'. 
Councillor A acted not only as leader of the Conservative group but also 
as spokesperson within the council chamber for the residents' campaign. 
In doing so, he provided a voice for the campaign which was not provided 
by the three ward councillors concerned. Councillor D who had expressed 
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reservations on the issue and a degree of support for the residents, did so 
only within the confines of the Labour group, and did not speak against the 
issue in open council. That was left to councillor A, who at one meeting 
commented, 'the Labour group haven't listened to what the residents say. 
In my book, consultation means giving full consideration to other points 
of view'. Interviewed on the issue he commented: 
Labour group discipline is quite plain to see, we all know they 
have made their minds up and it doesn't matter what anyone 
says, least of all the local people who are fighting them, 
particularly because they are fighting them in fact and they 
don't care what they do to the environment or to people's living 
conditions. One of them for Pye Green is OK, I just wish she 
would say something. You see the trouble is, because it's me, 
they can play some party political campaign of Labour versus 
Conservative and that somehow lets them off giving any 
attention to what local people want. Iron discipline, they won't 
even let poor old [named Labour councillor] fight for her own 
ward, I mean what would it matter anyway if she even voted 
against the proposals, the other 34 sheep will flock to vote for 
it. 
Secondly, councillor A acted as an advisor to the action group formed to 
campaign against the proposals. He attended meetings of it's executive 
committee, spoke at public meetings for their cause and provided a 
'gateway' into the council's bureaucracy that was otherwise denied to the 
group. As the chair of the action group commented in interview: 
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We got nothing from our own local councillors, Mr [councillor 
B] was always a gentleman, very polite and nice, but gave us no 
help or real support. Mr [councillor CJ was always very, very 
anti us, and very difficult to deal with, we haven't seen much at 
all of [councillor D] since the election last May. When 
[councillor A] took an interest and seemed to care, we were 
very pleased, I know he is for the ward by us but that doesn't 
matter he is on our side, our own councillors are not. 
Although leader of the five strong Conservative group, councillor A acted 
alone on this issue and received no support from his group colleagues at 
any public or council event concerning this issue. The rest of the 
Conservative group represented wards remote from Pye Green Valley. 
The Labour response 
The Labour councillors for the ward concerned were able to use councillor 
A's involvement to polarise the issue and undermine the campaign against 
their group's policy. One of the councillors commented in interview: 
I was glad when he came out of the closet so to speak because 
now everyone can see what we knew all along, these people [the 
action group] are all Tories anyway and all they really care 
about is the value of their house. He is advising them you know, 
or mis-advising them, going to their meetings, distorting what 
the council want to do, he thinks it will save his seat. All Tories 
in that campaign, none of them vote Labour. 
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The intervention of councillor A was used to undermine the political 
independence of the residents campaign. It was also used to absolve 
Labour councillors of any need to support or even communicate with the 
action group, 'why should we meet with them, we have made a decision, 
and I am not letting those Tories change my mind', was the response from 
one councillor when questioned as to his feelings towards the action 
group. The Anglesey ward Labour councillors had a sub-text to their 
agenda, that was to attempt to use the issue to weaken councillor A's 
chances of re-election in May 1996. He was criticised at council meetings 
and in the local press as interfering in issues outside his own ward, as 
indicating both a lack of concern for his own area and a vote-seeking 
desperation at his re-election chances. 
A Labour councillor for Anglesey ward stated: 
I'll do whatever I can to stop him getting back in, this is our 
ward, [meaning a Labour seat] and if he can't keep out of this 
road which doesn't affect this ward then he shouldn't be a 
councillor for Anglesey. He knows the Tories are going to loose 
all their seats, his just getting his name in the paper to get 
votes. 
On the issue itself the councillor added: 
it's not my ward, but the group has a policy and it is part of the 
District Plan, I support that policy and that plan, it all went 
through the group so its no problem to me to support it. 
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The Labour councillors for Anglesey and Pye Green Valley wards 
maintained firm public support for the policy of the Labour group in the 
face of very forthright campaigning by the residents action group. From the 
outset the relationship between the councillors for Pye Green Valley and 
their constituents within the action group and the wider community was 
strained. That strain increased as the issue developed. The Labour 
councillors did not attend any of the public meetings held by the campaign 
or any of its regular executive meetings, which were also open to the 
public. After an announcement by the action group that it would contest 
the local elections in May 1995, councillors B, C and D, went as far as 
refusing to meet with the group under any circumstances. They relied on 
their support for Labour group policy as a justification for their stance, 
claiming that nothing would change as a result of any meeting. 
The position of councillor D who had expressed doubt on the issue was a 
difficult one. She admitted in interview to being opposed to the road but 
was unwilling and almost unable to speak out against it in council, or to 
attend any of the public meetings organised by the action group. She 
commented: 
I have my views on this which I have expressed at the [Labour] 
group, there is no earthly point in me upsetting the group and 
having the whip withdrawn. I just can't make a difference and 
don't see the point of getting into trouble over it. I don't think 
we're right though, and I really think we should at least talk to 
people, they are very upset by this proposal and we can't ignore 
that. Some in the group think that is exactly what we should do 
though. 
358 
Questioned further, she admitted to feeling intimidated, though not 
directly, by members of the group and commented that 'they [the group] 
told me I have got to support it [the road] that's it'. She felt isolated in her 
opposition and as the group had made a decision, which was supported by 
senior Labour councillors, she was 'frightened' to take any action against 
that policy. Although acquiescing, she was not happy with the position in 
which she found herself, which she summarised as 'supporting the group, 
or shutting up'. 
The local ward Labour party was supportive of their councillors and the 
council on this issue and went as far as to attend the action group's public 
meetings so as to assess the groups tactics and pass on information to the 
Labour councillors. 
The position of councillors B and C was of clear support for a group 
policy against a vocal, and well supported and organised campaign from 
the electorate within their own ward. Although an attempt was made by 
Labour councillors to present the campaign as a 'Conservative Party front', 
a group of middle class home owners concerned only with property values, 
and a move by a doomed Conservative councillor to save his seat, they 
also gave support to the construction of the road as a substantive issue and 
to the decision-making process of the group and council as a procedural 
concern. 
THE CO TY CAMPAIGN. 
The reaction from the local community to the proposals led to the 
formation of a campaign group in March 1995, at a public meeting 
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attended by 100 people. It elected functional officers and an executive 
committee of ten members, which met every week. It held full meetings 
monthly, which were open to the public. Attendance at these meetings did 
not fall below 80 people. The group had a funding and action plan, and 
subsequently titled itself the 'Pye Green Valley Residents Action Group'. 
Early on in the campaign the prime target became the distributor road, not 
the housing development. As one campaigner reported in interview: 
We knew right at the beginning we could not stop the houses, 
but they did not have the impact on the area that the road 
would, linking as it would with already busy roads it would be 
an immediate rat run and ruin this Valley. 
The group undertook an extensive campaign against the road, including a 
2,300 signature petition, presented to the council via Conservative 
councillor A. from the neighbouring Anglesey ward. It organised an 
intense and wide-spread letter-writing campaign to the local press, which 
continued up to the time of writing. The group demonstrated outside the 
council offices, lobbied council meetings, and conducted an extensive 
leafleting campaign in the affected area. It organised a protest march along 
the route of the link road, attend by 160 people and conducted a door to 
door opinion survey on the issue. The local Member of Parliament and 
European Member of Parliament were contacted in order to seek their 
support. The group's fund raising activities were so successful that they 
were able to employ the services of a Barrister and planning consultant to 
present a case at the public inquiry into the local plan, held in December 
1995. 
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The campaign placed hope in councillor B as their local ward member and 
leader of the council being able to assist the opposition to the road. When 
that support was not forthcoming he was criticised by a campaigner for not 
standing up for his constituents. After councillor B failed to attend a 
planning and works committee meeting, of which he was a member, and 
which was to consider the road, the same campaigner commented: 
'everybody I know in the area is disgusted with the attitude of our 
councillors, [councillor B] didn't even turn up at the committee meeting'. 
In April 1995, an invitation to attend a public meeting on the road was sent 
to all Cannock Chase councillors, only two attended, councillor A, the 
leader of the Conservative group and a Labour councillor from a ward, 
across the district, who had been involved in campaigning against another 
road scheme supported by the Labour group of which he was a member. 
Councillor B, the leader of the council, had written to the group informing 
them that it was not appropriate that he attend the meeting, because they 
were to field a candidate in the local elections. 
The electoral challenge 
In March 1995, the Pye Green Residents' Action Group decided to fight 
the May local elections and a candidate was selected to stand under the 
banner, 'Pye Green Valley Residents'. There followed a short but intense 
election campaign by the group lasting only five weeks which consisted of 
regular public meetings, the distribution of leaflet material on the issue and 
in support of the candidate, and door to door canvassing. 
The local Labour party reacted fiercely to this challenge, and the campaign 
was a bitter and personal one. The local Labour party used tactics similar 
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to those of their sitting councillors, particularly emphasising the assistance 
given to the action group by the Conservative group leader. The party 
delivered a leaflet in the week before the poll which accused the residents' 
campaign of being 'bunkum', based on 'misrepresentations of the facts and 
distortions of the truth', and maintained that the group was a 'Conservative 
front'. The most stinging accusation made was that only 27 residents had 
objected to the road proposal in the local plan. The residents' group made 
accusations of a Labour 'dirty tricks' campaign and in interview the 
residents candidate stated his disgust at what he felt were the 'cynical' 
tactics employed and recalled: 
The late leaflet from the Labour party was delivered so that we 
would not have time to respond, as it was we were so enraged 
that we had to put the record straight in our own leaflet and at 
the last minute. We handed in a petition with 2,300 names on it 
so I don't know who is doing the sums at the council. Also the 
Labour leaflet just attacked us, there were no reasons what so 
ever in it given as to why people should vote Labour, just why 
they shouldn't vote for us. The theme of the leaflet suggested 
that the party was totally in favour of the scheme. We were very 
surprised at the criticism because of the non-political nature of 
our campaign. Their leaflet was entirely about discrediting and 
ridiculing our group and anti-road campaign. 
Labour also made accusations that the action group's meetings had been 
attended by members of the Conservative party and the National Front, 
while in fact they had also been attended by local Labour party members. 
These accusations were supported by the sitting councillor, and candidate, 
Councillor D identified earlier as unconvinced of the merits of the Labour 
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group's policy. A position she maintained despite the bitterness of the 1995 
election campaign, which saw the local Labour party refer one of the 
residents leaflets to the police for a breach of election law. 
A Labour party member interviewed at one of the public meetings said 'yes 
we've got them now, they left the imprint of their last leaflet, I've reported 
it to the police. Look if they are going to get involved in elections they've 
got to do it right or we're going to jump on them '"l The 1995 election 
result saw a narrow victory by the Labour candidate of some 97 votes, as 
table 8.1 shows, a drastic reduction in the normal Labour majority. 
Imprint: The legally required notation of the printer and publisher of any 
election material. Representation of the Peoples' Act, 1983, sections 
110, 
ill and 112, HMSO, 1983. 
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Table 8.1. Pye Green Valley, local election results, 1986 to 1995. 
Year Party Vote Labour Electorate Turnout 
Received Majority % 
1986 Con 155 
Lab 1076 
SDP/Lib 1032 44 5,297 42.78 
1987 Con 279 
Lab 1356 
SDP/Lib 1076 280 5,361 50.62 
1988 Con 253 
Lab 1333 
SLD 845 488 5,594 43.48 
1990 Con 321 
Lab 1511 
SDP 922 589 5,809 47.40 
1991 Con 884 
Lab 1337 453 6,026 37.03 
1992 Con 716 
Lab 1130 
Mon. R. L* 21 
Nat. Fr. * 68 414 5,969 32.40 
1994 Con 326 
Lab 1326 
Lib Dem 272 
Nat. Fr. * 104 1000 6,097 33.30 
1995 Con 126 
Lab 1020 
Nat. Fr. * 61 
P. G. V. R. * 923 97 6,139 34.71 
* Mon. R. L. - Monster Raving Loony Party 
* P. G. V. R. - Pye Green Valley Residents * Nat. Fr. - National Front 
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As 1989 and 1993 were county council election years, no district elections 
were held. 
Labour's vote and majority had not been reduced to such a level since the 
1986 local elections against the SDP/Liberal Alliance. The Pye Green 
Valley residents, although unsuccessful, had in four short weeks of a bitter 
campaign come within 97 votes of unseating the sitting Labour councillor 
and closer than any other party in the last six local elections to defeating a 
Labour candidate. 
At the count for the 1995 local elections, councillor B (the Labour council 
leader) on hearing the result, approached the unsuccessful residents' 
candidate and said 'we can have that meeting you've been asking for now,. 
In response to this another Labour councillor who had just been re-elected 
to his safe Labour seat for another ward in the district, shouted 'no we 
bloody well won't and there's the reason' at which he banged on the table 
and pointed to the piles of ballot papers. Subsequently, however a meeting 
was held between the residents group, the three ward councillors (B, C 
and D), the chair of the planing and works committee and the local MP. Of 
this meeting a residents campaigner commented, 'very polite, but no use, 
they didn't listen'. 
The residents' campaign was buoyed by their electoral near-success to 
such an extent that at the beginning of 1996 they declared they would fight 
the seat again that coming May when the Labour council leader himself, 
was up for re-election. The Labour party reacted angrily to the 
announcement, and in an open letter to the action group in the local press 
one Labour councillor attempted to shift the responsibility for the road 
onto the inquiry into the local district plan, and accused the residents of 
'getting involved in politics'. He continued: 
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I welcome the decision of the Pye Green Valley support group 
to field a candidate in this years local elections. We in the 
Labour party believe it is vital and healthy for democracy that 
more people take an active part in local politics. But this 
decision somewhat surprises me since it was reported in this 
paper that they had no interest in local politics. Surely by 
contesting elections they become political. 
I am sure the electorate would also be keen to know what the 
candidate's policies on housing or employment are, or does he 
support Labour's manifesto pledge to acknowledge the outcome of 
the local plan Inquiry? By this we mean if the Inspector says no 
development in Pye Green Valley. 
The author of the letter was councillor C, a Pye Green Valley councillor 
and also the Labour Party's Local Election Agent. 2 
The near-success of the residents election candidate in May 1995, their 
continued campaign against the road proposals, the evidence presented to 
the public inquiry in December 1995, and growing public awareness of the 
issue and criticism of the council, had an interesting political consequence. 
The leader of the council, (councillor B), due for re-election in May 1996 
and a Pye Green councillor since 1984, declined to fight the seat. He was 
however selected to fight a by-election, for a safe Labour seat caused by 
the resignation of his wife, only a year after her own re-election to the 
council. She claimed pressure of work had led to her resignation. 
Councillor B claimed that his residence in the new ward would make it 
2 Letter from Labour Party election agent, Chase Post, 4 April 1996. 
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easier for him to represent its interests. The residents were thus robbed of 
the opportunity to unseat the leader of the council 
The outcome of the May 1996 election for the Pye Green Valley ward was 
however a disappointment for the residents, in a straight fight against a 
Labour candidate who received 958 votes, the Pye Green Residents 
candidate collected 801 votes: a Labour majority of 157, an increase of 60 
on the previous year, on a turnout of 28.6 per cent. 
Meanwhile, two seats in the Brereton and Ravenshill Ward were to be re- 
elected in May 1996, that of the sitting Labour councillor, and a casual 
vacancy created by the resignation of the leader of the council's wife. Both 
seats were held easily by Labour with the leader of the council topping the 
poll with a majority of 79 over the sitting Labour councillor, who in turn 
was 782 votes ahead of the Conservative candidate. The leader of the 
council thus secured another four year term of office, and the sitting 
Labour councillor, who obtained the fewest votes of the two successful 
candidates, was re-elected for the three years that remained of vacated 
term of office. 
Prior to this election the council leader stated in the local press that 
rumours of a 'rift' in the Labour party over his decision to fight another 
seat, were 'complete rubbish', and that 'in all cases the support I have 
received has been unanimous'. However local party sources quoted that 
the Leader was 'running scared' and that 'it is very embarrassing at a time 
when the party is doing so well nationally that Cannock's council leader 
has turned on his heels and run'. 3 At a meeting of the Cannock Chase 
3 Express and Star, 3 February 1996. 
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District Labour Party in January 1996, the leader's intention to seek re- 
election to a seat other than Pye Green Valley, was condemned by 
delegates present, particularly the councillors in attendance. One 
councillor commented 'you should do the honourable thing, this is not 
honourable, stand by your ward and fight, fight, don't run like that'. A 
second councillor stated 'you're making a big mistake, you're making it 
worse for us in Pye Green, it's just wrong'. At the meeting no councillor 
spoke in favour of the leader's intention. 4 
In response to the leader's decision to fight a new seat, the Residents 
candidate, the same individual who fought in 1995 stated: 
Part of me wants to have a dig at him, but he was always a 
gentleman towards us, not like [named four Labour 
councillors, not all from the Pye Green ward], they seemed to 
think we had no business infighting an election, their attitude 
was always, "how dare you stand against us, how dare you use 
these elections against us ". Still we are hopeful this year, but it 
is difficult to get elected on a single issue, but this is an 
important issue. 
The four Labour councillors criticised by the candidate were interviewed 
for their responses to the residents fielding candidates in two local 
elections. The responses fall into two broad categories; first that the 
residents should stay out of party politics, and secondly that the seat was a 
Labour seat and any serious challenge was unacceptable. One of the 
councillors commented: 
4 Cannock Chase District Labour Party meeting, 17 January 1996. 
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Look-the Tories can't win this seat, they never will, so they put 
up a front. If these people are as independent as they say they 
are then they should keep out of the local elections. Its that 
simple. 
A second councillor stated 'they are wrong on the substantive issue, the 
road will regenerate the economy and bring jobs', while a third remarked, 
'bloody cheek, come that close to winning the seat and want to met with 
us afterwards, and old [named councillor] agrees to it, I'd tell them to 
clear off in no uncertain terms and stay out of our wards' 
Use of the local elections then, a successful tactic for harrying and 
angering the Labour group whose policy the residents wished to change, 
but of negligible effect in securing the real victory they required, a reversal 
of that policy. An electoral success would have represented a symbolic 
victory and sent a powerful message to the ruling party group, but any Pye 
Green Residents councillor, as a lone voice, and set against the solidarity 
of the ruling group, would not succeed in reversing that group's policy. 
ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS 
The link road case reveals a situation of political intransigence, and the 
construction and maintenance of firm boundaries around an issue, by the 
community affected and by the party group. Negotiation would achieve 
little, and even the statutory consultation procedures around the 
development of the Local Plan had not produced a compromise, or a relief 
of the political tension created around this issue. 
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Interviews conducted with those involved suggest that the political 
intransigence was the result of frustration amongst councillors generated 
by three sources. First, the existence of the road proposal for a period far 
longer than that of the action group's campaign and the slowness of the 
residents in reacting to an issue which had been public property since 
1981. This situation reveals a criticism amongst councillors of low levels 
of public awareness of council affairs. 
Secondly, that the Labour group's responses to perceived public criticism 
of 'policy' and the 'council' was translated as a political criticism of the 
Labour group. Similarly that a campaign against the 'policy' was a 
campaign against the Labour party by it's political opponents. The 
involvement of the Conservative leader, councillor A, confirmed this 
opinion to Labour councillors. 
Thirdly, a direct electoral threat levelled by the action group's decision to 
stand a candidate in the local elections. The conduct of the election 
campaign and the conflict between the local branch Labour party and the 
residents group was both a product and re-enforcement of this 'party 
political' interpretation. Labour councillors stressed their resentment at the 
residents decision to use the local elections on two occasions, and their 
anger at the closeness of the vote. Ward councillors and party members 
were particularly concerned at the embarrassing move to another seat, 
made by the leader of the council in response to the electoral threat. 
The party political interpretation imposed on the issue by the Labour group 
is a common response amongst party groups faced with public criticism. 
In 
this case, that interpretation was exacerbated by the use of the electoral 
process to register a protest. To that interpretation must be added the 
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advantage of previous knowledge that councillors have in regard to both 
issues and the processes of consultation available. Councillors in this case 
were particularly scathing of opponents of the scheme, first as 
misunderstanding the impact of the development, and secondly as not 
appreciating the wider policy pressure on the council to meet government 
and county council requirements in the production of the local plan. A 
committee chair commented on the process of the decision and on the 
issue itself: 
This decision was taken properly, council standing orders were 
adhered to and all the necessary requirements fulfilled. 
Deleting the Pye Green Valley site [from the draft local plan] 
would have meant taking other green belt for development, and 
the road scheme is needed to put traffic calming measures on 
some of the roads in other areas. I am well aware of the 
concern felt by residents about the housing and road proposals 
in this area. But to comply with government policies on the long 
term protection of the green belt we have to consider sites 
within the urban core. People just don't understand that we 
have to respond to the demands, made on us for housing and 
industrial land by the government. 
The party political interpretation led councillors to criticise the action 
group based on the assumption that 'elections' were to be fought and won 
by political parties, and that it was necessary to identify a broad political 
platform which could be opposed, rather than a single issue, which should 
be dealt with by other consultative processes or negotiation. In an 
interview a councillor expressed frustration at being, as he put it, 'unable 
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to pin them [the residents group] down to anything specific other than 
this road'. He added: 
what are they telling people about housing, employment, 
leisure, council rents, where do they stand on the government. 
That is what we want to know, we know what they think about 
the road. 
Here we see the nationalisation of local politics being used as justification 
for a policy-broadening approach rather than a representative-specific 
approach. 
The residents group were acutely aware of this political interpretation, 
even so some of its members, in interview, claimed the status of 'lifelong 
Labour voters, ' despite the colour in which they were painted. This claim 
was even made by the residents candidate himself, and his wife, who was 
a leading member of the group. The road was thus not seen by them as a 
party issue. One campaigner commented: 
I have voted Labour all my life, I am an ex-miner, what else can 
I vote? but never, ever again. That's quite an achievement for 
this lot, people all across the country voting Labour for the first 
time and me, never again, well not locally, I will for the 
government I mean. 
The residents' main criticism was that the council and councillors were 
acting undemocratically, by which they meant engaging in no real or 
genuine communication, displaying no intention to act on residents' views, 
and showing a resentment of the residents' 'daring' to both campaign 
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against their policy and particularly to use the electoral process. Councillor 
A, the leader of the Conservative group, in a letter to the local press, 
summarised the residents' group attitude and attempted to out-flank the 
Labour group on the 'green left' of the political spectrum, thus: 
There particular arrogance was never better demonstrated than by 
the council's portrayal of the public consultation phase of the 
plans. This gave the impression that public opinion would, in some 
way have a genuine influence on the council's final determination 
of the plans. Nothing could be further from reality, the petition 
was effectively binned... They [The Labour group] seem unable to 
recognise that public attitudes on health, pollution and the 
environment have changed dramatically over these years. The 
proposals for the Pye Green Valley are an offence against the very 
concept of democracy in local government. 5 
The residents' accusations that the controlling Labour group were 
somehow acting undemocratically were punctuated by reference to 
decisions being 'steamrollered', 'made in secret' by 'unresponsive' decision- 
makers who were 'uninterested in local people's views'. One campaigner 
stated 'we did a survey in this area and 98 per cent of the residents were 
against the road, they still won't listen'. The image presented was of a 
political monolith that communicated only when it had to and that would 
not respond to views with which it disagreed. A resident expressed the 
campaigners frustration thus: 
5 Letter from the Leader of the Cannock Chase Conservative group, 
Cannock Mercury, 18 May 1995. 
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We didn't want to get involved in politics, but they forced us to 
because it was the only way to make them listen. It frightened 
them as well. You see all we kept getting from [named 
councillor] was: "it's a group decision, the group had decided, 
we discussed this in group". I had to ask him who this bloody 
group was and how could we meet them. He told me it was the 
Labour people on the council, but you can't get at them so we 
stood, that certainly got at them. 
This case study displayed the specific impact of the use made of the 
electoral processes by a residents' group, but it was also important for the 
playing out of 'representation' in the party group and the local press and 
was particularly noticeable for its domination of the letters pages of the 
weekly free papers. The action group, local residents, the Conservative 
group leader, the residents election candidate, Labour councillors from Pye 
Green Valley and Anglesey wards, the chair of the planning and works 
committee and the Director of Technical Services, all used the letters 
pages of the local press to outline their positions and criticise their 
opponents. The power of public awareness and of the media as a theatre of 
representation was clearly evident in this case. 
The residents group and in particular their candidate found themselves 
stepping into a more overt party political environment, in a letter to the 
local press regarding the VJ day celebrations. The candidate wrote: 
It was a great site to see the Royal Brigade of Ghurkas and our 
old veterans, proud as ever, heads held high, chests stuck out 
marching through the High Street... Full marks must be given to 
our old boys. 
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It must be noted that the only councillors present in our proud 
march past were that of [councillor A, leader of the 
Conservative group and the Labour chair of the district 
council]. Of course these councillors will have very good 
excuses why they could not be present on this day, which was 
very important for our victorious lads of the forces. These 
councillors were elected by us, the residents of their wards to 
represent us in all aspects of our community and important 
functions of our area. Why are they there? Is it to better their 
own way of life or to serve the people who put them there, why 
were they not at the march past? Any person who is fortunate 
enough to be democratically elected to serve on the council 
should be proud to serve the people of their ward 
The attendance at the VJ parade was high and hence we must 
fight to keep Hednesford on the map and not be swallowed up 
by our sister town of Cannock. We must preserve Hednesford 
and our way of life. Tye Green Valley has undergone many 
changes over the years and against all odds has survived to 
lend a beautiful sight to its many residents. Please help us to 
ensure it stays this way for our future generations. Finally it is 
my sincere hope that in the future I shall have the opportunity 
to serve the people of this community to the best of my 
abilities. 6 
This appeal to past glory, its linkage of fighting spirit with community and 
its criticism of councillors, which would particularly imply Labour 
6 Letters page, Cannock Mercury, from the Pye Green valley Residents 
candidate, 11 October 1995. 
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councillors because of the party's considerable council majority, brought a 
furious press response from an Anglesey ward Labour councillor thus: 
A recent letter to your paper criticised local Hednesford 
councillors for their non-attendance at the Hednesford 
Extravaganza. For that is what it was, the VJ parade having 
taken place on the previous Sunday... During the past 30-40 
years many people have moved into the area and have added to 
Hednesford's unique character and strengths. I don't know how 
long [the residents candidate] has lived here but I have been 
fortunate to have been born and brought up in Hednesford. 
Added to this five generations of my family have lived here, 
many of them serving their country in two world wars. Myself I 
am privileged to serve the people of Hednesford on the district 
council and that is what I hope to continue to do.... If we as 
councillors do not care as is implied would we hold regular 
surgeries? Or spend many hours responding to letters and 
phone calls from constituents? Or the many hours spent paying 
people visits when asked to do so? The answer can only be 
given by the electorate, and at the proper time they will do so. 
In conclusion I hope the letter writer has found this response 
useful and realise that there is more to being a councillor than 
jumping on any parade bandwagon just to get himself noticed, 
and I would hope that he does not in future use the memories of 
our ex-service people as a vote catching exercise. 7 
7 Letters page, Cannock Mercury, 18 October 1995. 
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After the residents' second unsuccessful attempt to win a council seat and 
to further exemplify the claim made by Labour councillors that the 
residents were indeed a 'political body' and not independent at all, a 
Labour councillor stated: 
They now want to form a parish council, there you are that 
proves it, they can't get elected to the district so they think 
they'll set up a little parish council and snipe at us from it. If 
that's not being political I don't know what is. The people of 
Hednesford don't want, or need a parish council and they don't 
want to pay for it so these people can undermine the district 
council. If this is formed there will be trouble I guarantee it 
The chair of the residents group denied the comment, stating: 
We really have no interest in local politics, we have not 
approached the Staffordshire Parish Councils Association to 
form an active parish council, and some of the group are very 
anti the idea, but we have considered it, but we are just about 
the road 
When informed of a parish council's ability to conduct a referendum she 
replied 'oh, that's interesting, we didn't know about that, hmm, thank you'. 
This issue exemplifies the intransigence of a party group confronted by an 
active, unremitting and dedicated community group, with access to 
resources and a level of political appreciation that can be used to confront 
the political experience of a local party machine. It also illustrates the 
tendency for councillors to adopt a position based on the virtue of 
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permanency, that is that once a decision is made through the democratic 
procedures that are the closed party group, and abiding by the statutory 
criteria, no counter case can have a value exceeding the need to maintain 
the agreed group position on any issue. 
In this case at least, the party group appeared to view community 
disagreement with it's policy as a 'political' challenge leading them to 
further 'party politicise' the issue. Councillors here, when faced with such a 
challenge - when threatened by electoral competition and exposed to 
possible defeat - are nevertheless still drawn toward publicly supporting 
the group, and an open and public confrontation with the local community 
and their own electorate. Expressing reservations about that policy, as in 
the case of councillor D. is a matter not for the public but for the closed 
group meeting. A Labour councillor interviewed after the May 1995 
election results, and soon to have the group whip withdraw for his activity 
in another anti-road protest said: 
All she [councillor D, the Labour candidate in the May 1995 
elections] had to do was go to the first public meeting the 
residents ever had and say, I oppose this road and as your local 
councillor I will do all I can to stop it, they would have carried 
her into the council chamber and there wouldn't of been an 
anti-road candidate. She'd have had to have done it though, I 
mean fought the issue, I said to her tell the group to **** ***, 
it's your seat, you're the one going to lose, just fight it and 
them. 
When confronted with this advice the councillor concerned simply replied 
'don't be soft'. 
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9. THE RELIEF ROAD 
This case study concerns the Birmingham Northern Relief Road (BNRR), 
a major new road to be constructed through the areas of two county 
councils, Staffordshire and Warwickshire, three district councils, South 
Staffordshire, Cannock and Lichfield, one borough council, North 
Warwickshire, the Metropolitan Borough Council of Walsall and one City 
Council, Birmingham. 
To elaborate the tension between party group, councillors and the 
community, this case study considers the political environment and 
activities only within those local authorities where a controlling party 
group supported the proposed road, and were faced with opposition to that 
policy from sections of their community. It also considers only those 
authorities through which the proposed road would be constructed and not 
those close to the route. This is because the physical impact of the road 
through a particular area motivates greater public awareness and activity 
than a development which does not physically impact on an area. 
This case study concerns the political activities throughout the period 1993 
to 1996 as this presents a manageable time span for the issue. Public 
debate concerning a road such as the BNRR had occurred since 1984, and 
a proposal to construct a relief road for this area of the West Midlands was 
the subject of a public inquiry in 1988. This case study refers to this earlier 
period only as necessary and sparingly. It considers the case study as a 




The Department of Transport published the Draft Orders for the 
construction of the Birmingham Northern Relief Road on 15 June 1993, 
thus triggering the twelve week Statutory Objection Period. The £500 
million BNRR was proposed as Britain's first privately-constructed toll 
motorway. It was designed by, and to be funded, constructed, operated 
and maintained by, Midland Expressway Limited (MEL), a consortium 
comprising Trafalgar House and the Italian construction company Iritecna. 
The concession period for the BNRR was to be 53 years, three years for 
construction and 50 years of operation. The BNRR would be a public 
highway, apart from the toll areas, and was scheduled for completion, and 
operation, by 1998/99. 
The BNRR would provide a motorway link around the north east of the 
West Midlands conurbation from the existing M6 motorway, north of 
junction 11, to the M6 east of junction 4, thus linking the M6 in 
Staffordshire with the M42 at Coleshill in Warwickshire. This 27 mile 
stretch of motorway would be mainly dual, three-lane highway, but certain 
parts would be constructed as five lanes of highway. 
In addition the construction project included a Motorway Service Area, a 
maintenance area and seven toll stations. The route also included a number 
of link roads, new carriageways, junctions, roundabouts and the re- 
alignment of existing roads, either proposed by MEL or by the local 
authorities concerned. 
The construction consortium expressed four aims for the scheme; to 
provide relief to the existing M6; to provide a distributor road to the north 
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and east of the West Midlands conurbation linking the M42 and the 
proposed Western Orbital route; to have regard to the National road traffic 
Forecasts 1989; and to provide, as soon as possible, the infrastructure to 
relieve traffic congestion. 
In addition to these claims the Staffordshire local authorities which 
supported the BNRR maintained that certain benefits would accrue from 
its construction. Namely, that the road would: provide an alternative for 
the heavily congested M6; provide relief to the existing road system north 
of the conurbation, in particular the A5(T) and the A452(T); provide links 
for and improved distribution of traffic between the major roads to the 
north of the conurbation including the M54, A5(T), A38(T), and the M42; 
and provide improved access for development for areas throughout the 
route. I The non-Staffordshire authorities also shared these broad aims. 
The proposed road would form part of the Trans-European Road Network 
(TERN) which would enable traffic movement into the region direct from 
the continent, the purpose of this linkage was to facilitate long distance 
travel across Europe. The road would also link to the western orbital route. 
As such it can not be viewed simply as a 27 mile stretch of motorway but 
as an integral development of the local, regional, national and European 
road network and as a result its political impact extends beyond the 
boundaries of any one local authority. 
1 Birmingham Northern Relief Road, presentation to Kenneth Carlisle, 
MP., Minister for Roads and Traffic, report produced by Staffordshire 
County Council, Cannock Chase, Lichfield, South Staffordshire District 
Councils and Tamworth Borough Council, 1989. 
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The local authorities which supported the road scheme did so from a 
general belief in the economic regeneration properties of its construction 
and operation, specifically that of 'job creation'. Each local authority (and 
ruling party group) had its own specific reasons for support (or objection) 
to the road proposals, related to its own area and its perceived 
requirements, this was alongside more general grounds of support. The 
Labour groups concerned however, all opposed the private funding 
element, its construction as a toll road and had a policy which supported 
its 'public' provision. 
THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT: COUNCILLORS AND THE 
PARTY GROUP 
The controlling party groups which supported the construction of the relief 
road and through whose area it would run, were the Labour groups of 
Staffordshire County, Cannock Chase District, and Conservative 
controlled South Staffordshire and Lichfield Districts. The minority 
Conservative group of Staffordshire County Council also supported the 
road proposal whilst the minority Labour group of South Staffordshire 
District opposed it. The ruling Conservative group and minority Labour 
group of Lichfield District Council supported the construction. The Labour 
party assumed control of Lichfield Council in May 1995. The public 
inquiry had commenced by this time, and this was given as a reason by the 
secretary of that group for not reconsidering its existing policy. 
North Warwickshire Borough Council had pursued an officer-led support 
for the proposals, but as a result of, the national Labour party policy for a 
moratorium on all new motorway construction pending enhanced 
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enviroental studies, the 1992 general election campaign promise to 
oppose the BNRR and, two shadow transport spokesmen since confirming 
that position, the deputy leader of the group took action. A member of the 
shadow transport team, Joan Whalley MP attended a North Warwickshire 
Labour group meeting to stress the party's national position on the road 
and as a result the Labour group reversed its officer-led policy. During this 
consultation with the national party, no other groups, either national 
organisations, or locally formed action groups, were given the same 
opportunity to address the party group. North Warwickshire were 
however, the only group which supported the road to take advice on this, 
at a group meeting, from any source other than paid officers. 
Commenting on the political position of the group, the former deputy 
leader of North Warwickshire, Borough Council (now a Lichfield district 
councillor) stated: 
We were just going along with the officers, I always opposed the 
thing, but I had to get the party nationally to make the point. 
Some of our members wont listen to anyone but officers. I had a 
hard enough job getting them to agree to Joan [Whalley] 
attending a group meeting. There is absolutely no way they 
would meet with the public at a group meeting. Most of them 
didn't stay for the meeting with Joan, they just went off, but we 
got the policy changed and that's what mattered 
In the local authorities whose controlling groups supported the 
construction, the motorway would run through a total of 10 district wards 
represented by 24 district councillors, and affect six county divisions. The 
political composition of the district wards was 15 Labour, 
four 
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Conservative, three Independent Labour, one Independent and one 
Residents Association. The six county divisions were represented by two 
Labour, two Conservative, one Independent and one Residents 
Association member. At the time of the study four of these county 
councillors were also district councillors, being Labour, Conservative, 
Residents Association and Independent, the latter two being members of 
the same district council. 
The relief road was not a politically partisan issue, and both Labour and 
Conservative groups supported its construction. Partisan debate was 
limited to the private funding and toll elements with Labour groups 
opposed to, and Conservative groups supporting these aspects. Nor, within 
each of the party groups which supported the construction, was that 
support unanimous. Councillors in both Conservative and Labour groups, 
and at county and district level opposed the construction, although their 
opposition, and any articulation of community opposition to the road, by 
councillors, was largely maintained within the private meetings of their 
groups. Indeed, opposition was mainly evident from observation and 
interview with councillors opposed to the scheme. Councillor's positions 
where unaffected by whether the road would run through the electoral area 
they represented or not, as support existed in both situations. This was 
despite the existence of active community opposition to the road from 
within the wards and divisions. 
Interviews with councillors did not lead to accurate figures for opponents 
within each group, as the original decisions to support a relief road had 
often been taken in the mid 1980's. Decisions related to the road were then 
passed as consequent upon an original decision, and were seen as ancillary 
to its implementation. Only two councils from those originally supporting 
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the BNRR had changed their position, North Warwickshire Borough 
Council and Warwickshire County Council, the latter change came as a 
result of the defeat of the ruling Conservative group in 1993, and the 
formation of a Labour minority administration with Liberal Democrat 
support. 
Feelings ran high amongst the councillors interviewed. A Labour district 
councillor opposed to the road commented in an interview that: 
This doesn't go through my ward, or even close to it but I don't 
agree with the road, but, you have to fight these things in the 
group, I take every opportunity to raise the issue, I won't let an 
opportunity go by, you know if we have a report or something. 
Now we [the group] had this report about progress of the 
Public Inquiry and I reminded them of all the opposition to the 
road, the petitions we had, made a speech against it, got some 
support, and then they agreed to note the report. I didn't repeat 
in committee what I said in group, there's no point. This is the 
first time we have controlled this council so the Tories are 
looking for any disagreements to jump on. Besides, I don't have 
to say things in public, I am opposed to it, I've told people 
against the road I am opposed to it, what I do in the council 
doesn't matter, as long as I fought the corner where it counted 
and that's in group. 
A Conservative councillor from the same authority stated: 
This affects my ward and there exists considerable opposition to 
the road, of which I am well aware, I have made some non- 
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committal statements in the press, but the Conservative group 
made a decision on this road some time ago in the knowledge 
that it would benefit the area. I will listen to people from my 
ward, what I will not tolerate is the professional protesters from 
[named organisation] their input is no value as they are 
opposed to all roads. I have spoken at group meetings and 
relayed the feeling in my ward amongst some people that are 
opposed to it. But then there is the silent majority that does not 
protest and I must also speak for them. 
Another Labour councillor commented: 
I support this road for one reason only, they have linked it to 
the Burntwood Bypass, no BNRR, no Burntwood by-pass and 
we desperately need this by-pass. The group supports the road 
and I will support it in public on that basis. I have argued at 
public meetings for that position and tried to explain to those 
against it that this is the only way we get the by-pass. I can 
understand their feelings when you are faced with a six lane 
motorway thundering past you house, but if they don't like my 
actions on this thing they can vote me out. 
The reaction from councillors who supported the BNRR was sympathetic 
towards their colleagues that experienced pressure or opposition within 
their own wards or divisions. Conservative and Labour, county and district 
councillors recognised that a member had a local area to represent and that 
responsibility would on occasions involve conflict with a group position, 
particularly an issue on the scale of the BNRR. Representation however, 
could be conducted within the party group, and by acceptable methods 
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within council, such as the presentation of petitions. These, although much 
derided by many councillors as 'unrepresentative', were seen as an 
acceptable way by which a councillor could represent an area, without 
then having to publicly commit themselves to a campaign. As a Labour 
county councillor and committee chair, said: 
What [named councillor] did was clever, we all know he is 
against the road, he handed in this petition, some of us at the 
group meeting expressed an opinion that he had probably 
organised and collected it, but we didn't really know if he had. 
He had made his point, through the correct channels you might 
say, and that was that. If we found out he had organised and 
collected it then there would be trouble. 
Councillors of all parties were expected to act in an 'acceptable' fashion 
when representing those sections of the community that opposed their own 
group's position. Even minority groups expected their members to act 
cautiously and judiciously when handling opposition to the group's policy 
regarding the road. Acceptable opposition was that maintained within the 
party group, not spilling over into the public theatre of council, and 
particularly the press or public meetings. As a Labour group secretary and 
committee chair said of a fellow Labour councillor who had spoken at a 
public meeting against the road proposals: 
I just couldn't believe it, he stood up, in a meeting of 200 
people, and said he would do all he could to stop the road, he 
even gave out bundles of leaflets and petitions at the end of the 
meeting opposing the road for people to use. You cannot treat 
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the group in such a way, in my twenty years on this council I 
have never seen such disregard for group policy 
In one ward, two out of three Labour councillors, although aware of the 
depth of opposition amongst their own electorate to the proposal, 
supported the road in public meetings, the press and council, in deference 
to group policy. The third, whilst opposing the road, admitted to having 
made no public statements of opposition and had not pursued the matter in 
the group. As a result of group policy he had declined to speak against the 
proposals at the public inquiry, offering a conflict of interest as the cause. 
Conservative and Labour councillors in other wards and divisions directly 
affected by the BNRR, if opposed to it, concentrated their opposition at 
the group, and kept carefully worded press comment to a minimum up to 
and during the public inquiry. After the inquiry, and whilst awaiting the 
outcome, public protest noticeably declined, as it did amongst councillors, 
who used this respite to avoid the issue. The high profile opposition after 
the inquiry came mainly from Friends of the Earth. 
A CASE OF GROUP DISCIPLINE 
At the time of the study an incident of group disciplinary activity occurred 
which resulted in the withdrawal of the whip. A Labour county, district 
and parish councillor (councillor A) and an opponent of the relief road 
prior to his election to these bodies, was disciplined by his county and 
district groups. The proposed road would run through almost the entire 
length of the division he represented. Within his district ward, community 
opposition to the road existed, even though it was a distance from 
construction route. 
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Councillor A, used his election to the county council in 1993, as a platform 
to oppose the BNRR, despite a Labour group policy of support for it. He 
took the same approach on his election to the district council in 1994. A 
complicating factor was that councillor A used the parish council, on 
which there was no group whip, to criticise both the BNRR and the county 
and district councils support for it. These niceties notwithstanding, he was 
quoted variously in the press, as county, district or parish councillor. As a 
result of comments made, and questions asked at council meetings, the 
county and district Labour groups undertook disciplinary procedures. 
In December 1994 after 19 months of county membership and open, 
public campaigning against the relief road, a disciplinary meeting of the 
executive committees of the county Labour group and county Labour Party 
was convened by the chief whip. Although willing to tolerate this 
councillor's opposition to the road, in county council committee, it was a 
series of press reports of statements made at public meetings and at district 
and parish council meetings, that prompted the county whip to act. 
The meeting considered the councillor's statements, and a verbal 
submission made by him at the disciplinary hearing of his continued and 
public opposition to the Road. This meeting decided not to withdraw the 
whip and appreciated that divisional issues would need to be pursued by 
the local county councillor. He was advised to undertake his campaign in 
the same manner as a former Labour county councillor, defeated by a 
Residents Association candidate (and anti-road campaigner) in 1993: that 
was, to contain harsher criticism within the group and, if criticising the 
BNRR, to concentrate on the tolling issue, not to criticise the Labour 
controlled council or its position on the BNRR itself. As a result of such 
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assurances given by the member, it was agreed that no further disciplinary 
action would be taken. The chief whip commented: 
We didn't want to lose him from the group, but he must 
understand, the group is bigger than any one issue. We put up 
with it for a while because he was a new member but I had no 
alternative but to call a clause 10 [disciplinary] meeting, 
especially when the district are disciplining him as well. He has 
sort of behaved himself, spoken out against the BNRR in 
committee, and we were unhappy about that, but it was really 
the press coverage. Someone, let's just say, sources at the 
district council sent us the newspaper articles, because, being 
the county we don't see all the local papers, no I am not saying 
who sent it, but once we had been made aware of the way the 
BNRR and county were being criticised we had to act, which we 
did. But we did not withdraw the whip on assurances of better 
behaviour and a more sympathetic understanding of the group's 
position. We are sympathetic towards his position as local 
county councillor, we just want the same understanding. 
As far as the meeting was concerned we viewed his actions as a 
conscience matter and not deliberate action against group 
policy, but he was warned that any indiscretion along the same 
lines would leave us with no alternative but to withdraw the 
whip. It was a friendly warning really, there was nothing 
personal in the manner it was made, but we have to maintain 
group discipline 
The leader of the county council stated: 
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It was honours even I think, and he had a surprising amount of 
support amongst the county party executive members, and the 
group members present, I think they are quite open to his 
honesty and commitment on the BNRR. But this group is known 
for being a tight ship and you can't let these things run and run, 
otherwise people will start to think if he gets away with it so 
can I and that means anarchy. 
The district Labour group took a stricter interpretation of group discipline 
and procedure which involved a full meeting of the Labour group 
convened solely for that purpose, together with the district party executive 
committee. At that meeting, in November 1994, five incidents were 
presented as evidence of breach of standing orders, three involved 
councillor A asking questions at council and committee meetings, which 
opposed the relief road, and two concerned press reports of statements 
made by him at meetings of his parish council. At the meeting the chief 
whip proposed a motion for the indefinite withdrawal of the whip, an 
amendment was moved by a committee chair, that the whip be withdrawn 
for a period of six months. This was defeated after a vote, and the 
substantive motion then passed by the group. 
At an appeal meeting with members of the Labour Party regional executive 
committee, councillor A stated that although he had acted against group 
policy he had supported `national party policy'. The response he received 
from a member of the appeal panel was that 'it was group policy and 
standing orders that are important, not national policy and it was 
standing orders that had been broken'. However, the indefinite suspension 
was replaced by a nine-month period of withdrawal of the whip. Re- 
admission to the Labour group was to be after councillor A had re-signed a 
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commitment to abide by standing orders. If, after six months the group 
wished to re-instate the whip, they were able to do so; in this case they did 
not and the suspension ran the nine month period. The chief whip of the 
district Labour group is worth quoting at length on the issue: 
It was the most serious breach of discipline we had seen in this 
group, his actions were vexatious and frivolous and his whole 
intention was to embarrass the chairman of the committees at 
which he spoke against group policy. It does not matter if he is 
reported as a parish councillor or county councillor, you are 
not to speak against group policy. The catalogue of offences 
was incredible, going to the press, speaking at committee, and 
council, and I would add on no occasion did he come to the 
group and try to change our policy on the BNRR in the proper 
place, the group. No he just took public opportunities to attack 
the group and the BNRR and to embarrass our chairmen. 
There was no doubt his behaviour was not consistent with clause 8 
which is fundamental to group discipline and an aid to the well 
being of the group. 2 Loyalty to the group is one of the 
declarations made by all Labour councillors, including him, even 
before they are selected. The place to air our differences is at the 
Labour group not the floor of the committee or full council 
meetings where we only play hostage to fortune with our political 
enemies present. Our chairmen are elected by the group and we all 
must be respectful of that. If members are going to raise 
controversial questions to chairmen it must be at Labour group or 
2 Labour Party Rule Book, 13A. 8, `Action by Individual Members', p. 62. 
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well in advance of meetings so that appropriate answers can be 
proffered when the press and opposition and public are present. 
Members have rights under standing orders and if they are in 
doubt what so ever they should consult the leader, deputy leader or 
other officer of the group. 
I know I said this earlier, but what I, as chief whip, found as really 
offensive about his actions was the contempt for the group. He 
never once, tried to bring the issue to group, or to change our 
policy in group meetings. Such a short time on the council and the 
whip withdraw, it must be some sort of record, but shows his 
contempt for the proper group procedures. 
Councillor A commented in response: 
Not much to add to that really, yes, I did all that, but there was 
absolutely no point in raising the issue in the group, I know that 
group, I had been a district party observer for three years 
before becoming a councillor, they would not change their mind 
on the BNRR, no matter what I said and I had enough evidence 
against it. I represented my ward and they didn't like it. They 
withdraw the whip which really means that you can't go to the 
meetings to be told what to say and think, when you weren't 
doing it any way, a strange punishment. He's right I do hold the 
group in contempt, but that's only because they hold the public 
in contempt so they deserve it, besides I have no intention of 
standing for election to this lot again so they can do what they 
like. 
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The general consensus amongst councillors within the Labour group 
was reported by a councillor thus: 
The leadership were out to get him, and he gave them all the 
ammunition they wanted, most of us are sure he did it on 
purpose. But if he'd have come to the group, we could have 
done something I am sure, we could change the policy on this 
road, some of us don't agree with it. But he went against 
standing orders, quite a few of us -I didn't count on the night - 
voted for an amendment to withdraw the whip for six months, I 
mean he did it, we had all heard him and seen the articles, so 
we couldn't just forget about it. But once the amendment was 
lost, we had to vote for the substantive motion to withdraw the 
whip indefinitely, you can' just let that sort of thing go, there 
are right ways of fighting a corner you know. 
A committee chair, of whom councillor A had asked a question at council, 
the intention of which was to criticise the BNRR, commented at full 
council: 
Councillors of councillor [A's] ilk will always take the easy 
route and say what people want to hear, we have to make some 
unpopular decisions sometimes and stand by them. Councillor 
[A] just takes the easy way and gets in the press. It's not that 
easy you have to make decisions some people don't like 
The group had used the disciplinary procedures to draw in a recalcitrant 
councillor. Councillors finding themselves in opposition to the group, on 
an issue of importance to their electorate and themselves, are faced with a 
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clear choice of action. Take the issue and your position on it, to what is 
considered by many councillors as the proper theatre for decision, the 
group meeting, and argue a case. If however, the issue is lost at group, 
then any councillors becomes effectively bound by that decision which can 
then be used against him or her if they wished to continue public 
opposition. 
Councillors may decide not to take the issue to group in an attempt to 
obtain greater freedom of action, however, as this case indicates, 
councillors can equally be criticised for not using the group to raise an 
issue, particularly if the group already has a policy on it. Either way, the 
party group is a closed theatre, which expects councillors to both act 
within it as a deliberative and decision-making forum, and to be loyal to its 
decisions once made. Councillor's freedom of action is thus constrained by 
the group. 
CLOSED GROUP MEETINGS 
Decisions had been made in closed group meetings, taking advice only 
from officer sources (except in the case of North Warwickshire). 
Councillors, whether Labour or Conservative, in majority or minority 
groups thereafter abided in the vast majority of cases, by those decisions. 
Representation took place within the group, and at its most public through 
guarded press comments or reports of meetings. 
One of the most vociferous and vocal opponents of the road was a 
Residents Association county and district councillor. He had been elected 
on an anti-road platform and defeated, for his county seat, a sitting Labour 
395 
councillor, who, by the admission of the county Labour group deputy 
leader, had: 
Fought that road all the way, but he did it correctly, in group, 
so [named residents councillor] could say he was doing nothing 
about it and in fact supporting it. That wasn't true. He fought it 
tooth and nail in group, but quite rightly did not criticise the 
group policy in public. 
Thus a closed political environment had been created on this issue by party 
groups. Members of which voluntarily accepted that on this issue, as with 
many others identified during this research, opposition would take place 
within the group, and that group loyalty should not be compromised by 
acts of public representation. In such an environment, community action 
groups, national environmental groups and other organisations 
campaigning against the BNRR could not claim a priority over the group. 
It is to that community campaign and the relationship between 
representatives and represented that this case study now turns. 
THE COMMUNITY CAMPAIGN. 
Concentrating on those local authority areas which supported the 
construction of the BNRR, community protest consisted of three types of 
organisational input: community formed action groups, national 
environmental pressure groups and other institutions. Alongside this 
organised protest were individual reactions and protest made by people 
who were not members of any structured group. Action groups were 
formed along the 27 mile length of the route, with villages having their 
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own anti-road organisation. The opposition was not however unified with 
different groups either totally opposed to the BNRR, campaigning for 
amendments to the route, or for particular alternative routes. 
In some villages more than one BNRR-group existed. Shenstone for 
example, sported both SMAG and SMOG, the Shenstone Motorway 
Action Group, which campaigned for what was known as the Boosie 
route, designed by a local resident, and the Shenstone Motorway 
Opposition Group, which campaigned on a platform of total opposition to 
the BNRR. In some cases parish councils took a leading role against the 
road, in others they worked in conjunction with community action groups 
to oppose the road. The groundswell of public awareness and campaigning 
on this issue that developed over the period from June 1993 to 1996, 
continued. The full range of media coverage was used by individuals and 
organisations, and MPs and MEPs were contacted by campaigners. 
The BNRR also figured prominently in the 1996 Staffordshire South East 
by-election, in which each of the three main party's candidates responded 
to a request from the West Midlands Friends of the Earth for a statement 
of their position on the BNRR. Each candidate responded as opposed to 
the road. The victorious Labour candidate was the council leader, and 
former mayor of Tamworth Borough Council which, although the BNRR 
would not run through its boundaries, supported the construction. The 
campaign against the road was wide-ranging, extensive and well 
publicised and attracted the interest of national environmental groups. 
Friends of the Earth were instrumental in forming the 'Alliance Against the 
BNRR', an umbrella group representing organisations along the 27 mile 
route, which acted as a clearing house for protest and as a co-ordinator of 
action. 
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Councillors figured prominently as a focus for community activity, 
particularly those councillors who were members of a party groups which 
supported the motorway. Individual district and county councillors were 
contacted by national and local action groups for either support for the 
anti-BNRR cause or to pressurise those members who favoured its 
construction. One public meeting, organised by a parish council which 
opposed the BNRR, attracted an audience of 160 members of the public. 
Two of the three district councillors and the county councillor for the area 
were present, all were members of a party group which supported the 
BNRR. The three councillors spoke, two of whom presented a careful 
support for the road and the policy of their group, as well as their own 
personal arguments. A Labour district councillor stated at the meeting: 'the 
reality is this road is going to be built, it will come, we can't stop it so we 
must work to get the best for the village and that is what the council have 
tried to do'. Another stated: 
This road, whilst I admit causing problems will bring jobs and 
we need those jobs... you must take a wider view. This will re- 
generate the whole of the local economy... its going to be eight 
metres below ground level when it hits our village, they [the 
developers ] wanted five but the district council fought hard on 
your behalf and got them to go down to eight metres. 
In both cases those councillors were representing the party group's 
position to the electorate, rather than channelling the electorate's response 
back to the party group. 
At a public meeting in another, smaller village, which attracted 95 people 
the Conservative district councillor commented: 
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I know you do not want this road, but there are 90 or so here 
tonight from this village, I have to think of what is right for all 
those not present. The district council believe most strongly that 
this road will be a tremendous boon for this part of the county 
and I know you do not want it, but in the long run we will all 
benefit. The district council on which I am proud to be your 
representative has your interests at heart, knee jerk opposition 
is fine at the beginning but we are sure in the long term this 
road will pay off 
The Labour county councillor was more forthright in his deference to the 
policy of the party group and stated: 
Look speaking personally, and I must ask the press not to quote 
me on this, I am not really happy about the road, I share you 
concerns, I don't as you know live in this village, but where I do 
live we will certainly hear the road You must understand I can 
only do so much, I will happily hand in petitions, organise a 
deputation to the county council, but you must appreciate I can 
not shout against this road from the roof tops, it would be 
against policy of the Labour group and against standing orders, 
I am sure you understand that. 
A campaigner interviewed for this research commented of her councillors: 
[Named county councillor) is great, really supportive, he 
does 
anything to stop this road, do you know they kicked him off the 
council for it [meaning withdrew the group whip] I didn't think 
they could do that sort of thing, he was elected to represent us, 
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they can't kick him off for that, that's what they're all there for. 
We all wrote to the papers you know, telling them what we 
thought about it. Now [three named district councillors] are 
hopeless, [named councillor], actually supports it, thinks it will 
be great, I mean he lives here we just can't understand it. We 
had him to a meeting you know, told him what we thought of 
him. At least he came, you don't see the other two, till they 
knock on your door for a vote that is. 
The campaign along the route of the relief road varied depending on the 
area and groups concerned. It consisted of a high press and media profile, 
letter writing campaigns, petitions, leaflet drops, protest marches, lobbies 
of, and demonstrations outside, council meetings and deputations to 
ministers in London. The campaign galvanised a range of organisations 
from environmental campaigners to residents' associations and pony clubs, 
into a critical mass of protest, channelled at whichever representative or 
representative body seemed worth targeting. Amongst the 24 district 
councillors and six county councillors identified earlier, only two, one 
Labour and one Residents' Association, both of them parish, district and 
county councillors, took an active part in the community campaign against 
the BNRR. Their protest extended beyond representing local views in 
council to a full range of campaigning activity. 
Amongst the remaining councillors, those opposed to the road articulated 
that opposition within the party group and those who supported it found 
themselves opposed by a well organised and high profile public campaign. 
Not one councillor was identified as having changed their position 
from 
support to private opposition, or from that, to public opposition, as a result 
of the public pressure applied. Such pressure was then 
largely 
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unsuccessful in either changing the position of individual councillors or 
their party groups, or in tempting individual anti-BNRR councillors in any 
party to break cover from the group. There was but one instance of this, 
which resulted in the withdrawal of the Labour whip from a councillor, the 
resultant press coverage and letters to the local papers protesting at this 
disciplinary action, was used by both the councillor concerned and action 
groups to further protest against the road. 
The party groups were confronted not only by public pressure but also a 
weighty intellectual argument against the road, which consisted of 
independent and University-based research, from Britain and the United 
States, independent consultants and pollution experts, all of which 
undercut the arguments in support of the BNRR. Despite the public and 
intellectual campaign, the party groups remained unmoved, unresponsive 
to public pressure to change position, and defensive of their own position 
and arguments. 
A Labour district councillor and committee chair commented: 
All these protesters have their own cars and most of them drive 
to public meetings about the BNRR in them. The car has given a 
certain amount of freedom to people and people want to use 
them. The BNRR will relieve the A5 and M6 and make travel 
easier, that is why we support it. 
The public inquiry 
The public inquiry into the BNRR, under the government appointed 
Inspector, Si John Fitzpatrick, sat from 21 June 1994 to 3 October 1995, 
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and became the longest running public inquiry into a new road proposal of 
this nature. It heard objections from groups and individuals, and received 
technical evidence both in support and objection to the proposals. A 
consortium of local councils supporting the road were legally represented 
by a Barrister and shared the cost of this, half being met by Staffordshire 
County Council and other half by four district councils. 
An attempt was made by a county councillor to have the costs of legal 
representation for the opponents of the scheme also met by this 
consortium; as he commented at a meeting of the county council's special 
joint sub-committee: 
You are using council tax payers money to forward a scheme 
you support against the expressed wishes of thousands of those 
council tax payers. How can you juste not financially 
supporting the objectors by giving them their own money back 
for legal representation? 
The officers recommendation to this meeting which were accepted by the 
committee were: 
The decision of the county council to support the proposed 
BNRR now subject to the detailed matters of objection referred 
to, had been taken by elected members of the county council 
through the democratic process of this sub-committee, and the 
planning and highways committees. The representation of those 
views at the Inquiry is a reflection of that process and the 
expenditure of the council on officers' time, and the sharing of 
costs of a barrister, is a corollary. Having expressed a 
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democratically-taken view on the proposed BNRR, it would not 
then be appropriate for the county council also to expend its 
resources promoting at the Inquiry views which are not those 
which elected Members had resolved that the county council 
should express. 
It is not considered therefore that the request can be agreed. 3 
Introducing this report a council officer advised that it would be 
'democratically inconsistent, to agree to this request'. The councillor who 
had made the request, replied, 'I'll tell you what's democratically 
inconsistent, sticking two fingers up to all those people who want to stop 
this road. We should be representing them, that's what's democratically 
inconsistent'. 
Of the 24 district councillors and 6 county councillors representing the 
wards and divisions through which the road would run, only four spoke at 
the inquiry, the Residents' Association councillor and disciplined Labour 
councillor referred to above, and two Labour councillors from a minority 
district Labour group which opposed the BNRR. Other than the 
disciplined Labour councillor none of those councillors representing areas 
through which the road would run and who were members of party groups 
which supported the road, made a submission to the public inquiry. 
With the Inquiry closed, the Inspector's determination is not expected until 
1997. 
3 Report to Staffordshire County Council's highways and planning special 
joint sub-committee re: toll roads, 3 June 1994. 
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IMPLICATIONS 
An examination of the relationship between the councillors, party groups, 
individuals and organisations involved in this case study demonstrates the 
closed nature of the political environment created by the demands of 
loyalty made by party groups on councillors. That closed political 
environment is conducive to the 'policy broadening' effect of the group 
system and antithetical to a more representational and responsive 
orientation. Councillors identified as adopting a 'policy orientation' may be 
more the product of the group approach to representation that 'broadens' 
the representative horizon, than any innate preference amongst some 
councillors for 'policy' issues. The group system and its processes, 
including its ability to discipline members as necessary, and to secure their 
loyalty without recourse to disciplinary mechanisms, is a key element in 
diverting councillors' attention away from their local electorate. 
Generalising from this case study, when confronted with a major issue, 
which impinged not only on a single electoral area but on a number of 
areas, and crossed a number of local authority boundaries, the group 
system displayed common characteristics, whatever the political control. 
Councillors who opposed the BNRR but were members of groups which 
supported the construction, irrespective of political affiliation and with one 
exception, restricted the nature of their opposition and confined its conduct 
to the closed theatre of the party group. 
That a single councillor in this case chose to act against the group and in 
public was exceptional, and underlines the fact that for other members the 
proper course of action was not to oppose group policy in public. Even 
when faced with an issue of the scale of physical, economic, 
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environmental and social impact as the BNRR, the political and party 
political process and conflicts involved outweighed public awareness and 
concern. Councillors remained loyal to the group. At the same time 
however, the possibility of dissent being tolerated by the group, is the 
greater, provided it is 'properly' expressed, that is by the use of the group 
as a deliberative and decision-making theatre, and the avoidance by 
councillors of public acts of opposition to its position. When acts are 
undertaken by councillors, these must be of a nature 'acceptable' to the 
group. 
The BNRR case study demonstrates the ability of the group to stand firm 
on a decision or policy that attracts considerable public opposition, and to 
maintain that position throughout a protracted time period. The group 
system strengthens councillors' abilities to make and maintain unpopular 
decisions and to deflect, rather than reflect public opinion. The nature, 
scope and impact of that issue makes little difference to this ability. 
Although the BNRR was the most important local issue for many of those 
involved in the public campaign against the scheme, and in many cases 
was their first, and only, experience of such campaigning, for the 
councillor it would not be the only issue with which they were involved. 
The councillor would still be engaged in a range of decision-making 
processes within group, committee and council and wider public theatres 
of representation on a range of other issues. The party group, and the 
associated council committee structure generalises councillors' interest, 
whereas the interests of the electorate are more specific and focused 






This thesis began by setting out the tension inherent in local representative 
democracy, that between the electorate and the councillor and his or her 
party. That tension is integral to a system of local representative 
government, designed as it is to allow the electorate to select their 
representatives but at the same time allow those representatives to govern 
the locality. The existence of coherent groupings of councillors, elected 
through the use of some political agency increases the tension between 
councillor and electorate. Political groupings of one sort or another have 
long been a feature of British local government. What has varied over time 
and place has been the extent to which such groupings have acted as 
unified and disciplined blocs of councillors for the conduct of council 
affairs. The existence of party politics is not a new phenomenon in British 
local government. But the prominence of the national party label, and its 
use both to secure election and to operate as an identifiable party on any 
council, has heightened public awareness of the incursion of party politics 
into what was once the pursuit of a restricted social elite. 
Chapters 1 and 2 of the thesis examined how the party system developed 
in local government and showed how the councillor is now confronted 
with not only a loyalty-demanding group, but equally with an electorate 
growing in confidence and assertiveness. The concept of `event driven 
democracy' was introduced to explain how specific local issues can 
stimulate the electorate to protest a council decision and thus articulate a 
demand that the councillor 'represent' that view to the council. The 
councillor is faced with a crisis of representation, when the opinions of 
the group and the electorate collide, and when both demand that the 
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councillor 'represent' their views to the other. He or she must balance these 
demands and give greater weight to one or either of the protagonists. 
Chapter 3 examined how councillors' attitudes towards democracy assist 
the group in interposing itself between the councillor and the electorate. 
For this purpose a number of questions were specifically formulated 
together with a number reproduced from the research conducted for the 
Widdicombe committee. A representative index was constructed from 
councillors' responses to these questions. The responses were scored on a 
positive and a negative index to produce a representative score which 
enabled councillors' attachment to electorate and party to be assessed. By 
examining councillors' responses through the filter of party affiliation, it 
was found that not only did councillors of different party background 
respond differently to different aspects of representation, but that some 
remarkably similar attitudes are also to be found across the political 
spectrum. 
Chapter 4 looked at the various open and public theatres of representation 
in which councillors could perform the representative acts of speaking or 
voting. Councillors were asked for their responses to a series of questions 
testing their likely action (speaking or voting) when faced with a crisis of 
representation (where party group and electorate collide over a local 
issue). Councillors were presented with a range of theatres in which to act 
and with issues located within their own ward or division and outside of it. 
Thus they were given the opportunity to reveal the pattern of their 
attachment to their own electoral area and their party group. 
Chapter 5 considered the exercise of councillors' representative 
discretion 
in the closed and private theatres of representation: the party group, the 
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local party and 'other private meetings'. As with chapter 4, councillors 
were presented with a question which located a crisis of representation 
both inside and outside the areas they represented, and were asked how 
likely they were to speak or vote against the group in those closed 
theatres. Again, a differentiated pattern of behaviour emerged with the 
party group being the theatre in which councillors were most likely to act, 
and with speaking a more likely act than voting. Councillors were less 
likely to act as the theatre of representation moved away from the party 
group and into gradually more open settings. 
This chapter also compared the likelihood of councillors acting against the 
group in open and closed theatres, and again different patterns of 
behaviour were apparent across the political spectrum. But while party 
affiliation emerged as a predictor of the likely outcome of the use by 
councillors of their representative discretion, it makes less difference to 
representative acts than might be expected. The only clear party difference 
was the more dramatic decline in likelihood of the Labour councillor 
acting against the group in open as opposed to closed theatres when 
compared with Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. The same 
differentiated behaviour pattern as between open and closed theatres, and 
between speaking and voting, applied to Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat councillors, only to a lesser degree than their Labour 
counterparts. 
Chapter 6 considered the actual behaviour of those councillors who had 
acted against the group in any theatre of representation, as opposed to 
hypothetical acts considered in the earlier chapters. It was clear that the 
Labour councillors focused to a greater degree than Conservatives or 
Liberal Democrats on the group as a legitimate recipient of their 
loyalty. 
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Again, intensity of attachment to the group was the distinguishing feature 
between councillors of different parties, for not just Labour councillors but 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat councillors also see the group as a 
legitimate theatre for representation, the place within which they are most 
likely to act in a crisis of representation. Equally, they see it as a body to 
which the councillor owes his or her loyalty, and are prepared to give that 
loyalty. This chapter considered the reasons why councillors view the 
group in the way that they do. It discussed a number of loyalty-generating 
factors that were both shared across the political spectrum and also distinct 
to particular parties, what might be called the ideological or 
predispositional elements of councillor loyalty to the group. 
The case studies set out in chapters 7,8 and 9 considered actual crises of 
representation, along with the acts undertaken by councillors, the group 
and the community, in such crises. The case studies provided examples of 
how councillors acted and where they acted as representatives. The group 
was clearly an important theatre for the councillor to use in these crisis 
situations. Councillors' behaviour was to use the group for the purposes of 
deliberation on the issue and to ensure that deliberation and associated 
decision-making was restricted to the group. Although public acts were 
undertaken, by and large they were to support the group position and not 
to indulge in public speculation as to how the issue could progress. In only 
one of the case studies did a councillor go as far as to rebel in public. 
Acting against the group in public was clearly an unusual act for 
councillors. Its hypothetical possibility often seen by councillors as a 
pathological act against the rightful recipient of loyalty, the party group. 
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The party group and local government 
In a comprehensive review of literature representative of the 'orthodox 
view' of local government, Dearlove noted that 'the local electorate, the 
councillors and the officers', are seen as the key participants in local 
democracy. Indeed local decisions are made through the electorate's input 
of votes, which councillors, via officers, transform into 'popular public 
policies'. As Dearlove points out, the success of a local democracy 
constructed around the electors' input of votes depends not only on those 
votes, but also on the closeness of the relationship between councillors and 
the electorate. 1 If the relationship is disrupted by a party group making a 
prior claim on the councillor's loyalty through the mechanism of party (a 
claim to which, as we have seen, councillors are by and large happy to 
respond), then the group itself also becomes a powerful key participant in 
local democracy, if one scarcely recognised as such. 
This thesis has shown that the conditions for the party group developing 
this status and for the widespread development of a party group system in 
local government, have long existed. Certainly, these conditions pre-date 
the formation of the Labour party, despite which it has been held 
responsible, at least by its political opponents, for the introduction of party 
politics into local government. On the contrary, the party politicisation of 
local government is not a result of the introduction of working-class 
1 J. Dearlove, The Reorganisation of British Local Government: Old 
Orthodoxies and a Political Perspective, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1979, pp. 29-30. A similar model of the aggregation of 
political demands by parties into policies and the 'engagement' between 
councillors and officials which transforms those policies into 'outputs' was 
presented by A. Mabileau, G. Moyser, G. Parry, P. Quantin, Local Politics 
and Participation in Britain and France, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1989, p. 170. 
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political practices, solidarity or structures from the trade union movement, 
into an otherwise non-party political local democracy conducted by 'social 
leaders' of one type or another. Groupings on local councils, bearing a 
variety of labels from those of national parties, disguised versions of those 
parties, other political organisations, and indeed even of 'purely local 
parties' or organisations, have long existed. Party groups, to varying 
degrees across time and location, have equally sought to encourage, 
persuade, cajole or bully councillors, with differing degrees of success, 
into acting in a broadly cohesive fashion, or into following a particular 
leadership. The question this thesis addressed was this: what exactly has 
the party group and group system done to the processes of local 
representation? 
The party group and the councillor as a local representative 
Rao noted the importance to representative systems of (i) responsiveness 
of the representative, (ii) the impact of locality on the councillor's roles and 
(iii) the representative linkages at the individual level. 2 This thesis has 
examined the strength and nature of representative linkages at the local 
level and found the party group acting as a filter of the representative 
processes (and linkages) as they relate to local issues and events of 
importance to the electorate. 
In order to meet the representative expectations and demands of the 
electorate councillors are required to channel the electorate's views to the 
council, thus adding representative 'voice' to their concerns. Indeed, more 
actively, they may be expected to support the position of the electorate 
against the council and party group. However, the party group will, to 
2 Rao, The Making and Unmaking of Local Se f Government, p. 200. 
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varying degrees across party and place, require the councillor to be loyal 
to its decisions; where a crisis of representation arises, the councillor's 
ultimate loyalty is expected to rest with the group. 
In any one crisis of representation councillors must use the discretion 
attached to their office to decide whether their loyalty will be granted to 
either their electorate or their group, if an acceptable compromise cannot 
be found. Equally, the councillor must decide which representative act - 
speaking or voting - they will perform and the range of theatres, from the 
open and public to the closed and private, in which they will act. The use 
of that discretion and the choice of theatre and act indicates how far the 
councillor is prepared to represent the electorate to the group and pursue 
the local interest. 
The crisis point for local representation comes when the electorate require 
their councillor to act in public as their representative in those places 
where they perceive it matters, in the council or committee or some other 
public theatre of representation. It is precisely at that stage that councillors 
may be reluctant to transfer their representative activity to a public theatre 
from the closed party group. The public may view this failure to act in 
public as an act of betrayal, or as a sign that over-strict party discipline 
constrains the councillor's action. The councillor on the other hand will 
see the group - and not the more public theatres of representation - as the 
real point of decision-making. Any action that is transferred to open 
theatres may thus be no more than a symbolic indication of the councillor's 
recognition of the claims of their local electoral area rather than a genuine 
attempt to alter a decision. Indeed, the group may collude with the 
councillor in this misrepresentation of representation and permit its 
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members to voice, if not vote on, some local issue or other in a 
demonstrative fashion. 
The importance of the party group within the processes of local democracy 
and its influence on the activity of the councillor as a representative of an 
electoral area is not specific to any one party. An expectation of loyalty to 
the group exists for all councillors, whether Labour, Liberal Democrat or 
Conservative. As the research for this thesis has indicated, councillors of 
all parties are willing to grant it that allegiance. In all parties the option for 
public dissent from group decisions on a local issue and for the councillor 
to publicly 'represent' the local electorate exists. Yet most councillors do 
not choose this route, preferring to take the electorate's views to the closed 
group meeting rather than the open council meeting. 
The sources of loyalty 
Although Labour councillors display the greatest propensity for group 
loyalty in a crisis of representation, both Conservative and Liberal 
Democrats also see public disagreement with the group as something to be 
avoided. Equally, examples of a willingness to act against the group and in 
support of the electorate are to found amongst all councillors, irrespective 
of party. However, the validity of that act and the likelihood of its success 
is also influenced by the stance taken by the party group. Loyalty to the 
group is an important factor for all councillors when assessing crises of 
representation and considering the use of the discretion attached to their 
office to act in such situations. 
The reason for councillor loyalty to the group is only in part a reflection of 
the firmness (or flexibility) of a party (or group's) approach to group 
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discipline, and the group's willingness to 'punish' any councillor who 
publicly dissents. Councillors make it clear that their loyalty to the group is 
only in small part a result of group disciplinary mechanisms. Although a 
certain amount of enforced loyalty through 'fear' of punishment appears to 
be present, it is by no means the only source of councillor loyalty to the 
group. Loyalty to the party group arises at least as much from a 
councillor's own predisposition towards democracy and their own political 
philosophy. 
Councillors enter into a four-part `contract of loyalty' with the group. 
First, there exists an element of loyalty that is born of a genuine fear of the 
consequences of dissent, in terms of the disciplinary processes and their 
possible outcome. This factor should not be overstated for it is clear from 
interviews with councillors that although the word `fear' is used, it 
indicates more an intense sense of unease at the unknown element of the 
disciplinary processes and its outcome. In addition, there is an 
unwillingness to be seen as in some way having failed the group and party, 
and to have done so in public. Councillors use the discretion attached to 
their office with a careful eye to the anticipated reactions of their group 
alongside an understanding of how far it will tolerate public dissent and 
the nature of that dissent. Generally councillors expressed considerable 
reluctance to expose themselves to group discipline, some because they 
felt it as a block to progression to committee chair, most however because 
of the uncertainty, personal disquiet and feeling of embarrassment, 
isolation and failure such processes would bring. As one Labour councillor 
commented: 
Look, I don't want to be disciplined by the group for much the 
same reasons as I don't want to be a in a disciplinary situation 
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at work, its just not a pleasant thing and you are highlighted as 
having done something wrong. Guilty before proven innocent if 
you like. 
Secondly, the contract of loyalty involves a psychological element in 
which councillors feel predisposed to support their party colleagues, 
particularly against a opposing party. Group loyalty is often the result of 
general agreement on principles and policy. Any public disagreement, even 
on a matter specific to the councillor's electoral area, is at best disloyal to 
the party's programme and ideology, and at worst a betrayal of both the 
group and the individual's own beliefs that sustain their membership of a 
party. Put simply, councillors just do not like going against their party 
because they more often than not agree with it. Public dissent raises the 
question of the councillor's relationship with an organisation that is a 
prominent part of their daily lives. 
Thirdly, the councillor's contract of loyalty might also contain a real 
contractual agreement and be seen as such by both the individual 
councillor and his or her party colleagues. This is more 'real' for the 
Labour councillor and such a contract is an important part of the party's 
rules. All nominees to Labour's local panels of prospective candidates 
must 'undertake, if elected, to accept and act in harmony with the standing 
orders of the appropriate Labour group'. 3 No similar conditions exist for 
the Conservative and Liberal Democrat councillor, but the acceptance of 
candidacy and election as a councillor implies an expectation of support 
for the party which makes public acts of rebellion seem disloyal, and this 
implicit contract may be no less real for councillors of these parties. 
3 Labour Party Rule Book, section 5.5A. 3 (c), 1995, p. 29. 
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Finally, the group is seen by many councillors as a team, a family, or at 
least a tight-knit group of colleagues to whom the same attachment is 
given to as would be given to the family. That the group is to be protected 
against 'outsiders' or opponents, that any disagreements must not be 
publicly displayed and that above all else and whether right or wrong the 
`family' that is the group is generally supported even when internal 
disagreements exist. As one Conservative councillor commented, 'we all 
have our disagreements and spats, but I would always support my fellow 
Conservatives against the Socialists. Our very worst member is infinitely 
preferable to their very best'. The basis of the contract, then, is one of 
reciprocity and mutual support. 
Differences in political philosophy 
Councillors' attitudes towards representation and democracy result in their 
being receptive to demands for their loyalty being made by sources other 
than the electorate. Indeed, for the Labour councillor the party represents 
such an alternative focus, more so than for either the Conservative or 
Liberal Democrat councillor. The Labour councillor often adopts a 
collectivist approach to political representation which reflects a political 
philosophy based on collective provision. Moreover the Labour councillor 
expresses a predisposition toward 'party' as a decision-making body and as 
a focus for representation based on an interpretation of democracy as rule 
by the majority. This majoritarian approach can, and indeed does, de- 
localise local issues. 
The Conservative councillor reflects a preference for representative 
freedom from both the party and the electorate, and whilst expressing 
loyalty to both, prefers pressure from neither. The Conservative maintains 
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that the office of councillor should allow the individual councillor freedom 
to represent in whatever way they decide is most appropriate. Adherence 
to a philosophy based on individual freedom and responsibility enables the 
Conservative councillor to reconcile the seemingly conflicting beliefs of 
freedom and discipline, or respect for authoritative sources. It is this 
reconciliation that leads the Conservative councillor to prefer a degree of 
distance between themselves and both the group and the electorate. Thus 
although recognising the importance of locality the Conservative does not 
see his or herself as a delegate of that area, more a trustee of its best 
interests, which it is the councillor's task to decide. If the best interests of 
the locality are congruent with those of the party group, so much the 
better. 
The Liberal Democrat councillor reflects both an individualistic, but also a 
communitarian orientation to political representation. The distinction 
between the Liberal Democrats and their Labour and Conservative 
counterparts is based on how community is a cumulation of individual 
needs rather than a collective general good. Individuals form a community 
and that community is not greater than the sum of its parts. Community 
representation means the Liberal Democrat working with individuals who 
are part of a campaign or some common purpose, but that purpose is 
defined by individual activity. The Liberal Democrats have an affinity with 
the Burkean concept of representation, because they see themselves as 
individuals who are part of a team, not just as a team. They require the 
same right to disengage from a community activity as to engage in it, and 
see the group in the same light as something which requires loyalty, until 
such time as that loyalty is inconvenient. 
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Liberal Democrats do not slavishly reflect every community reaction from 
their ward or division, with their Labour and Conservative counterparts, 
they reject the idea that they are a delegate of the community. Equally they 
recognise that collective and cohesive action by both the community and 
their group is the key to political success. As a Liberal Democrat borough 
councillor stated: 
I feel I must draw in as much information and opinion from my 
colleagues [Liberal Democrat councillors] and from the people 
I represent when the sort of occurrence you describe happens. 
There are some things I would not do, like pander to racism, but 
many community campaigns do not have a party political 
element although of course they are political. I like the Liberal 
Democrats, I am at home here and I would do all I could to 
ensure I stayed in step with the group, or for that matter them 
with me. I take the same attitude to community campaigns, keep 
them in step with Liberal Democracy and that way the group 
and community do not clash. If they do, then circumstances 
must decide which way you jump, but at least you can jump. 
Does the difference in approach between councillors of the different 
parties result in Conservatives and Liberal Democrats being more 
responsive to local issues than the Labour councillor? The evidence from 
this research suggests that, despite political and philosophical differences 
toward democracy, this is not the case. The greater room for representative 
manoeuvre created for the Conservative and Liberal Democrat by their 
own expectations of a greater freedom for party group enables them still to 
focus on the party group when a crisis of representation occurs. 
The 
difference is that the Labour councillor will openly expound the virtues of 
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loyalty to the group as a proper functioning of the democratic processes, 
whereas Conservatives and Liberal Democrats come to focus on the group 
from a different intellectual journey. It is their perceived freedom from 
party that simply enables them to accept, and offer to the group, their 
loyalty. 
The group and the electorate 
Why is it that party group looms larger in councillors' frame of reference 
than the electorate, even that within their own ward or division? Part of the 
answer is provided by considering councillors' attitudes toward the 
electorate's interest in, and motivations for action around, certain 
important local issues. Across the party spectrum, councillors expressed a 
broadly similar sceptical attitude toward the electorate as only interested in 
issues that affect them. The electorate are thus seen by councillors 
primarily as self-interested, short term and adhering to a `Not In My Back 
Yard' perspective which fails to take account of the broader governmental 
needs of the authority as a whole. Councillors were as sceptical of the 
ways in which electors expressed their opinions as they were of the 
motivation for those opinions; both are viewed by their representatives 
with considerable suspicion. 
In contrast, the group is able to prove itself worthy of a councillor's loyalty 
through offering a process of democratic debate, by enabling the councillor 
to contribute to that debate (and to articulate any concerns emanating from 
their ward or division) and through the acceptance, by the majority of 
councillors, of the majority rule principle. Added to this is the view of the 
office of councillor as 'free agent' or 'trustee' within a Burkean approach 
to 
representation which is reflective of the representative's right to use 
his or 
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her own judgement on any issue. A corollary of this approach is that the 
representative is also free to focus attention and loyalty wherever they 
think appropriate: most councillors select the group as such a focus. This 
process is made all the more easier for the councillor if their attitude to 
representation is such that the party is a legitimate focus of representation, 
or if the councillor feels he or she should be free to judge issues on their 
own merits, without the assistance of the electorate's opinions. 
The group and local representative democracy: control or opposition? 
Across the political spectrum, the party group is a common element of 
councillors' experiences of local representative democracy. Irrespective of 
political affiliation, the Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democrat 
councillor will be a member of a party group and will find themselves 
confronted by a cohesive block of councillors organised for the purpose of 
either governing a council or providing an opposition group. Equally, 
councillors will be part of a group which forms a majority or minority on a 
council, or indeed part of a shared administration. The councillor's 
membership of either a majority or minority group makes little difference 
to expectations of group loyalty and to the willingness of councillors to 
subordinate the wishes of their electorate to the decisions of their party 
group. 
The overriding concern for many councillors is that the group should not 
appear disunited in public and that political opponents should not be 
provided with opportunities to embarrass the party group, irrespective of 
whether that issue is a major policy or a ward-based locational issue. 
Control of a council does not necessarily bring heightened expectations of 
loyalty; but it may magnify the consequences for the councillor of public 
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dissent. In interviews, councillors across the political spectrum emphasised 
their loyalty to the group as something uninfluenced by minority or 
majority status. Although a majority group in control of a council is more 
likely to be the target of protest, minority group councillors are not 
immune to public criticism of their position on an issue, particularly if 
minority councillors represent a specific ward within which an event is 
located. 
The case studies indicate that when faced with public opposition to a 
group decision, councillors will not only generally support the group 
against the community but also seek to discredit any community group as 
`politically motivated'. That implies that protest groups are organised, 
controlled and run for the benefit of supporters of another party. 
Discrediting a message by discrediting the messenger is a tactic that 
councillors are willing to undertake to protect the party group. Councillors 
often interpret local issues from a party political perspective, and by 
identifying community protest with party political opposition they can 
justify their own position and that of the group. Thus, no community 
protest can be totally free from an accusation of being a political front 
organisation, or a body created in direct opposition to the strongly held 
beliefs and assumptions of the majority party. 
The consequences for local democracy 
All councillors recognise that the success of their own political values and 
policies requires a degree of organisation and cohesion amongst their party 
colleagues. The group system provides just such organisation and 
cohesion. As a result, councillors accept that the discretion attaching to 
their office is in practice fettered by the decisions of the group. To these 
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they are expected, by and large, to adhere. They do not, however, allow 
their electorate to fetter their discretion to an equal degree 
It is a shortcoming of the existing scholarly literature on local political life 
that these matters have received so little attention. Councillor role analysis 
may indicate the orientation of the councillor toward policy or 
representational issues but it does not explain the impact on the 
representative relationship - between the councillor and his or her 
electorate - of the organisation and activities of the party group. Nor does 
it explain the importance the group assumes for the councillor within local 
representative democracy. 
What, in contrast, this research shows is that the group, operating within 
an adversarial political system at the local level, is able to capitalise on 
councillor's party loyalty, and to ensure that it is maintained when the 
councillor is faced with an issue of importance to his or her ward or 
division. The group does not necessarily need to resort to disciplinary 
mechanisms to ensure that loyalty and, throughout the research, such 
disciplinary action as was identified was seen to be far removed from the 
normal processes of representation that result in group cohesion. 
Councillors instead employ considerable degrees of self-discipline, which 
comes from their inherent acceptance of the group as both a theatre for, 
and their principal focus of, loyalty. 
Whether the councillor can be categorised as Corma suggests as a party 
politician, ideologist, partyist, associate or politco-administrator, all 
councillors operate within a group system. 
4 Thus, whatever the 
4 Corina, `Elected Representatives in a Party System: A Typology'. 
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councillor's strength of attachment to party group, as either an ideological 
body, or simply as an organisation designed to ensure that decisions are 
made, he or she will in practice support the party group's decisions. 
Equally, the party group is the coherent and organised body that any 
categorisation of councillor must work within. Whatever the councillor's 
motivations, group loyalty can ensure the success of any objective only if 
all councillors operate through, and adhere by, the decisions of the group 
processes. All councillors then, have something to gain from group loyalty 
irrespective of motivation or political affiliation, and equally have much to 
lose from their own, or their colleagues', public dissent from the group. So 
self-discipline and restraint are powerful weapons in the group's 
disciplinary armoury and far more effective than more mechanistic 
approaches to securing group loyalty. 
Individual discretion to undertake acts of representation in opposition to 
the group and in support of the position of the electorate on any important 
local issue is open to any representative. That they are not predisposed to 
undertake them and that they are more likely to attempt to solve any crisis 
of representation by a means that does not involve their public 
disagreement with the group (and particularly avoids them having to vote 
against the group), has important implications for local representative 
democracy. It is the party group that benefits from the councillor's use of 
representative discretion at the expense of the electorate. As a result, local 
opinion on a specific issue is likely to be frustrated by a system In which 
the party group is the most influential component. In time, councillors may 
come to be seen as less and less the representatives of a community and 
more and more as the representatives of a very specific part of the 
local 
political party, the party group. The stage is set for an increasing alienation 
of the community from its own representatives. 
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Tocqueville commented that 'the strength of free peoples resides in the 
local community. Local institutions are to liberty what primary schools are 
to science; they put it within the people's reach'. 5 This work demonstrates 
that while the development of British local representative democracy 
encourages the organisation of councillors into effective blocs, the party 
group - as a coherent body - has gradually put local representation out of 
the reach of the people and into its own grip. Only the growing efficacy 
and assertiveness of the local electorate offers any hope of reclaiming local 
representation back from the group and placing it truly 'within the reach of 
the people'. 




The research methods used for this thesis comprised a review of the 
relevant literature, quantitative analysis of research data collected by 
postal questionnaire (appendix 2), in-depth interviews, participant 
observation and the construction of three case studies. 
The survey 
The questionnaire designed for this study is attached as appendix 2. The 
survey was conducted between May 1994 and December 1994. It was 
circulated to the entire council membership of 20 local authorities. 
Although the main survey area was the West Midlands the questionnaire 
was also circulated to members of Buckinghamshire County Council, and 
a number of Buckinghamshire district councils to ensure an acceptable 
number of Conservative councillors were contacted. 
A total of 1067 questionnaires were circulated and 629 were returned, and 
usable for data analysis, giving a response rate of 58.9 per cent. This rate 
compares with the national surveys of councillors conducted in 1985 and 
1993, which obtained around 60 per cent. Excluding the non-party 
councillors from the total received resulted in 548 questionnaire returns 
from party-affiliated councillors, and it is this sub-group who mainly 
appear in the analysis in chapters 3-6. 
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The questionnaire was based on re-use of questions from the Widdicombe 
committee research, with additional questions specifically designed for this 
study. The new questions focused on the relationship between the 
councillor, the electorate and the group. The tables generated by the data 
obtained from the questionnaire are included within the relevant chapters 
of the thesis and the presentation of this data has been elaborated with 
interview and case study material as appropriate. 
Interviews 
A total of 37 interviews were conducted with those councillors, mainly 
though not exclusively, from the West Midlands area, who had responded 
to the postal survey. Direct approaches were also made to councillors who 
had not returned the questionnaire. The main criterion for selection of the 
interview sample was that the councillors should be members of either the 
Conservative, Labour or Liberal Democrat parties. The interview sample 
consisted of seven Liberal Democrats, 13 Conservatives and 17 Labour 
councillors and a Conservative metropolitan group political assistant. 
The majority of interviews were conducted between September 1994 and 
December 1995. However, councillors were also interviewed throughout 
1996 as and when necessary. Interviews were unstructured in nature, but 
supported by appropriate probing questions. On average, interviews lasted 
about an hour. An unstructured approach allowed for a wide-ranging 
consideration of the party group and the collection of many examples of 
how councillors acted within a party group system. Councillors were 
informed prior to interview that the area of concern for this research was 
the organisation and activities of the party group and group system, and 
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their relationship with their own group. The choice of the interview sub- 
group was designed to ensure that councillors from each of the three 
parties, sitting on county, district and metropolitan authorities, were 
interviewed. The selection was also designed to ensure that council 
leaders, committee chairs and whips were included within the interview 
group. In the event of refusal, non-attendance at appointments, or 
difficulties in finding mutually convenient dates, approaches were made to 
other councillors to fill the interview quota. 
When specific instances of councillor activity or issue occurrence were 
given in interviews, attempts were made to contact the other councillors 
mentioned to provide another interpretation of those events. Telephone 
interviews were also conducted with the Conservative local government 
officer at Central Office and a senior officer of the Association of Liberal 
Democrat Councillors. 
Participant observation 
At the time of conducting the research for this thesis the author was both a 
Labour district and county councillor, as well as having served a term of 
office as a London borough councillor before moving to Staffordshire. As 
a serving member of two Labour groups the author was able to observe the 
councillor in his or her natural habitat, the party group. Attending group 
meetings, observing councillors in action and listening to the 
debates 
concerning local issues and decisions, provided both a wealth of 
elaborative material and an opportunity to compare councillor's activity 
in 
the group setting to their more public activity in open theatres of 
representation. Important to my participant-as-observer role was that as a 
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Labour party member of 20 years standing I had legitimately sought 
selection and election through the party, as both a London borough 
councillor and now as a county and district councillor. The decision to 
become involved in local politics was on my part both a personal and 
political one, it was not made to forward a research degree, and indeed I 
had served a term of office as a councillor before undertaking this 
research. I was thus a legitimate member of the groups concerned. 
The role adopted by the researcher exists on a continuum ranging from the 
complete participant to the complete observer, encompassing the 
participant-as-observer and the observer-as-participant. ' My position for 
this work was that of participant-as-observer within two Labour groups. 
The situation was complicated however by the fact that some of the 
councillors with whom I had a closer relationship than others were aware 
both of my research and its subject matter; others were aware that I was 
conducting a research project, but not its subject; whilst others with whom 
I had no, or minimal contact outside of the council, were unaware of my 
research. The knowledge of my research was more wide-spread amongst 
my district council colleagues than members of the county Labour group. 
The problem identified by Gold of the researcher interacting with the study 
group as an ordinary friend j eopardising' field roles did not occur as I was 
indeed already an ordinary friend to some members of the group and 
1R. L. Gold, 'Roles in Sociological Field Observations', in G. McCall and 
J. Simmons (editors), Issues in Participant Observation: A Text and 
Reader, Reading, Mass, Addison-Wesley, 1969, pp. 30-38. Gold also 
refers to B. Junker, 'Some Suggestions for the Design of Field Work 
Learning Experiences', in E. Hughes et al (editors), Cases on Field Work, 
University of Chicago, 1952, Part 111-A. 
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acknowledged this fact within the research process. With other councillors 
I was barely on speaking terms; with others merely cordial. 2 The risk of 
familiarity influencing the research was avoided as the familiarity I had 
with party groups enabled me to hold the group up to critical analysis 
rather than over sympathise with it and its position within the democratic 
processes. 3 Indeed, I had already accepted the setting and its behavioural 
norms before entering the party groups rather than being influenced by 
them after entry. My not being a 'stranger' to the party group facilitated 
close observation and understanding of the minutia of group activity, and 
both its meaning to councillors and its impact on the electorate. 4 
Did my role as a participant-observer within the two Labour groups 
provide me with 'unsought opportunities to influence' the behaviour of the 
councillors I was observing? Did my presence either reinforce or weaken 
the convictions of other councillors, or in any way influence their actions 
and reactions within the Labour Group? 5 My approach within group 
meetings was to observe and note comments and actions by councillors as 
they acted and reacted to issues before the group meeting. As a legitimate 
member of the group I was entitled to fully participate in the group 
deliberation on any issue. As with most councillors, some issues were of 
more interest and concern to me than others; I had no problem in 
contributing to any debate in a way that reflected self as a councillor rather 
2 Gold, `Roles in Sociological Field Research', p. 35. 
3 See, R. Burgess, In the Field: An Introduction to Field Research, 
London, George Allen and Unwin, 1985, pp. 21-25. 
4 Ibid, pp. 23-24 
5 See, H. W. Riecken, 'The Unidentified Interviewer' in McCall and 
Simmons (editors), Issues in Participant Observation, pp. 39-45. 
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than self as a researcher. Indeed, with an eye to re-election and 
progression within the group it would have been difficult to do anything 
other than act as a councillor. 
The influence I had on my group colleagues was as a councillor not an 
observer. The group meetings I attended were conducted no differently to 
how they would had I not been a member of the group. Any matters raised 
by myself were only raised because I had a legitimate councillor interest in 
them. Equally, I would be disappointed if after 4 years membership of the 
county council and 3 years membership of the district council Labour 
group, my presence had no influence on those groups. Of course my 
presence influenced the groups and their processes and activities, but that 
influence was through me as a councillor and legitimate member of the 
group. Indeed, at an important time during my research and writing, 
political circumstances became such that I was asked by a number of 
colleagues to seek election by the group to a committee chair. Thus 
political circumstances required me to act in a way that the demands of 
conducting research for a higher degree would advise against. 
Participant-observation requires ethical justification and considerations 
arise, which have to be taken into account and reported. Homan argues 
that the researcher should ascribe to the: 
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doctrine of informed consent on the part of the subjects and 
accordingly should take pains to explain fully the objects and 
implications of research to individual subjects. 6 
Similarly Wax maintains that a: 
persuasive argument can be made that the informed consent of 
the subjects should be solicited prior to the experiment, 
otherwise they should be free not to participate.? 
How did my position within the two party groups match the criterion of 
informed consent? 
An important ethical justification for my position was, although I did not 
announce at a group meeting that I was conducting the research and seek 
informed consent for it, neither did I deliberately withhold the fact from 
any of my colleagues. Indeed, I had often unburdened the usual student 
frustrations and anxieties of pursuing a research degree onto the shoulders 
of those councillors with whom I shared a social life. Thus, although not 
all the members of the two Labour groups of which I am a member knew 
i 
of my research, it was no secret and - of ethical importance - it was not the 
reason why I was a member of those two groups. I also informed by the 
leaders of the county and district council of my research project. 
6 R. Homan, 'The Ethics of Covert Methods', British Journal of Sociology, 
31 (1), March 1980, pp. 46-59. pp. 51-52. 
7 M. I. Wax, 'Paradoxes of Consent to the Practice of Field Work', Social 
Problems, 27 (3), February 1980, pp. 272-283. p. 274. 
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The participant-observation for this work was not fully one of operating 
covertly; although consent was not sought, the research was not withheld 
from other councillors. Wax notes that the 'requirement of consent by 
those studied seems dubious when that which the researcher seeks to study 
is either public or is the conduct of persons who are publicly accountable'. 
Wax acknowledges however that field work within some public settings 
would indeed require an ethical justification for not seeking informed and 
explicit consent 'to do what seems open to any person'. He gives explicitly 
political examples of a study of the U. S., President, or a member of 
Congress as not fitting the rubric of field work. 8 Worth repeating at length 
is his comment that: 
Where researchers deal with the public aspects of the activities 
of public figures, the notion that they must seek informed 
consent does seem inappropriate. Within governmental 
structures of the U. S., most officials are ruled by codes requiring 
that their activities be open to public inspection. The norm is that 
the activities are open and public, except for particular kinds of 
cases. Thus, under these circumstances, researchers who wish to 
study upward scarcely need to seek informed consent, providing 
they confine their interests to behaviour which is publicly 
accountable. 9 
8 Ibid, p. 276. 
9 Ibid, p. 278. 
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A number of points arise here, first, councillors are public figures and are 
'ruled' by various codes and indeed legislation concerning their behaviour 
and requiring that some of their activities 'be open to public inspection`. 
Secondly, their behaviour is publicly accountable. Thirdly, however, I did 
observe the behaviour in the private and publicly unobservable party group. 
Councillors' behaviour however, in the public and representative body that 
is the council, is indeed, influenced by their activity in the party group and 
this alters the nature of the ethical considerations. Indeed, it becomes 
obvious that the ethical arguments and concerns regarding consent are not 
as clear cut as Wax outlined. 
The party groups of which I am a member consist of councillors, elected by 
public vote, to bodies with popular accountability and a requirement for 
transparency. Although the party group is a closed body its decisions and 
policies are enacted and supported by councillors in public. Indeed, that 
councillors may act differently in the party group meeting to how they 
otherwise do in public theatres of representation somewhat weakens the 
public accountability and transparency of the local council and local 
democracy. This weakened public accountability in turn qualifies the need 
for ethical justification for research amongst councillors. 
Councillors as participant-observers are in a different situation from others 
involved in participant research. They are indeed genuine players in the 
processes being observed, having been party members, candidates and then 
elected as councillors. They are therefore legitimately entitled to take part 
in the representative processes as a full participant, and the writer is aware 
of no instance where his interests as a researcher led him to act 
differently 
as a councillor than would otherwise have been the case. Interestingly, 
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quite a few of the works on local authorities have been written by 
councillor-researchers. 10 
Participant-observation may be criticised as illuminating only the specific 
area studied, a similar criticism to that levelled at any case study. As a 
member of three Labour groups - two at one time - and comparing my 
experiences both in the group and of the group, there is no evidence to 
suggest that those groups operate in anyway as vastly different from the 
majority of Labour groups. As for the Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
groups, it seems that the difference between the parties in terms of the 
organisation and activities of party groups, lies only in the intensity with 
which they act, and not in their activities or behaviour. 
The case studies 
Part III of the thesis, entitled 'crises of representation' comprises three 
separate case study chapters. These case studies examined the interaction 
between councillors, party groups and the electorate, in connection with a 
specific issue or event over which the opinions of the electorate were at 
variance with the decisions of the party group. In these circumstances the 
councillor could use the discretion attached to his or her office to reflect - 
or rather represent - the views of either the group or the electorate. 
The case study issues were selected because the author, as a Labour 
councillor, had access to the decision-making processes, particularly two of 
the Labour party groups involved, as well as a closeness to source material 
10 Wiseman, 'The Working of Local Government in Leeds': Part I and II. 
Corina, 'Elected Representatives in a Party System'. Dennis, 'Community 
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and key players within the councils and communities concerned. Equally, 
the case studies clearly present examples of councillors and the parry group 
operating in a closed decision-making environment - at arms length from 
the communities they represent. 
Case studies have their limitations. they often say much about a specific 
issue or event but offer little from which to draw general lessons about the 
processes of political representation. The case studies for this thesis, whilst 
concentrating on specific issues, do however display some general lessons 
regarding the relationship between councillor and his or her party group, 
and how that relationship influences the behaviour of the councillor as a 
political representative. 
Although the case studies consist of three different issues, the influences of 
the party group in each case displays a consistency as a forum for decision- 
making and as the body which councillors come to represent. There is no 
particular reason to suppose that the activities of the councillors, party 
groups and electors in these cases is in any significant way different from 
that found in any local representative system in urban Britain. 
Action'. Green, Power and Party in an English City. 
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SECTION A: YOU AS A COUNCILLOR 
Please give the name of your authority 
2. For how many years have you served on this Council? 
[] years 




[]A continuing member - no plans to retire at next election 
[]A retiring member - planning to retire at next election 
[]A former member - came off the Council in May 1994 
Are you now or were you prior to May 1994 
TICK ALL THAT APPLY 
[] Leader of the Council 
[] Chair/Mayor of the Council 
[]A Committee Chair 
[]A Committee Vice-Chair 
[JA Sub Committee Chair 
[]A Sub Committee Vice-Chair 
[] Party Leader 
[] Other party group office holder or spokesperson (please state which position) 
[] None of these 
When you were last elected to the Council, did you stand as: 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY 
[]A Conservative Party candidate 
[]A Labour Party candidate 
[]A Liberal Democrat Party candidate 
[] An Independent candidate 
[] other (Please specify) 
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6. Is the Ward/Division you represent 
rural [] 
urban [] 




SECTION B: ABOUTYOUANDTHE ELECTORATE 
8. Below are a number of statements about some of the issues of concern to Councillors and 
Councils at present. For each one, please indicate whether you: agree strongly; agree; neither 
agree nor disagree; disagree; or disagree strongly. It is appreciated that this may involve some 
oversimplification of complex issues, but we would be grateful if you could indicate which comes 
closest to your view. 
Agree Agree Neither Disagree Disagree 
Strongly agree nor Strongly 
disagree 
i) Ordinary citizens 
should have more 
say in the decisions [][][][][] 
made by local Govt. 
ii) The way Local authorities 
are presently organised 
prevents them from dealing [][][][][] 
adequately with todays 
problems. 
iii) It is for local 
Councillors rather then 
members of the public 
and pressure groups to 
make decisions on [] 
[] [1 [ý [] 
local issues and priorities. 
iv) The first concern of 
the elected members of 
the majority party is to [] 
[] [I [][] 
implement the party manifesto. 
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Agree Agree Neither Disagree Disagree Strongly agree nor Strongly 
disagree 
v) Back bench Members 
have little real 
influence over [][][][][] 
decision making. 
vi) Council officials 
have too much 
influence on [] [] [] [] [] 
decision making. 
vii) People only become 
interested in local 
Govt when an issue [][][][][] 
directly affects them. 
viii) More should be 
done to interest 
people in local govt. [][][][][] 
ix) More should be done 
to involve ordinary 
people in local [] [) [][][] 
decision making. 
9. In what ways, if any, could local authorities do more to involve the public in Local Government. 
PLEASE WRITE IN 
10. In what ways, if any, could Political Parties do more to involve the public in 
Local Government. 
PLEASE WRITE IN 
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I. Could you list what you feel are the four most significant issues presently affecting: - 
a) The Ward/Division you represent 
PLEASE WRITE IN 
b) Your Local Authority 
PLEASE WRITE IN 
12. Could you now list the four most significant issues that over the coming year you feel will most 
affect the: 
a) The Ward/Division you represent. 
PLEASE WRITE IN 
b) Your Local Authority. 
PLEASE WRITE IN (Some of these may of course be the some as question 
II above, but please replicate 
here if so) 
440 
13. If a group of electors fromYOUR Ward/Division were opposing a decision or policy of your 
Party Group on the Council and you agreed with them on the issue please indicate by ticking the 
appropriate box, how likely you are to: - 
a) Speak out against the decision or policy of the Party Group in the following places: - 
Very Likely Depends Not Not at all 
likely on the very likely, 
issue likely 
a meeting of 
your Party Group [][[[][][] 
of Councillors 




of any kind 
a public meeting 




at a Council 
Committee meeting 
at a Full 
Council meeting 
would never speak 
against a group 
decision 
other (please specify) 
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b) Vote against the decision or policy of the Party Group in the following places: - 
Very Likely Depends Not Not at all likely on the very likeI 
issue likely 
a meeting of 
your Party (] 1] [1 ýý Group of Councillors 










other (please specify) 
14. If a group of electors from OUTSIDE your Ward Division were opposing a decision or policy of 
your Party Group and you agreed with them please indicate by TICKING THE APPROPRIATE BOX, 
how likely you are to: - 
a) Speak out against the decision or policy of the Party Group in the following places 
Very Likely Depends Not Not at all 
likely on the very likely 
V issue likely 
a meeting of 
your Party Group [][I [I [] [ 
of Councillors 
a meeting of 
your own [] [3 [] ýý Iý 
political Party 
private meeting 
of any kind [] [] 
[1 [) [ý 
a public meeting [) [] 
[] [[ 






at a Council 
Committee meeting 
at a Full 
Council meeting 
would never speak 
against a group 
decision 
other (please specify) 
Very Likely Depends Not Not at all likely on the very likely 
issue likely 
b) Vote against the decision or policy of the Party Group in the following places: 
a meeting of 
your Party 
Group of Councillors 






Council meeting [][][][] 
would never 
vote against [][][][I 
the Group 
other (please specify) 
443 
15, a) During your time as a Councillor have you ever spoken against Group decisions in one of the following places 
PLEASE TICK 
Yes [] No [] 
a meeting of your Party Group of Councillors 
a meeting of your own political Party 
private meeting of any kind 
a public meeting 
the local press 
local radio or television 
Council Committee meeting 
Full Council meeting 
never spoke against Group decisions 
other (please specify) 
b) If you have used any of the above PLEASETICK if this was for 
one issue [] 
, two issues [] 
three issues [] 
more then three issues [] 
c) If you have answered b) above, please indicate an issue and your reasons for speaking 
PLEASE WRITE IN 
d) During your time as a Councillor have you ever voted against a Group decision in one of 
the following places PLEASE TIICK 
Yes [] No [] 
a meeting of your Party Group of Councillors (] 
a meeting of your own Political Party 
{] I1 
a Council Committee meeting 
EIII I II 
-a Full Council meeting 
EI 
never voted against the Group 
I]I 
other (Please Specify) 
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e) If you have used any of the above in d) PLEASE TICK if this was for 
one issue [] 
two issues [] 
three issues [] 
more than three issues [] 
f) If you have answered e) above please indicate an issue and your reasons for voting. PLEASE WRITE IN 
16. Could you identify below one decision or policy (or more) during your most recent term as a 
Councillor, over which in response to public pressure the Council changed an existing policy or 
decision. (that public presure may include issues on which the Council were taken to Court. ) 
PLEASE WRITE IN 
SECTION C: ABOUTYOURSELF 
Finally, we would be grateful if you would give us the following details about yourself: 
17. a) Are you: [] Male [] Female 
b) How old were you on your last birthday? [] 
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18. a) How old were you when you left school? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY 




[] 18 or over 
b) Please indicate below any school or educational qualifications you have obtained. 




Higher National Certificate/Diploma 
GCE A Level/Scottish Higher Grade 
Ordinary National certificate/Diploma 
GCE 0 Level/School Certificate 
CSE (other then grade 1) 
Other (please specify) 
No School or educational qualifications [] 
19. At present are you: 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY 
In full time paid employment (30 Hrs per week or more) 




Permanently sick or disabled 
Looking after a home/family 
Not working for some other reason 
20. If you are currently employed or self employed, is the firm or organisation 
in which you work in: 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY 
[] the public sector 
[] the private sector 
[] the voluntary sector 
446 
21, Please show below the group into which you annual gross income falls, that is, your income before deductions for tax and national insurance and including overtime and bonus payments. 
(By gross income, we mean your income from all sources including earnings from employment, 
benefits, interest from savings and so on, . 
but excluding any financial allowances you receive as a Councillor. ) 
[) Less than £5000 p. a 
[] £5000 - £9,999 p. a. 
[]£ 10,000 -£ 19,999 p. a. 
[) £20,000 p. a. or more. 
22. If you left the Council in May 1994 or you plan to retire at the next elections, please say which 
of the following factors influenced your decision: 
TICK ALL THAT APPLY 
Excessive time commitment 
Too heavy a work load 
Too much paper 
Financial burdens of office 
Family commitments 
Unsympathetic employer 
Insufficient influence on Council decisions 
Too many demands made by constituents 
Conflicts over Council policy and constituent demands 
Conflicts over Party Policy and Constituents demands 
Frustration at lack of local autonomy 
Not re-selected/not re-elected 
Some other reason (please say what) 
23. Lastly, please use the space below to add anything you would like about your experiences as a 
Councillor or about the issues of current concern to your local authority. 
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if you would be willing to discuss some of the issues raised above in more detail please indicate 
below and give a contact address and telephone number. 
Name: (Only if willing to be contacted further) 
Contact Address: 
Telephone Number. 
Once again thank you for your time and effort 
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